

**BROADCASTING AND POLITICS IN GREECE, 1936-1987**

by

**Fotini Papatheodorou**

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**Department of Political Studies  
Queen Mary and Westfield College  
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## ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to analyse and explain the organization of Greek broadcasting, and particularly its relationship to the state and politics. The study begins with the introduction of state-owned radio in 1936 and ends with the abolition of the state monopoly and the introduction of private local radio by a Socialist government in 1987.

Through a mainly chronological structure the study examines the development of Greek radio and television set against major developments in the sphere of politics from the inter-war period until the late 1980s. These developments include the establishment of a quasi-fascist dictatorship in 1936, the Right-Left cleavage of the 1940s and the nature of parliamentary regime which was established as a result of the Communist defeat in the civil war (1946-1949). Subsequently, the study deals with the imposition of the dictatorial regime in 1967 and examines the contradictions which led to its eventual downfall in 1974. Finally, the thesis covers the transition of the country to democracy, the nature of the democratic regime, the party system and the major aspects of policy of both the Conservative governments (1974-1981) and the Socialists (1981-1987).

Placed within the framework of the debate about the role of broadcasting in liberal democracies, the thesis examines the applicability of two antithetical models, the 'fourth estate' and the 'dominance' models to the Greek broadcasting system from 1936 to 1987. Neither is found to be satisfactory. Our study of government-broadcasting relations since the introduction of radio demonstrates that the broadcast media have always been subordinate to partisan political control and that neither the editorial autonomy nor the political independence of Greek broadcasters, on which the 'fourth estate' model is based, have ever been safeguarded by Greek politicians.

The 'dominance' model, on the other hand, to the extent that it considers the mass media as an instrument of the dominant classes fails to describe accurately the role of Greek broadcasting institutions and of the state which controls them within Greek society. Due to the uneven and belated industrial development of the country, the state has acquired a dominant position in social and economic life by distributing resources and safeguarding the vital interests of various social groups. Political parties have always relied on the mechanisms of the state to consolidate their power. Broadcasting institutions have therefore been used by those holding executive power as a legitimating mechanism of their policies. Preoccupied as they were with the political output of radio and television, Greek politicians never pursued the development of a public service ethos in Greek broadcasting.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AERE:	Greek Radio Company
ASKE:	Representative Assembly of Social Control
ASKE:	Independent Socialist Party of Greece
BBC:	British Broadcasting Corporation
DA:	Democratic Defence
EAM:	National Liberation Front
EAR:	United Left
EDA:	United Democratic Left
EDIK:	Union of Democratic Centre
EDIN:	Union of Democratic Youth
EENA:	Union of Junior Officers
EIIEA:	Union of Owners of Athenian daily newspapers
EIR:	National Broadcasting Institute
EIRT:	National Institute of Radio and Television
EK:	Centre Union
EKKE:	Revolutionary Communist Party of Greece
EK-ND:	Centre Union-New Forces
ELAN:	Greek Popular Liberation Navy
ELAS:	Greek Popular Liberation Army
EON:	National Youth Organization
EP:	National Camp
EPEN:	National Political Union
ERE:	National Radical Union
ESA:	Greek Military Police
ERT:	Greek Radio and Television
ESIEA:	Union of Journalists of the Athenian dailies
ESYE:	National Statistical Service of Greece
GEET:	General Union of Greek Press
GNP:	Gross National Product
GSEE:	General Confederation of Greek Workers
GSPI:	General Secretariat for Press and Information
IDEA:	Sacred Bond of Greek Officers
IKA:	Foundation of National Insurance
KAE:	Party of Peasants and Workers

KEME:	Liberal Party Movement of Greek Reformers
KEPE:	Centre for Research and Planning
KKE:	Communist Party of Greece
KKE-es:	Communist Party of Greece (interior)
KODISO:	Party of Democratic Socialism
K.Phil.:	Liberal Party
KRSEDE:	Central Radio Station of the Armed Forces
KYP:	Central Intelligence Service
MoD:	Ministry of Defence
ND:	New Democracy
OECD:	Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
OTE:	Greek Telecommunications Organization
PAK:	Panhellenic Liberation Movement
PAM:	Patriotic Front
PASOK:	Panhellenic Socialist Movement
PASKE:	Panhellenic Socialist Workers Movement
PASP:	Panhellenic Student Camp
PCS:	Press Central Service
PEEA:	Political Committee of National Liberation
POSPERT:	Panhellenic Federation of ERT Employees Unions
RAI:	Italian Broadcasting Corporation
RSA:	Athens Radio Station
SPAD:	Alliance of Progressive and left-wing Forces
SSEK:	Socialist Workers Movements
YDA:	Undersecretariat of Public Order
YENED:	Information Service of the Armed Forces
YRE:	Radio Broadcasting Service
YTT:	Undersecretariat of Press and Tourism

## INTRODUCTION

The present study could be broadly described as a political history of Greek broadcasting. It examines the evolution of radio and television in Greece - from the introduction of radio in the inter-war period to the dismantling of the state monopoly in the late 1980s - against the background of major developments in the political sphere. In essence, the following pages constitute an attempt to explore and evaluate the contribution of radio and television to the process of political communication in Greece, that is, to the transmission of messages from political actors to their political receivers.

As a means of information, broadcasting appears to occupy an increasingly important role in our everyday lives. An indication of this is the high degree of penetration of radio and television receivers in - at least - the most developed parts of the world (Table Int. 1) and also the significance that audiences appear to attach to broadcasting and especially to television as a source of information on world events<sup>1</sup>.

In Greece, television set ownership soared in the 1970s bringing about significant - though not as yet systematically assessed - changes in lifestyle, and inflicting a fatal blow to the national cinema industry (Table Int. 2). By 1985, when saturation point was reached (Table Int. 3), it was estimated that Greek adults were spending three hours daily in front of television and that the number of those who did not watch television at all had been reduced to a mere two per cent of the total population<sup>2</sup>. Moreover, although there has been no empirical research on the importance that Greeks attach to

different media, television seems to have become a major source of information, insofar as the peak viewing period is between 9 and 10 p.m., the time when the two public networks transmit their evening news bulletins (Table Int. 4).

**TABLE Int. 1**  
**Penetration of television sets in Western Europe**

	Television sets per 1000 inhabitants		
	1973	1982	per cent increase
Austria	240	306	+27.5
W. Germany	311	354	+13.8
France	233	313	+34.3
United Kingdom	309	331	+7.1
Netherlands	251	305	+21.5
Belgium	240	304	+26.7
Denmark	301	366	+21.6
Sweden	336	387	+15.2
Finland	259	348	+34.4
Norway	245	315	+28.6
Italy	203	238	+17.2
Spain	159	256	+61.0
Portugal	6	149	+2383.3
Greece	113	285	+152.2

Source: M. HAERETAKIS: The penetration of television and its audience in Greece (in Greek). In, Television and Communication, Paratiritis, Thessaloniki 1988.

The use of broadcasting as a means of transmitting political messages has always fascinated and troubled Greek politicians. Radio and television were hastily and most haphazardly organized in Greece (in 1938 and 1968 respectively) by

**TABLE Int. 2**  
**Penetration of television sets in Greece, 1966-1976**

	Number of television sets	TV sets per thousand inhabitants
1966	3,000	0.4
1967	15,000	1.7
1968	40,000	4.6
1969	86,000	9.8
1970	183,000	20.8
1971	280,000	31.7
1972	520,000	58.7
1973	950,000	107.0
1974	950,000	106.7
1975	1,140,000	127.7
1976	1,165,000	130.1

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Source: Statistics on radio and TV, 1960-1967, UNESCO Statistical Report, No 23, p. 55.

**TABLE Int. 3**  
**Penetration of television sets in Greece, 1980-1985**

	Percentage of households with a TV set
1980	92.0
1981	92.0
1982	92.6
1983	95.1
1984	96.3
1985	96.3

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Source: NIELSEN survey, in M. HAERETAKIS: The penetration of television and its audience in Greece (in Greek). In, Television and Communication, Paratiritis, Thessaloniki 1988.



dictatorships in order to serve as legitimating mechanisms of the new political orders that the dictators aspired to establish. During and after the painful civil war (1946-1949) radio was used as a major weapon of anti-communist propaganda, while the military, which had emerged as an independent centre of power from the civil strife, established its own broadcasting service to run alongside the state organization.

**TABLE Int. 4**

**Percentage of adults (in the total Greek population) who had watched television the day before.**

	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
2-3 p.m.	8	5	3	3	3	5	5	7
4-5	6	5	4	5	8	7	7	7
5-6	4	5	4	4	6	6	7	7
6-7	11	7	10	9	17	15	14	13
7-8	22	17	21	25	37	24	26	24
8-9	36	41	45	52	59	47	46	44
9-10	49	55	58	65	79	76	75	78
10-11	45	53	49	52	75	75	77	75
11-12	31	39	34	31	57	55	59	60
12+	-	-	-	-	-	3	13	20

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Source: NIELSEN survey, in M. Haeretakis. op. cit.

After 1974, when transition to democracy began, broadcasting became a centre of conflict and polarization between the government and the opposition. Battles were waged for the control of the broadcasting organizations both inside Parliament and outside, as opposition leaders took to the streets to protest against the continuous manipulation of radio and television by the government.

The debate on the control and role of broadcasting became increasingly heated in the latter part of the 1980s. The disappointment with the Socialists' heavy-handed policies on the broadcast media and the major structural changes in the sphere of West European broadcasting - dismantling of state monopolies, introduction of new channels and the anticipated expansion of cable and direct broadcasting via satellite - led to increased pressure from various sides for the abolition of the state monopoly. Political and economic actors who had previously been excluded from the broadcasting field were striving to gain a foothold in it - most of the time with a lot of success.

At the moment, Greek broadcasting is at a crossroads. On the one hand, the state monopoly has been abolished along with government control over most of the broadcast media. On the other hand, the proliferation of private television channels and the increasing competition among them for audiences and advertisers have already led to a deterioration in programme quality and to the emergence of reporting with an emphasis on sensationalism and crime. There is no doubt that at the present time a redefinition of the role of the broadcast media is urgently needed, as well as a redefinition of public control over their operation.

But what was the role of broadcasting in the first place? If, as the available evidence suggests, politicians in government used radio and television in order to serve their partisan political ends, the question which emerges is why did they need to do so? Moreover, in what ways did politicians seek to control the broadcast output and what were the implications of their policies on the development of Greek broadcasting institutions? Notwithstanding the vigorous debate on the future of radio and television in Greece, questions like the above have not yet been answered. Until now, the nature, purpose and operation of these institutions have remained a mystery. Yet,

an inquiry into the historical structure and practices of broadcasting institutions and into their specific relationship to political power is surely of vital importance when defining their purpose in the process of mass communication in general and of political communication in particular.

It is a remarkable fact that so far there has been no systematic, comprehensive academic study of the operation of Greek broadcasting institutions. True, within the last decade or so, a number of significant legal studies have been published, which examine the legal history of Greek broadcasting and the potential impact of the changes taking place in the international, and especially the European, legal framework within which broadcasters operate. Valid as these studies are, however, they provide little analysis of the internal functioning of the broadcasting organizations and their role in the general political process. Though of contemporary interest to legal practitioners, they lack a historical reference point and a feel for the essentially political nature of Greek radio and television<sup>3</sup>. In addition to these studies, the broadening of the debate on the future of broadcasting beyond the confines of Parliament in the 1980s has led to the publication in Greece of a growing number of articles on the Greek broadcast media. Although these are important contributions to our understanding of how broadcasting institutions operate, they tend - in most cases - to be brief examinations of different, and not necessarily related aspects (e.g. political history, media policy, programme production) of the evolution and operation of broadcasting<sup>4</sup>.

Thus, the present thesis aspires both to fill a large gap in the existing literature and to provide the basis for further research into the process of mass communication in Greece. More specifically, our study provides a historical background to future inquiries into the structures and practices of Greek

broadcasting organizations as well as the detailed information for the public debate on the evolution of Greek radio and television and their relationship to the political process.

From a broader perspective, this thesis also constitutes a major contribution to our understanding of the development and workings of Greek political institutions from the 1930s to the present day. This examination of the attitudes of Greek politicians towards broadcasting and of the ways in which they try to influence public opinion increases our knowledge of the functioning of the Greek political process, of policy formulation and implementation and of the elite political culture.

The present thesis focuses on two major issues:

- one relating specifically to the development and operation of Greek broadcasting;
- and the other concentrating on more general developments in the political (and to a lesser extent the social and economic) sphere.

Both issues are inter-related. The latter provides the essential background for a full understanding of the factors which have influenced the operation of Greek radio and television and shaped their content. The former can be seen as a case study of political behaviour, exemplifying practices, policies and attitudes which are predominant in the Greek political process. However, the thesis should be seen as a coherent whole, locating the history of Greek broadcasting in its relationship with the political world.

It was also considered necessary to make references to developments in the press throughout the period under examination, in order to provide the reader with a clearer view of the general context of political communication in Greece. These brief accounts regarding recent press history, offer the basis

for a comparison of the relationship between the political elite and the press on the one hand, and broadcasting on the other.

Inevitably, as a survey of broadcasting and politics this book contains two kinds of literature:

- i) the first refers to general media theory and to different interpretations of the role of the mass media in contemporary, liberal, democratic society.
- ii) the second refers to studies on contemporary Greek history, politics and society.

A review of the first body of literature is included in Chapter 1 to help provide the general theoretical framework within which this research is placed and to set the main questions contained in this thesis. By contrast, as the studies of the second body of literature refer to different periods of Greek political history, these are introduced into the thesis when specifically dealing with the relevant periods or aspects.

For the purpose of our analysis we concentrated our attention on: (a) the examination of different reforms of the broadcasting framework and the implications that these have had for the relationship between broadcasting institutions and the government; (b) the ways in which politicians have sought to control broadcast output, with emphasis being placed particularly on ministerial interventions and on appointments to key managerial and editorial posts in the broadcasting organizations; and (c) the effects of the above factors on the content and form of news programmes and on the relationship between the government and the opposition parties.

With regard to the methodology of our research, two main source of information were utilized. The first comprised published material, both primary and secondary. This included: published works (books and journal articles); official

documents of broadcasting organizations; legal documents; minutes of parliamentary debates and of committee meetings; reports of foreign experts on the reform of broadcasting organizations; material from the personal archives of broadcasters; unpublished academic theses; and a large number of newspaper and magazine articles. The second source of material consisted of a series of twenty interviews with members of broadcasting management, journalists, politicians and foreign media experts. These interviews were not representative in any statistical sense. They have been used to clarify or exemplify certain points which had in most cases already emerged from the published source material.

It should be stressed, however, that the collection of data proved a far from easy task insofar as the legendary inefficiency of Greek public administration meant that significant documents and archive material which would have shed more light to our research have been lost, or at least impossible to find. Another limitation was the unwillingness of some interviewees to give specific information about their personal experiences from their work in the two networks.

In conclusion, it would be useful to present an outline of the structure of the thesis. Chapter 1 examines the theoretical framework of the relationship between the mass media and politics. The rest of the chapters (2-8) are a chronological presentation of the inter-relationship between politics and broadcasting in Greece. This chronological presentation is the most practical way of arranging the findings of our research in order to give the reader the opportunity to keep pace with successive developments in the political and social sphere as well as in the field of Greek broadcasting. Chapter 2 covers the introduction of radio under the dictatorship of General Metaxas and the first years of its development up to the end of the civil war in 1949. In Chapter 3 we analyse the ideological role of radio during the period 1950-1967 within the repressive

political framework established in the aftermath of the civil war. Chapter 4 deals with the political developments which led to the military coup of April 21 1967 and the development of television as a means of legitimating the regime. Chapter 5 examines the first seven years of democracy, the structure of the new political system and the policies of the Conservative (New Democracy) government. Chapter 6 analyses the policies and practices of the Conservatives towards broadcasting. Chapter 7 concentrates on the period of Socialist government (1981-1987) and examines the character of PASOK and its policies during its period in office. Chapter 8 deals with PASOK's policy vis-a-vis radio and television and analyses the factors which led to the dismantling of the state monopoly in broadcasting. Finally, the Conclusion discusses the role of Greek broadcasting in the process of political communication and, on the basis of our findings, examines the nature and character of contemporary Greek political institutions.

## NOTES

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## CHAPTER 1

### MASS MEDIA AND POLITICS: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

#### 1.1 Introduction

In the last days of December 1989 the political events in Romania underlined the importance of television as a means of mass communication. This was so not only because this particular audiovisual medium enabled the inhabitants of the 'global village' to watch in excitement and horror one of the tribes executing its chief, but because a decisive act of what has been termed the 'Romanian revolution' took place inside the studios of the country's national television. In this latter-day revolution, it was the 'storming' of television headquarters rather than of any Winter Palace which appeared to be the symbolic as well as the critical moment of political developments in that country. Extreme as this case may be, or perhaps precisely for this reason, it is indicative of television's central role as a means of information and hence of power within society. It is not accidental that the first non-communist government of Romania was formed and held its first meetings in the television studios before the eyes of an entire fighting population.

The issue of who has power and control over television and over the mass media more generally has been the subject of political debate and even conflict internationally as this study of Greek broadcasting will exemplify. The main reason for this is that the media are seen as "a power resource - a means of control, management and innovation in society, which can be a substitute for force or other resources"<sup>1</sup>. There are however

other factors which contribute to the importance of the media for contemporary society; as McQuail has suggested:

- "The mass media are a growing and changing industry providing employment, producing goods and services and feeding related industries; they are also comprising an institution in themselves, developing their own rules and norms...

- They are often the location of developments in culture, both in the sense of art and symbolic forms, but also in the sense of manners, fashions styles of life and norms.

- They have become a dominant source of definitions and images of social reality for individuals, but also collectively for groups and societies"<sup>2</sup>.

Due to their increasing importance as social and political institutions, in the last fifty years the mass media have been the subject of systematic research, which has given rise to a host of studies almost as diverse in aspect, scope and method as they have been numerous. For instance, an obvious distinction in media research has been between studies which view the media as institutions dependent on, or in interaction with their external social, economic and political environment and studies which attribute the significance of the media as the means of change within society to their intrinsic technological properties - this is the so-called 'technological determinism' approach whose best known representative has been Marshall McLuhan<sup>3</sup>.

At the very early stages, media research was associated with the Frankfurt School of writers - particularly Marcuse, Horkheimer and Adorno - and their attempts to explain the failure of the Left to bring revolutionary change and the subsequent rise of fascism in Europe. The mass media, the Frankfurt theorists argued, turned the people vulnerable to fascist propaganda and domination; moreover, in the modern industrialized countries, they turned society into a mass of

passive, atomized individuals, isolated in their world of consumption and hypnotized by their addiction to media entertainment<sup>4</sup>. The result was indifference to common social problems, unwillingness to indulge in collective action and thus the atrophy of democratic institutions.

In contrast to the pessimism of the Frankfurt School, American empirical studies on media effects between the late 1940s and early 1960s showed that the media had only very limited influence upon the people and that social ties and democratic principles were still strong. As empirical studies, usually conducted during the brief timespans of election or advertising campaigns, suggested, media effects were not direct but mediated by extra-communication factors and conditions such as group or individual relationships and influences from 'opinion leaders'. In general, the media were found to serve more as agents of reinforcement of one's views rather than of conversion<sup>5</sup>. Instead of being passive consumers of what the media had on offer, individuals appeared to expose themselves selectively to and to use the media according to the needs they wished to satisfy which themselves could vary according to one's educational or social background<sup>6</sup>, leisure opportunities, etc<sup>7</sup>.

Although the media effects approach dominated the field of research for a long time, it is not the only line of enquiry into the power of the mass media. More recent studies have shifted attention from the response of individuals to mass communication to the structure and workings of media organizations in order to answer the question of how and by whom media power is wielded. Thus, to name but a few major examples, research has focused on aspects of media operation such as the process of newsmaking<sup>8</sup> and the coverage of controversial issues<sup>9</sup>; professional practices, values and career orientations<sup>10</sup>; the limitations placed upon programme-

making by the economic or political environment<sup>11</sup>; and the structures of media ownership and control<sup>12</sup>.

Another current of media studies influenced by structuralism and semiology has looked at the content of media output by analysing media messages and signs (both visual images and sounds)<sup>13</sup> and revealing their underlying ideological frames and meanings<sup>14</sup>.

As it becomes apparent from the above review, the field of media research is wide and continuously expanding in different directions on the basis of new findings and developments in the sphere of mass communications. The question which is raised then is how useful existing media research is for the study of Greek broadcasting. In general terms, this study falls into the field of media institutions research, as distinct from content analyses and effects approaches. As such it will touch, albeit briefly, upon aspects like news production, professional practices and the coverage of political events. Nevertheless, as has been explained in the introduction, the aim of the present thesis is to examine historically the establishment and development of Greek broadcasting organizations and explain their particular role within the process of Greek politics. Therefore, in order to evaluate the importance of existing mass media research for our analysis, it is necessary to move from the micro-level of analysis to one where the combination of individual studies produces a more general picture of the power of media institutions within society.

For our research, we have concentrated primarily upon the ever-growing body of Anglo-Saxon literature on media theory. The main reason for doing so is the fact that the Anglo-Saxon school has provided a great variety of analyses and paradigms regarding the role of the mass media in contemporary society. It is true, that in the last decade or so, a number of books and articles have been published with reference to the

operation of the media in other countries of Europe and of the developing world<sup>15</sup>. However, notwithstanding their value and contribution to the understanding of the operation of the mass media in other parts of the world, these studies are primarily empirical, failing so far to produce concise models which could serve as theoretical tools for media research. Amid the variety of approaches and methods of enquiry, two major perspectives emerge which are of particular importance for this study.

## 1.2 The liberal-pluralist view of the mass media

In discussing the political effects of television, J. Blumler has listed five main components of liberal democratic systems: (i) the accountability of the rulers to the ruled; (ii) the autonomy of the mass media; (iii) the media's power to choose among a plurality of messages competing for publicity those deemed as most newsworthy; (iv) the media's power to act as 'watchdogs' of governments; and (v) the presupposed fallibility of those in power<sup>16</sup>. What Blumler suggested was that in the classic model of political communication:

A(politicians)\_\_\_\_\_→ C(channels of information)\_\_\_\_\_→ B(voters)

the element C, that is mainly radio, television and the press are not mere transmitters of messages from A to B, but also, by adopting a critical stance towards power they expose the errors of rulers and hold them accountable to the electorate.

The above view is underpinned by the conception of the role of the press in liberal democracy as a 'fourth estate' which alongside Parliament and the judiciary scrutinizes the government and protects the citizens from the excesses of power. But how has the press come to be considered as the

"guardian of the guardians"<sup>17</sup>? And does broadcasting perform a similar role within the context of liberal democracy?

The pluralist view of the press has its roots in the theory of the 'free press' and its evolution into the theory of 'social responsibility' in the latter part of the twentieth century. The 'free press' theory originated in the seventeenth century when, due to technological advances, a flood of publications rendered the official control and the exercise of censorship on printed material impossible<sup>18</sup>. An extension of the right of free expression, the 'freedom of the press' was one of the central principles in the emerging liberal democratic state, together with the belief in the supremacy of the individual, reason and the sovereignty of popular will<sup>19</sup>. The main tenet of press freedom was that only through the free expression and competition of alternative or conflicting opinions and ideas can rational individuals learn the truth about politics and their rulers and arrive at reasonable decisions. Freedom of the press was identified with independence from government and was embodied in the right of property, as the right of any individual to own and use the means of publication without official intervention. Thus, newspapers of diverse opinions could be produced and circulate like material goods in what J.S. Mill envisaged as a free marketplace of ideas where every individual could express him(her)self.

Nevertheless, new technological and commercial developments in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, particularly the immense increase of the cost of publishing and the consequent concentration of ownership into fewer and fewer hands, led to a thorough revision of the free press theory. It was then realized that private ownership and free market conditions could not by themselves safeguard the freedom of the press, nor guarantee high quality of output in regard to society's needs for information and cultural progress. The

emergence of new media such as film and broadcasting increased awareness of the need for new mechanisms which secure high standards of performance for the media and would hold them accountable to the public.

In 1947 the American Commission for the Freedom of The Press set forth what became known as the 'social responsibility' theory of the press. Underling the new theory was the basic principle that apart from private enterprises the mass media are powerful institutions with vital social and political functions to perform within a democratic society. The media's independence was not unlimited; it was in fact bounded by an obligation to the society they were expected to serve. To meet this obligation the media had to apply higher professional standards (informativeness, accuracy, truth); to reflect the plurality and diversity of opinion in society and offer access to different viewpoints; and to apply self-regulating mechanisms within the framework of the law and established institutions<sup>20</sup>.

In the case of the press the 'social responsibility' theory was reflected in the emergence of a new kind of professionalism; journalists became increasingly specialized, following established codes of professional conduct and supervised in their activities by voluntary bodies set up by the newspaper industry itself (for instance, the Press Council in Britain).

It was, however, in the establishment of public broadcasting that the 'social responsibility' theory found its best expression<sup>21</sup>. The creation of public - but independent - bodies to deal with the management of broadcasting in the inter-war period, reflected official concern, that was expressed from a very early stage, about the responsible use of what was a rare national resource. The awareness of the new medium's capability to attract large audiences and the belief that it could exert

enormous influence upon them rendered broadcasting too powerful to be left to private enterprise. To ensure that broadcasting was to serve the public interest as a whole, detailed sets of rules were introduced by the state with emphasis placed upon principles such as objectivity, neutrality, impartiality and balance, by which broadcasters had to abide especially when dealing with political issues. State supervision, previously regarded as a menace to free expression, was now seen as the necessary safeguard for the responsible operation of the new medium in a society whose members were no longer seen as rational and capable of reaching reasonable decisions. "Into broadcasting, its culture and its institutions, was fed a picture of the modern audience, vast and simultaneous. That audience owned the medium. The broadcasters served it. The relationship was too highly charged with political tensions for the old Millian theory of free expression to survive"<sup>22</sup>.

In the sphere of radio and later television the power and spontaneity of press journalism were limited. In the case of British television editorializing was absent from its programmes, for its messages were addressed to the nation as a whole, not to a limited number of readers with a common political predilection. Was then broadcasting divorced from the idea of the 'fourth estate'? On the contrary, as Blumler suggest, television has introduced new terms according to which governments come under media scrutiny<sup>23</sup>. If investigative reporting is almost non-existent on television, if the medium does not serve so much as the watchdog of political power as does the press, yet it holds politicians accountable to the electorate in a different way: if television does not expose the errors of the rulers, yet it echoes the mood of the ruled; it functions as a kind of 'para-parliament'<sup>24</sup> where interviewers act as the conveyors of the electorate's opinions, questions and criticism.



The central point in this argument is that public broadcasting, although regulated as it may be by the state, is not subjected to government control. The framework within which the broadcasting media operate is one of 'socially responsible autonomy'<sup>25</sup> not one of servitude to the dominant political institutions. Broadcasters are free to practise their skills so far as they abide by the set of rules and principles to which we referred above. These principles are at the same time the limits of broadcasters' freedom and the limits of political control over them. In fact this framework is flexible enough to allow broadcasters to adapt their practices to new social and political circumstances. Thus, commenting on broadcasting coverage of British election campaigns in the period 1945-1970, Seymour-Ure has observed<sup>26</sup>:

"The principles (his emphasis) of non-partisanship remained the same. What changed was the critical matter of who had the power to interpret them in practice (...) Before 1959 partisanship could be measured in quantitative terms ('how many minutes of party broadcast each?'), after 1959 it needed a qualitative judgement and the question 'who is to judge?' could in the nature of things more often be answered by the people actually making the programmes than by party leaders and managers".

In his study of the British media, Seymour-Ure observes two related developments in broadcasting coverage of national elections since 1959: first, the increasing independence of broadcasters to decide what is newsworthy, combined with an increase in quantity and quality of election coverage; and secondly, the gradual disappearance of party-imposed rules and conventions on programmes about the election.

In effect, he argues, the increasing independence of the broadcasting media from political control, which the above developments suggest, together with the detachment of newspapers from party politics can cause 'serious dislocations' to the political system. This is so because political parties can no longer project their policies through the media in the

way they see fit in order to generate and sustain the support of the electorate. With its ability to make its own definitions of reality instead of relying for them on the political parties, "television now, like the press, has become itself an arena in which politics is carried on" Seymour-Ure argues in a more recent study<sup>27</sup>. In this new political arena, journalists are not only independent to practise their skills, they can also exercise political leadership: "In broadcasting the leadership of potential broadcasters such as Robin Day and Brian Walden - even newscasters like Alistair Burnet - has been considerable... In a sense it is recognized by the bestowal of honours (Sir Robin...)"<sup>28</sup>. Moreover, so far as television studios can serve as arenas for the exercise of political leadership, they may contribute to the decline of party organizations; for, Seymour-Ure concludes, television can offer party leaders a tribune from where to influence the electorate without the mediation of party structures.

Broadcasting, like the press, Blumler and Gurevitch argue, derives its power precisely from its ability to deliver to the politicians an audience so sizable that it could not be available by any other means<sup>29</sup>. This power has enabled broadcasting to enter into a 'horizontal' relationship with political institutions rather than of subordination to the latter. In the communication system of liberal democracies the media and the political institutions are bound in a "network of mutual dependencies"<sup>30</sup>. Thus, although tensions may arise from time to time between the two interacting parts due to different or even conflicting interests, the mutual dependence will entail at least a minimum of accommodation, without which neither the media's nor the politicians' aims - in the last analysis the process of political communication itself- could be realized<sup>31</sup>.

### 1.3 The dominance view of the media

The dominance perspective, which is embedded in the Marxist school of thought, adopts a critical, radical approach to the mass media. According to this view, the mass media in liberal democracies are not independent factors in the A  $\longrightarrow$  C  $\longrightarrow$  B communication system to which we referred above; instead they are integral parts of the institutions of power and domination within society, whose role is to legitimate and preserve the existing status quo. Far from being an effective mechanism of control upon power, the mass media are seen in this paradigm as its servant. Three major trends are distinguishable here to which we will refer in turn.

A. According to the first of them, the media are seen as ideological instruments of domination by the ruling class or classes, either through direct ownership or, as in the case of public broadcasting, through the control of ruling class representatives within the state. Seen from this perspective, the main task of the media is to reproduce the values and ideas of liberal capitalist society and to generate the agreement and consent of subordinate groups to the interests of the dominant classes<sup>32</sup>. The views and opinions projected by both the press and broadcasting are those which project what is loosely defined as the 'middle class consensus'<sup>33</sup> upon which modern liberal democracy is based. This, Marxist critics argue, applies primarily to public broadcasting, which due to a system of extensive controls and detailed state regulation, is more vulnerable to political pressure.

Thus, in the case of British broadcasting organizations, for instance, state control over their finances (fixing the licence fee for the BBC or the levy on the ITV companies) constitute significant government powers through which it can exercise constant influence on broadcasters<sup>34</sup>. The fact that the

broadcasting media perform a conformist rather than a critical role, however, is not the result of direct political intervention in programme making. Instead, the social background, education and political orientations of the broadcasting institution's governors, controllers and staff usually suffice to guarantee that programme content will not go beyond a safe and limited ideological framework and that it will not challenge the existing social and political order. As Miliband suggests, even in these cases where a programme goes beyond the bounds of the consensus, the government-appointed Board of Governors for the BBC and the members of the IBA can function as 'safety valves' for the political system; these two bodies consist of distinguished personalities of the British establishment, whose political preferences extend from the Conservative to the Labour Party<sup>35</sup>.

Moreover, the recruitment of professional staff from the narrow range of university graduates usually with middle class backgrounds, contributes to the creation of what Garnham has called the 'cultural ruling class', a group of privileged media practitioners who have accepted the values and norms of the establishment without question<sup>36</sup>. Additional factors such as the pursuit of promotion or job security may also encourage broadcasters to adopt a compromising stance. Broadcasters, Hood argues, are not independent as they claim; usually they have to "compromise, balance and suppress", especially when they come under pressure from leading groups and elites which the broadcasting institution finds necessary to "appease"<sup>37</sup>. To make the news the broadcaster must absorb the organization's "sense of political realities"<sup>38</sup> as these are internalized by the editorial office. "A good and effective editor will be one who is, by his social and political outlook, in tune with the organization, so that his judgements coincide with the judgements of the upper management or, to put it another way, who is able to persuade that management that any changes he wishes to make are a logical extension of accepted positions"<sup>39</sup>.

In this context the principles of impartiality, objectivity and balance are not the basis of the broadcasters' autonomy as the liberal-pluralist theory and the professionals' self-perceptions claim, but as safeguards of the existing status quo<sup>40</sup>. Impartiality and balance exist only within the bounds of the consensus; they are applied to the parties which occupy the middle ground of politics. When it comes to controversial issues and the coverage of activities which challenge the conventions of the established social and political order, impartiality and objectivity disappear. The result is the constant absence or marginalization of all dissenting views and voices, particularly those which derive from the Left. If the media are seen as performing a watchdog role in liberal democracies, Miliband concludes, then this watchdog barks primarily against the Left<sup>41</sup>.

Although in general agreement with this classic Marxist approach, the other two trends constitute major shifts from the instrumentalist towards more sophisticated analyses of the mass media. Thus, studies within the first of these two approaches concentrate on the ideological and cultural role of the mass media, whereas the subject of the second is what has been termed the 'political economy' of media institutions.

B. Studies on ideology and culture stress the relative autonomy of the ideological superstructure and its central role in reproducing the class relations of advanced capitalist societies. Particularly influential for this shift of attention in media studies have been structuralism and semiology and especially Althusser's studies on ideology and Gramsci's writings on culture and the role of intellectuals in sustaining capitalist domination<sup>42</sup>.

Gramsci did not develop any particular theory for the media, but his central concept of hegemony has been applied in several media studies<sup>43</sup>. Hegemony may be defined as the process whereby

the ruling class or class alliance dominates over the subordinate classes by establishing its own ideology as the universal one and its interests as the interests of the entire society. In other words, hegemony is the construction of the consent of the dominated classes to the established order<sup>44</sup>. Although hegemony (the leadership of the ruling classes) depends on both consent and force, in the liberal capitalist state Gramsci argues, consent is prevailing, whereas coercion remains in the background. Thus, although the repressive apparatus is always present, it is primarily through the ideological institutions of society (the family, the educational system, the church, trade unions and the mass media) that hegemony is maintained. As part of the institutional-ideological complex, the media, 'the mass hegemonic institutions' as Downing has termed them, have enormous political power, for through their continuous flow they reproduce specific 'definitional categories' which are deeply embedded in the dominant ideology<sup>45</sup>.

The reproduction of the hegemonic view of the world, however, is neither deliberate nor the product of a ruling alliance conspiracy, notwithstanding the fact that senior media personnel, editors and reporters come from the petty bourgeoisie, which in Gramsci's view is the natural ally of the capitalist class. Media professionals are not seen as biased nor as conforming to overt or covert pressure by political or economic elites; if the reading of the world's events is biased in favour of the established order, yet this reading is largely unconscious.

"Normally the dominant frames are taken for granted by media practitioners and reproduced and defended by them for reasons and via practices which the practitioners do not conceive to be hegemonic. Hegemony operates effectively (...) yet outside consciousness"<sup>46</sup>.

Journalists may be unaware of the fact that the ideological frames on which they are drawing meanings to describe real

events is reproducing the dominant values and ideas of society; for media messages are conditioned by the underlying and unconscious 'deep structure' of ideology. According to L. Althusser<sup>47</sup> ideology is a representation of the individual's imaginary relationship to their real conditions of existence. The imaginary character of this relationship implies that ideology is largely distorting; as Althusser suggests, ideologies do not correspond to reality; they are an illusion of it; they are moreover, unconscious<sup>48</sup>. Reality therefore, is not a given set of facts and it does not identify with a single meaning. Through the process of what structuralists have termed 'signification', that is the process of meaning production, an individual's perception of reality can be structured by the unconscious function of ideology, no matter what are the conscious intentions or biases of this individual<sup>49</sup>. Hall suggests, that even a Trotskyist journalist may read controversial events, events which threaten the status quo, through the application of dominant ideological frames (for instance, to view the rise in wage demands as the sole cause of inflation)<sup>50</sup>. Thus, Hall concludes, the power of the media, the means par excellence through which reality is described and analysed, is that they reproduce the dominant ideas of capitalist society in such a way that they reproduce also its structure of domination<sup>51</sup>.

C. Unlike the above approach, studies on the 'political economy' of the media focus on the economic base - particularly on patterns of ownership and control of media organizations - as the main determinants of the media's political and ideological orientations<sup>52</sup>. According to this model media organizations are seen as 'economic entities' engaged in the production of surplus value. As Garnham suggests, culture is today as much a superstructural phenomenon as it is a "part of material production itself, directly subordinate, or at least in a closely determined articulation with the laws of development of capital"<sup>53</sup>. The outcome of the 'industriali-

zation of culture' is the subordination of mental production to market logic, since big business media organizations are primarily concerned with their survival and growth; that is the magnetization of audiences and readership and consequently the maximization of advertising revenue. In pursuing these objectives, media enterprises seek increasingly for the common denominator in tastes, interests and values of a politically and ideologically differentiated public. Thus, the more intense the competition, the less variety is on offer from the media industry. This market logic, Westergaard comments on the British press, has led to the search and support of the middle-ground in politics, the diminution of the diversity of opinion, the watering-down of press 'radicalism' and to increased doses of populism. These developments, he concludes, have disqualified the British press from the role of the 'fourth estate'<sup>54</sup>.

Similarly, Curran and Seaton argue that the massive concentration of press ownership after the war, the disappearance of many new titles and the enormity of cost for the launching of new papers have led to a prolonged crisis of press legitimacy in Britain, as market forces can no longer safeguard the plurality of opinion nor the press's accountability to the public<sup>55</sup>.

Even public broadcasting has been affected by market logic. Thus, the BBC has been caught up in a competition for at least half of the total audience in order to sustain its claim to the compulsory license fee and be able to request its increase. As a consequence, the share of popular programming is steadily increasing at the expense of educational and other quality programmes<sup>56</sup>.

In summary, according to the 'political economy' paradigm, the ideological power of the media is the result of the economic activity of the media industry. "...the determining



context for (media) production is always that of their market. In seeking to maximize this market, products must draw on the most widely legitimated central core values while rejecting the dissenting voice or the incompatible objection to a ruling myth. The need for easily understood, popular, formulated, undisturbing, assimilable fictional material is at once a commercial imperative and an aesthetic recipe"<sup>57</sup>.

As it becomes apparent from the above analysis, there is a variety of perspectives on media institutions within the Marxist tradition, with each perspective focussing on different aspects of the media's operation. However, notwithstanding the disagreements and sometimes the fundamental contradictions (for instance, the stress on the autonomy of the ideological superstructure in structuralism and the determination of ideology by the economic base in 'political economy' approaches) there is a general agreement that the power of the mass media in liberal capitalist societies is ideological. No matter the particular processes and mechanisms through which the media perform their ideological function, the main elements of this function are similar in all different approaches: the reproduction of the dominant values and ideas of society; the systematic exclusion or marginalization of dissenting views; and the reinforcement of the existing consensus and established power relations.

#### **1.4 Conclusion**

There are two main perspectives with regard to the study of the mass media within the liberal democratic political process. Each of them is associated with a major school of thought on society and politics, the liberal-pluralist and the Marxist respectively. According to the liberal-pluralist view, media institutions in Western societies are part of a system in which

power is diffused among various competing groups and interests of which none is dominant. The media in this context serve as fora in which diverse ideas and proposals may contest for support; in this way the media contribute to the effective control of the governing by the governed and to political change.

From the opposite perspective, power in Western society is seen as concentrated on the side of a dominant class and dominant institutions. From this viewpoint the media are seen as "part of an ideological arena" in which although "various class views are fought out"<sup>58</sup>, the predominant view of the world is shaped, consciously or not, according to the norms and interests of ruling classes and groups. In capitalist societies the media play a central role in securing the continual legitimation of the established order and in excluding any challenge or call for change.

Notwithstanding the substantial differences between these two schools both can be very relevant and useful to our study of Greek broadcasting. To start with, both approaches have similar starting-points. Both relate the question of the media's power to the broader question of how power is distributed and wielded within contemporary society, and it is this dual question with reference to Greece which forms the basis of this study. Moreover, although the liberal-pluralist and the 'dominance' dichotomy in media research is based on disagreements between two fundamentally opposed schools of thought, it could be argued that the two perspectives of the media are not incompatible; they could even be seen as complementing each other. Indeed the two perspectives focus on different aspects of the same phenomenon. Thus, while the liberal-pluralist perspective stresses the role of the media within the context of parliamentary politics, the 'dominance' view considers the workings of media institutions in relation

to the more general dynamics of power within liberal capitalist society. As Tracey arguably suggests:

"the media do indeed function as a fourth estate within the context of the rather narrow confines provided by the Parliamentary system, but not within the broader framework of the political, economic and moral order that underpins that Parliamentary system"<sup>59</sup>.

It is perhaps indicative of this complementarity of approaches that in some cases, albeit within the general ideological and theoretical framework of each one of them, there is a detectable convergence of positions. Thus, some Marxists suggest that media organizations are "relatively autonomous"<sup>60</sup> or "autonomous within the boundaries of the hegemonic system"<sup>61</sup>. This autonomy from direct class or state control as it is enshrined in the everyday practices of production through the principles of impartiality and balance is the basis of the media institution's legitimacy<sup>62</sup>.

On the other hand, Blumler and Gurevitch suggest<sup>63</sup> that the media's coverage of events, although in general terms guided by the established professional principles stated above and by news value criteria, is nevertheless influenced by the 'degree of respect' that journalists accord to different groups and institutions on the basis of the value system of society. Thus, whereas certain institutions such as the monarchy and Parliament receive the most favourable treatment, other institutions such as trade unions or deviant groups ("muggers", "terrorists", etc) may receive less positive or even negative coverage. The media, Blumler and Gurevitch conclude, do not simply legitimate or undermine society's dominant institutions. They perform both tasks; they have "both legitimating and disruptive implications for the social order. They are involved in processes of both social control and social change"<sup>64</sup>. Another example is N. Garnham who<sup>65</sup> has come very close to Seymour-Ure<sup>66</sup> by arguing that the operation of public broadcasting within the framework of objectivity and balance

has contributed to the decline of the political party. At the same time, he suggests, "by concentrating on personalities TV has enhanced the position of political leaders at the expense of party organizations".

Taking into account the above and returning to the subject of the present thesis, both the liberal-pluralist and the 'dominance' viewpoints will be relevant to our study of Greek broadcasting. At one level this study will focus on what Tracey calls the "formal processes and relationships"<sup>67</sup>, that is the formal distribution of power and control within the Greek broadcasting organizations and their role within the system of political communication (especially with reference to its relationship to government and political parties).

In relation to the above, informal processes will be detected, through which power is wielded by forces external to broadcasting institutions over the latter's general policy and especially over programme production. Therefore, a part of the following analysis will be to test the 'fourth estate' theory and the view of the media professionals' autonomy against the available evidence on the workings of Greek broadcasting. To put it more crudely, this enquiry will involve at this stage the question of who has power and control over Greek radio and television, that is the capacity to determine or influence the content of these media's output. Attention will also be directed to two foci: to the socio-political environment of the broadcasting institutions and the ways and extent that it impinges upon their performance; and to the role of individual actors, the managerial staff and broadcasters and the processes through which external pressure is translated into work practices.

At the same time, this study will examine from a broader perspective the role of broadcasting within the general framework of power relations in Greek society. Here the

question involved is whether broadcasting has ideological power; if so, what are the components of the dominant ideology that Greek radio and television are supposed to reproduce? This points in turn to the wider issue that we stated above, the structure of power within Greek society, that is the structure of economic, political and social life. In particular, as the subject of enquiry is state-owned broadcasting, the study will examine the nature and role of the state within Greek society. If, as available evidence suggests, the state exercises considerable control over broadcasting, then in whose interest does it do so?

In conclusion, the subject matter of this thesis covers two inter-related questions. First, we shall examine the organization and operation of Greek broadcasting institutions and their relationship to the political process. Secondly, this leads us to the wider question of the structure of Greek society and the role of the state within it. Only by examining the role of the broadcasting media at both these levels ('micro' and 'macro'), can the political nature of radio and television in Greece be fully appreciated.

## NOTES

1. McQuail (1987), p. 3.
2. Ibid.
3. McLuhan (1964). For a critique see also Schramm and Porter (1982), p. 114-118.
4. Adorno and Horkheimer (1977).
5. Klapper (1960).
6. McQuail (1972 and 1987); Blumler and Gurevitch (1982).
7. For a more recent evaluation of media effects during elections see M. Harrop (1987).
8. Schlesinger (1978 and 1987).
9. Halloran et al.(1970); Gitlin (1980); Elliott et al.(1986).
10. Tunstall (1971); Kumar (1977); Elliott (1977); Burns (1972 and 1977).
11. Tracey (1978).
12. Garnham (1986); Murdock and Golding (1977); Curran and Seaton (1981).
13. For studies in semiology see R. Barthes (1984) also, his Mythologies, Paladin, London 1985. See also, U. Eco (1983).
14. Hall et al.(1980); Hall (1982); Glasgow Media Group (1976 and 1980).
15. On France, A. de Tarle (1979), R. Kuhn (1980 and 1985); on Italy, F. L. Cavazza (1979); on Spain, E. Lopez-Escobar and A. Faus-Belau (1985); on the media in many Latin American countries see E. Fox (ed) (1988).
16. Blumler (1970), p. 90.
17. Ibid.
18. Smith (1973), p. 36.
19. McQuail (1987), p. 113.
20. Ibid, p. 117.
21. A. Smith (1973), p. 45, in particular, argues that the establishment of public broadcasting became a precedent for the theory of "social responsibility".
22. Smith (1973), p. 45.
23. Blumler (1970), p. 96.

24. The term is mentioned by P. Dunleavy and B. O'Leary (1987).
25. M. Tracey (1978), p. 25.
26. Seymour-Ure (1974), p. 236-237.
27. Seymour-Ure (1987), p. 4.
28. Ibid, p. 14.
29. Blumler and Gurevitch (1977), p. 274.
30. Ibid, p. 287.
31. Ibid, p. 280.
32. Milliband (1969/1984); Hood (1972, 1982 and 1986); Garnham (1978).
33. Hood (1972), p. 418.
34. Garnham (1978); Hood (1972), p. 409.
35. Milliband (1969/1984), p. 304.
36. Garnham (1978), p. 31.
37. Hood (1972), p. 424.
38. Smith (1973), p. 98.
39. Hood (1972), p. 418.
40. Garnham (1978), p. 33.
41. Milliband (1969/1984), p. 291.
42. Two different approaches are involved here: A culturalist approach as this is exemplified in the works of S. Hall (1977); S. Hall et al.(1978); S. Hall et al. (1980); also, S. Hall (1986). R. Williams (1966, 1973) which views the media as powerful institutions which shape the public understanding of reality and construct the prevailing consensus. The second trend is influenced primarily by structuralism and semiology and focuses on the process of signification, that is the process of meaning production and the role of ideology in structuring media messages (Hall et al., 1980; Hall, 1982; Davis and Walton, 1983; J.Woolacot, 1982; Glasgow Media Group, 1976, 1980). Despite differences on the subject and level of analysis between these two approaches, we will try to present them here in a synthesis although more attention will be paid to structuralist studies on ideology, by focusing on their common premise, that is the relative autonomy of ideology and culture and the role of the media in reproducing the dominant

values and ideas of society.

43. Hall (1977 and 1982); Williams (1973); Downing (1980); Gitlin (1980).
44. For an extensive analysis of the concept of hegemony see M. Carnoy (1984) and M. Trikoukis (1985).
45. Downing (1980), p. 162.
46. Gitlin (1980), p. 257.
47. Althusser (1971/1983).
48. Camargo Heck (1980).
49. On signification see for instance, R. Barthes (1984), pp. 108-120.
50. Hall (1982), p. 88.
51. Hall (1977), p. 346.
52. Murdock and Golding (1977); Murdock (1982); Curran and Seaton (1981); Curran (1986); Westergaard (1977); Garnham (1986).
53. Garnham (1986), p. 20.
54. Westergaard (1977), pp. 101-104.
55. Curran and Seaton (1981), pp. 290-299.
56. Murdock and Golding (1977), p. 21; Murdock (1982), p. 121.
57. Murdock and Golding (1977), p. 40.
58. Gurevitch et al.(1982), p. 1.
59. Tracey (1978), p. 34.
60. Hall (1977).
61. Gitlin (1980), p. 269.
62. Hall (1977), p. 345.
63. Blumler and Gurevitch (1986).
64. Ibid, p. 90.
65. Garnham (1986a), p. 50.
66. Seymour-Ure (1987).
67. Tracey (1978), p. 33.



## **CHAPTER 2**

### **RADIO, THE FIRST YEARS: FROM DICTATORSHIP TO CIVIL WAR.**

#### **2.1 Introduction**

This chapter deals with the early period of the operation and development of Greek broadcasting; it examines the first efforts of Greek governments towards the introduction of radio, the establishment of the Greek Radio Service by the authoritarian regime of General Metaxas and the integration of radio into the extensive network of Nazi propaganda during the years of German occupation (1941-1944). Particular emphasis is placed on the social and political conditions under which Greek broadcasting was established, including the political and social upheavals of the 1930s; the establishment of the quasi-fascist dictatorship of Ioannis Metaxas in 1936; the painful experience of the civil war (1946-1949); and the establishment of a repressive parliamentary regime in the aftermath of the Communist defeat.

#### **2.2 Dictatorship, political upheaval and the introduction of radio.**

Greece was the last country in Europe to acquire a broadcasting service. It was only in 1938 that the dictatorship of general Ioannis Metaxas introduced radio into the country. Until then the few radio set owners<sup>1</sup> enjoyed infrequent broadcasts from the Radio-telegraphic Service of the Ministry of Transport and amateur broadcasters<sup>2</sup>. There was also the regularly operating station of Thessaloniki which was

established in 1928 by the pioneer of Greek radio, Christos Tsigirides and which was the first radio station in the whole Balkan peninsula<sup>3</sup>.

It is not known why the issue of broadcasting had been neglected by successive governments during the 1920s. A likely explanation could be the extremely unstable political situation of that time. Established in 1924, the Greek Republic had been riddled with conflict within the governing Liberal camp. This had manifested itself in military intervention and short lived dictatorships which reflected the inability of the traditional political forces to present a viable solution to the country's mounting social and economic problems. Between 1924 and 1928 the country had ten different prime ministers, three general elections, eleven military coups and pronunciamientos and a military dictatorship which was then itself overthrown by a military coup<sup>4</sup>.

Thus, it could not have been a coincidence that broadcasting became a matter of governmental consideration only at the end of the 1920s, after the most stable government of the inter-war period, that of Liberal Eleftherios Venizelos (1928-33), took office<sup>5</sup>. In 1930 after a competition had been held, the Liberals passed the first law on broadcasting according to which the Greek state granted to a private entrepreneur E. Markoglou the 'exclusive privilege to install and exploit radio stations' with the aim of educating and entertaining the public<sup>6</sup>. Markoglou's company was to cover all costs for the installation and operation of the radio service, while the state was obliged to provide all necessary facilities for the realization of the venture<sup>7</sup>.

The agreement between Markoglou and the government did not mean however that the establishment and operation of broadcasting in Greece were to be the exclusive domain of private enterprise. Beyond a significant number of regulations regarding the

content of programmes, the transmission of commercials (articles 2 and 24) and the quality of transmission equipment (article 6), the law established extensive state participation in most aspects of the broadcasting company's policy.

Thus, all plans for the expansion of the service and the renovation of its equipment were the subject of government decisions; most important though was the provision according to which radio programme content should be approved by a seven-member committee appointed by the Minister of Communications (article 24). In addition, a government commissioner was to supervise the daily transmission of programmes (article 25). Also, the company was bound to provide up to 1-1.5 hours daily airtime for state broadcasts whenever this was requested by the government (articles 21,22). Finally, the state was to receive a large share of the income and profits of the company, depending on the number of subscribers and the amount of advertising<sup>8</sup>. Such extensive state control of a private company reflected the concern of Venizelos' government about the significance of the social and political role of broadcasting. Moreover, the statutory provision that after 21 years the ownership of the organization was to be transferred to the state proves that the ultimate purpose of the agreement was the eventual establishment of a public broadcasting service after it had been effectively organized and developed by private capital<sup>9</sup>.

It is not clear, nevertheless, why the Liberal government did not seek the immediate establishment of a state-owned broadcasting service. A possible explanation could be the financial strains that Greece was experiencing at that time. After 1929, the country faced one of its worst economic crises as the inherent problems of the Greek economy were aggravated by international depression. Between 1928 and 1932 the country's national income fell from \$600 to \$330 million. At the same time almost one third of the national budget was going

to the liquidation of the country's enormous public debt, leaving the government with very little to invest in public works. As a result, in 1932 the government was forced to declare partial economic bankruptcy<sup>10</sup>. Therefore, it might have been under these circumstances that the government, unable or unwilling to finance the setting up of a state broadcasting service, resorted to private investors. In any case, the venture was never realized and the agreement was finally repealed in 1935 by the dictatorship of General Condylis<sup>11</sup>.

The eventual failure of Markoglou to establish a broadcasting service and the absence of any other initiative until 1936 prove that the matter although deemed important was not seen as a main priority by the governments of that time. The widely felt repercussions of the depression (by 1932 237,000 wage earners, almost half of the urban working population, were unemployed)<sup>12</sup>, growing social strife (for instance, the number of strikes increased from 199 in 1932 to 473 in 1933) and the apparent inability of the traditional political forces to cope with the country's aggravating social and economic problems brought about a political upheaval in view of which the issue of broadcasting could only be of minor importance.

In the period until 1936 the country, which had been profoundly shaken by the republican-royalist cleavage, experienced the following: the defeat of the Liberals in the 1933 general elections and the victory of the royalist Populist party; an assassination attempt against Venizelos which fuelled once again political passions; an abortive coup of republican-Venizelist officers and the subsequent purging of the state machine of most republicans; another election in 1935; a military coup by royalist general G. Kondylis and subsequently a farcical referendum which led to the re-establishment of the monarchy. Finally, new general elections were held in January 1936 which resulted in a hung parliament. In April that year

General Ioannis Metaxas, a man of outspoken authoritarian convictions, was appointed Prime Minister. On August 4 he declared a dictatorship and a month later his government established the Greek Radio Service. The introduction of broadcasting by a dictatorial government almost as soon as it seized power was not accidental; it reflected the need of the regime to win the support of the masses and thus to gain full legitimacy. The significance of broadcasting for Metaxas' government will be better understood if we first make a brief reference to the conditions under which the dictatorship was established and to the peculiar characteristics of that regime.

The pretext under which the dictatorship was declared was a general strike announced for the 5th of August and the alleged imminent danger of a communist insurrection. The reality was rather different, as the Communist party (the KKE), although it had made its best performance ever in the elections of January by gaining 15 seats in Parliament, had still a very limited influence upon the masses. By the time the dictatorship was declared, the KKE had only 14-16,000 members, whereas the number of workers participating in strikes and demonstrations was about 500,000<sup>13</sup>. The reference to the communist menace reflected both Metaxas' profound anti-communism and his attempt to exploit the widespread fear of communism in order to justify the declaration of the dictatorship. There was some truth to these allegations, however, to the extent that Metaxas intended to smash the growing political movement.

As we have already said, the deterioration of the Greek economy by the depression had been widely felt among the country's lower income groups; unemployment, meagre wages and inflation were the major causes of discontent, the expression of which through strikes and demonstrations had reached enormous proportions<sup>14</sup>. The massive mobilization of the 1930s reflected the disillusionment of the lower classes with the traditional bourgeois parties and their disentanglement from



the republican-royalist cleavage. This development alarmed politicians of both camps who realized the danger of losing their grip on the masses. Thus, unable themselves to put an end to the social strife, the bourgeois politicians surrendered power to Metaxas, a man who had publicly declared his dislike for parliamentary institutions<sup>15</sup>. The bourgeois leaders' stance reflected also the unwillingness of the upper classes which they represented to make any substantial economic concessions to the lower social strata. Hence, through a consensus of the two rival political camps Metaxas was granted by parliament semi-dictatorial powers for five months<sup>16</sup>. Metaxas was also supported by King George II who saw the dictatorship as the only way to consolidate and reinforce the powers of the throne.

Nevertheless, whereas for traditional leaders - and perhaps for the King - Metaxas' government was a temporary break with representative institutions and a necessary prerequisite for the restoration of the previous order, for Metaxas himself the dictatorship was the opportunity he was awaiting in order to dissolve parliamentary institutions and to institutionalize his own ideals about the state. Thus, his first move was to abolish all political parties including his own minuscule party, the 'Free Thinkers'. A graduate of the Berlin Military Academy and an ardent believer in Prussian militarism and social discipline, Metaxas was convinced that totalitarianism was the only natural and suitable system for Greece. In pursuit of discipline which was to replace for ever the 'destructive individualism' of Greeks, Metaxas adopted many of the ideas and symbols of German Nazism and Italian Fascism which he so profoundly admired. For the dictator the nation was a totality above the people and social classes; all individual and class interests had to be sacrificed for the 'national interest', the expression of which was the dictator's 'National State'. In imitation of Hitler's Third Reich, Metaxas declared as his ideal for Greece the creation of the Third Hellenic Civilization which, coming after the civilization of ancient

Greece and that of Byzantium, was to combine the virtues of both<sup>17</sup> and develop under the auspices of the 'New State'. By the end of 1938, Greece was well into the process of becoming a totalitarian state. All major institutions of the country including the economy, labour and agrarian organizations, education, the church and the press had been radically reorganized and incorporated into Metaxas' state. The dictator also created an elaborate bureaucracy which could secure the state's increasingly interventionist role in the economy and society.

Metaxas' attachment to fascist ideology and policies, as well as the excessive projection of him as a great leader by the regime's propaganda, have led many historians to consider the 'fourth of August' a fascist regime<sup>18</sup>. Yet his dictatorship lacked one of the most essential characteristics of fascism, i.e. a mass fascist movement which could be the concrete basis of Metaxas' power. Instead, the dictator had based his power primarily on the support of the King on whom he remained politically dependent until the end. Thus, despite the festivities and the rest of the regime's propaganda which at times attributed to him enormous, almost metaphysical powers, Metaxas never acquired the powers of a Fuhrer<sup>19</sup>.

In order to consolidate his power and secure the future of his 'New State', the dictator created a number of repressive and ideological apparatuses which interrelated and cooperated with each other. Thus, within the first few months of the dictatorship Metaxas established the Undersecretariat of Public Order (YDA), the National Youth Organization (EON) and the Undersecretariat of Press and Tourism (YTT). The YDA was a powerful autonomous repressive mechanism which controlled the security forces and was directly answerable to the dictator. Headed by Metaxas' personal friend, K. Maniadakis, this Undersecretariat was to become notorious for its treatment of

political opponents and for its extensive network for the policing of all sectors of society and the state machine<sup>20</sup>.

EON on the other hand, having Metaxas himself as its president, represented the dictator's intensive efforts to create a mass party base. Organized in a military fashion (with uniforms, ranks and military training) and with the purpose of developing the 'national and religious beliefs of the youth', EON was both an ideological and repressive mechanism. Its members were indoctrinated in the ideals of fascism and taught to develop discipline and obedience to the state and the 'Chief'<sup>21</sup>. Also, a major indoctrinating function had been undertaken by the Ministry of Education, which was taken over by the dictator himself in November 1938. This ministry contributed also to the development and strengthening of EON.

Metaxas also founded the Undersecretariat of Press and Tourism which could just as well be called the Ministry of Propaganda. Apart from censoring the press, books, cinema and theatre, its main purpose was to disseminate the ideals of the 'New State' and project the dictator as the country's only undisputed leader. As with the YDA, Metaxas appointed another of his close friends as head of the YTT, Theologos Nikoloudis, an ex-press publisher fully committed to the aims of the dictatorship. Among other things, the YTT's activities included the production of a large number of voluminous publications containing the dictator's speeches and accounts of his achievements<sup>22</sup>.

More effective however, was the propaganda channelled through the press and broadcasting, both of which had been placed under the complete control of the undersecretariat. The role of the YTT as well as that of the YDA and EON was strengthened further after the regime entered its second phase in early 1938 with the intensification of the dictator's efforts to establish a totalitarian state<sup>23</sup>. Thus, with



Compulsory Law 1075/1938, the dictatorial government systematized the legislation on the security of the regime and introduced new measures which extended the powers of the YDA even further. Indicatively we mention here the introduction of the 'certificates of loyalty' to the regime which were necessary if one intended to find work in the state machine and most private businesses. Also, with compulsory law 1798/1939 the state now undertook officially the organization of EON. In practice this meant the intensive use of state resources and repressive mechanisms for the aggrandizement of EON. As a result, the organization's membership increased from a mere 15,000 in 1938 to a staggering one million in 1940<sup>24</sup>. Finally, with a number of compulsory laws both the press and broadcasting were incorporated in the 'New State' through the YTT.

As soon as the dictatorship was declared, the press was subjected to censorship regulations which according to some historians were drafted by the dictator himself and circulated to newspaper editors by the YTT<sup>25</sup>. Criticism of the government was unequivocally forbidden and so was the printing of any information about political parties or their leaders. In addition, newspapers were prohibited from publishing any news regarding the public debt, the state finances, the economy and the currency unless the information originated from the Cabinet and was fully approved. Newspapers were not allowed to print information about labour union activities unless such activities were supportive of the regime. Blank spaces due to censorship could not be filled with advertisements. Any material revealing censorship was also forbidden. Finally, all newspapers and periodicals were required to praise the 'New State' and its accomplishments. Before publication the censor's stamp of approval was necessary.

Apart from censorship, the press was also subject to the anti-communist legislation which was promulgated by the

dictatorship. Thus, according to Compulsory Law 117/1936, everybody who 'pursued orally, in writing or otherwise the dissemination, development or implementation of theories, ideas or social systems which tended to overthrow the social system of the country' was to be condemned to imprisonment of up to five years or to deportation ranging from six months to two years. If the above crimes were committed by the press, they led to the suspension of the implicated journalists, editors, publishers and printers from their work for a period of up to six months. In the case of a second offence suspension from work could be extended up to three years and the authorities could order the confiscation of the printing equipment<sup>26</sup>.

According to article 10 of the law, all publishers, booksellers or owners of books whose content breached the law were required to hand all these publications to the local police authorities or face imprisonment and deportation for a period of up to a year. Of course, the terms 'communist' and 'subversive' were interpreted broadly enough to include a wide variety of books including Sophocles' Antigone and Thucydides' The Funeral Oration of Pericles. Maniatakis himself as head of the YDA banned 445 books in November 1938. Moreover, in clear Nazi fashion the government organized the ceremonial burning of hundreds of books by Greek and foreign writers. Apart from the works of Marx, Lenin and Engels, the works of Shaw, Freud, Darwin and Dostoevsky were burnt<sup>27</sup>. Censorship was also applied to cinema and theatre by various multi-membered committees operating within the YTT<sup>28</sup>.

Apart from censorship, newspapers were primarily used as instruments of the regime's propaganda, constantly supplied with material from the services of the Undersecretariat of Press and Tourism. Beyond the exaltation of the government's works and Metaxas' personality, newspapers were also obliged to publish favourable reports about Germany, Italy, Spain and all other countries with dictatorial governments. Moreover, with

the aim of demoralizing KKE members and supporters and in collaboration with the Undersecretariat of Public Order, the YTT fed the press with signed declarations of 'repentance' by which tortured or imprisoned communists allegedly renounced their beliefs<sup>29</sup>.

Metaxas' policies regarding the press did not face any significant resistance from journalists and publishers. Rizospastis (The Radical), the official organ of the KKE was of course outlawed, while another three papers closed down during the dictatorship. Most publishers, however, willingly placed their papers at the service of the regime. Among them were not only ardent advocates of the dictatorship such as the Kyrou brothers and George A. Vlachos, publisher of the largely influential Kathimerini (Daily), but also Dimitrios Lambrakis, publisher of two major liberal papers<sup>30</sup>. This stance towards the regime reflected clearly the support of the Greek bourgeoisie for the dictatorship as the only way to end the political mobilization of the lower classes.

Nevertheless, in view of his plan to transform Greece into a totalitarian state, Metaxas sought to create a system which would guarantee in the long run the support of the press for the 'New State' even after the abolition of censorship and other emergency measures. It could not have been a coincidence that the government passed new press legislation at the beginning of the regime's second phase in 1938<sup>31</sup>. The new legislation introduced a large number of conditions for the confiscation of newspapers and magazines. These included the insult of the Orthodox Christian Religion, the person of the King or public decency, the publication of information regarding military preparations and fortifications<sup>32</sup>, the insulting of the Country and the foundations of the existing regime, the person of the Prime Minister or the Cabinet and the royal family, and any material published without the permission of the Undersecretary of the Press. The latter could order the

confiscation of any publication he considered as damaging the 'national interest' ( article 51). Moreover, the law introduced heavier sentences for crimes committed through the press (article 3, paragraphs 2 and 3). Especially in the case of a second offence, the involved journalist and director of the paper as well as the manager of the printing works where the paper was printed were to be suspended from their work for up to one year, while the publisher was forbidden to use the title of that publication for the same period of time.

The new legislation increased the number of requirements that the publishers should fulfil in order to be granted permission to publish. Among other things, a prospective publisher should be of 'upright character and adequate education' and had to deposit a large amount of money as a pledge to the state<sup>33</sup>. No newspaper could be published without a licence granted by the Undersecretary of Press at his discretion. As a result of these measures, only those papers that the government approved of were allowed to be published.

The novelty of the new legislation, however, was the introduction of a 'Press Register' which was to be organized and updated by the YTT. All publishers, journalists and other press employees had to be registered in this record in order to receive permission to work in the press business. A number of conditions had to be fulfilled before the Undersecretary considered anyone eligible to be registered in the record. For example, the candidate should have not been condemned for breach of the anti-communist legislation, while journalists in particular had to pass an examination organized by the YTT (articles 1-7).

Finally, the law established an elaborate corporate system which was to represent collectively the interests of publishers, journalists and other press employees. On the top of the pyramid stood the powerful General Union of the Greek

Press (GEET), administered by a council whose members comprised representatives of press employees and three representatives of the YTT. The Undersecretary of Press was also the honorary chairman of the Union (articles 10-33). Therefore in practice the regime turned press publishing into a closed shop organized and supervised in all its functions by the almighty undersecretary and in which membership was limited only to those deemed safe by the regime. Moreover, in order to secure the cooperation of both publishers and journalists, the government introduced a number of benefits such as an increase in the price of newspapers, the introduction of duty free newsprint and the establishment of Sunday as a holiday plus a number of minor privileges (such as free entry to public spectacles). Thus, by 1940 the regime propaganda could boast that the 'New State' had transformed the 'depressing' profession of journalism into a real social function and that it had ended the financial insecurity of newsmen by safeguarding their welfare<sup>34</sup>.

Apart from the press, the Metaxist regime sought to develop radio as a major instrument for its propaganda. Only a month after the declaration of the dictatorship, the government passed new broadcasting legislation. Compulsory Law 95/1936 established the Radio broadcasting service (YRE), a public organization aimed at the 'education and entertainment of the public' and financed through subscription fee and advertising<sup>35</sup>. The organization was to be administered by a Board of Governors consisting of state officials, military officers, a representative of the Greek Orthodox Church, the chairman of the journalists' union, a representative of the management of Athenian dailies and four from the field of culture. Some of the members were appointed ex-officio, but the majority were appointed by the Minister of Communications. An employee of the same ministry was to be appointed as Director General of YRE by the minister. Apart from control of appointments, the latter could also intervene in the policy of

the Board of Governors by presiding over its meetings whenever he considered it necessary. Moreover, the minister exercised control over the organization's finances and set YRE's internal regulations. It is characteristic of the haphazard fashion in which the law was passed that it did not explicitly define the competences of the Board of Governors, nor those of the Director General; according to the law, YRE's organizational structure was to be defined later by a number of royal decrees.

Despite the hasty introduction of broadcasting legislation, the regime did not start radio broadcasts until eighteen months later, mainly because of the lack of the necessary premises and equipment. This must have been one of the main reasons why in the meanwhile Metaxas' government was considering granting the exclusive right to broadcast to the German company Telefunken, a decision which if realized would have meant the abolition of the broadcasting law we have just referred to. On 25 January 1938, the government made an agreement with Telefunken according to which the latter was to provide and install a 15KW transmitter for radio and to organize and operate the radio service in Greece. The reasons behind this change of direction are not known. A possible explanation could be the strong political and commercial ties between the 'fourth of August' and Hitler's Germany, as well as the remarkable influence that the representative of Telefunken in Greece, I. Voulpiotis, seemed to be exercising within the government<sup>36</sup>.

Nevertheless, although Telefunken installed the transmitter, the agreement was not ratified until the German occupation, when the quisling government re-discovered and implemented it. Thus, Metaxas' government proceeded with its initial plan for broadcasting and on March 25, 1938 it inaugurated the Athens Radio Station, RSA. The date was chosen symbolically as it coincided with the anniversary of the beginning of the war of independence, which is the greatest national celebration in Greece<sup>37</sup>. The station was set up in a haphazard way and as

there were no special headquarters for broadcasting the RSA was housed in a room of the Zappeion museum near the Houses of Parliament. Thus, after various ill-fated attempts and delays, radio was finally introduced in Greece without prior planning and adequate equipment to cover much of the country outside the Athens area. For almost the next 15 years the Greek broadcasting service was to operate with that 15KW transmitter. Initially the daily programming was five hours long, but by 1940 it had been expanded to eleven hours divided into three parts: morning, afternoon and evening.

In 1939, ostensibly to serve more effectively the regime's need for propaganda, the RSA was placed under the supervision of the YTT in which a special Directorate for the Press and Radio had been set up. It was this directorate which in practice undertook the administration of the station. The head of the directorate was journalist Dimitris Svolopoulos, one of the regime theoreticians and a consultant of the Department of Education of EON<sup>38</sup> who became in essence the Director General of RSA. As part of the station's reorganization by the YTT, all its staff were dismissed and only forty per cent of them were re-hired as 'appropriate' - defined in terms of loyalty to the dictatorship<sup>39</sup>. While hard evidence has proved impossible to find, it seems likely that as in the rest of the state machine a 'certificate of loyalty' to the regime issued by the Undersecretariat of Public Order must have been required from all prospective RSA employees. In this way all those suspected of leftist or liberal ideas could be excluded from the broadcasting service.

In addition to anti-communism which became the main theme of the regime's propaganda and ideology, the organization and programming of the RSA were also affected by the widespread 'anti-intellectualism' of the 'New State'. Metaxas had often expressed his aversion to intellectuals who 'contaminated the Nation with foreign, impure ideas'<sup>40</sup>. A number of Greek

intellectuals (academics, writers and journalists) were arrested and deported to remote islands<sup>41</sup>. Those who escaped arrest had to remain silent, though some of them were involved in the resistance against the dictatorship<sup>42</sup>. In any case, the silence of all those who constituted the vanguard of Greek left-wing and liberal thought in the inter-war period deprived Greek radio of the human resources which could have contributed to its development as a cultural medium.

The absence of creativity from the RSA must have been widely felt for a well known Metaxist writer and propagandist felt obliged to apologize for the low quality of programming: "I know that there are many people who complain about the quality of voices or do not find the level of programmes satisfactory enough. But are they right?(...) Every talent of this country has been presented on our radio. And if the country has run out of artistic minds we should not blame the RSA for that"<sup>43</sup>.

The poor quality of programmes did not prevent the regime's propaganda from boasting that the 'fourth of August' had established a 'popular cultural' medium which had "improved the taste of the audience and had marked a return to the traditions of pure folk music"<sup>44</sup>. However, radio was seen by the dictatorial government more as an instrument of propaganda rather than a medium for education and entertainment. As another Metaxist writer put it, "what makes radio utterly necessary for Greece is the sense of discipline that it conveys by its nature. Only one speaks; the others listen. They cannot discuss...radio teaches people how to listen without discussion"<sup>45</sup>.

Censorship on radio was exercised by the Speeches Department of the YTT, which scrutinized all kinds of broadcast texts<sup>46</sup>. In its news and current affairs policy the RSA followed the same guidelines as newspapers: praises for the 'Chief' and the accomplishments of the 'New State', propagation of the regime's



ideals and favourable reporting of fascist countries. It is characteristic that even after the sinking of the Greek cruiser 'Elli' by an Italian submarine in August 1940, the RSA concealed the nationality of the attacker and attributed what was the first clear sign of war between Greece and the Axis powers to an "unknown submarine"<sup>47</sup>.

Far from denying the propagandistic use of radio, the government had often attributed to it publicly a significant role as a tool for the building of the 'Third Hellenic Civilization'. For instance, in one of the numerous articles in the press celebrating the fourth anniversary of the regime, the RSA was presented as "a medium of enlightenment of the masses in the big cities as well as in the countryside; a medium of communication of the government with the people; a medium for the transmission of the great political ideals of the 'fourth of August'. The Prime Minister and many members of the cabinet have used broadcasting several times for this important purpose"<sup>48</sup>.

It is impossible to estimate the effect of radio as a propaganda weapon on the Greek people. When broadcasting was introduced in Greece, radio set ownership was limited to about 10,000 sets nationwide. Even with the rapid increase of subscribers in the next three years (60-62,000 by 1940), the penetration of radio in Greek society was still limited, with about 8.5 sets per 1,000 inhabitants by the time of the regime's downfall<sup>49</sup>. With just over thirty eight per cent of the population earning an income sufficient only to cover their bare necessities and another forty per cent living below the poverty line , the acquisition of a radio set remained a luxury that the vast majority of people could not afford. In the few rural areas which could receive RSA's broadcasts a radio set in the local coffee shop usually served the entire community. The impact, such as it was, of radio propaganda

throughout the four and a half years of the dictatorship is not of major importance for our analysis.

What is important to emphasize here, is the establishment and organization of Greek broadcasting by a dictatorial government which saw it as a precious tool in the long run for the consolidation of Metaxas' 'New State'. Moreover, together with the numerous well staged parades and festivities, radio could offer a unique opportunity to Metaxas for personal contact with the people that he so badly needed if he were to achieve the unquestioning support of the masses. To serve these ends better, broadcasting was incorporated into the huge propaganda machine of the government and was turned more into an instrument of persuasion rather than a medium for the information and education of the people.

### **2.3 War, internal cleavage and repressive parliamentarism**

In October 1940 Greece entered the war against Italy at first and a few months later against Germany despite Metaxas' efforts to maintain the country's neutrality. His government's decision to side with the Allies was the victory of the pro-British faction of the power bloc headed by the king over that part of the ruling class and the military which had close political and economic ties with Hitler's Germany<sup>50</sup>.

The declaration of war and the largely anti-fascist character that was given to it by the people marked in essence the end of the dictatorship. In February 1942, the dictatorial regime was also officially abolished by the government that the king had appointed in exile<sup>51</sup>. In Athens, a quisling government was formed by the Axis forces, as soon as they occupied the country, in April 1941. It was headed by General G. Tsolakoglou who had played a leading part in the signing of the armistice

agreement with Germany behind the backs of the king and the government<sup>52</sup>. Keen to achieve acceptance by and if possible the support of the Greek people, the occupying authorities and particularly the Germans - more than the Italians and the Bulgarians - sought to organize an extensive and effective propaganda network within the country. Thus, the daily press was placed under strict censorship, while with German sponsorship a number of collaborationist publications undertook also the task of disseminating the ideals of national-socialism to the Greeks.

Initially German propaganda aimed at creating among the people a climate of suspicion and hostility against the Allies and especially Britain, whereas after the defeat in Stalingrad in early 1943 the propaganda was turned against the Soviets and the left-wing liberation movement in Greece, EAM<sup>53</sup>. Of course, radio played a major role as a propaganda weapon in the hands of the Germans. Less than forty days after the Axis forces occupied Greece, the new quisling government changed the broadcasting legislation. In fact the new legal framework for broadcasting was nothing more than the above mentioned contract that the Metaxas government had arranged with Telefunken in January 1938. According to that contract, as modified by the Tsolakoglou government, the German corporation represented in Greece by I. Voulpiotis was to establish a new organization for broadcasting called Greek Radio Company (AERE), which was given the exclusive right to "operate and exploit" the Greek broadcasting service. In return, Telefunken was obliged to supply all transmitting and other technical equipment necessary for the operation of the Athens radio station. All this equipment was to be the property of the Greek state<sup>54</sup>. AERE was responsible only for the entertainment part of the programming, whereas the news and current affairs broadcasts were the responsibility of the collaborationist government. According to one testimony, news bulletins were prepared by a team of German-speaking Greeks at the German embassy in Athens<sup>55</sup>.

Apart from the news, however, a large number of programmes such as lessons in Italian and German, travelogues, speeches and the presentation of selective German and Italian works of literature, also served propaganda purposes.

Indeed, headed by Voulpiotis himself as its Director General and a number of ardent Nazi admirers who had worked also for Metaxas' ideological and repressive apparatuses, AERE became the mouthpiece of the Germans and the collaborationist government. Most prominent among the AERE propagandists was writer Sitsa Karaïskaki who during the dictatorship had been a top official of EON specializing in methods of indoctrination<sup>56</sup>. As a result, the discredited Athens radio ceased to be a source of reliable information for the public who turned their attention to news bulletins broadcast in Greek over foreign radio stations (particularly the BBC in London and also Cairo, the place of exile of the Greek King and his government). To prevent the reception of these foreign broadcasts the Germans ordered the sealing of all radio sets in such a way that only the reception of the Athens station was possible; it is estimated that in the capital city alone, 43,000 radios were sealed in this way<sup>57</sup>. Moreover, listening to foreign radio stations was declared an act of resistance against the occupying forces and listeners caught were punished to death<sup>58</sup>.

Foreign radio programmes, however, were not the only alternative source of broadcast information in Greece. At the same time, EAM was operating in the provinces its own radio stations as part of an extensive communications network, organized for the first time in the countryside by the resistance movement. The contribution of these radio stations, which could reach Crete and even remote Aegean islands, to the information and boosting of morale of the population in all probability must have been significant; their importance for our study is only minor, however, not only because our

knowledge about their organization and policy is still very limited, but also, because they disappeared together with the resistance movement during the turbulent period which followed the end of the war<sup>59</sup>. In any case, even the establishment and operation of radio broadcasting nationwide by EAM is yet another indication of the significant social, political and cultural role that the left-wing movement played in Greece during the second world war. The impact of this movement on Greek society was enormous and determined to a large extent the political developments which took place after the war.

EAM (National Liberation Front) was founded on 28 September 1941 by the Communist party, the Socialist and agrarian parties and other minor political forces and personalities of declared socialist ideas. Although Communist-led, EAM was not dominated ideologically by the KKE. Its programme had two major components: the anti-fascist struggle and liberation of the country, and the establishment of a democratic regime based on social and political equality after the war.<sup>59a</sup> In reality EAM was the continuation and development of the massive mobilization of the lower classes which had taken place in the 1930s. The war and the resistance finally enabled the social forces which had been demobilized by Metaxas' dictatorship to become politically active again and prepare the ground for the establishment of a dynamic political formation independent of the traditional parties.

Apart from influencing large segments of the urban population, EAM's programme and activities also contributed to the radicalization and mobilization of the peasantry. EAM not only assumed control over the largest part of the provinces through its military branch ELAS (Greek People's Liberation Army), but it also made a great effort towards the political and administrative reorganization of the areas it controlled. New institutions of self-government and people's courts of justice were introduced which made known to the peasants for

the first time the benefits of democracy and political participation. New schools and theatre contributed to the cultural development of the rural population, which had previously been neglected by the centre. As a fierce opponent of EAM-ELAS later admitted, "the benefits of culture and education appeared in the mountains for the first time (...) A communal life was organized to replace the traditional individualism of the Greek peasant. EAM-ELAS created the conditions of what the Greek governments had overlooked: an organized state in the mountains"<sup>60</sup>.

These policies together with a programme of social welfare applied especially at times of food shortages and hunger increased immensely the popularity and broadened the social base of EAM and contributed to its development into the biggest movement followed far behind by smaller resistance groups of liberal or conservative convictions<sup>61</sup>. Although there are no accurate figures available regarding the membership of EAM-ELAS, it appears that by the end of the war EAM had between 500,000 and 2,000,000 members (in a population of 7,000,000) As for ELAS its members were estimated at 50,000 during the same period<sup>62</sup>. By 1944 almost all Greece apart from Athens was under the control of EAM-ELAS which had become consequently the major political force in the country.

The establishment of a government in the mountains (PEEA), in March 1944 marked the beginning of a process of realization of EAM's plans for a social and political reform and the prevention of new dictatorial solutions after the end of the war. With the preservation of national unity as one of its main objectives, PEEA (Political Committee of National Liberation) sought to achieve the cooperation of the traditional political leaders, most of whom were participating in the King's governments in Cairo, for the formation of a coalition government after the liberation of the country. Indeed in May 1944, representatives of PEEA, of all resistance groups and

political parties met at a conference in Lebanon, presided over by the Prime Minister of the Cairo government, G.Papandreou. Among other things, the participants agreed upon the formation of a government of national unity which after the war would take the necessary measures to guarantee the holding of free elections and a referendum on the future of the monarchy<sup>63</sup>.

The political situation, however, was far from idyllic. The prospect of the domination of EAM and of a political reform that the majority of the population seemed to be in favour of, was not welcomed by any of the forces which had participated in or supported the government of Cairo. As could be expected, the left-wing movement in Greece was seen with hostility by the traditional political leaders insofar as it called into question the social and political structures which had existed in Greece before the war, thus posing a threat to their own political future. The parliamentary representatives of the bourgeoisie, who, alarmed by the mobilization of the 1930s had surrendered power to Metaxas, chose not to participate in the resistance; instead, they followed the King into exile seeking support primarily from the British government which in turn saw them as a political counter-weight to the power of EAM-ELAS.

The British had also every reason to be alarmed by the enormous influence of EAM among the Greek people: first because under the domination of the Left the prospect of the abolition of monarchy, the power of which the British government was eager to restore after the war, was very likely. And secondly, because this domination of EAM was counter to Britain's interests in the Mediterranean; it is now well known that already by the end of 1943 (Teheran conference) Greece was considered to lie within the British sphere of influence<sup>64</sup>.

Finally, hostile towards EAM-ELAS were all those ultra Right-wing segments of the bourgeoisie, the bureaucracy and the

military which were looking forward to a return to the political situation that had been established with Metaxas' dictatorship in 1936<sup>65</sup>. All those forces united by their hostility towards EAM were preparing to prevent the establishment of any de facto situation by the Left after the Germans' withdrawal. Their plans were also facilitated by the stance of EAM itself, which keen to preserve national unity accepted the allocation of minor posts to its representatives in Papandreou's coalition government.

Moreover, with the agreement of Kazerta in September 1944, EAM accepted to place all its resistance organizations under the command of British general Scobie and also agreed that ELAS would not enter Athens<sup>66</sup>. The problems of the policy of national reconciliation which had become apparent soon after the Lebanon conference aggravated rapidly when the government returned to liberated Greece in October 1944<sup>67</sup>. At the centre of the dispute which erupted between EAM on the one side and Papandreou and the British on the other was the disbanding of ELAS which the latter were pressingly demanding. At the same time Papandreou's government backed by the British, refused to dismantle the fiercely anti-communist 'Mountain Brigade' and was unable to control a number of collaborationist groups used by the Germans to fight EAM-ELAS and to terrorise the supporters of the left in the provinces. It was this dispute which led to the first military confrontation and defeat of EAM by the government forces in December 1944. The policy of national unity had failed and the prospects for the implementation of EAM's programme of social reform became more and more bleak.

A last attempt to preserve peace was made with the Varkiza Agreement in February 1945. According to this agreement which was drafted under British pressure, the Left was obliged to disband all its military organizations - ELAS, ELAN (EAM'S Navy) etc - while the Athens government undertook the



responsibility among other things of restoring civil liberties, purging the military and security forces of all collaborators of the Metaxas' regime and of the Nazis, and of holding as soon as possible the referendum on the monarchy and subsequent general elections for a new Constitutional Assembly.

Nevertheless, whereas ELAS was disarmed within the agreed deadlines, the government did not take the necessary measures for the implementation of the agreement. Moreover, it tolerated the development of an unprecedented surge of terror against the supporters of EAM and other democratic segments of the population in which Nazi collaborators together with the local police and the militia were involved. The number and fierceness of atrocities, the destruction of property and the constant fear which a large part of the population was experiencing led many left-wingers and ex-partisans to form the first groups of self-defence. These groups, together with a small number of ELAS fighters who had refused to conform to the Varkiza Agreement, became the nucleus of a new army of the Left which was to fight against the government forces during the imminent civil war<sup>68</sup>.

It was under these conditions of fear and destruction that the first general elections in ten years were held on 31 May 1946; EAM, as well as the KKE and other democratic parties of the Liberal camp abstained from the elections in protest. Apart from the royalist Right, the National Political Union also took part in the elections under the leadership of three major Liberal leaders S.Venizelos, G.Papandreou and P.Kanellopoulos who were campaigning also for a cooperation of all "nationally minded" forces against EAM. The abstention of the majority of the democratic forces from the elections, combined with widespread terror and electoral fraud, resulted in an overwhelming victory of the Right with sixty five per cent of the votes<sup>69</sup>. Thus the royalist Right was to be responsible for the preparation of the referendum on the monarchy, which was

held on the 1st of September of the same year. Although all political forces participated in the campaign, again white terror and excessive fraud gave the monarchy a staggering 68 per cent against 32 per cent for the republic<sup>70</sup>. A few weeks later George II, who had lived abroad until then, came back to his throne.

The results of the general elections and the referendum inflicted the final blow to the policy of national unity and the prospects of a peaceful political arrangement between the Left and its opponents. As available information suggests, this outcome of the elections and the referendum largely influenced the KKE's decision to support the increasing movement of self-defence militarily as well as politically. By the end of 1946, Greece was well into the civil war<sup>71</sup>. It is far beyond the scope of this study to analyse the reasons behind KKE's decision to enter into this conflict, although it had been isolated by the other forces of the non-communist Left which had participated in EAM. Our account of this controversial period aims to highlight the social and political developments in the 1940s and the political climate that led to a civil war. This new ordeal of the Greek people ended with the defeat of the Communists in August 1949. Between 1946 and 1949 the loss of human life and destruction of property reached appalling proportions: 40,000 people were killed, while 80,000-100,000 others took refuge in neighbouring communist countries<sup>72</sup>.

Most important of all, however, was that the result of the civil war created a political, social and ideological cleavage between the Right and the Left, the repercussions of which were to be felt for several decades. In the last part of this section we will briefly analyse the bourgeois regime which was established after the war, namely the organization of power and its contradictions, the guiding principles and ideology. Such an analysis we believe, is necessary for a better understanding

of the social and political conditions under which broadcasting developed in the post-war period.

The electoral victory of the Right and the restoration of monarchy marked the return to the political situation of the inter-war period. The bourgeois regime was far from being consolidated however, as neither the result of the elections nor of the referendum represented the will of the large majority of the people. For although the popularity of EAM had suffered a first blow with the events of December 1944 the Left was still the largest political force in the country. According to American reports in the beginning of the civil war at least 1/10 of the population - 700,000 people - openly considered themselves as left-wingers and another 150-200,000 could be mobilized for violent confrontation against the authorities. At the same time according to the same sources, 50 per cent of the people were hostile or suspicious towards the government<sup>73</sup>.

For these reasons the government introduced a number of emergency measures which aimed at the final suppression of the "rebellion" and also at the continuous exclusion of the Left from politics. Most important of all pieces of legislation in this respect was compulsory law 509/1947 by which the Communist party, EAM and all organizations and trade unions affiliated to them were outlawed and activities deemed subversive, such as meetings and assemblies, were punished with very heavy sentences. Moreover, with the Third edict implemented in June 1946, which punished all conspiratorial activities turned against the "integrity of the country", hundreds of people were sentenced to death by martial courts all over Greece<sup>74</sup>. A much larger number of people were deported to prison camps without trial for being suspected of subversive activities or ideas by decision of ad hoc established Committees of National Security. According to the Red Cross, in summer 1948, the number of those interned in prison camps was 16,000, while many hundreds of others were deported to small islands. In the winter of that

year all these were transferred to the prison camp of Makronissos which became notorious for the barbarous methods applied to prisoners<sup>75</sup>.

Particularly effective in the suppression of leftist ideas were the certificates of social beliefs which, based usually on a declaration of loyalty to the regime by the person concerned, were necessary for almost every activity: from finding employment and entering university to receiving a driving licence or a passport to emigrate. The ideological function of this and the other emergency measures of that period was of immense importance in a society which at first was not hostile to the communists.

If repression and atrocities contributed to the shrinkage of the social base of the Left, they were not enough to achieve an overwhelming victory of the Right in the civil war. As we have already said, the traditional political leaders of the inter-war era had lost the support of the masses, while the bourgeois strata - those which survived the war and those which emerged from it-<sup>76</sup> were still very weak to constitute a social base for the bourgeois regime. Moreover, there was not a properly organized army to confront the rebels effectively. The Greek governments were too weak to cope with the problems of a complex political situation. Being in essence a creation of British intervention, these governments depended upon Britain for aid and support and they would collapse whenever this support was withdrawn.

Foreign intervention during and after the war played a decisive role in the establishment and the consolidation of the bourgeois regime. For although the civil war was primarily an internal conflict, it had also a major international dimension as it was placed within the context of the cold war. Both the British and the Americans (the latter took over in 1947) undertook to support the government in its fight against

communism. According to available evidence, the Americans' involvement in the Greek civil war was based on their interpretation of the conflict as an immediate consequence of Soviet expansionism. Seen from the cold war perspective Greece was the most eligible place for the implementation of Truman's policy of "containment"<sup>77</sup>. Hence, thanks to the Truman doctrine and the Marshall plan Greece became the recipient of enormous military and economic aid which for 1947 alone reached \$300 million<sup>78</sup>. With American support the military was reorganized and by 1949 was strong enough to inflict a fatal blow on the rebels.

Moreover, American economic aid contributed significantly to the strengthening and consolidation of a new Greek bourgeoisie. Thus a large part of the Marshall aid, about 50 per cent of the Gross National Product (GNP), was transferred in the form of loans to the emerging capitalist classes. Equally important was the contribution of the United States in the establishment of a new class of ship-owners; by an agreement between the Greek government and the Americans 100 old warrior ships were sold to Greek ship-owners at less than 50 per cent of their initial price. Thus in all, between 1941 and 1953 40,000 new industries were established which together with enterprises in other sectors of the economy (trade, shipping, transportation and construction) amounted to about 140,000 businesses<sup>79</sup>. Therefore, British and then American political support as well as military and economic aid determined to a large extent the outcome of the civil war and the establishment of the post-war social and political status quo.

The defeat of the Communists in August 1949 marked the end of the social conflict which had originated in the inter-war era and come to a head in the 1940s. The enormous suffering of the 1945-49 period combined with repression and anti-communist state propaganda led to the dramatic shrinkage of the social base of the Left. The latter was now pushed to the margins of

political life, whereas the reconstituted traditional forces of the Right and Centre dominated once again the political scene. Highly personalized, the political parties of these two camps consisted of notables with local clienteles clustered around a powerful leader. Another important development which took place during the civil war was the ideological and political convergence of the two traditionally rival political camps. The future of the monarchy which had created a cleavage in the inter-war period between the Right (Populists) and the Centre (Liberals) was no longer a dividing issue. In the face of the Communist threat and the danger of their own political elimination most Liberal leaders finally recognized the throne as the cornerstone of the existing social and political order.

As Meynaud has pointed out, the post war forces of the Right and the Centre were two alternative versions of conservatism, respectively the authoritarian (or traditional) and the liberal<sup>80</sup>. Their differences did not refer to the form of the social and economic structures, but to different political strategies in the management of power. Both political formations agreed upon the need for rapid economic development. But whereas the Right put forward a programme of intensive capital accumulation at the expense of the lower income groups and based on social discipline and repression, the model that the Centre proposed was the establishment of a wider social consensus through a relative liberalization of the regime and the widening of the internal markets.

In the first general elections after the civil war in March 1950, the parties of the Centre with their programme of moderation and national reconciliation won 57 per cent of the vote. However, the fragmentation of the Liberal forces caused primarily by personal rivalry among their leaders and fundamental disagreements on the issue of amnesty to the defeated of the civil war resulted in political instability and successive government reshuffles.

In 1951, Field Marshal Papagos, a wartime hero and the chief commander of the military forces in the last phase of the civil war, announced the establishment of a new party of the Right. Papagos, who aspired to present himself as the Greek De Gaulle, managed to reunite all the forces of the Right into his Greek Rally which was both in terms of its title and strategy influenced by the Rassemblement du Peuple Français. Under strong American pressure, a new majority electoral system was introduced which in the elections of November 1952 gave the Greek Rally 49.2 per cent of the vote and 82.3 per cent of the seats in parliament. This result marked the beginning of an 11 year rule by the Right which at first under Papagos and later (1955) under his successor Constantine Karamanlis (and under the new name of Greek Radical Union, ERE) introduced a new form of authoritarian government. To a considerable extent the monopoly of power by the Right was facilitated by the continuous fragmentation of the Centre forces, which throughout the 1950s proved unable to form a united party and thus to present a credible alternative to the Greek Rally and ERE.

In any case, the Right with its uncompromisingly anti-communist stance and its governmental stability became the safeguard of the interests of all those forces which constituted the winning side of the civil war - the palace, the bourgeoisie, the anti-communist state apparatus (the military, the security forces and the bureaucracy) and the Americans. The political period after 1952 was characterized by a systematic use of all mechanisms of mass manipulation, which N. Mouzelis would call systems of political incorporation and exclusion<sup>81</sup>. The main components of the post war political system were the revived patronage networks which benefited mostly the party in power; and the continuous application of the emergency legislation of the civil war, which became an effective mechanism for the exclusion of the Communists and their sympathizers from politics and the state machine. The KKE and its organizations remained outlawed while the members and

supporters of the United Democratic Left Party, EDA, the only legitimate representative of the Left in that period, faced constant persecution and intimidation from the repressive apparatus. It is characteristic that between 1951 and 1967 the number of people deported reached 1,722<sup>82</sup>. Moreover, with a law on espionage first introduced by Metaxas in 1936 (Compulsory Law 375/1936) a significant number of Communists were condemned to death by martial courts and several of them executed<sup>83</sup>.

Another major characteristic of the post-war parliamentary regime was the establishment of government tutelage of the labour movement through an elaborate system which secured a majority of the Right in all major unions and especially the General Confederation of Labour, GSEE. Furthermore, special mechanisms were established for the effective policing of trade unionists; most important of these was the trade unions section of the Public Security Services<sup>84</sup>. Finally, through a series of unfair electoral systems which were designed to secure right-wing majorities and through the intimidation of the rural population by the security forces and various para-state organizations both the Greek Rally and especially ERE managed to dominate the political life of Greece for more than a decade.

To summarize, the bourgeois regime which was established after the civil war was not in reality a democratic one. Imposed from above as the outcome of a violent confrontation rather than the outcome of a social consensus, the regime had to be protected from the dangers posed by the popular movement. Thus, the forces which emerged as the victors of the civil war resorted to a complex system of control and manipulation of the masses in order to prevent the emergence of new movements which could demand social reforms and the democratization of political structures. Therefore, behind the parliamentary facade, which was enhanced by the presence of EDA, a powerful anti-communist state was established. Its main components were:



the emergency legislation of the civil war and a fiercely anti-communist repressive apparatus (military and security forces) which throughout the post war period served as guardians of the social and economic order. It is for these reasons that analysts of Greek politics have called the post war regime repressive parliamentarism<sup>85</sup>, exclusivist system<sup>86</sup> and parliamentary dictatorship<sup>87</sup>.

## 2.4 Conclusion

The initial phase of Greek broadcasting coincided with the most turbulent period of modern Greek history. The social conflict and political mobilization which originated in the inter-war period, led to the establishment of a dictatorship in 1936 and subsequently to a civil war, the political and ideological implications of which were to haunt Greek public life for several decades. Radio was introduced by the Metaxist dictatorship in a haphazard fashion and was subsequently incorporated in the machinery of the government in order to serve as a means for the legitimation of the new political order that Metaxas aspired to establish.

The extremely centralized organization in which all aspects of policy were determined by the powerful Ministry of Information and Tourism laid the foundations of a tradition of government manipulation of radio which continues until the present day. The authoritarian and anti-communist policies of the 'New State' led to the development of a mentality of conformity within RSA's largely conservative staff, which provided the necessary grounds for the medium's subjugation to political power in the anti-communist state which was established in the aftermath of the civil war.

## NOTES

1. Radio set imports started in 1925. According to an estimation of the Metaxas' regime, in the period preceding the coup there were 10,000 sets all over the country. Kathimerini, 2-8-1940.
2. Five licences had been given to amateurs in 1937. The government withdrew the licences for reasons of national security after the Second World War broke out in 1939. See K.Karayiannis: Greek Radiophony, publication of the Radio Karayiannis enterprise, Athens 1952, p. 110.
3. Tsigirides was forced to close down the station in 1947 as this was breaching the monopoly of the National Broadcasting Institute, EIR.
4. K.TSOUKALAS: The Greek Tragedy (in Greek), Nea Synora Athens, 1981, chapter 3. For more about the unstable interwar republic, see G. MAVROGORDATOS: Stillborn Republic, University of California Press, Berkeley 1983; and T.VOURNAS: A History of Modern Greece 1909-1940 (in Greek), Tolidis, Athens 1977, chapter 9.
5. In 1929 Venizelos' government held an international competition for the provision of transmission equipment. The successful bidder was to provide a Marconi transmitter for the installation and operation of which he was to receive 1 drachma daily from each radio owner. For unknown reasons, however, the government withdrew the contract.
6. Law 4551 of 16 April 1930, article 4.
7. For instance state-owned land was to be provided free for the building of premises and the installation of equipment.
8. Article 30 of Law 4551. Thus, the state would take 7-65% of the income from the annual fee, 18-30% of the income from advertising and 50% of the profits.
9. Article 3 of Law 4551. Also, according to article 4, the state could buy the broadcasting equipment of the company eleven years after the implementation of the law.

10. In the fiscal year 1931-32 for instance, the service of the public debt took up 3,587 million drachmas; 4,550 million went to administrative services, 1,767 million to defence and nil to productive works. See J.V. KOFAS: Authoritarianism in Greece, New York 1983 and Tsoukalas, op. cit. for more details.
11. See Radio Karayiannis, op.cit.; N. ALIVIZATOS: State and Broadcasting (in Greek), Athens 1986 and T. DOULKERI: Broadcasting and its Legal and Social Problems (in Greek), Papazisis, Athens 1979.
12. Throughout the Liberal government's office, unemployment increased by a staggering 216% and wages fell by almost 13%. Kofas op. cit., p. 2
13. Ibid.
14. The unrest reached its climax in Salonica on 8,9 and 10 of May when 32 workers were killed and another 300 injured by the gendarmerie, ibid.
15. See S. LINARDATOS: The Fourth of August (in Greek), Dialogos, Athens 1975, p. 11.
16. The Parliament endorsed Metaxas' government with 241 votes and conceded to it substantial legislative powers. Moreover the Parliament decided to suspend its functions for 5 months.
17. For a detailed analysis of Metaxas' ideology, see Kofas op. cit., p. 52-64, Linardatos op.cit, p. 89-117, N. ALIVIZATOS: The Political Institutions in Crisis (in Greek), Themelio, Athens 1986, p. 108-129.
18. See for instance, Linardatos ibid, Tsoukalas op. cit. and Vournas op.cit.
19. According to the Fuhrerprinzip, the Fuhrer is the source of all powers: Legislative, Executive and Judiciary.
20. See Alivizatos, op.cit., p. 433-440; and Linardatos, op. cit., p. 61-87
21. See Kofas, op.cit., p. 83-97; and Linardatos, ibid, p. 159-212.
22. According to the regime propaganda, within the first four years of the dictatorship, the YTT had published 40 books and booklets and a number of other luxury publications.

KATHIMERINI, 2.8.1940.

23. During this second phase, Metaxas replaced all conservative members of his government and military chiefs with persons completely loyal to him personally and introduced new pieces of legislation which was to accelerate the establishment of what Metaxas perceived as a totalitarian state. See Kofas op.cit., p. 56-76; and Alivizatos op. cit., p. 401-446.

24. Alivizatos ibid, p. 440-446; Linardatos op.cit., p. 159-211.

25. Linardatos ibid, p. 76; Kofas op. cit., p. 98.

26. Linardatos ibid, p. 72.

27. Ibid, pp. 73-75; and Kofas, op.cit, p. 85.

28. Linardatos ibid, p. 81-82.

29. See the cynical explanation about this policy given by Maniadakis himself in confidential circular 9/118/15 of 8.2.1939, quoted by Alivizatos op. cit., p. 437-438.

30. Apart from a few journalists who were arrested, there was no significant resistance by journalists to the dictatorship. Linardatos op. cit., p. 79-80.

31. Compulsory Law 1092 'on the press' and Compulsory Law 1093 'on press organizations' both passed on 22.2.1938.

32. The above cases were included in the Constitution of 1864/1911.

33. C.L. 1093/1938, articles 9-12.

34. See series of articles in KATHIMERINI, op.cit.

35. The law did not state explicitly that YRE was to have the monopoly of broadcasting.

36. H. FLEISCHER refers to Voulpiotis' power in his article "The Nazi Propaganda in Greece", TO VIMA 18.6.1989. Also, see K. CHATZIDOULIS: The History of Greek Radio, in ELEFTHEROTYPIA 6.6.1988. For the extensive financial and commercial relations between Nazi Germany and Greece see Linardatos op.cit., p. 141.

37. See G. KARTER's chronicle in RADIOTELEORASSI magazine, 11.3.1978.

38. Linardatos op. cit., p. 189.

39. See "50 Years since the Fourth of August" (in Greek) in

- SCHOLIASTIS magazine, no 41, August 1986, p. 28-29.
40. Kofas, op. cit., p. 55-56
41. See lengthy and moving descriptions of their life in the islands, in Linardatos, op. cit., p. 411-473.
42. Ibid, p. 215-241.
43. Spyros Melas in KATHIMERINI, July 1940 (exact date missing) quoted in SCHOLIASTIS, op.cit.
44. KATHIMERINI, 2.8.1940 series of articles on the achievements of the "New State".
45. G.D. Koromilas on radio, quoted in SCHOLIASTIS, op. cit.
46. See the festive issue of the Weekly Programme of the RSA, 4-10 August 1940.
47. See the account of the then head of news programmes D. CHRONOPOULOS: Past and Present in the Mass Media (in Greek), Athens 1981, p. 10.
48. Spyros Melas, op. cit.
49. Figures from KATHIMERINI, ibid and AION magazine, no 11, January 1960, p. 31.
50. We have already referred to the extensive trade exchanges between Greece and Germany during the dictatorship. There was a major part of the bourgeoisie which had had important links with Germany and was against a war with the Axis. See for instance, Tsoukalas, op.cit., p. 45.
51. The King left Athens on April 22 1941 and fled to Crete, then to London and finally Cairo; from the exile he claimed the continuation of the Greek state. Metaxas had died early in 1941, shortly before Germany attacked Greece.
52. Tsolacoglou was succeeded as Prime Minister by professor G. Logothetopoulos (2.12.1942-7.4.1943) and I. Rallis (7.4.1943-11.10.1944), a member of the Populist party.
53. For more about the German propaganda in Greece, see H. Fleischer in TO VIMA, 18.6.1989.
54. Legislative Decree 126 of 4 June 1941. As far as we know, Telefunken did not fulfil its obligations towards the Greek state.
55. Interview of the then announcer of AERE N.Hakkas with the

author, 16.12.1986

56. See H.Fleischer, op. cit., and Linardatos, op. cit., p 211. Just before the German army evacuated Greece in 1944, Karaiskaki fled to Germany.

57. Radio Karayiannis, op. cit., p. 120.

58. JOHN IATRIDES: "Occupation, Resistance and the British", in Greece in the 1940s and 50s (in Greek), Athens 1984.

59. See C.M.Woodhouse's book "The Apple of Discord", quoted by Alivizatos, The Political..., op. cit., p.146-147.

60. From Woodhouse's book *ibid*, as quoted by Alivizatos, *ibid*. Since October 1943 Woodhouse was the chief of the Allies military mission in the Greek mountains. See also: I.CHONDROS: "The Greek Resistance Movement" 1941-1944, and C.M.WOODHOUSE: "EAM and its Relation with Britain", in *Greece in the 1940s...*, op.cit.

61. Most important of these resistance groups were EDES and EKKA both founded by liberal, anti-royalist army officers. Soon, however, both these organizations entered into conflict with EAM. See note 10 for bibliography and Tsoukalas, op. cit.

62. For the various estimates see Chondros op. cit.

63. See for more details P. PAPASTRATIS: "Papandreou and the Lebanon Conference", in *Greece in the 1940s...*, op. cit.

64. Alivizatos, The Political..., op. cit. p. 152.

65. See I. PETROPOULOS: "The Greek Traditional Political Parties during the Occupation" in, *Greece in the 1940s and 1950s* op. cit.; D. CHARALAMBIS: Army and Political Power in Post-Civil- War Greece (in Greek), Exandas, Athens 1985, p. 24-36; and K. TSOUKALAS: State, Society Labour (in Greek), Themelio, Athens 1986, p.31

66. Tsoukalas, The Greek Tragedy, op. cit., p. 66. Kazerta is an Italian city near Naples which had become the basis of the coalition government shortly before the liberation.

67. The government of national unity under Papandreou returned to Greece on 18 October 1944. It was accompanied by British officials and military forces.

68. Between the date of the Varkiza Agreement, 12-2-1945 and

31st of March 1946, there were 1,289 murders, 84,931 arrests, and 31,632 cases of torture. See G.MAVROGORDATOS: "Elections and Referendum 1946", in Greece in the 1940s..., op.cit.

69. The decision to abstain from the elections has been considered by most writers of that period as a fatal mistake of the Left, which lost a last opportunity to participate in politics preventing therefore the civil war. For the elections see Tsoukalas, The Greek Tragedy, op. cit., Mavrogordatos ibid, p. 317.

70. Mavrogordatos ibid.

71. Ibid. Indeed, it was after the summer of 1946 that the strength of the partisan army increased from 1500-2700 to 8000-13500 men.

72. According to other sources, the dead were four times more than officially stated; Tsoukalas, The Greek Tragedy op.cit., p. 102. The number of people who became homeless amounted to several hundred thousands.

73. See Reports of the State Department and the commander of the Joint US Military Advisory and Programming Group in J. IATRIDES, "The Civil War 1945-49", in Greece in the 1940s...op. cit., p. 344.

74. See N. ALIVIZATOS: "State of Emergency and Civil Liberties" in Greece in the 1940s...ibid, p. 397, note 15.

75. See for instance series of articles in MACHI, 11 and 28.4.1950.

76. Due to black market, transfer of property and collaboration with the occupying authorities a new wealthy class emerged during the war. K. VERGOPOULOS suggests that throughout the German occupation 6,500 new industries were established. "The Establishment of a New Bourgeoisie", in Greece in the 1940s...op. cit., p. 534.

77. Charalambis op. cit.; L.W.Wittner: "The USA Policy towards Greece 1944-1949", in Greece in the 1940s...ibid.

78. Tsoukalas, The Greek Tragedy... op. cit., p. 94.

79. Vergopoulos op. cit., p. 548-9.

80. See J. MEYNAUD: The Political Forces in Greece (in Greek),

Bayron, Athens (date missing).

81. N. MOUZELIS: Parliamentarism and Industrialization in the Semi-periphery (in Greek) Athens 1986, p. 235-45.

82. Alivizatos, The political institutions...op. cit., p. 579.

81. N. Mouzelis: Parliamentarism and Industrialization in the semi-periphery, Themelio, Athens 1987.

83. We note here the most famous of all cases that of N. Beloyiannis and another three KKE members who were executed in March 1952. See S. LINARDATOS: From the Civil War to the Dictatorship, (in Greek), Athens 1975, vol 1.

84. Meynaud op. cit., p. 181-7; and Alivizatos, The political institutions...op. cit., p. 591-600.

85. N. MOUZELIS: "Capitalism and Dictatorship in Post-war Greece", New Left Review, no 96, March-April 1976, p. 57-80.

86. N. DIAMANDOUROS: "Transition and Consolidation of Democratic Politics in Greece 1974-1983", in G. PRIDHAM (ed) The new Mediterranean Democracies, Frank Cas USA 1984.

87. Charalambis op. cit.



## CHAPTER 3

### BROADCASTING IN THE POST-CIVIL WAR ERA: 1950-1967.

#### 3.1 Introduction

As was shown in the preceding analysis, the socio-political order which was established in Greece in the post-war period was not based on a broad social and political consensus; it was imposed from above and secured through the defeat of the communists in the civil war. Thus, those forces which found themselves on the victorious side, and especially the Right which monopolized power for over a decade, sought to employ extensively the mechanisms of the state in order to consolidate the bourgeois regime and reproduce their power. Apart from repression and the consolidation of new bourgeois and middle classes through the distribution of resources by the state, ideology also played a central role in legitimizing the new status quo. In particular, broadcasting was used by successive governments as a major means for anti-communist propaganda and for influencing the electorate in favour of their policies. In this chapter, we will examine the institutional organization of broadcasting after the war and the rationale behind the establishment of a state monopoly; the ideological role of broadcasting; and the relationship between broadcasting institutions and the political world, especially those holding executive power.

### 3.2 The new ideological framework or the search for legitimacy.

We briefly examined in the previous chapter the process under which the post-war bourgeois regime was established in Greece and the measures that the victors of the civil war applied in order to eliminate politically the left-wing movement. Repression was the necessary strategy for the continuous exclusion of the most radical part of the population from the political process. It could not guarantee, however, the final abandonment by the masses of the demand for political and economic reforms. The mass mobilization of the 1940s and the "direct experience of collective political activity"<sup>1</sup> combined with the discontent caused by the ambiguous stance of the traditional politicians during the occupation had largely destroyed the foundations of the pre-war political system. After the war the reconstitution of patronage networks and the institutionalization of repression became the main forms of political control of the masses. Nevertheless, the political balance which had been imposed from above was still precarious. Despite the hostility that the majority of the population seemed to feel towards the Communists after the civil war, the elections of 1950 and 1951 clearly indicated that the largest part of the people favoured a policy of reconciliation and consequently of democratisation. Moreover, despite the terror exercised by the state and para-state organizations, in 1951 the newly established EDA gained 10.57 per cent of the vote and 10 seats in parliament<sup>2</sup>. A new strategy had to be invented, therefore, which could in the long run achieve a broad popular consensus for bourgeois domination and the power structure which became its political expression.

New legitimating mechanisms had to be developed and it was the Greek state which undertook this task. In the post-war period the state acquired a dominant position within the Greek social formation by allocating resources to and securing the

vital interests of a large part of the population. The role of the first post-war governments was decisive in the establishment and consolidation of a new capitalist class, through loans based primarily on American aid, a large number of subsidies, protective measures and a system of indirect taxation. Moreover, amid conditions of widespread poverty and unemployment (the latter was estimated at 30 per cent throughout the 1950s)<sup>3</sup> the state became the main - if not the only - hope for employment for a large part of the population. Already in 1949, the number of civil servants had reached 144,000, an increase of 69 per cent within a decade. Furthermore, the permanent military staff amounted to 65,000 whereas an unspecified number of people were working in state-controlled organizations (banks, transport, telecommunications, local government, etc)<sup>4</sup>. In this way, a new petty bourgeoisie emerged of state employees which together with the wealthier strata constituted the social base of the new regime.

The consolidation of the middle strata through the distribution of wealth was the main component of the legitimating strategy of the post-war state. It was not enough to secure a broad popular consensus. What was also necessary was the ideological integration of the dominated classes. A new 'hegemonic' ideology was therefore necessary and the state sought to provide it. Although the civil war was presented as the struggle between liberal democracy and communist totalitarianism<sup>5</sup>, in reality the Greek bourgeoisie was too weak, insecure and dependent on the state<sup>6</sup> for its survival to be able to reproduce Western bourgeois values as the dominant ideology of Greek society; the traditional liberal principles of political pluralism, freedom of speech, equality before the law and free elections could threaten its uncertain power. A new ideology had to be introduced, through which the authoritarian organization of power and the limited political role of the masses within it could become broadly accepted; this new official ideology was anti-communism.

The content of this new ideology was not, however, the criticism or resentment of the principles and shortcomings of communism or socialism. At a time when poverty and unemployment had hit hard the largest part of the population<sup>7</sup> the ideology of the Left had to be stripped of its political and social content and its relevance to class relations. Political antagonism had to be separated from class conflict. In this context, communism became a menace against national security, while the Left was identified with the perennial enemies of Greece - the Slavic countries which after the war happened to have established communist regimes. Hence, the Right-Left polarization was no longer a conflict between the bourgeois regime and the dominated classes, but a fight of the "Nation against its enemies". The reinforcement in 1950 of the law on espionage, by which the Communists were in practice identified with spies, is indicative of the climate of that period. In this way the 'national interest' was identified with the security of the established regime. A new term, 'Ethnikofrossyni' (commitment to nationalistic attitudes), was invented to describe the approved political ethos, which in the last analysis was nothing more than conformity to the restrictions imposed on political activity through repression and patronage. A new nationalism was developed therefore, which unlike that of the 19th and early 20th centuries did not have an irredentist but rather a defensive character; its main ideal was the reference to the Ancient and Greek-Orthodox traditions which the 'nation' had to preserve in order to survive the 'external menace'. The similarity to the Metaxist ideals is very obvious.

This climate of repression and ideological confusion affected the cultural life of the country. As Tsoukalas rightly points out<sup>8</sup>, in a period of acute political and social problems, social criticism was absent from all sectors of intellectual life. The Left, from within which a significant number of thinkers and writers had emerged in the 1930s, was

now placed in a political and ideological ghetto. Many of its intellectuals had been imprisoned, self-exiled or simply silenced by censorship and repression. In 1955, to give only one example, many leftist publishers and writers were deported to prison camps while the police even confiscated translations of 'suspected' classics, such as Hugo, Balzac and Dostoevsky<sup>9</sup>. As for the non-communist liberal intellectuals of the inter-war period, they chose to abstain from any commentary on the political situation and turned to other less controversial subjects<sup>10</sup>. Oddly enough, they were the same people who had overtly opposed Metaxas' dictatorship. We will not try to explain their stance, for this is a complex matter requiring a separate study; it seems to us however, that the establishment of representative institutions after the war and the illusion of democracy and free expression that parliamentarism created must have been largely responsible for the adoption of this neutral stance by non-communist intellectuals. Under these circumstances, the social and political sciences also remained underdeveloped for almost the entire period until the downfall of the dictatorship.<sup>11</sup>

The state with its reinforced role in post-war Greece took on the most significant ideological-indoctrinating functions. Beyond the purely ideological apparatuses, education and the media (especially broadcasting), of major importance as means of ideological persuasion was the anti-communist legislation which had been introduced after the civil war. These emergency measures aimed primarily at punishing the ideological inclination towards the Left, being interpreted as an intention of subversive activity, as well as the activities themselves. For instance, Compulsory Law 509/1947 punished any "attempt at the implementation of ideas ostensibly aiming at the violent overthrow of the regime (...) or the detachment of a part of the country"<sup>12</sup>. We should also mention here the ideological pressure exercised through the 'certificates of social beliefs' which were the necessary ticket to employment in the state

apparatus. In a country where more than one third of the population were unemployed, the selective offer of employment by the state on ideological grounds appeared as reward for the 'nationally minded' and conversely, a punishment for those with left-wing ideas.

Education, one of the state's most important ideological apparatuses, was seriously affected by anti-communism. By 1947, 3,633 teachers and university professors had been purged, by far the biggest number of all sectors of the state machine<sup>13</sup>. This policy caused a serious shortage of staff and for this reason serious disruptions to the already problematic functioning of Greek education<sup>14</sup>. The content of the curricula was also influenced by the post-war ideals. According to the 1952 Constitution (article 16), school lessons had as their goal the "moral and intellectual education and the development of the national consciousness of the youth on the basis of the ideological directions of the Helleno-Christian civilization". To give only one example, in 1961, at a high school of classical orientation (emphasis on language and literature) out of the 36 hours of the weekly timetable, 7-8 were taken up by ancient Greek (grammar and syntax, rather than discussion of content) whereas only 4 hours were dedicated to the modern Greek language. Also, religion was a compulsory lesson for all classes of the high school taking up 2 hours of the weekly timetable, while only three hours were allocated to history and civil education together<sup>15</sup>.

The press became from the beginning of the civil war one of the main targets of repressive legislation and practice. Government measures were aimed especially at left-wing newspapers and publications, a large number of which had sprung up during the years of the occupation by the Axis powers. According to one source, EAM-ELAS and its various local and other organizations as well as the KKE and the other parties which participated in EAM published regularly throughout the

occupation 252 newspapers, magazines and other publications. There was also an unspecified number of leaflets and newsletters published under the most primitive of conditions by members and supporters of EAM<sup>16</sup>. Moreover, a significant number of journalists of different political affiliations contributed regularly to underground publications while working at the same time for the official press which was under the control of the occupying forces and the quisling government<sup>17</sup>. Some of the major illegal publications continued to circulate for a short period after the liberation of the country<sup>18</sup>. Shortly after the civil war began, however, under a number of emergency measures most of the publications were banned and the people involved in them were persecuted.

The first major piece of legislation which restricted the freedom of the press was passed in November 1946 and authorized the confiscation of newspapers, magazines and other publications if they contained articles of "rebellious content, aiming at the overthrow of the democratic bases of the existing regime or being against the security of the State and the public order". Confiscation was also authorized when papers sought to publish information about the movements of the armed forces and about the fortification of the country<sup>19</sup>. The main target of this measure was Rizospastis (Radical), the official organ of the KKE, which published on a daily basis information about the rebels' movements and announcements of the party leadership which the official government was keen to prevent from reaching the public. Nevertheless, it was not until a year later that the government decided to silence the Communist press. Until then, Rizospastis and a number of other papers and publications were circulating legally; besides, the government, keen to maintain a democratic facade, was still hesitating to outlaw the Communist Party. By the end of 1947, however, the situation had so aggravated as the struggle intensified further, that the muzzling of the Communist papers was considered an indispensable measure in the fight against the

rebels. As Christos Ladas, the Minister of Justice remarked, "it is necessary to oppose the tricks of the rebels with the determination of the State to finish with the rebellion and its propagandists"<sup>20</sup>. And he went on, "the continuation of the struggle is unacceptable according to common sense while at the same time the rebel continues to be served by journalistic organs circulating freely (...) poisoning every effort, praising the rebellion, calling for its continuation (...) and undermining shamelessly everything which is sacred in the Motherland"<sup>21</sup>.

Hence, edict 31 banned "as long as the rebellion continued" the publication of all newspapers and magazines the contents of which proved that "by serving consciously and purposely those who raised their weapons against the Motherland and who conspired against the integrity of the country, (these publications) refused systematically to abide by the laws of the State and evidently served by all means the rebellion". At the same time the court had to order the confiscation of the assets, furniture, printing machines and other material of the banned publications. The martial courts which were exclusively empowered to deal with these cases could sentence to temporary - or even life - imprisonment those who sought to continue the publication of the paper under the same or a similar title. Finally, those who were caught holding copies of the outlawed publications could be sentenced to a maximum of three years' imprisonment if it was proven that their intention was to distribute them. The implementation of these stipulations led to the banning of sixty two newspapers, including Rizospastis and Eleftheri Hellada (Free Greece) the official organ of EAM. Moreover, as it appeared that some banned newspapers continued to be published under different titles<sup>22</sup>, under the provisions of edict 32 the government forbade the publication of any new papers and periodicals without previous permission from the Undersecretary of the Press and Information. Also, many of the publishers and journalists who were working for left-wing



papers were arrested and deported to islands and prison camps<sup>23</sup>. Beyond these edicts, there was also Compulsory Law 509/1947 which stipulated life imprisonment and in certain cases capital punishment for anybody who "pursued the implementation of ideas (...) aiming at the overthrow of the regime or at the detachment of part of the country by violent means" or anybody who "exercised indoctrination for the implementation of these ideas" (article 2, par. 1). In those cases where these offences were committed by the press, the writer of the article, the director or publisher of the paper and the distributor - if he was informed in advance about the content of the publication - were suspended from their work for one year and in cases of a second offence sine die (article 3, par.2); all offences defined by law 509, including those of the press, fell under the jurisdiction of martial courts (article 7, par.2).

The peculiarity of the press legislation of the post-war period was that it could neutralise the left-wing press and also prevent any serious criticism in the press about the government's policies, especially those concerning civil liberties, without the imposition of censorship. These measures enabled the government to refuse permission for the publication of new papers<sup>24</sup> and the banning of others<sup>25</sup>. Moreover, in many cases publishers and journalists were arrested and tried by martial courts for articles on the government's record on human rights. A major example of this policy was the Socialist paper Machi (Battle), the only left-wing paper in our knowledge to circulate legally at that time, the director of which as well as some of its reporters were repeatedly tried by martial courts<sup>26</sup>. In this way, while giving the impression of safeguarding press freedom due to the lack of censorship, the first governments of the post-war period managed to neutralize the left wing press. The grave situation of journalists at that time was best described by Machi which went so far as to suggest in one of its editorials that " censorship was a more

humanist measure (than the rest of the legislation)...because it affected texts, whereas the emergency measures affected individuals" and to conclude that "the freedom of the press is restricted in Greece not by censorship but by terror"<sup>27</sup>. Beyond these measures the circulation of liberal and leftist papers was hindered outside the urban areas by the intervention and zeal of the local gendarmerie who intimidated readers and forced distributors not to sell the 'anti-national' publications. In Rethymno, for example, the local newsagent was forced by the police to hand to the authorities a list with the names of all buyers of Machi<sup>28</sup>.

The emergency measures and the practice of the local security forces created a climate in which only newspapers of a limited ideological and political scope were allowed to publish and circulate freely. After the closing down of Machi in the early 1950s due to a lack of readers, the only paper to represent the Left was Avgi (Dawn) which came out in 1952 as the official organ of EDA<sup>29</sup>. The legislation which restricted the freedom of the press remained in force until the "rebellion" was officially declared finished in 1962<sup>30</sup>. In the meantime, having achieved the exclusion from press publishing of those who were not 'nationally minded', the emergency measures fell into abeyance<sup>31</sup>. Even without these stipulations persecution against the left-wing press continued systematically under the provisions of the Penal Code and especially those articles dealing with insults against the authorities (article 181, par. 1)<sup>32</sup>.

The 1952 Constitution, with the numerous restrictions to press freedom that it introduced, safeguarded the "disciplined" function of the press within the limits of the repressive parliamentary system. Hence, the Constitution introduced a significant number of cases in which the confiscation of newspapers and publications was allowed. Such cases included: i. insults against the person of the King and his family; ii.

publications offending the Christian religion and public morals; iii. the revelation of information about the movements of the military and of plans regarding the fortification of the country; iv. the publication of texts which were of a "rebellious" character or undermined the national integrity of the country or constituted provocation to the commitment of high treason. Also, for the above offences and under certain conditions, the Constitution provided for the banning of newspapers and magazines and for the final deprivation of the right to work as journalists of those who had been convicted of press offences<sup>33</sup>.

Thus, after the civil war and until the dictatorship of 1967 the political scope of newspapers, with the exception of Avgi, clearly reflected the domination of the two traditional camps, the Right and the Centre, in the post-war political system. All dailies of that period supported either the Greek Rally and after 1956 ERE or the various forces of the Centre and after 1961 the integrated Centre Union party (EK). The support of the major Athenian dailies<sup>34</sup> for the right-wing and liberal parties was almost equally distributed as the table below shows:

TABLE 3. 1

	Morning	Evening
RIGHT :	'Kathimerini'(Daily)	'Messimvrini'(Noon)
(Greek Rally,	'Acropolis'	'Apogevmatini'(Afternoon)
ERE)	'Ethnikos Kyrix'	'Vradyni'(Evening)
	(National Herald)	
CENTRE:	'To Vima'(Tribune)	'Ta Nea'(The News)
(various,	'Eleftheria'(Freedom)	'Athinaiki'(Athenian)
EK)		'Ethnos'(Nation)

Amid the climate created during and after the civil war, these measures determined to a large extent the political orientation of the Greek press in the post-war period. Apart from the legislation, the increasing economic dependence of the

national papers on the state for their survival constituted also a major, and perhaps the most important, means by which successive governments have exercised pressure on newspapers and particularly on those of the opposition. State advertising, subsidies (especially the removal of duty on newsprint), significantly reduced tax rates and loans have been used by governments in the entire post-war period as both the carrot and the stick for publishers.

### **3.3 The establishment of the National Broadcasting Institute.**

Less than a year after the liberation of Greece the government of Petros Boulgaris<sup>35</sup> introduced new legislation on broadcasting. With the Constituent Act 54/15 June 1945, a new public broadcasting organization was established, the National Broadcasting Institute (EIR). AERE had been abolished in the meanwhile and its equipment which had been sequestered by the state as enemy property was transferred to the new organization<sup>36</sup>. EIR was given the monopoly of all broadcasts of sound and vision. In fact the new statute was the first to establish explicitly a state monopoly on broadcasting. The institute was placed under double state control: on the technical aspects it was to be supervised by the Minister of Communications, whereas the general supervision was to be exercised by the Undersecretary of Press and Information.

EIR was to be administered by a Board of Governors consisting of 15 members and a Director General. Thirteen out of all the members of the Board were appointed by the government, and the same applied to the Director General, who was classified as a civil servant with the same rank as the General Directors of ministries. The main sources of income of the new organization were to be the subscription fee, income from commercials and the sales of the radio-programme magazine,

as well as subsidies and loans from the state. We will not elaborate on the main principles of EIR's organization which were introduced by the new law. These provisions became the basis of broadcasting legislation and were repeated with minor modifications in all subsequent statutes. An overall review of broadcasting legislation until 1967 is given below. EIR was housed in the same old headquarters in the Rigillis square and the studios continued to be in the basement of the Zappeion. The radio service continued to broadcast via the pre-war 15 KW transmitter, for Telefunken never fulfilled its obligation established by the contract with the Greek state to provide a new transmitter of 150 KW in exchange for the operation of AERE. In a country devastated by the war (the total cost of damages was estimated officially at \$14 billion in 1938 prices) and with the entire communications network (railways, bridges, telephone and telegraph) destroyed<sup>37</sup>, the expansion and modernization of the broadcasting service could not be seen as a top priority. Besides, in the turbulent period which followed the liberation of the country, radio was seen primarily as a significant weapon of the government and the foreign powers which supported it in their fight against communism. It is characteristic that a large part of the daily programme in the first post-war years was produced by the British forces and especially by the A4 Army Broadcasting Unit and the joint English and Greek Information Service<sup>38</sup>.

After the Americans took over in 1947, Greek radio became part of a masterly organized anti-communist campaign which aimed at "arousing the people within Greece, breaking the guerilla morale and counteracting the widespread confusion of world opinion"<sup>39</sup>. In late 1948 an extensive psychological warfare programme began within the country organized and financed by the US State Department which also provided experts in different media. The American officials were actively involved in this programme mainly because they considered the propaganda of the Greek authorities as "inept" and thus

ineffective. "The Greeks must be taught to preach a dynamic doctrine of victory" an American official suggested<sup>40</sup>. One major operation of this programme was the setting up of a radio station in Thessaloniki, Northern Greece, which would also cover the communist Balkan countries. For this purpose, a 50KW transmitter was installed, which was by far the most powerful in Greece (the transmitter that EIR managed to install in the same city by the end of the 1940s had a power of only 2KW)<sup>41</sup>. The "New Radio Station of Thessaloniki" broadcast an eight-hour programme of which only two hours were in Greek. Apart from the British and American broadcasts, propaganda was exercised by the daily programmes of the General Staff, the air force and the navy<sup>42</sup>.

In January 1946, as the civil war appeared to be inevitable, the government of Liberal Th. Sophoulis passed a modification of the constituent act 54, by which preventive censorship was introduced<sup>43</sup>. According to article 1 of the new law, the Ministry of Press and Information had the right to forbid the transmission of any texts with overall or partly political content. Thus, all political programmes had to be submitted to the Ministry of Press and Information; also, every news programme crew had to include a journalist appointed especially by the Minister of Press, apparently to act as the watchdog of the government within the news department of EIR.

Apart from censorship and propaganda, the operation of Greek broadcasting was affected by the ideological climate of the civil war and the emergency legislation which was implemented at that time. As a part of the wider public sector, EIR fell within the stipulations of edict 8 of 28 August 1946 by which a large number of civil servants and more generally public workers were purged on the basis of their political beliefs. According to available information more than 14,000 people were purged by this edict up to 1949, of whom 4,000 were employees of banks and public organizations of the same status

as EIR<sup>44</sup>. Unfortunately, although testimonies of the employees of EIR suggest that purges did take place at the Institute, it became impossible to obtain any figures as to how many people were dismissed<sup>45</sup>. However in our view, more important than the number of the dismissed employees were the long-term effects of the emergency legislation on the mentality and attitude of employees within EIR as well as in the rest of the state machine. Here we refer especially to Emergency Law 516/1948 which introduced the concept of "loyalty to the regime". According to this law, which was a Greek version of Truman's Loyalty Order<sup>46</sup> special Councils of Loyalty were established in all parts of the administration and state-controlled organizations, which scrutinized the political beliefs and activities of all public workers. Additionally, these councils could request the employees to sign a special declaration of 'repentance' or 'loyalty' to the regime; those of them who refused to do so or were considered to be of 'anti-national' ideas were dismissed from the service. In practice a 'Damocles' sword' over the heads of all public employees, this legislation which remained in force until after the downfall of the dictatorship, constituted one of the most effective means for the subjugation of employees to the dominant ideology and the political power which represented it.

Beyond the general anti-communist legislation, special emphasis was placed on the legislation regarding EIR, which aimed at the complete manipulation of its personnel. Thus, included among the breaches of discipline which could even lead to the dismissal of an employee were: lack of "loyalty and devotion to the country and the national ideals" as well as any intention to overthrow the existing political and social regime; the participation in any strike, or any activity which could instigate a strike; the breach of confidentiality on matters concerning EIR's policy; habitual gambling and inappropriate conduct; and finally every activity of political character which constituted public expression of political

ideas or indoctrination<sup>47</sup>. The following testimony of an EIR employee of that time is typical of the climate that these measures had created within Greece's broadcasting organization. As a former announcer of EIR said, "there was a widespread anxiety whether we managed to retain our jobs. For according to the regulations the heads of the institute could find any reason to fire us; under a legal cover, the management was applying a high-handed practice towards the employees"<sup>48</sup>. Thus, the above measures largely contributed to the development among EIR's staff of a mentality of subordination and guaranteed the reproduction of the dominant ideology through broadcasting. Moreover, through a series of laws the first post-war governments safeguarded the tight control of the state over the broadcasting media.

In the 1952 Constitution, broadcasting was only briefly mentioned. According to article 14, par. 8, radio and "similar" audiovisual media were exempted from the provisions which protected the press against preventive measures (censorship)<sup>49</sup>. In this way, the Constitution authorized the imposition of any restriction on the freedom of expression through broadcasting and in practice enabled the establishment of an extensive government control over the medium. Following the principles which were introduced by the Constituent Act 54/1945, successive governments of the Centre and Right established in the early 1950s a legal framework for broadcasting which led to the manipulation of radio by the successive governments.

Of all pieces of legislation which retained more or less the same organizational structure for EIR we will examine in more detail, here, the Law 2312 which was passed by the Greek Rally government in 1953 and remained in force with various modifications until the advent of the dictatorship<sup>50</sup>. According to this law the Institute, which as mentioned above had the monopoly of broadcasting, was administered by two main organs: the Board of Governors and the Director General. The



Board consisted of 11 members seven of whom were top-rank members of the judiciary and state officials, appointed either ex-officio or by the Minister to the Prime Minister<sup>51</sup>. The remaining four members were personalities of "distinguished authority and education and with national activity" who were selected personally by the Minister. Finally, the Director General, who was classified as a revocable civil servant, was appointed by the government following a proposal by the Minister to the Prime Minister and could be dismissed in the same way.

Hence, the majority of the members of the administration of EIR were appointed directly by the government which had in this way an absolute control over all aspects of the institute's policy and particularly over programming. Most crucial in this respect was the role of the Director General who was primarily responsible for programming (the Board of Governors dealt in practice mostly with economic matters and the appointment of personnel). Being appointed primarily according to political criteria, the Director General was completely dependent on the favour and confidence of the government and especially the Minister to the Prime Minister who was the overall supervisor of the Institute's operation and was primarily responsible for appointments. As characteristically stated in the report with which the Bill (later Law 2312) was introduced by the government to Parliament the Director General, who was described as a "watchdog of the governing party", was seen as being "directly responsible to the government for the general policy which was applied at the institute".

As a result, whenever EIR's policy failed to please the government the Director General was dismissed. It is not accidental that in a period of 18 years (1945-1963) the government changed seventeen Directors General. We should note here that according to the previous legislation (Constituent Act 54/1945 and Compulsory Law 1775/1951) the Director General

of EIR was a permanent civil servant. The purpose of this provision was to render the head of the institute independent from the government and thus prevent any intervention in his policies. In practice, however, the provision was systematically ignored by successive governments and as a result, between 1945 and 1953, EIR had six different Directors. By Law 2312, the Greek Rally government abolished the permanency of the Director General removing in this way any potential legal obstacle to government intervention with the excuse that the provision had been in practice a dead letter<sup>52</sup>.

Following the same reasoning, the government omitted from the new statute a stipulation of the previous legislation according to which the structure and content of programmes should not be determined by party political criteria and preferences but should serve the "Nation" as a whole<sup>53</sup>. As it was not accompanied by the necessary guarantees for its implementation, this stipulation had constituted rather a declaration of good intentions than a deterrent against the political intervention of the governing party. The abolition by Law 2312 of the few restrictions to the control exercised by the government on broadcasting was in essence the legalization of an authoritarian practice which was as old as the broadcasting institute itself.

Moreover, with a modification of the law in 1957, the powers of the Minister to the Prime Minister who exercised in practice government control over EIR were further extended<sup>54</sup>. Thus, all decisions of the Institute's Board of Governors had to be examined by the minister before they were ratified. In case of a disagreement, the decisions were sent back to the Board of Governors for reconsideration<sup>55</sup>. Furthermore, the minister was empowered to request the submission by EIR's management of all programme schedules and of the relevant texts of all radio stations for approval before their transmission. In this way, the government of ERE re-established unrestrained, preventive

censorship on radio<sup>56</sup>. Although there has been no available evidence suggesting that this stipulation was implemented in practice<sup>57</sup>, it is largely indicative of the government's attitude towards broadcasting.

Finally, by a decision of the Council of Ministers in 1959 an attempt was made for the further centralization and systematization of government control over broadcasting<sup>58</sup>. The decision established a Council for the Coordination and Control of Radio Programmes attached to the Undersecretary of the Ministry to the Prime Minister. The Council had a wide range of competences which included: i. The coordination and control of radio broadcasts; ii. the preparation and definition of the content of programming; and iii. the supervision of the production of all radio programmes of all stations, both of those which belonged to EIR and of those under the command of the General Staff. The Council consisted of three members who were the Director General and the Director of Programming of EIR and a representative of the General Staff, who was a higher or top-rank officer appointed by the Minister of Defence. All the actions and decisions of the Council should be submitted to the Undersecretary for approval and modification if necessary. In this way, radio programming became in essence a matter of government policy. We should also emphasize here the composition of the Council in which no representative of the arts, science or literature was included, although as it was explained in the decision, the rationale behind the establishment of the council was the "importance of radio for the education, information and entertainment of the people" and the need for the "best possible constitution of radio programmes". In any case, as available evidence suggests, this Council did not function in practice for reasons which are not known<sup>59</sup>.

Nevertheless, even without the enforcement of prior censorship by the Minister to the Prime Minister and the

operation of the Council for Programming, the post-war broadcasting legislation laid the foundations of extensive government intervention in the general operation of EIR and particularly in its programming policy. Hence, in practice, the complete dependence of top appointees and especially of the Director General by the Minister led to the abolishment of the Institute's autonomy which was established by Law 2312/1953 (article 1, par. 2).

The post-war legal framework of broadcasting reflected the politicians' perception of the medium as a major legitimating mechanism for the policies of the party in government. As the representative of the Greek Rally government G. Lychnos stated during the parliamentary debate on Law 2312:

"Radio (...) constitutes a power in the service of the Nation and the People and should be in the service of the Government which represents the Nation and the People (...) Greece is a democratic country and Democracy is not anarchy. And we must give the government the power to govern the country, to influence public opinion...But what is going to happen if every party, every politician, every citizen could attack through radio the government seeking to refute its views and overthrow the policy that it implements? (...) The opposition has all the means available to influence the people. It has the Parliament, the press, the public assemblies. Why should radio also be placed in the service of the opposition, whether this opposition is loyal or disloyal to the regime?"<sup>60</sup>.

The significance of radio for the government as a means to influence public opinion was further enhanced by the rapid increase in radio set ownership after the war and consequently by the increased importance of radio as a medium for public information. In a period of seven years (1946-1953), the number of subscribers of EIR had increased from 35,000 to 250,000; by 1962, the number of radio receivers had reached 740,000<sup>61</sup> and continued to increase at a quicker pace throughout the 1960s. This outcome was largely due to the expansion of EIR's services, with the establishment of a second

station in Athens and a number of regional stations in the rest of the mainland and the islands<sup>62</sup>.

Of prime importance for the government were of course the news bulletins and all other programmes of political content. The rest of the daily programme, which was mostly light entertainment, did not seem to be of particular political concern. Apart from that, the appointment of a member or affiliate of the governing party as Director General and the mechanisms of ideological control of employees were enough to guarantee that the non-political content of the programming was harmless and reproducing the dominant ideology. The political content of radio was not very significant. In 1950 the total time allocated to news and current affairs was between 65 and 75 minutes daily. By the mid-1960s the length of news programmes was still only around two hours. Only the National Programme of Athens broadcast news pertaining to politics, which was then carried by regional stations. The reason for this must have been the eagerness of the central government to maintain overall control over the content of news broadcasts<sup>63</sup>. According to one writer on broadcasting, the news bulletins of EIR were being prepared by the Department of Press of the Ministry to the Prime Minister<sup>64</sup>.

Even if this is an exaggeration, the fact remains that the news programmes were dominated by national news and dealt exclusively with the daily activities of the government. Radio was totally inaccessible to the political parties and leaders of the opposition. Consequently, party political broadcasts, radio discussions among representatives of different political parties or interviews with party leaders and cadres were completely unknown to the Greek audience. It is characteristic, that while the broadcasting statute (article 15, par. 1 of law 2312/1953) established an obligation for EIR to transmit all announcements of the government, no such provision was made for the announcements or replies of the opposition. In cases where

a leader of the Liberal camp (from the evidence that we have, EDA did not have this option) wished to address the people, he had to request special permission from the government, and particularly the Ministry to the Prime Minister; and even then the permission was not always granted<sup>65</sup>. It was only during electoral campaigns that the leaders of the opposition - though not of EDA - were allowed to use radio. The usual practice was the relay of the leaders' speeches at mass rallies in Athens and Thessaloniki. Only in the elections of February 1964 did the caretaker government of I. Paraskevopoulos allocate an equal amount of airtime to the three major contestants: ERE, the Centre Union (EK) and EDA<sup>66</sup>.

Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s the governments of the Right and especially of ERE which remained in power for seven years sought to promote their policies through radio to an extent that the news programmes often acquired the character of propaganda by the governing party. The handling of political information by EIR was best described by two of its ex-directors: "It would constitute contempt for the truth to say that EIR does perform its duty in reference to the information of the public (...) Radio has been a harassed institution ever since its inception. In Greece radio has always been 'his master's voice'"<sup>67</sup>. A more detailed description of the style and content of news broadcasts was given by D. Svolopoulos, Director General of EIR between February 1947 and March 1950:

"Neither the newscasts nor the comments of the Athens Radio Station inform, because their content is limited to the information that best serves the government (...) Their bias and partisanship is obvious. The pompous style of news-reading is totally unsuitable for radio and emphasises the biased content of EIR's news bulletins (...) The censorship imposed on broadcast information is noticeable by the audience. For many events which the people experience or read in the newspapers are omitted from newscasts"<sup>68</sup>.

Apart from the continuous promotion of the government's accomplishments, very often newscasts and commentaries contained

direct or indirect attacks against the parties of the opposition, to which the latter did not have any opportunity to reply<sup>69</sup>.

In all, throughout the 1950s and early 1960s the general performance of EIR and particularly the content of its political programmes reflected the authoritarianism of right-wing governments and their continuous effort to maintain power. To this end, the Greek Rally and especially ERE, sought to use in full the right-wing dominated state apparatus. We do not refer here only to the repressive mechanisms applied against political opponents, particularly of the Left; we mean the systematic use of the state administration by the governing party in order to maintain popular support and reproduce its power. According to Meynaud, many of the tasks of the General Secretariat of ERE, which was responsible for the organization, propaganda and electoral campaigning of the party, had been undertaken by the political bureaux of the ministries. These tasks included the allocation of favours to the party clientele and the staging of a propaganda campaign in favour of ERE<sup>70</sup>. In this latter task, the Ministry to the Prime Minister played a central role. Beyond the tight control of EIR, the promotion of the governing party's policies was conducted through various publications issued and distributed by the Ministry to the Prime Minister. As an example we will mention here the "Information Bulletin", a luxurious publication of 60 pages which apart from praising the accomplishments of the government, contained attacks against the leaders of the opposition. Characteristically, one of its issues included an article titled 'The Political Gimmick of Mr Papandreou'<sup>71</sup>.

One of the most important components of ERE's strategy throughout the period we are examining was the reproduction of the Right-Left polarity and consequently the climate of communist fear which were largely the basis of ERE's power.

Based on the legal fiction of the "continuous communist rebellion", the Right preserved and implemented extensively the emergency legislation of the civil war many years after the defeat of the Communists. As Prime Minister K. Karamanlis told Parliament in 1960:

"The extreme Left (obviously meaning EDA) taking advantage of the freedom which has been given to it by the democratic regime, has started a resolute effort to erode the Nation. It uses all means available to disarm materially as well as psychologically the Greek People in order to make it a prey for itself and its mandators (...) It encourages (...) every demand and promises to solve any problem trying in this way to create a revolutionary psychology to the citizen and make him an enemy of the state"<sup>72</sup>.

Therefore, repression and propaganda were justified as the necessary weapons for the defence of the state against the communist menace. It is characteristic of this strategy that in March 1957 there were still 3,209 people imprisoned since the civil war<sup>73</sup>. In the same year the government forfeited the citizenship of 5,521 Greek political refugees in the East European countries, a record number since 1948 when the measure was first introduced; for instance, in 1950, only a year after the end of the civil war, there were 93 cases of citizenship forfeiture and in 1951 only 72<sup>74</sup>.

The ideological polarization was reflected also in the cultural life of the country. Suspicious books and theatre plays were banned and publishers persecuted. In 1957 the government stopped all cultural exchanges with the socialist countries and a little later refused permission to the Bolshoi Ballet to visit Greece, for, as the deputy Prime Minister explained in Parliament, the group with its artistic achievement could influence the people in favour of the Left. In February 1960, the police interrogated an eighty-year old writer, because he had visited the Soviet Union three years earlier<sup>75</sup>. These few examples are indicative of the effort that the ERE government was making in order to preserve the



cold war climate in Greece at a time when the first signs of detente were visible worldwide.

The same line against communism was also applied in radio. According to the internal regulations, EIR's Directorate of Programming should, among other things, listen to the broadcasts of foreign radio stations, especially those which conducted propaganda in support of or against Greece, submit to the government daily reports on the received programmes and transmit counter-propagandistic broadcasts in foreign languages<sup>76</sup>. Moreover, EIR transmitted twice daily programmes of the 'Voice of America' in Greek (30 minutes in all) as well as broadcasts in Greek from the BBC and the Paris radio station. We should see these broadcasts coming from three NATO members within the context of the cold war and the need to counter-weight communist propaganda beamed into Greece from neighbouring socialist countries. The radio of EIR frequently broadcast attacks against the socialist countries as well as EDA which in the general elections of 1958 gained 24.43 per cent of the vote and 79 seats in Parliament, becoming thus the official opposition<sup>77</sup>. The following quotations of EDA representatives from their speeches in Parliament in April 1960, give a clear picture of the anti-communist performance of radio at that time:

"Greece broadcasts through state radio a rabid propaganda from morning till night. We transmit the most anti-Soviet speeches, speeches of hatred against other nations, belligerent speeches which tend to make suspicious even the word 'peace'".

"It is beyond imagination the campaign of the government against these (the communist) countries. One hears the Greek Radio saying to the people 'do not believe those who talk to you about detente'".

"Greek Radio turns continuously against EDA, the biggest party of the opposition, calling us 'these traitors' and defaming us"<sup>78</sup>.

Nevertheless, despite the stifling control of EIR by the right-wing governments throughout this period, broadcasting did not become a matter of particular consideration by the

political parties of the opposition. Criticism regarding the treatment of political opponents through radio was expressed occasionally and sometimes could be rather fierce, as in the case of a liberal deputy who called Greek radio a "stupefying medium"<sup>79</sup>. Even then, however, the debate on broadcasting was always part of a general attack against the government's authoritarian policies. As available evidence suggests, all the political parties of that time and of the entire ideological spectrum, shared the same short-sighted view of broadcasting, which concerned them only for its political content. The following comments of a writer on Greek broadcasting<sup>80</sup> summarize the politicians attitude towards the medium:

"Broadcasting has been always by-passed in the parliamentary debates with such a unanimity which shows either an ignorance of the fundamental importance of the medium, or, more probably, a tendency to maintain the status quo that always was the political subordination of broadcasting by the government".

### **3.4 The Radio Stations of the Armed Forces.**

EIR was not the only source of broadcast information in post war Greece. Alongside it operated the nationwide network of the Armed Forces. In March 1948, during the most crucial phase of the civil war soldiers of the 781 Communications Company used military channels to broadcast popular music to their colleagues in the battlefield<sup>81</sup>. Soon, however, the political potential of radio was recognized by the General Staff and in December of the same year the Radio Station of the Armed Forces was organized in Athens. By 1950 a number of military radio stations had been set up all over Greece, operating as a rival network to EIR, with a programme which was addressed to the general public and not only to the personnel of military units. To understand the major political significance of these radio

stations, the operation of which breached the legally established broadcasting monopoly of EIR, it is necessary to examine the role of the military in the post-war Greek society.

With their victory over the communists in the civil war, the armed forces became the main mechanism for the preservation and reproduction of the established social and political status quo. Financed and trained by the Americans<sup>82</sup>, the military undertook the role of the watchdog of the bourgeois regime against the communist menace. The army constituted the main repressive apparatus which, together with the police, the gendarmerie and various para-state organizations were the deterrent forces against social mobilization, while in many cases they intervened in order to determine the result of general elections. Thus, TEA (Battalions of National Security), the military reserve units of the countryside, were used to terrorise the supporters of the opposition, while, through the transference of entire regiments to areas where the support of the constituencies for the Right was marginal, the vote of military personnel could secure the victory of the Right-wing candidates<sup>83</sup>. This does not mean, however, that the military was simply an instrument in the service of the right-wing governments which were the political expression of the post-war status quo.

Being in essence the main pillar of the bourgeois domination in post-war Greece, the military emerged as an autonomous and dominant centre of political power with an integrated ideological basis, the main component of which was anti-communism. The armed forces no longer reflected the political divisions (Venizelists-Royalists) of the inter-war era. After the abortive Venizelist coup of 1935 the purge of most liberal officers started a process which led to the autonomy of the military from any form of political control. This process was continued and completed during the Metaxist dictatorship, the years of German occupation and the civil war, with further

purges of democratic officers, the recruitment of ex-members of the pro-Nazi Security Battalions and the appointment to all key posts of officers loyal to the King<sup>84</sup>. Hence, in the post-war period a new military emerged which was a politically and ideologically solid force, the cohesive elements of which were anti-communism and a profound distrust for parliamentary institutions and politicians.

The political autonomy of the military was institutionalized in 1949 when the Sophoulis government in a final effort to defeat the communists transferred to Alexandros Papagos, commander-in-chief of the armed forces, all powers regarding their organization and structure as well as the planning of military operations. His decisions were to be compulsory for the government. Moreover, Papagos was empowered to declare martial law wherever he considered that as necessary<sup>85</sup>. This new legal framework which vested Papagos with almost dictatorial powers was the actual recognition by politicians of the military as an independent political force, the only one which could wage successfully the anti-communist struggle and guarantee the established order. The situation remained the same even after Papagos' resignation as commander-in-chief in 1951. His powers were taken up by different military authorities and especially by the General Staff and the staffs of the three services. The Minister of Defence and more generally the elected government had very little control over major military matters pertaining to finances, the structure of the armed forces and the organization of defence<sup>86</sup>.

The main expression of the political autonomy and the dominant role of the armed forces in the post-war power structure was IDEA (Sacred Bond of Greek Officers), a paramilitary organization established in Athens in October 1944 by officers, members of wartime paramilitary organizations. Fiercely anti-communist and profoundly "nationally minded", IDEA aimed at the "punishment of communists and their fellow

travellers". The main component of the organization's ideology was the identification of the military with the 'Nation'. The military and IDEA in particular were seen as the "embodiment" and the only guarantors of the national interest. The ultimate purpose of IDEA was the disciplined organization of society with the military as the dominant centre of political power. According to the organization's manifesto, the only means of achieving this was the "dictatorship of IDEA" which was to be established "whenever the circumstances allow it, for the benefit of the motherland"<sup>87</sup>. Throughout the civil war the influence of IDEA within the army was significant and by 1950, 2,500 officers were members of the organization. When Papagos became Prime Minister, IDEA officers were appointed as commanders of the military staffs. From then on, IDEA was to occupy and control most major posts in the administration of the armed forces<sup>88</sup>. With the rise of Papagos to the premiership in 1952, the military and IDEA in particular acquired direct control of the elected government. Under the repressive parliamentary regime which was established after the war most of the aims of IDEA were fulfilled. The military was beyond any political control, the anti-communist legislation of the civil war remained in force and the masses were "disciplined". The political situation remained the same after the death of Papagos and the rise to the premiership of C. Karamanlis; thus, there was no need for a dictatorship at that time. The 1950s was a period of inertia for IDEA, which was reactivated only after the elections of 1958, alarmed by the overwhelming increase of popular support for EDA<sup>89</sup>.

In the early 1960s, in view of the increasing social mobilization and the impact of the new Centre Union party on the masses, the military and its para-military organizations were engaged in a number of activities which - directly or indirectly - led to the destabilization of parliamentary institutions. The unprecedented intervention of the military in the general elections of 1961 and the excessive use of violence

and fraud secured another victory for ERE, but also aggravated the climate of popular discontent against the government. Moreover, the implication of top-rank officers of the military and the security forces in the assassination of the EDA MP G. Lambrakis in Thessaloniki in May 1963 damaged decisively Karamanlis' authority and contributed to his downfall later that year. Similarly, the bombing attack in Gorgopotamos in November 1964 and the so called "sabotage of Evros" which was masterminded by the future dictator G. Papadopoulos were clear attempts to discredit the Centre Union government by creating, especially in the latter case, a climate of anti-communist hysteria<sup>90</sup>.

To summarize, in the post-war period, the military emerged as a separate centre of political power, with an autonomous political and ideological role to perform. Part of this ideological role was the indoctrination of conscripts into the "national", Greek Orthodox ideals. It is characteristic that the General Staff through a confidential circular had imposed strict censorship on all publications read by conscripts, a ban which was extensive enough to include works of the classics such as Renan and Hugo<sup>91</sup>. The dominant role of the military was reflected also in the legal framework of EIR. From 1945 onwards, the armed forces were continuously represented in the Administrative and Advisory Councils and the Programming Committees of the Institute. Military officers were also appointed to the post of the Director General of EIR. We should note here, that according to the 1951 statute, the Director General of EIR could be either top-rank state official or a top-rank military officer<sup>92</sup>.

However, it was through the operation of its own radio stations in the late 1940s that the military undertook a major ideological-indoctrinating role, especially because in this way it could reach directly a very wide audience. At a time when the civil war had entered its most dramatic phase the military

broadcasts must have been seen as a precious weapon of anti-communist warfare. It was not probably a coincidence that out of the nine radio stations which had been set up by the beginning of the 1950s, five were installed in North and North-West Greece, in areas close to Greece's borders with the communist countries. A sixth station was set up in Macronissos, the notorious prison camp, used for the rehabilitation of political prisoners and later of conscripts with left-wing affiliations<sup>93</sup>.

During the cold war these stations' programmes were seen as a counter-weight to the communist propaganda broadcast in Greece through the Grecophone programmes of eight East European stations. Apart from entertainment for troops, the radio programme provided by the Central station in Athens, included nationalistic programmes such as royal and ministerial addresses, religious services and cultural broadcasts with "liberal doses of patriotism"<sup>94</sup>. The importance of military radio as a propaganda weapon must have been a major reason for the lack of any government reaction against the de facto operation of the military stations. However, the most important reason was the political and institutional autonomy that the military had acquired. It is in this light that decision of the liberal government of Venizelos-Papandreou to authorize the network's continued existence in 1951 must be seen. According to the provided legal framework<sup>95</sup> the General Staff was empowered to install and operate radio or television stations the purpose of which would be the "enlightenment, entertainment and education of the armed forces" and also, at times of war the "boosting of the morale of the fighting Nation". By that time, however, the military broadcasting network was already performing a much more significant political role, which exceeded by far the purposes defined by legislation. In 1950, the Athens radio station (later it was named Central Radio Station of the Armed Forces) was broadcasting 11 hours daily, a service only 2.5 hours shorter than that of EIR. The variety of

programming and the amount of advertising - 30 minutes daily, as much as the amount of advertising of EIR - as well as the broadcasting of news bulletins and programmes of political content indicate that the broadcasting service of the military was addressed to an audience much wider than the personnel of military barracks. Therefore the broadcasting service of the armed forces had become by the early 1950s as important as that of EIR in terms of volume and content of programming and had entered into competition with the official broadcasting organization for audiences and advertising. We should note here, that even after the provision of a legal framework the operation of the military network continued to be illegal, for it breached the broadcasting monopoly of EIR which was never legally abolished. On the contrary, the provision securing EIR's monopoly was repeated in the 1953 statute which was passed by the Papagos government.

This was not the only inconsistency regarding the operation of the military broadcasting service. Being under the command of the General Staff (it operated as part of the military administration and a large part of its personnel were conscripts and reserve officers) the network was practically, like every other aspect of the military's activities, beyond the control of the elected government and the Parliament; a practice, which as it has been rightly suggested abolished in essence the basic principles of parliamentarism<sup>96</sup>.

All in all, we could say that the structure of post-war broadcasting was an accurate reflection of the organization of political power around two dominant and largely antagonistic poles: the government and the military, each one of which controlled a nationwide radio network<sup>97</sup>. The political significance of the military radio service did not lie only with the newscasts and programmes of political propaganda. The supply of a wide variety of free entertainment (there was no subscription fee for the military radio service) through a



medium which was still a novelty for the majority of the population contributed, in our view, to the legitimization of the dominant role of the armed forces in public life.

Although throughout the 1950s the political interests of the government coincided with those of the military, the latent antagonism between these two centres of political power was expressed through the attempt of the government to obtain control over the military radio network. A first major attempt was the establishment of the Council for the Coordination and Control of Radio Programmes by which the programming policy of the military network was placed under the control of the Undersecretary of the Ministry to the Prime Minister<sup>98</sup>. For unknown reasons this measure was never implemented. In the early 1960s the Karamanlis's government came under pressure from the opposition and the management of EIR itself to abolish the network or to allow its merger with the Institute. For some time it appeared that the government was about to give in to the pressure (at that time ERE and Karamanlis especially had been under constant attack from the Centre and EDA for their authoritarian policies, especially after the fraudulent 1961 elections). With the resignation of Karamanlis in 1963, however, the merger was abandoned<sup>99</sup>.

The operation of the military network was not questioned by the Centre Union government (1963-1965) which was apparently keen to secure the support of the military (for the same reason Prime Minister G.Papandreou appointed as Minister of Defence P. Garoufalias, an extremely conservative politician with close ties with the palace and the military)<sup>100</sup>. After EDA criticized the Minister of Defence for the political content of the military newscasts, the Central Radio Station was ordered to follow the same political line as that of EIR<sup>101</sup>. In 1964, the Armed Forces Broadcasting Service asked Papandreou's permission to expand into television. According to one theory, this was the personal wish of King Constantine who wanted the

establishment of a television network of the military in order to counter-weight the liberal-controlled EIR<sup>102</sup>. The Prime Minister, however, refused permission. Under the palace-backed governments which succeeded Papandreou, the armed forces finally managed to install television transmission equipment. In April 1966 the military started its experimental television transmissions. The regular nationwide television service of the military would be established later by the dictatorial government.

### **3.5 Liberalization: The rise of the Centre Union.**

The result of the general elections of 1958 was a first major sign that the Right was losing its hold both in the rural and urban areas and that the influence of the Left on the masses was far from being eliminated. Thus, whereas ERE's share of the vote dropped from 47.38 per cent in 1956 to 41.17 per cent, EDA made spectacular gains (24.43 per cent of the vote) and became the main opposition in Parliament (with 79 out of 300 seats)<sup>102</sup>. This development was the expression of widespread popular discontent due to repression and the growing economic inequalities. The major social problem of 1950s appeared to be the high rate of unemployment which was a result of the absence of any large-scale productive investment. It is characteristic that employment in industry rose within a decade only by a marginal 1 per cent (from 21.1 per cent in 1952, to 22.1 per cent in 1962); in manufacture things were even worse as within the same period employment remained at the same levels (13.3 per cent to 13.4 per cent)<sup>103</sup>. By the end of the 1950s, the unemployed accounted for 20-24 per cent of the workforce<sup>104</sup>. The result was massive emigration which in 1958 amounted to 24,251 and in 1960 to 47,768 people. Other main reason for the emigration were the extremely low wages and the meagre income from agriculture; according to statistics of the

Foundation of National Insurance (IKA), the average daily wage in 1960 was around 39 drachmas. Equally gloomy, if not worse, was the situation of those engaged in agriculture, as more than three quarters of the peasant families (866,000 out of 1.026 million) received a monthly income between 316 and 650 drachmas<sup>105</sup>.

Moreover, lower income groups were hit hard by indirect taxation which provided more than half of the state's revenues. In 1958 alone, indirect taxes absorbed 12.7 per cent of the GNP while only 4.2 per cent was absorbed by direct taxation<sup>106</sup>. At the same time, the government eager to attract foreign investors, accorded enormous privileges to big capital, especially foreign and mixed, in terms of taxation, credit facilities, cheap energy etc, so that "it would not be an exaggeration to say that in many cases industrial expenses and risks are socialized whereas the fruits of any industrial success go solely to private capital"<sup>107</sup>. In this way, the burden of Greece's industrial development fell largely on lower income groups.

By the end of the 1950s, growing inequalities and repression had created a climate of social discontent the first significant indication of which was the result of the 1958 elections. The major shift of the electorate towards EDA and the mounting social unrest (frequent strikes and demonstrations)<sup>108</sup> put on the alert the forces of the para-state and especially IDEA. Many anti-communist organizations were established or reactivated, in many cases with government support, with the aim of intimidating supporters of the Left and the Centre<sup>109</sup>. This practice reached its climax in the general elections of 1961, when IDEA used the 'Pericles' contingency plan, initially devised for the neutralization of the communists in case of war, in order to secure the victory of ERE. As a result, ERE gained 50.81 per cent of the vote, while the Pandemocratic Peasants Front in which EDA was the

main participant received 14.63 per cent of the vote and gained 24 seats in Parliament<sup>110</sup>.

This overt intervention of the military and para-state organizations in the elections became the starting point for 'Anendotos' (Unyielding struggle), an all-front campaign staged by G. Papandreou, the leader of the newly established Centre Union party against ERE's repressive policies. The formation of the Centre Union, EK, in September 1961, was to a large extent the outcome of the defeat of the liberal forces in the elections of 1958. The continuing fragmentation of the centre parties had contributed to the impressive electoral gains of EDA and had proven that only a unified Centre could challenge effectively the Right's monopoly of power. As available evidence suggests, the formation of EK was favoured also by the American administration which, alarmed by EDA's appeal to the electorate, saw the establishment of a second major bourgeois party as the necessary alternative to ERE and thus as a safety valve of the bourgeois regime<sup>111</sup>.

The objective of EK's political programme was not a change of the social and economic system. The party's policy was to boost capital investment and lead the country to industrial development through a different strategy than that followed by ERE, however. EK's purpose was to achieve a broad social consensus which was not to be based on the fear of communism and repression, but on the - relatively - free function of parliamentary institutions, and a fairer redistribution of wealth<sup>112</sup>. The programme of the party , together with "Anendotos" appealed to the people; thus in 1961, despite violence and fraud, EK received 33.66 per cent of the votes.

In a climate of growing discontent and political mobilization, the campaign of EK became the main expression of the masses' opposition to the government's authoritarian policies. Papandreou disputed the result of the elections and

targeted his attacks against ERE's corruption, scandals and repression. The appeal of "Anendotos" to the people became clear in the elections of November 1963 in which EK gained a majority of the vote (42 per cent) and ERE came second with 39.37 per cent. New elections held in February 1964, gave Papandreou a landslide victory with 52.72 per cent of the vote; the share of ERE decreased further (35.26 per cent), while EDA received 11.8 per cent<sup>113</sup>.

The main component of EK's strategy was the increase of incomes and the consequent boosting of consumption, which was expected to give momentum to industrial investment. Thus, wages and salaries of all levels were increased and agricultural products were subsidized. Soon the expansion of demand proved to be effective; in 1964 the GNP increased by 8.5 per cent and in 1965, the value of industrial production exceeded for the first time that of agricultural production<sup>114</sup>. The government also increased state expenditure in welfare and education. For the latter in particular, the government increased expenditure by 36 per cent in 1964, abolished fees for university education and increased the years of compulsory education from six to nine.

EK's reforms included also the democratization of the trade union system, the release of all political prisoners (with the exception of 125 people convicted for breach of Law 375 on espionage). Nevertheless, in the 21 months that the Centre remained in power, it did not attempt to make any institutional reforms which could change the post-war power structure. Thus, although the emergency measures of the civil war were now scarcely implemented, they remained in force. The legalization of KKE remained out of the question and the political refugees to the Eastern bloc were not allowed to return en masse; instead, the government agreed to examine certain cases and grant individual permits of return. Moreover, no attempt was made to purge IDEA, although the government dissolved eleven

para-state organizations<sup>115</sup>. A number of IDEA officers were removed from their key positions and sent to frontier posts, but the power of the army was never challenged. Any attempt to change radically the power structure would lead to the fierce reaction of the repressive apparatus and the consequent dismantling of parliamentary institutions. To achieve even the moderate liberalization of the regime, Papandreou needed the support of the King who appeared to control the military after the death of Papagos<sup>116</sup>. For this reason, Papandreou appointed to the post of the Minister of Defence P.Garoufalias, an ultra-conservative member of EK and a personal friend of King Constantine, who enjoyed the confidence of the military. Papandreou's half-hearted attempt to liberalize the political system can be also explained by the propaganda of the Right (ERE, as well as the state apparatuses) which presented the Premier as paving the way for communism<sup>117</sup>. Apart from the above reasons, we should not disregard the conservative and anti-communist position of Papandreou, who twenty years before had played a leading part in the smashing of the left-wing movement.

In any case, it is a fact that after EK's electoral victory, Greece experienced a spectacular change of the ideological climate. Anti-communism ceased to be the main component of the official ideology and practice. Repressive measures were slackened, the open political intimidation in the countryside was ended and the use of the certificates of social beliefs was limited. There was also a timid change of the state's attitude towards the resistance against fascism, which until then was associated with communism in Greece. Thus, although the resistance was not officially recognized as a national liberating movement, many celebrations were organized to honour the entire resistance movement<sup>118</sup>. This moderate democratization had an enormous impact on the people. It provided the grounds for the development of an unprecedented political and social movement. Massive marches, demonstrations

and cultural events were organized, which gave the opportunity for the expression and exchange of ideas to an extent that had never existed in the past.

The political liberalization was also reflected in the radio broadcasts, particularly that of EIR<sup>119</sup>. It is indicative of the changed political climate that the Institute started a series of broadcasts to celebrate the anti-fascist resistance movement<sup>120</sup>. Anti-communist propaganda disappeared from EIR's programmes. Moreover, in May 1964 by a decision of the Prime Minister's son Andreas, who had been appointed as Minister to the Prime Minister, the Institute ceased the transmission of the Grecophone newscasts of the British, French and American radio. The reason behind this decision, which reflected the government's determination to adopt a more independent foreign policy vis-à-vis NATO, thus provoking the hostility of the Americans, was the transmission of controversial broadcasts about the Cyprus issue by the "Voice of America"<sup>121</sup>. Also, EK established spoken Greek (demotic) as the official language of the radio programmes instead of 'purist' Greek (katharevousa) which was associated with the nationalistic, anti-communist ideology.

There was finally a marked change of attitude towards the opposition in the political broadcasts; the activities of the parties of the opposition were often covered and the statements of their representatives transmitted. To the post of the Director General, Papandreou appointed lawyer Anastassios Peponis, an ex-manager and producer of radio programmes who during the German occupation had been involved in the resistance press<sup>122</sup>. According to Peponis' own account of his policy at the Institute, "a significant change was made in the mentality of news and current affairs programmes. Radio was never used as a means of defamation against political opponents...and we never intended to turn it into an instrument of attack against political forces or against foreign

countries"<sup>123</sup>. This did not mean, however, that the traditional government grasp on EIR was released. The legal framework of broadcasting which enabled the complete manipulation of radio by the government remained in force. A few modifications regarding the composition of the administrative bodies did not constitute any essential change, as the management of EIR continued to be appointed by the government<sup>124</sup>. EK's attitude towards broadcasting, an attitude not very different to that of ERE, was best summarized by Peponis himself:

"When a political party becomes the government under democratic procedures it has every right to promote government activities. In that case an 'equal' treatment of the democratically elected government and the other political parties would be unfair"<sup>125</sup>.

Although this mentality was largely due to the long political tradition of manipulation of all state mechanisms by the government, it can also be explained by the general political situation of the time. EK was facing fierce opposition particularly from ERE which in many cases tried to discredit the government's policies. As an example, we will refer to the campaign against the policy of income increases; ERE accused Papandreou of undermining monetary stability and for some time it created a panic among depositors, with serious effects for the economy. At the same time, through a surge of strikes and demonstrations organized by the Left, EK was pressured to introduce more radical changes<sup>126</sup>. Under these circumstances and with a state apparatus dominated by the Right, government-controlled radio must have been seen as a major means for EK to counter-weight opposition and increase its influence on the masses.

In any case, the moderate liberalization of the post-war regime released new dynamic social forces which had been suppressed for almost twenty years. This unprecedented political mobilization and pressure of the masses could lead to a radical reform of the political system. Within the EK a



strong left wing emerged led by Andreas Papandreou. The anti-NATO positions of this wing and its social-democratic programme (Meynaud paralleled it with that of Harold Wilson and Willy Brandt)<sup>127</sup> had an enormous appeal to the population. Andreas Papandreou himself was seen by many as the natural leader of a renovated Centre whose strategy was to be based more on political issues and less on clientelism<sup>128</sup>.

The prospect of any radical change in the existing status quo alarmed the military and particularly IDEA which saw in the strengthening popular movement a threat to its own domination. Hence, by a series of provocative activities the para-military networks attempted to discredit the government by creating a climate of anti-communist hysteria. Among other things, A.Papandreou was accused of being involved in a subversive group within the army called ASPIDA<sup>129</sup>. It was then that G. Papandreou realized that it was necessary to achieve government control over the military, as the latter's activities undermined the government and together with it the whole strategy of social consensus. Thus, Papandreou sought to change the Chief of the General Staff. When Garoufalias refused to conform with the Premier's decision, Papandreou decided to dismiss the minister and take up himself the Ministry of Defence. It was now the King's turn to react to Papandreou's decision; with the Prime Minister being also the Minister of Defence, the King's control over the military would be diminished and the post-war balance of forces disturbed. Thus, Constantine refused Papandreou his constitutionally established right as Prime Minister to appoint the ministers of his government. Amid the stalemate which followed this disagreement Papandreou threatened to resign. The King hastily accepted the informal resignation, as he had already the solution at hand. After a few unsuccessful attempts a government was finally formed with the support of ERE and a number of defectors from the EK. The two-year period which followed the downfall of the Centre Union was marked by governmental instability and social

upheaval, caused by a profound crisis of representation. Through demonstrations and strikes the masses challenged the new governments' power and demanded new elections.

The so-called governments of "defectors" were a last attempt for the preservation of the post-war power structure. The political climate changed again. The IDEA officers were returned to their key posts; the control of radio became again suffocating and anti-communism returned to the programmes. As an example we mention the banning of the music of composer Mikis Theodorakis because he was an MP for EDA and his music was deemed political propaganda<sup>130</sup>. Finally, at the armed forces network the military resumed full control over programming; in the Central Radio Station were appointed among others, two specialists on anti-communist propaganda, V. Stamatopoulos and G. Georgalas who were to become the leading propagandists of the 1967 dictatorship<sup>131</sup>.

### 3.6 Conclusion

The state monopoly for broadcasting was established officially for the first time after the liberation of the country and came as a direct consequence of the reinforced role of the state in post war Greece. It was the state which undertook the reconstruction of the country's shattered economy and which secured the vital interests of a large part of the population by offering employment and allocating resources. The public broadcasting monopoly was accepted by all political forces at that time, since the state was obviously regarded as the guardian of the public interest, although this concept was never defined by politicians.

The civil war and eventually the communist defeat led to the establishment of a largely defensive state, within which the

Right presented itself as the only safeguard against the ruin of the country by communism. As the only representatives of the national interests, the right-wing governments which ruled the country until the early 1960s, resorted to an unprecedented manipulation of the state machine in order to preserve their power and defend the regime from its enemies. Together with repression and patronage, propaganda played a decisive role in the reproduction of the power of the Right. In a society which was torn apart by the Right-Left cleavage, broadcasting was seen as a legitimating mechanism for the established status quo.

Under these circumstances, the concept of objectivity lost every meaning and even came to constitute a threat to the national interest especially as part of the opposition was the left-wing EDA. The latter was continuously denied access to radio and the same applied with a few rare exceptions to the liberal opposition. In the anti-communist defensive state of the post war period there was no place for compromise and this was reflected in the operation of radio. In any case, broadcasting was not turned into a central political issue by any of the parties in opposition, for although they criticised the government for its methods, they never proposed an alternative solution. A truly pluralist system on radio was never on the agenda of either the Centre or the Left. It seems that there was a unanimous acceptance by all political forces that broadcasting was an instrument of influencing public opinion and also, or rather for this reason, that the government had a right to employ it for its own ends.

This practice was continued by the Centre Union after its rise to power in 1963. Indeed, although anti-communism and the defamation of political opponents disappeared from broadcasts, the liberal government did not lose its grip on radio. In any case, even if during the 21 months of E.K.'s government the first signs of a new political consensus had appeared, the

crisis which followed Papandreou's downfall and the subsequent military dictatorship did not allow the development of radio to anything more than an instrument of political persuasion.

Political attitudes towards broadcasting revealed in practice an amazing indifference and/or ignorance of the role that broadcasting could perform as a cultural and educational medium. This was one of the main reasons that until the early 1970's even technically the broadcasting networks remained completely underdeveloped. In view of what we have already said, if the mission of public service broadcasting is to "cater for all sections of the community, reaching all parts regardless of cost, seeking to educate, inform and improve"<sup>132</sup>, then certainly Greek broadcasting of the period under analysis did not fulfil this mission.

## NOTES

1. K.TSOUKALAS: State, Society, Labour (in Greek), Themelio, Athens 1986, p. 30.
2. In the 1950 elections all Liberal forces together gained 57 per cent of the vote. In 1951, with the added votes of EDA the Centre-Left gained 54.3 per cent; J. MEYNAUD: Political Forces in Greece (in Greek), Byron, Athens (exact date missing), p. 85-91.
3. Tsoukalas, op.cit., p. 94
4. Ibid, p. 22
5. N. ALIVIZATOS: "State of Emergency and Political Freedom, 1946-1949", in, Greece in the 1940s and 1950s, a Nation in Crisis, Themelio, Athens 1984, p. 383.
6. For more about the relation of the Greek bourgeoisie with the state see K. VERGOPOULOS: "The Establishment of a New Bourgeoisie". In Greece in the 1940s...ibid; N. MOUZELIS: "Capitalism and the development of the Greek state". In, R. SCASE(ed) The State in Western Europe, London 1980
7. The real wages in 1950 corresponded only to the 58 per cent of the wages in 1938. At the same time 1/3 of the population were unemployed. Vergopoulos, ibid, p. 546.
8. Tsoukalas, op.cit., p. 39-50; also, K. TSOUKALAS: The Greek Tragedy (in Greek), Nea Synora, Athens 1981 p. 102.
9. S. LINARDATOS: From the Civil War to the Junta, Vol 2, Papazisis, Athens 1978, p. 30-31. Among the deported were writers Th. Kornaros and M. Loundemis.
10. Most writers turned to historical, philosophical and autobiographical subjects. For a concise reference to the intellectual production of the 1950s and 1960s, see K. DIMARAS: The Reform That Was Not Made, Nea Elliniki Vivliothiki, Athens 1988, and Tsoukalas' above two mentioned works.
11. As Tsoukalas noted in 1969, "Marx is excommunicated and sociology is an unknown science.the history of philosophy ends with Kant. Even recently an Athenian daily accused Darwin of

subversive ideas". Greek Tragedy, op.cit., p. 105.

12. N. ALIVIZATOS: The Political Institutions in crisis, 1922-1974, Themelio, Athens 1986, p. 511-23.

13. The information which was based on official- and for this reason perhaps smaller than the real- figures was given by MACHI, 25.12.1949 and referred to the purges under Edict 9.

14. Dimaras, op.cit.; Linardatos, op.cit., vol 2, p.107 and vol 3, pp. 241 and 507

15. Dimaras ibid, pp. 309 and 241. S.Linardatos, ibid, vol. 3, refers to the expulsion from all high schools of Greece of a pupil who refused to write a composition against the communists; he was the son of the previously director of the KKE's official organ - Rizospastis - K. Karagiorgis, who was by that time, 1961, dead. The case which must have not been an isolated incident, had caused uproar among public opinion

16. V. GEORGIU: A History of the Resistance, 1940-1945 (in Greek), Avlos, Athens 1979, Vol 4, p. 1445. There was also a number of underground publications by other resistance organizations and groups. An other estimate raises the total number of underground publications at more than 700; see: D. KARMOKOLIAS: Political Communication in Greece 1965-1967, National Centre of Social Research, Athens 1974, p.125.

17. Georgiou, names 52 journalists, the most prominent ones, but as he admits the list is much longer. ibid, p. 1471.

18. See for the press in the war J. DIMAKIS: "The Greek Press". In, J.T.A. KOUMOULIDES(ed), Greece in Transition, Essays in the History of Modern Greece, 1821-1974, Zeno, London 1977.

19. Edict IE' of 25 November 1946. Alivizatos, The Political Institutions...op.cit., p. 506-507

20. Introductory Report to Parliament for Edict 32 of 22 October 1947 (in Greek), Kodix Themidos 1947, p. 297

21. Introductory Report to Parliament for Edict 31 of 17 October 1947 (in Greek), ibid, p. 281.

22. See Ladas' introductory report for Edict 32, as in note 20.

23. See for instance, the telegram of the managers of six local newspapers deported to the island of Lemnos, published in

MACHI, 18.8.1947. See also for names of journalists tortured in the prison camp of Macronissos, in MACHI, 11.4. 1950.

24. See the complaints of two prospective publishers whose applications were rejected by the Undersecretary of Press and Information in MACHI, 17.11.1947, for Laiki Phoni (People's Voice); and in MACHI, 24.11.1947, for an unnamed paper.

25. In January 1951, the court order the paper Democraticos (Democrat) to fold

26. See for instance the cases of prosecution of the director and journalists of Machi in the issues of 1 March 1948 and 18 May 1950.

27. MACHI, 1 March 1948

28. MACHI, 1 December 1947. The intervention of local authorities in newspaper circulation has been also mentioned by Dimakis, op.cit., p. 231 and Tsoukalas, The Greek Tragedy, op.cit., p. 132.

29. From 1964, EDA started also the publication of the evening paper Democratiki Allaghi (Democratic Change).

30. See article 1 par. 1 of the legislative decree 4234/1962.

31. We mean here the edicts which were issued during the civil war and not the law 509 which was not abolished until the downfall of the dictatorship.

32. Alivizatos, The Political...op.cit., p. 557, footnote 65.

33. Ibid, p. 533.

34. There was also a number of short-lived papers during the same period which also supported one of the two camps. We should also mention here Estia (Hearth) a conservative paper which supported the Progressive Party, a minor party lying politically between the Right and the Centre, and also, the two papers of EDA which we named above.

35. This was one of the numerous short-lived governments which in essence were appointed and supported by the British before the elections of March 1946.

36. Constituent Act 82/17,18 December 1945

37. J. IATRIDES: "Occupation, Resistance and the British". In, Greece in the 1940s...op.cit., p.46

38. The author possess a number of photocopied documents (correspondence of the A4 Army Broadcasting Unit with the heads of the Greek radio service, records of the daily output and weekly schedules for office use), from the archive of the then announcer N. Hakkas. It is characteristic of the influence of the British forces on Greek radio programming that at four o'clock every day a music programme called 'Tea Time' was scheduled.

39. These were precisely the suggestions of American officials as quoted by L.S. WITTNER: American Intervention in Greece, 1943-1949, New York 1982, p. 160.

40. Ibid. Care was of course exercised to keep the role of US administration in the background.

41. World Broadcasting, early 1950s (exact date missing), p. 32, from the archive of N. Hakkas.

42. Unfortunately, it became impossible to have access to archives of that time and study the very content of broadcasts.

43. Emergency law 818 of 8 January 1946.

44. The Edict 8, provided also for the dismissal of employees on the grounds of their lack of proper professional qualifications, lack of the necessary ethos and inability to fulfil their obligations at work. These conditions were so vague, however, that it becomes apparent that their purpose was to serve as an excuse for dismissals on political grounds. See figures given by MACHI, 25-12-1949.

45. See for instance, the testimony of N.Hakkas interviewed by the author 16.12.1986.

46. This order was issued by Truman on 22 March 1947, according to the proposals of the Committee of Anti-American Activities. See Alivizatos, The Political...op.cit., p. 479-87.

47. Royal Decree of 20 January 1954 for the ratification of the internal regulations of EIR.

48. N.Hakkas, op.cit.

49. Exempted were also cinema, phonography and other public spectacles.

50. We will mention here the modification of the above law, the



law 3188/1955 and the legislative decree 3778/1957.

51. Some pieces of legislation refer to the Minister to the Prime Minister, while others to the Undersecretary for Press and Information. The Ministry to the Prime Minister is an umbrella ministry which supervises the function of the entire state administration. In many cases the law transferred the supervision of broadcasting from the Minister to his inferior Undersecretary for the Press and Information.

52. See in the relevant Parliamentary debate, the speech of the Minister to the Prime Minister P. Sifnaios, Gazette of Parliamentary Debates, Period 1, Session 3, 1952-1953, sitting 19 of 27.2.1953, p. 415.

53. Article 2 par. 4 of Constit. Act 54/1945. See also the similar provision of article 3, par. 2 of Comp. Law 1775/1951.

54. Legislative Decree 3778/1957 which modified the Law 2312/1953.

55. The new decision of the council was final. See article 3 of the above decree.

56. The relative provision of the Compulsory Law 818/1946 had been abolished by the law 2312/1953, article 27.

57. Dagtoglou suggests that this provision was never implemented; see P. DAGTOGLOU: Broadcasting and Constitution, Sakkoulas, Athens 1986, p. 29.

58. Decision of the Council of Ministers 85 of 11/26 June 1959.

59. Dagtoglou, op.cit., p. 30.

60. Gazette of Parliamentary Debates, Period 1, Session 3, 1952-1953, Sitting 21 of 3.3.1953, p.445. It is clear in the last phrase of the speech the reference to the left-wing party EDA.

61. Figures given by the Minister to the Prime Minister P. Sifnaios in the above Parliamentary debate, Gazette of Parliam. Debates, Period 3, Session 1, Sitting 19 of 27.2.1953, p. 416. Figures for 1962 from U.N. Statistical Yearbook 1965, mentioned by Karmokolias, op.cit., p. 27.

62. By 1954 there were regional stations (one each) in Salonica,, Kos, Komotini, Rhodes, Chania, Patrae and Volos. See

the Royal Decree of 20.1.1954 for the ratification of EIR's internal regulations In Athens there was a transmitter of 150 KW for the First Programme and another of 51 KW for the Second Programme. Karmokolias, *ibid*, p. 27. There was also an expansion of the Armed Forces radio stations to which we will refer below.

63. *Ibid*, p. 27.

64. Dagtoglou, *op.cit*, p. 28.

65. See for instance, Linardatos, *op.cit.*, vol 2, p. 148, for examples; also, the speech of G. Mavros in Parliament, Gazette of Parliamentary Debates, Period 5, Session 2, Sittings 14.11.1959-3.6.1960, Sitting 76 of 4.4.1960, p. 559.

66. Dagtoglou, *op.cit.*, p. 158; N. ALIVIZATOS: State and Broadcasting (in Greek), Sakkoulas, Athens, p. 30.

67. Comments of G. Alexiades General Director of EIR between March 1953 and May 1954, in the magazine ELEFTHEROTYPIA, September 1965.

68. *Ibid*. Some of the comments have been slightly paraphrased in the translation.

69. See for instance, the speech of G. Mavros in the Gazette of Parliamentary debates, Sitting 76, *op. cit.*, p. 559.

70. Meynaud, *op.cit.*, p. 238.

71. See the speech of G. Papandreou in Parliament in the Gazette of Parliamentary debates, Sitting 76, *op. cit.*, p. 604.

72. See Gazette of Parliamentary Debates *ibid*, p. 664.

73. Linardatos, *op.cit.*, vol 4, p. 220. The figures were given by the opposition in Parliament in March 1957.

74. Alivizatos, *The Political Institutions...op.cit.*, p. 491.

75. Linardatos *op.cit.*, vol 3, p. 509- 510. See also the speech of President of EDA in Parliament, Gazette of Parliam. Debates sitting 76 *op. cit.*, p. 666.

76. Royal Decree of 16.7.1955.

77. Meynaud, *op.cit.*, p. 104-105.

78. Speeches of the EDA MPs H. Heliou, A. Brillakis and I. Passalides, the latter being President of the party. Gazette of Parliam. Debates Sitting 76 *op. cit.*, pp. 546, 617 and 666

respecti vely.

79. Speech of G. Mavros, *ibid*, p. 558.

80. Dagtoglou, *op.cit.*, p.17.

81. See the memories of the first news editor of the Athens Radio Station of the Armed Forces, M. LABRINIDES: 33 Years in YENED (in Greek), Phillipotis, Athens, 1982, p. 14-44.

82. Out of the \$3,984 million of American aid, 53.5% or \$2,114 million went to military expenses. Moreover, in the period 1950-1970 one in three military officers was trained in one of the U.S. military schools. Alivizatos, *The Political ...*, *op.cit.*, p. 261.

83. N.MOUZELIS: Parliamentarism and Industrialization in the semi-periphery (in Greek), Themelio, Athens 1987, p.237-238.

84. We will mention here the purges of all democratic officers from the 11,000 strong armed forces which were stationed in the Middle East during the war. The reasons for these purges were two revolts which took place in March 1943 and April 1944 and which aimed at the dismissal of all pro-fascist officers and the formation of a government of national unity with the participation of all resistance forces.

85. See the content of Compulsory Law 822 of 20 January 1949 in Alivizatos, *The Political...*, *op.cit.*, p.199.

86. And this despite a general reorganization of political control in 1953, according to which the government through the Ministry of Defence and the Supreme Council of National Defence - ASEA - was given the control of the armed forces. *ibid*, p. 260-271. See also, K. LEGG: Politics in Modern Greece, Stanford University Press, Stanford California 1969, p. 222.

87. D.CHARALAMBIS: Military and Political Power (in Greek), Exandas, Athens 1985, p. 35 and 227.

88. Linardatos *op.cit.*, especially vol 2.

89. The centre of para-military activity was now EENA (Union of Greek Junior Officers), established by members of IDEA and other officers.

90. For more details, see T. VOURNAS: A History of Modern Greece 1953-1967 (in Greek), Tolidis, Athens, p. 215-217.

91. Meynaud, op.cit., p. 352.
92. Compulsory law 1775/1951, article 10, par. 1. Indicatively we note here three officers appointed Director Generals Chr. Tsigantes: 1950-1953; E.Apokoritis: 1955-1957, and E.Stassinopoulos: 1963-1964.
93. At that time the armed forces operated stations in Athens, Cavala, Jannina, Komotini, Kozani, Larissa, Macronissos, Salonica and Tripolis. See World Broadcasting, op.cit., p. 33.
94. R.McDONALD: Pillar and Tinderbox, Marion Boyars, London 1983, p. 164. See also any issue of the Radioprogramme of the late 1940s and early 1950s.
95. Compulsory Law 1663 of 24/27 January 1951.
96. Dagtoglou op.cit., p. 32.
97. Together with the military we should also mention the monarchy, but we will refer to it and its peculiar relation with the armed forces in the following chapter.
98. Decision of the Council of Ministers 85/1959.
99. Labrinides op.cit., p. 45 and 75.
100. Papandreou's attempt to dismiss Garoufalias in 1965 would lead to a row with the king and to the final resignation of the Prime Minister.
101. Meynaud op.cit., p. 352; and Labrinides op.cit., p. 86.
102. Meynaud ibid, pp. 98-105.
103. The lack of major investments was due both to the unwillingness of big capital to invest in manufacture as there were more profitable and less risky sectors (shipping, construction, or deposits in foreign banks) in which it could operate and a policy of high interest rates which discouraged long-term industrial finance with banking capital. See for instance, Charalabis op.cit., p. 82-94.
104. Ibid, p. 103.
105. Linardatos op.cit., vol 3, p. 430 and 536-537.
106. N. Mouzelis: "Capitalism and Dictatorship in Post-war Greece", New Left Review, vol 96, March-April 1976, p. 69.
107. Ibid, p. 70. For the privileges to foreign capital, see the terms of the scandalous contract of the state with Pechiney

- in 1960, in Charalabis op.cit., p. 95-99.
108. See Linardatos op.cit., vol 3, p. 242, 532-3 and vol 4, p.170
109. Meynaud op.cit., p. 298-300.
110. Ibid, p. 111.
111. See ibid for the mission in Greece of the State Department representative McGhee in summer 1961, p. 107-108.
112. For details about EK's programme, Ibid, p. 292-295.
113. Ibid, p. 119-123.
114. Charalabis op.cit, p. 160.
115. Meynaud op.cit., p. 299.
116. See the following chapter for the complex relation of the military and the King.
117. See for instance, the statement of the leader of ERE after the government gave permission for a massive pacifist march organized by the Left, Linardatos op.cit., vol 4, p. 418.
118. Meynaud op.cit., vol 2, p. 16.
119. We have already referred to Papandreou's policy regarding the military stations.
120. Meynaud op.cit., vol 2, p. 19.
121. Ibid, vol 2, p. 47
122. ANTI 21.9.1974.
123. ELEFTHEROTYPIA, September 1965.
124. See Royal Decree of 31.10/4.11.1964.
125. ELEFTHEROTYPIA, ibid.
126. Tsoukalas, The Greek Tragedy, op. cit., p. 166-77.
127. Linardatos, op. cit., vol 2, p. 51.
128. Tsoukalas, The Greek Tragedy, op. cit., p. 171, and Mouzelis, Parliamentarism... op. cit., p. 242-3.
129. Mouzelis suggests that such an organization existed in the army but it was insignificant and its purpose was mainly to promote the professional interests of its members; ibid, p. 247. So far there has been no proof of the group's subversive activities or of Andreas Papandreou's involvement in it.
130. See extracts from the press ministry bulletin 15.2.1967 in McDonald op.cit., p. 163.

131. Labrinides op.cit., p. 107.

132. J.CURRAN and J.SEATON: Power Without Responsibility,  
Fontana, London, p. 311.

## CHAPTER 4

### THE MILITARY DICTATORSHIP OF 1967 AND THE BEGINNING OF TELEVISION

#### 4.1 Introduction

On April 21 1967, a month before the general election, a group of army officers headed by two colonels and one brigadier staged a long-prepared coup which in Andreas Papandreou's famous expression "caught the politicians in their sleep". As a consequence, parliamentary institutions were abolished for seven years and politics became the exclusive prerogative of the military. For those who have carefully studied Greek political history since the civil war, the dictatorship was not merely an aberration from democratic 'normality', as has often been suggested by both conservative politicians and writers on Greek politics. It was rather the ultimate attempt to preserve the power structure which had resulted from the civil war and in which the military held a dominant position.

With the dictatorship the authoritarian organization of power took its most extreme form: parliamentary institutions were dismantled and the monarchy was deprived of its main prerogatives before it was in turn abolished in 1973. Hence, the military became the sole centre of power in Greek politics, until the Cyprus crisis in July 1974 led to the collapse of the dictatorial regime.

The study of the establishment and policies of the military dictatorship is crucial for two main reasons. First, seen from a broad historical perspective, such a study can contribute to a better understanding of post-war and post-dictatorial

political institutions and the elements of continuity and change between the past practice and the present organization of the political system. Secondly, viewed from the narrower perspective of an analysis of the broadcasting system, the study of the military junta's policies in the field of the mass media is necessary not only because the latter as the principal means of information inevitably became the prime targets of the dictators, but also because of the historic fact that television was established and organized by the dictatorship. It is not a mere coincidence that both radio and television were established by dictatorial regimes. Rather it seems that whereas democratic politicians hesitated to develop broadcasting, perhaps unaware of its social and political significance, the dictators sought to exploit its immense propaganda potential. Hence, like radio under Metaxas, television was seen by the 1967 junta as a means of achieving broad popular consent for the regime. The role of broadcasting in this respect was very important, especially because the dictatorship lacked any significant support from the masses. For this reason, it is essential to examine the social and political conditions under which the dictatorship was established and the regime's main policies, before we turn more specifically to its policies on the mass media.

#### **4.2 The rise of the dictatorship: the political context**

On the morning of April 21 1967, the Greeks were informed by radio that "due to the disorderly internal situation the military had assumed the governing of the country". Consequently, Parliament was dissolved and all clauses of the 1952 Constitution regarding civil liberties were suspended. The coup was carefully organized and staged by a group of army officers led by colonels George Papadopoulos and Nicolaos Makarezos and brigadier Stylianos Pattakos. This group



was the core of the paramilitary organization IDEA. What was particularly important was that the King was completely ignorant of the putschists' plans, although under the Constitution he was the commander-in-chief of the military. Symbolic as this title might have been within the framework of the 1952 Constitution, the palace had been keen to assume control over crucial aspects of the organization, structure and operation of the armed forces<sup>1</sup>. Moreover, most officers of the higher ranks including the chiefs of the three services were committed royalists; that group of generals known as the 'big junta' (in contrast to the 'small junta' of IDEA) was conspiring at the same time as IDEA to stage its own coup in the name of the King<sup>2</sup>. Yet, the successful staging of the coup by a handful of unknown lower-rank officers proved that the palace did not have complete command over an army which it considered to be the pillar of its power.

Why was the military contemplating the establishment of a dictatorship in the first place and why were there two rival juntas? Furthermore, why were the colonels more successful than the generals? To answer these questions, we will have to examine more closely the political and social situation which existed at the time of the coup and the peculiar balance of forces which characterized the post-war power structure.

As explained in the previous chapter, the restoration of bourgeois domination in Greece after the war became possible only thanks to the support of the military and its final victory over the Communist forces in 1949. Being in essence the guardian of the established social and political order, the military emerged in the post-civil war political context as an independent political force. Its autonomy and crucial role for the preservation of the status quo were acknowledged by bourgeois politicians of all colours. Moreover, the creation of IDEA in 1944 and the extensive influence that this organization exercised within the armed forces is the clearest indication

that the military itself was fully aware of its central position within the Greek state.

Nevertheless, until 1967 it was not the military which appeared to be the dominant force in Greek politics, but the throne. The restoration of the monarchy after the war was based on the unanimous agreement of all traditional politicians who, like their British and American allies, considered the King as the symbol and guarantor of the bourgeois legitimacy they were seeking to establish in the country. Thus, with the unquestioning support of the entire political world the institution of the monarchy emerged from the crisis of the second world war significantly reinforced.

Far from being the neutral head of state that the 1952 Constitution postulated, the King was actively involved in parliamentary politics with the covert or overt tolerance of all political parties except EDA. In many cases the King interfered in the affairs of the government, taking political initiatives and declaring his personal views on crucial matters, such as the question of Cyprus or internal political crises<sup>3</sup>. Moreover, the King insisted upon acting as the utmost regulator of the political life by openly promoting politicians who in his view could guarantee the continuation of the authoritarian organization of power, or conversely by withdrawing his support from those political leaders who were no longer 'cooperative'. The most telling example in this respect, was the appointment by King Paul in 1955 of C. Karamanlis to the post of Prime Minister at the expense of S. Stefanopoulos whom the deceased Papagos had designated as his successor as leader of the Greek Rally and who seemed to have the support of the majority of the party's parliamentary group. Eight years later, following a strong disagreement with the King, Karamanlis was forced to resign though he was supported by a comfortable parliamentary majority. The same scenario was repeated in 1965, with main protagonists this time King

Constantine and G. Papandreou. This practice of the monarch of appointing as Premiers politicians of his choice and the pressures he exercised on them to resign revealed a profound distrust of party politics and democratic procedures and "in the last analysis brought the electorate before faits accomplis or diluted its mandate"<sup>4</sup>.

What was particularly crucial for the fate of parliamentary institutions was the fact that, especially after Papagos death in 1955, the throne had the final word on major matters regarding the organization of the armed forces such as the promotion and appointment of military officers. Hence, throughout the period until the colonels' coup, the top positions of the military hierarchy and also the defence portfolio were held by people who enjoyed the personal confidence and support of the King. This limited even further the ability of the political power to exercise control over the armed forces and certainly enhanced the disrespect of the latter for parliamentary institutions. Until 1967 the palace seemed to exercise complete control over the military while the latter never showed any signs of disloyalty towards the crown<sup>5</sup>. In effect, throughout the 1950s the military had no reason to seek a more direct involvement in the political process insofar as the palace and right-wing governments were able to guarantee the continuous 'discipline' of the social forces and the reproduction of the military's central role within the state.

This balance of forces, however, was to be threatened in the early 1960s when the economic plight of the lower classes together with new developments in the social sphere led to an unprecedented political mobilization which could no longer be contained by repression. Growing economic inequalities<sup>6</sup>, together with urbanization and the expansion of communications<sup>7</sup>, increased political awareness and led to the radicalization and mobilization of a large part of the population. Hence, the 1960s witnessed the emergence of active

youth and peace movements, the formation of trade unions close to the Left and Centre and a dramatic increase in industrial action. Moreover, as Mouzelis has pointed out, the migration of 1.5 million people from the countryside to the big urban centres and abroad largely dislocated the local patronage networks through which the Right had maintained its control of the rural population<sup>8</sup>.

An expression and a result of the mounting popular discontent were the electoral victories of the Centre Union in 1963 and 1964. Under the pressure of the mobilized masses, the government of George Papandreou introduced a number of economic and social reforms which aimed at the relief of the lower social strata and also sought to liberalize the regime by considerably slackening the measures of political repression. The air of freedom which started to blow gave new momentum to the popular movement which expressed itself through an increasing number of strikes, demonstrations, peace marches and other mass activities.

Although timid and inadequate, these reforms were enough to alarm the military and the palace which saw in the democratization of the system an immediate threat to their dominant position within the state. The incompatibility of EK's policies with the interests of the palace and the military led to the political crisis of the 1965-67 period. The fuse for the crisis was Papandreou's efforts to place the armed forces under the control of the elected government. Constantine's refusal to endorse the decision of his Prime Minister to take over the Ministry of Defence, thus forcing him to resign, was an attempt by the palace to defend the political status quo and its central role within it.

Nevertheless, as was proven by the political developments which followed Papandreou's resignation, the monarchy was no longer able to guarantee the preservation of the existing

structures of power. Instead of announcing the holding of fresh elections, Constantine insisted upon forming a government from the same Parliament. After three palace-backed governments had failed to gain an absolute majority, a fourth one managed to secure a flimsy majority of two votes, thanks to the support of the ERE and of 44 EK deputies who were persuaded to defect from their party (the leader of ERE P. Kanellopoulos himself, spoke later of "conscience bribing" by the palace)<sup>9</sup>. However, the King's attempt to turn the clock back to the pre-1963 situation created further political unrest and exacerbated the climate of polarization, particularly between ERE and the Centre Union<sup>10</sup>. Through an increasing number of demonstrations and strikes, the pro-democracy movement expressed its opposition to the royal intervention and demanded the holding of a general election.

Eventually, having sensed the danger of a military takeover, Papandreou and Kanellopoulos decided in a secret agreement to put an end to the crisis and announced the organization of new elections for May 1967. The military leadership on the other hand seemed to be determined to prevent the election, especially as the prospects of a right-wing comeback appeared to be extremely poor in view of the mounting popular mobilization. Indeed, a new electoral victory of EK, which was now under the increasing influence of its left wing led by Andreas Papandreou, would inevitably lead to the reinforcement of parliamentary institutions and consequently weaken the position of the military and the monarchy within the state. In particular, the strengthening of political power would mean the establishment of stricter controls upon the organization and activities of the armed forces, thus ending or seriously restricting their political autonomy. The situation was particularly alarming for those who held key positions in the secret services and the repressive apparatus and who were largely members of IDEA. The military had thus to intervene in order to defend its dominance within the state.

The conspiracy for the establishment of a dictatorship, however, proved that there were fundamental divisions within the officers corps. For while the royalist military leadership, (the 'big junta'), was considering a dictatorial solution under the auspices of the crown, the IDEA group, (the 'small junta'), was laying its own plans for a pre-emptive coup behind the back of the King and the generals<sup>11</sup>. As Charalambis suggests, IDEA was not a monarchist organization; its 1944 manifesto did not contain any reference to the monarchy and none of the top-ranking royalist officers had ever been a member of the group<sup>12</sup>. Once the King had proven unable to safeguard the authoritarian power structure, IDEA withdrew its allegiance from the throne and sought to preserve the established political order itself.

It is not easy to explain, however, why there was this major split within the armed forces. According to some analysts the reasons must be sought in the promotion structure and the social divisions of the Greek army. The increased needs for military personnel that the civil war had created led to the lowering of standards and the admission by the military academies of children from the lower classes. Therefore, a significant social gap now existed between the royalist top-ranking officers who had graduated before the war and the medium and lower-rank officers who had joined the army in the post-war period<sup>13</sup>. Moreover, the massive recruitment of new officers during the civil war had created a series of bottlenecks as the limited number of top posts severely restricted opportunities for promotion. It seems moreover that there had been a lot of dissatisfaction within the army against the palace, caused by the favouritism shown by the latter towards those officers who were outspoken monarchists<sup>14</sup>. Thus, a significant number of junior officers took the side of the 'small junta' on the day of the coup anticipating that the massive dismissals of other officers would provide them with new career possibilities. As we will see later in this chapter,

before the end of 1967 the dictators had already taken drastic measures in order to advance the interests of their military clientele. In contrast to the IDEA group, the generals' junta did not show any organizational activism or readiness in order to impose a dictatorship. Their influence among the armed forces was clearly limited, as it was to be proven when the King staged his own counter-coup in December 1967. Moreover, the generals were uncertain about the timing of the coup - before or after the elections of May - and had conditioned their intervention upon the will of the King, whereas the colonels were determined to seize power at all costs<sup>15</sup>.

It has often been suggested by writers on the Greek dictatorship that the main reason behind the rise of the junta was the interests and policies of the U.S.A. and particularly of the CIA<sup>16</sup>. As the preceding analysis has shown, the Americans performed a central role in the establishment and consolidation of the post-war socio-political system in Greece. Also, strong bonds had been developed between the American and Greek armed forces as a large number of Greek officers had been trained by the Americans in the United States and elsewhere<sup>17</sup>. Moreover, the CIA had largely assisted in the setting up of the Greek Central Intelligence Service (KYP) in which IDEA officers held key positions<sup>18</sup>. Finally, it is well known that CIA officials had meetings with members of the 'small junta' shortly before the coup<sup>19</sup> and that the US administration adopted a clearly favourable attitude towards the dictatorship.

Nevertheless, although it is likely that the Americans encouraged, or at least did not try to avert a military intervention, there is as yet no serious evidence to support the allegation of a direct US involvement in the preparation of the coup. Furthermore (as both Gregoriadis and Mouzelis suggest) given the strong Atlanticist orientation of the monarchy and its central role in Greek politics, it seems more plausible to assume that, had the Americans opted for a

dictatorial solution, they would have supported the coup of the royalist military leadership rather than that of a group of relatively unknown lower-ranking officers<sup>20</sup>.

In summary, it is more plausible to look for the causes of the dictatorship within the internal social and political situation of the country rather than in external factors. In our view, which is also the view of many analysts of the dictatorship<sup>21</sup>, the 1967 coup was clearly an attempt by the military to preserve the repressive regime and its own position within it at a time that both were being seriously challenged by an unprecedented popular mobilization. Insofar as both parliamentarism and the monarchy had failed to guarantee the continuation of the system of political controls, the military had to resort to its last means - overt repression and violence- in order to preserve the authoritarian power structure and its dominance within it.

What should be stressed here is that the reasons underlying the military takeover were primarily, if not exclusively, political. The crisis of the 1960s which led to the dictatorship was about the political organization of power, not about the established social order. The domination of the bourgeoisie in Greek society was not challenged; the massive support for the EK (and not for the left-wing EDA) was the best expression of the wide acceptance of the capitalist class structure. The bourgeoisie itself had little to fear from a liberal government, for its vital interests were not at stake. The strategy of economic development followed by the EK was basically the same as that of ERE. The favourable climate for investors continued to exist in the form of various incentives to big capital as well as loans and subsidies. Also, despite substantial increases, wages and social security expenditure remained relatively low. Furthermore, to the extent that it expressed a broad social consensus, EK's mild, reformist programme was a guarantee of political stability. It is not



surprising, therefore, that annual foreign investment in Greece increased from \$8.7 million in 1962 to \$28 million in 1963 and to \$61.3 million in 1965<sup>22</sup>.

The above analysis does not mean that the IDEA group lacked any support from the dominant social classes. An indication to the contrary was again the right-wing press, a section of which adopted a clearly alarmist attitude in view of the political unrest and the prospects of an EK victory<sup>23</sup>. Moreover, the junta was on friendly terms with representatives of financial interests<sup>24</sup>. Nevertheless, as the stance of conservative politicians and publishers was to prove, the dictators failed to gain supporters even among the right-wing camp. The political character of the crisis and the lack of an intensive class struggle deprived the dictators of the kind and degree of popular support offered to Pinochet in Chile six years later. The broad acceptance of parliamentary institutions as the only way to resolve the crisis meant that the dictatorial regime could not be easily legitimated. The lack of any popular consent was the major weakness of the dictatorship and this was to determine its policies as well as its destiny.

#### **4.3 Towards the establishment of a new order: The organization of military rule.**

On the morning of April 21 the colonels' junta presented the King with a *fait accompli*. The dictators had abolished parliamentary institutions and suspended civil liberties without the endorsement of the head of state. The King had been practically stripped of all his political power. Nevertheless, the junta did not seek to abolish the monarchy, for the latter had to perform a vital function for the future of the dictatorship. In order to win popular support, the putchists

had to appear to be acting within the framework of the Constitution and for the protection of the established social order of which the King was the main representative. In other words, they needed to present the coup as having been staged with the support of the palace. For this reason, a royal decree was hastily forged, according to which all clauses of the Constitution regarding civil liberties were suspended<sup>25</sup>.

Constantine finally agreed to cooperate with the junta. He consented to appoint a government most members of which were chosen by the putchists; furthermore, he presided over the new cabinet a few days later and signed a large number of compulsory laws and decrees requested by the dictators. His decision to do so was crucial for the fate of the coup, as it secured the support of a large part of the officers corps for the conspirators. Had he publicly denounced the coup, the dictatorship would have probably collapsed. This option, however, ran counter to the interests of the throne. The demise of the dictatorial regime would have paved the way for a general election and the establishment of parliamentary dominance, which would have meant the drastic shrinkage of the monarchy's powers, as these were defined in the post-civil war political context. This did not mean, however, that Constantine gave his consent to the dictators by choosing what appeared to be the less damaging solution. By accepting a regime which was established without his endorsement, he knew that he had given up his powers as a monarch. In practice, the new government, consisting mainly of military officers, was not answerable to him while he himself was almost a hostage in his own palace<sup>26</sup>.

What Constantine had in mind was the staging of a counter-coup which would overthrow the colonels, and the establishment of a regime controlled by the palace. He was not committed to a democratic solution to the crisis, however, as the events preceding his counter-coup indicate. In his attempt, the King sought the support of the members of the 'big junta' and other

royalist officers. On the other hand, the offer of a number of dismissed liberal officers to join the venture as liaisons between the king's group and various clandestine organizations was turned down. Ostensibly, the plan was the enforcement of a solution from above, without any recourse to popular mobilization<sup>27</sup>. The King's intentions became clear with his announcement to the people on the 13th of December, the day of the attempted counter-coup. Although conveying to the people an explicit call for support, his message was nevertheless authoritarian and imbued with the same anti-communist ideas which had constituted the foundations of the post-war repressive regime<sup>28</sup>.

Whatever Constantine's intentions might have been, however, the failure of his counter-coup proved that the basis of popular and military support for the monarchy was very narrow. The identification of the throne with the authoritarian organization of power had deprived it of the wide popularity that royalty enjoyed in other countries. Moreover, although it is true that bad organization largely accounted for the breakdown of the attempt, it is equally true that the King failed to attract the support of the majority of the military as he had anticipated<sup>29</sup>. Within a few hours the royal counter-coup was over and the only option left to the King was to leave the country on the same day.

Nevertheless, the monarchy was not abolished even then, for it was still necessary to the dictators for the reasons explained above and also because the latter wished to avoid any strong opposition from the King from his position in exile. Therefore, a leading member of the junta was sworn in as Regent, to act as official substitute for the King in his absence. In this way the monarchy was retained and the dictators could exercise their power without the embarrassing presence of the King.

The failure of the King's counter-coup gave the chance to the junta for a major government reshuffle which brought to the foreground the powerful man of the regime, George Papadopoulos. On the 14th of December he became the new Prime Minister, replacing K. Kollias, a Public Prosecutor of the Supreme Court, who chose to accompany the King into exile. Even in the period preceding the events of December 13, Kollias was a figure-head in government, since the strings were discreetly pulled by Papadopoulos, who at the time occupied the key Ministry to the Prime Minister. Papadopoulos decided to retain this post (which enabled him to control among other the KYP, the General Directorate of Press and Information and EIR) even after his elevation to the premiership and also to post of Minister of Defence. In this way he was able to control the most sensitive areas of government policy.

Moreover, the key ministries of the Interior and Economic Coordination were occupied by the other two strong men of the junta, S. Pattakos and N. Makarezos respectively. The rest of the ministries were assigned to largely unknown judges and technocrats, so that the government did not appear to be totally controlled by the military. However, many other members of the junta were appointed as general secretaries in those ministries and in practice they assumed the ministers' competences. Hence, in reality, political power was concentrated in the hands of the IDEA group.

After they had fully settled in power, the dictators sought the introduction of new institutions which aimed at transforming the country into a military state. Thus, in 1968 a new Constitution was introduced which had two major characteristics: first, the armed forces were legally established as an independent and dominant centre of power within the state; and secondly, the monarchy and parliamentarism were maintained, but with their position severely weakened.

The dictatorial Constitution institutionalized the military's role in society as this had been envisaged by the IDEA group. According to clause 129, the purpose of the armed forces was to defend the "territorial integrity and the national independence of the the state" as well as "the existing social and political system against external or internal enemies"<sup>30</sup>. In practice, this meant that apart from their duty to defend the country from external threats, the armed forces were empowered to intervene in political matters at their discretion in order to prevent any attempt to change the established order.

Moreover, the new Constitution established the complete autonomy of the military from any form of political control. Thus, all matters regarding the promotion and the compulsory retirement of officers were to be dealt with exclusively by councils of top-ranking officers, whose decisions were binding for the government. More importantly, the administration of the armed forces was turned into an exclusive prerogative of the Commander of the Armed Forces (a post introduced for the first time by the dictatorial Constitution) who became solely responsible for aspects of defence policy which under the 1952 Constitution had fallen under the competence of the government and Parliament<sup>31</sup>. The Commander of the Armed Forces was in essence a "super minister independent from any government control"<sup>32</sup> who, apart from dealing with all matters pertaining to the organization and operation of the armed forces, was empowered to prepare the budget of the Ministry of Defence and to allocate resources to the various military branches<sup>33</sup>. His political role, however, was not limited to matters of defence. As a member of the Council of the Nation (a new advisory body attached to the monarch), the Commander could also influence to a significant extent many crucial decisions of the executive, such as the declaration of a state of siege and the appointment of the Prime Minister<sup>34</sup>.

The institutionalization of military dominance by the Constitution was accompanied by a parallel diminution of the powers of the throne. The King's powers over the appointment of the Prime Minister and the government were drastically restricted while his prerogative to ratify laws was almost abolished<sup>35</sup>. Furthermore, whereas the dictatorial constitution provided for the establishment and operation of political parties, it also introduced draconian stipulations for the operation of parliamentarism. Thus, all political parties whose aims were counter to the 'fundamental principles of the regime' were to be outlawed. The function of representative institutions would be supervised by the Constitutional Court, a new body which would act as the juridical watchdog of the regime with the task of deciding which parties or politicians were to be allowed to participate in politics<sup>36</sup>. In any case, however, the provisions regarding parliamentary institutions and civil rights were to be suspended indefinitely and the decision for their reactivation rested with the dictatorial government (a. 135 and 138). In this way, whereas the junta was tightly holding the reins of power, it could give the impression that the authoritarian solution was a temporary one and that the restoration of democratic institutions would take place at some future, albeit unspecified, time. With this arrangement the dictators must have expected to gain the consent of the palace and, at least a section of the political elites and ultimately to achieve the legitimation of the regime.

The implementation of the 1968 Constitution was mainly an attempt to transform the power of the junta from 'de facto' into 'de jure' especially as reaction against the regime was mounting abroad. For the same reason, and in order to appear as adhering to democratic principles, the dictators requested the endorsement of the Constitution by the people through what was in fact parody of a referendum. However, if the Constitution was necessary to improve the junta's image both inside and

outside Greece, violence and repression were the only way for the dictators to retain their power within the country. These policies of repression we will examine in the following section.

#### **4.4 The policies of violence and repression.**

##### **4.4.1 Silencing political opponents**

The pretext used by the colonels as an excuse for their intervention was that Greece was directly threatened by a communist insurrection<sup>37</sup>. Although this was untrue, it is hardly surprising that the propaganda of the regime initially focused on the myth of the communist peril. The reason was not only the profound anti-communism of the dictators, but also, the fact that the domination of the military had been consolidated and legitimated by the fight against communism. Hence, the anti-communist law 509/1947 which had not been in use for many years was reactivated by the dictators and the first to be persecuted were those with left-wing affiliations.

However, contradicted as it was by political reality, the junta soon abandoned the argument of the communist menace in favour of the explanation that parliamentary institutions had led the country to "chaos" through the strategies of "corrupted" politicians<sup>38</sup>. The dictatorship was presented as a revolution aiming at "cleaning up the politicians' mess" and leading the country to her re-birth. We will see below how the junta propagated its ideals and "revolutionary" mission. What should be emphasized here, is that in view of the absence of strong support, even from the right-wing camp, the dictators had to resort to various means of repression in order to consolidate their power. All institutions of political

participation which could serve as channels of opposition against the dictatorship had to be destroyed.

Therefore, shortly after the establishment of the new regime, all political parties were dissolved, starting with EDA on April 29, and many of their leading cadres were arrested. There was also a large number of arrests among the civilian population, many of whom were deported to concentration camps mainly in the Aegean islands. According to one estimate, throughout the seven-year dictatorship 80,000 people were arrested (or one citizen in 100) and of these only five to ten per cent were brought to trial<sup>39</sup>. On April 25, the colonels announced the establishment of ten special martial courts in the biggest Greek urban centres. Nine days later, by order of the Chief of Staff, 274 trade unions were dissolved all over the country, for alleged 'violation of their constitution'. Among the dissolved organizations were the Greek Committee for International Detente and Peace and the 'Bertrand Russell' youth association. Hundreds of trade unionists were arrested, while many of those who escaped arrest were dismissed from their jobs on the instructions of the military authorities<sup>40</sup>. The same pattern of intervention was also applied to the major agricultural cooperatives of the country. Nevertheless, due to strong reaction by the international trade union movement<sup>41</sup>, the junta sought to keep a facade of trade unionism by retaining some unions whose leadership it would effectively control. The right to strike, however, was practically abolished due to the numerous restrictions imposed upon it by the dictatorial Constitution (a. 19, par 5). Moreover, the junta forbade assemblies in the open of more than five people, as well as assemblies indoors, except in the cases of entertainment or lectures at schools and universities<sup>42</sup>.

From a very early stage the junta sought to control the state machine by purging it of all those most unsympathetic to the regime and by appointing many of its friends to the



evacuated posts. Therefore, by means of a series of compulsory laws, the dictators dismissed all the Boards of Governors of the major public utility organizations, as well as the elected councils of local government for "lack of healthy social views". Through a significant number of constitutional acts the junta abolished the civil service tenure and thus the relative independence of state functionaries from the government. At the same time, the legal arsenal of the civil war, under which left-wingers had been excluded from public administration, was reactivated by the dictators and used for the scrutiny of employees' political views<sup>43</sup>. All employees had to submit to the authorities a written statement in which they were requested to give details, among other things, of their non-professional activities such as participation in any political organization, membership of the communist party or attendance at any public meeting in which "the public order had been disturbed"<sup>44</sup>.

About 200,000 employees, civil servants and other personnel, were compelled to answer these questionnaires and sign a statement of loyalty to the regime. Although no official figures have ever been made available about the number of employees dismissed during the dictatorship, according to one estimate, during the first three months of 1968, 572 employees left the civil service, 162 of whom were dismissed while another 214 simply "resigned"<sup>45</sup>.

The dictators' attitude towards education was equally heavy-handed. During the seven years of military rule 56 professors and readers were dismissed from Greek universities, as were 257 teachers from primary and secondary education. In the same period of time, 46 new professors and readers were appointed by the junta to the universities and polytechnic schools, without being elected to the posts by the academic staff as had been the practice until then<sup>46</sup>. The dictators also sought to assume control over the Greek Orthodox Church by replacing its

decrepit head, Archbishop Chrysostomos, with another clergyman, who had shown loyalty to the regime. The cooperation of the clergy was essential for the junta in order to propagate its ideals on the new 'Greece of Christian Greeks'.

In May 1968, with a constitutional act aiming at the "restoration to health of the judiciary"<sup>47</sup>, the military junta suspended for three days the life tenure enjoyed by judges. This enabled the dictators to dismiss thirty judges considered to be hostile to the regime, including the President and five members of the Supreme Court. A year later, due to strong resistance by the Council of State to recognize these purges<sup>48</sup> as legal, the dictators dismissed the President and one of the Vice-Presidents of the Council, as well as eight of the councillors. Finally, the colonels sought to purge the military from all officers whose loyalty to the regime was questionable. During 1967, 400 officers were dismissed for involvement in the ASPIDA affair or for their participation in the royal abortive counter-coup. The dismissal of top-rank officers paved the way for the promotion of a significant number of lower-rank officers who largely constituted the backbone of the dictatorship<sup>49</sup>.

Therefore, through purges and the subsequent appointment of friends to decision-making crucial posts, the colonels assumed total control of the state apparatus within the first year of their dictatorship.

#### 4.4.2 Censorship, ideology and propaganda

Greek cultural life was also a victim of the dictatorship. Through censorship and physical repression, the colonels sought to silence every dissident voice in literature, theatre, cinema and the rest of the arts. For this reason a large number of censoring committees were set up in the Ministry to the Prime

Minister. For example, seven of these committees dealt exclusively with cinema and theatre<sup>50</sup>. The censors were so keen to rule out any manifestation of opposition against the regime, that even plays by Sophocles, Aristophanes and Shakespeare which dealt with or ridiculed political power were forbidden. The authorities also banned 760 books by over 200 Greek and foreign writers, as well as periodicals such as the left-wing Epitheorissi Technis (Arts Review). Other journals such as the liberal Epoches (Seasons), chose to close down of their own accord<sup>51</sup>. In music, the most notable case was that of the imprisoned communist composer and activist, Mikis Theodorakis; his works were totally banned and all of his records destroyed<sup>52</sup>.

Many intellectuals, artists and writers were imprisoned, exiled or sought refuge abroad, while those who escaped prison chose not to create anything that they would be compelled to submit to the censors<sup>53</sup>. Their attitude was a significant form of passive resistance against the junta, which needed the cooperation of the intellectuals as the ideological vanguard of its "revolution."

Faced with a lack of popular support, the dictators soon realized that in addition to terror, they had to create the basis for a new social consensus which would guarantee in the long-term the consolidation of their power. For this reason the junta tried to construct a new official ideology which would contribute to the legitimation for the regime. The new ideal was the 'Greece of Christian Greeks', a country re-born from the ruins left by parliamentarism and inspired by both the ancient Greek civilization and the Byzantine tradition. In this context, the military coup was presented as a national revolution aiming to save the country from "corrupt politicians" and to create a more balanced and harmonious society without great contradictions<sup>54</sup>. Although classes would not cease to exist - as social equality was unattainable -

the "revolution", would seek to avoid wide divisions through a fairer distribution of income. In the 'modern state' that the dictators were to built class struggle would give way to class cooperation.

This ideal society would be created if, in Papadopoulos' words, "individuals ceased to be anarchic and materialistic and became social individuals"<sup>55</sup>. In order to achieve the 'transformation' of the Greek people, the dictators sought to impose their ideals through enforcement and indoctrination. Everyday life should be guided by the values and principles of ancient Greek civilization and Christian Orthodoxy. For instance, church-going on Sundays became compulsory for schoolchildren and civil servants. The latter were also compelled to attend all national celebrations and festivities, particularly if they were attended by members of the military government. According to the dictatorial legislation, those absent from the celebrations would be subject to disciplinary procedures<sup>56</sup>. 'Greece of Christian Greeks' as a slogan was blazoned on walls and on neon signs at airports and along motorways.

To emphasize the return to ancient Greek and Orthodox values, a large number of parades and festivities inspired by ancient and Byzantine history were organized by the regime. They became legendary as the expression of the dictators' distorted view of history and kitschy aesthetics, but served as opportunities for the 'spontaneous', albeit enforced, demonstration of popular enthusiasm towards the regime. All the mumbo-jumbo which constituted the dictators' world view was included in a voluminous work by Papadopoulos, called 'To Pistevo mas' (Our Creed) and published at the taxpayers' expense. In this work the arch-dictator with his usual verbose style dealt with a variety of usually unrelated topics, such as 'anguish', 'the sporting spirit', 'mini skirts', 'Marx' and 'the moon'<sup>57</sup>.

The regime was not short, however, of more serious theoreticians, such as the Minister of Education, Theophylactos Papaconstantinou, and the official spokesman of the government, George Georgalas, both wartime Communists. Georgalas, who had been trained in propaganda methods in Eastern Europe, elaborated the ideology of the Revolution, while Papaconstantinou wrote a pamphlet called 'Civic Education' which was distributed free to schools, the civil service and public organizations, and aimed at the political education of the people along the ideals of the "revolution"<sup>58</sup>.

It is not easy to define the ideology of the military regime, least of all to call it fascist, as many observers did during and after the dictatorship<sup>59</sup>. For although there were certain fascist elements in the junta's ideology, such as anti-communism, militarism and ultra-nationalism, the dictators lacked the support of a huge popular movement which has always been the main component of fascism. Despite the junta's efforts, its youth organization 'Alkimoi' (the Strong Ones) never attracted a large number of members - its membership was voluntary rather than compulsory as had been in Metaxas' EON.

In sum, the junta's propaganda efforts were a mixture of systematic indoctrination, kitsch, verbosity and buffoonery by the dictators, who with their outspoken sciolism became the constant targets of ridiculing jokes circulating among the people as an expression of passive opposition to the regime. Nevertheless, through terror and constant propaganda, Greece was turned into a military state in which public life was best outlined by Pattakos' slogan, "Halt, or I shoot."

#### 4.5 The fight against the press

"There are positions in the front line for everyone. I am sure that I may regard myself a colonel in active service with the journalists' regiment in the attack for the immediate objective which is called development and progress."

(Papadopoulos to journalists)

The dictators' attitude towards the newspapers was based on the perception of the Greek press as the most important source of power for every government. "It was the press which created public opinion and public opinion, in turn, created governments"<sup>60</sup>. Furthermore, the Greek newspapers, because of their extremely partisan reporting during the 1965-67 period, were seen by the junta as having largely contributed to the stirring up of political passions and to the aggravation of the turmoil which followed the political crisis of July 1965<sup>61</sup>. For these reasons Papadopoulos insisted upon having personal control over the press - and, of course, broadcasting - through direct supervision of the Directorate of Press and Information<sup>62</sup>. Moreover, a number of repressive measures were applied to secure total manipulation of newspapers.

As was expected, the two papers of EDA, the morning Avgi (Dawn) and the evening Democratiki Allaghi (Democratic Change) became the prime targets of the dictators; they were both closed down by troops on the very day of the coup and their assets confiscated and dispersed among various state offices. The publishers of a third paper, Athinaiki (Athenian) which had fanatically supported Papandreou, were forced through incarceration to declare voluntary bankruptcy although they were not facing serious economic difficulties<sup>63</sup>. Apart from the publisher and the two directors of the left-wing papers, the junta also arrested the publisher of two major centrist papers, the morning To Vima (The Tribune) and the evening Ta Nea (The News) and kept him in solitary confinement until December 1967.

Another 50 journalists were arrested and deported to prison camps<sup>64</sup>.

Newspapers were subject to preventive censorship, exercised by the Press Control Service (PCS), which was answerable to the Minister to the Prime Minister, that is Papadopoulos himself<sup>65</sup>. Any criticism of the actions of the dictatorial government was forbidden, as well as any commentary or news item deemed to be an insult to the royal family and the institution of the monarchy. Reference to political parties, and particularly to those of the Left, were forbidden too. The same applied to any historical accounts and references which could "re-awaken passions and sow discord". Finally, in anticipation of foreign reaction against the regime and of radio propaganda by self-exiled Communists, all transcriptions of broadcasts by foreign radio stations were banned. All newspapers had to use the purist language instead of the "vulgar" demotiki, which was associated mainly with the Left.

Control over the content of newspapers was not confined to censorship. In addition, government communiqués, various official texts and dictated editorials were compulsorily printed by all newspapers. Photographs distributed by the PCS, referring to the work of the government had to be reproduced on the front page, while each newspaper was compelled to publish "at least one commentary per day referring to the Government and its work"<sup>66</sup>. All aspects of newspaper publication fell within the domain of the censors who often determined even the layout of the papers, such as the size of and typefaces for headlines. The result of such a policy was the complete uniformity of the Greek national press to the extent that a newspaper of the Centre was hardly distinguishable from one of the Right<sup>67</sup>.

Not all publishers agreed to publish under censorship. The owner of the liberal paper Eleftheria (Freedom) which had

turned conservative amid the crisis of 1965, chose to close down the paper and flee abroad. The worst surprise for the dictators, however, was the decision of Helen Vlachou to close down her two prestigious conservative papers, the morning Kathimerini (Daily) and Messimvrini (Noon) by declaring force majeure. Vlachou's decision was a major shock for the dictators, especially since the publisher in the past had repeatedly appeared to endorse a dictatorial solution under the auspices of the King<sup>68</sup>. Therefore, the colonels had hoped to get support from her papers for their "revolution" and tried hard to persuade her to re-publish, but without success. Vlachou, an ardent royalist, after being placed under house arrest for a few months, finally fled the country in the wake of the King's abortive counter-coup and became a leading campaigner against the junta abroad<sup>69</sup>. Vlachou's stance was a major blow for the colonels as it indicated that the regime did not enjoy the full support of the Greek bourgeoisie. This became more obvious a few months later, when another influential Conservative paper, I Vradyni (The Evening) took advantage of a partial lifting of prior censorship and started to oppose the regime overtly on every given occasion.

There were, nevertheless, two papers which endorsed the dictatorial regime; the ultra-conservative Estia (Hearth) and the Eleftheros Kosmos (Free World). The latter, founded several months previously, had engaged itself in alarmist reporting and propaganda about a Communist insurrection. It was published by former Communist Savvas Constantopoulos who was a personal friend of Papadopoulos. Before the coup both papers had very low circulation rates: Estia with nearly 6,000 copies daily and Eleftheros Kosmos with some 23,500 copies. With the advent of the dictatorship, however, both papers saw their circulation double in 1967 and nearly triple in 1968. The significant increase in circulation of the pro-regime papers, however, was not an indication of a popular endorsement of the dictatorship. For although Estia and Eleftheros Kosmos ostensibly absorbed a



**TABLE 4.1**  
**Average Daily circulation of national newspapers, 1966-1967**

	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>
<u>A. RIGHT-WING</u>		
1. Acropolis	78,559	94,810
2. Apoyevmatini	48,773	85,889
3. Vradyni	42,659	65,722
4. Kathimerini	45,745	-
5. Messimvrini	72,239	-
TOTAL	288,011	246,421
<u>B. CENTRE and LEFT PAPERS</u>		
1. Avgi	23,540	-
2. Athinaiki	29,035	-
3. Dimokratiki Allaghi	13,589	-
4. Eleftheria	14,849	-
5. Ethnos	28,236	29,023
6. Ta Nea	195,278	142,242
7. To Vima	91,213	66,074
TOTAL	395,744	237,339
<u>C. PRO-JUNTA PAPERS</u>		
1. Eleftheros Kosmos	23,543	48,017
2. Estia	5,963	11,245
TOTAL	29,506	59,262
TOTAL OF ALL PAPERS	713,257	543,022

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Source: EIIEA (Union of Owners of Athenian Dailies).

number of readers from the closed down newspapers, they never reached the level of those enjoying high circulation figures<sup>70</sup>.

The general picture of the press by the end of the dictators' first year in power was rather discouraging. Six newspapers had closed down, three of them of their own accord. Moreover, the uniformity of the remaining papers made the tight control of the government so conspicuous that even the dictators were eventually embarrassed. Worst of all, the press had been discredited and this was reflected in the dramatic decrease of total circulation. Of all the remaining newspapers the hardest affected by the dictatorship were the liberal ones, especially Ta Nea and To Vima which saw their average daily circulation shrink by more than a quarter. This was for two main reasons: because they bore no difference to the conservative ones in the initial phase of the dictatorship; and because to appear reading a previously outspokenly pro-Papandreou paper was a risk that not everybody was willing to take. With the closing down of six papers and the introduction of prior censorship and propaganda, almost one in four readers ceased to buy a newspaper. This was the first clear indication that the regime did not enjoy wide popularity and that the measures against the press were not wholly effective. The changes in the daily circulation of the national papers during the first year of the dictatorship are shown in Table 4.1.

In the first months of 1968, the colonels decided on the partial lifting of preventive censorship. This decision was among a number of measures of 'liberalization' introduced to create the illusion of a gradual return to parliamentary normality. Newspapers were free to decide on questions pertaining to news reporting, page setting, editorials and the choice of subjects to be covered. Force-feeding of the press was to all intents and purposes abolished and the same applied to the restrictions on the language used by newspapers. But reference to political parties and their leaders continued to

be forbidden. Criticism of the military was permitted, provided that it was responsible and 'bona fide'<sup>71</sup>.

With the relaxation of censorship, the dictators aimed to give the impression of a press operating freely. This they did for two apparent reasons. First, it was a response to the international outcry against the regime and the pressure for the restoration of press freedom exercised upon the junta by the Council of Europe and the International Federation of Journalists<sup>72</sup>. Secondly, it was intended for domestic purposes, to show the country that the pro-regime stance of the papers was spontaneous. This need was explicitly stated at the end of the circular: "The scrupulous application of the present order is intimately connected with the success of the government's action." Moreover, it was clearly reflected in Papadopoulos' frequent addresses to journalists during 1968-69, which showed that the achievement of the support of the press was one of the dictator's major preoccupations: "Gentlemen, you have dismantled yourselves", he told newspaper representatives on November 23 1968. "And I ask you why? Take the pen again and launch yourselves into the struggle. The people need you. Do not deprive them of your services"<sup>73</sup>.

Nevertheless, despite Papadopoulos' admonitions, the partial lifting of censorship did not improve the junta's relations with the press. Rather, it gave newspapers an opportunity to express, albeit implicitly, their opposition to the regime<sup>74</sup>. The colonels' failure to attract the support of the press was the main reason for the launching of a new pro-regime paper, Nea Politeia (New State) in September 1968. As the date for the referendum on the new Constitution was approaching, the need for newspapers which would carry the regime's propaganda became imperative. The initial circulation of the paper (42,000 copies daily) seemed promising, but before long it started to decline. Within a year Nea Politeia had lost 18,000 readers, and with the total abolition of prior censorship at the end of 1969, the

paper's daily circulation went down to a little more than 10,000 copies<sup>75</sup>.

With their relations with the national press at a dead end, the dictators announced the implementation of a new law for the press to take effect from the beginning of 1970. They decided, however, to give the journalists a trial period, by abolishing prior censorship completely<sup>75</sup>. Hence, in October 1969 modifications were made to the application of the martial law on press matters and a memorandum was issued by Papadopoulos which outlined the subjects which were still prohibited<sup>76</sup>.

With the total lifting of prior censorship, the newspapers regained their original political orientation to a considerable degree. Opposition to the regime became more outspoken, especially from the liberal papers and the conservative Vradyni, which became the regular forum for an ex-junta member, D. Stamatelopoulos, fiercely to criticize the regime and especially Papadopoulos himself. The pro-regime papers on the other hand saw their circulation decrease steadily, despite the launching in 1970 of a fourth paper, the evening Simerina (Today's news), by the publisher of Eleftheros Kosmos. Between 1968 and 1972, the share of the pro-regime papers in the total daily circulation fell from 18.5 to 12.5 per cent. As a result, Nea Politeia folded at the end of 1972, and Simerina two years later (Table 4.2).

On November 17 1969 the dictators published the new Press Law, which was to be implemented from the beginning of the following year. The new law, containing 101 clauses, repeated many of the restrictions included in Papadopoulos' memorandum to the newspapers. Among other things, the dictatorial press law prohibited the publication of any kind of information inciting revolt against the established political order and outlawed publications which would harm the reputation of the armed forces or be insulting for the royal family<sup>77</sup>. The

**TABLE 4.2**

**Average Daily circulation of Athens newspapers, 1968-1972**

	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>
<b><u>A. RIGHT-WING</u></b>					
1. Acropolis	102,127	109,663	86,017	94,602	106,502
2. Apoyevmatini	122,059	145,348	121,055	135,762	156,185
3. Vradyni	85,384	101,217	84,243	84,677	95,899
TOTAL	309,570	356,228	291,315	315,041	358,586
<b><u>B. CENTRE</u></b>					
1. To Vima	47,518	44,187	42,107	40,820	47,369
2. Ta Nea	125,073	133,151	122,051	131,316	149,545
3. Ethnos	26,821	26,031	44,361	-	-
TOTAL	199,412	203,369	208,519	172,136	196,914
<b><u>C. PRO-JUNTA</u></b>					
1. El. Kosmos	60,911	59,270	50,818	42,870	43,490
2. Estia	13,218	13,629	11,900	11,847	12,388
3. Nea Politeia	41,977	24,438	18,530	10,455	7,900
4. Simerina	-	-	25,006	15,589	15,566
TOTAL	116,106	97,337	106,254	80,761	79,344
TOTAL OF ALL	625,088	656,934	606,088	567,938	634,844

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Source: EIIEA

introduction of new press legislation (which was complemented with the law on 'false information'<sup>78</sup>) was a clever device, for whereas it gave the dictators the opportunity to do away with censorship, it imposed so many restrictions upon newspaper reporting that in essence it penalized the expression of any substantial criticism against the regime. Indeed, in the following years a large number of journalists were prosecuted and condemned by courts through press law action and an influential liberal paper, the evening Ethnos (Nation), was forced to close down in 1970<sup>79</sup>.

The junta also exercised economic pressure on newspapers. For example, under Legislative Decree 345/1969 the dictators abolished the right to free newsprint that newspapers had previously enjoyed. From now on, duty would be payable according to circulation on a set scale (Table 4.3 ).

TABLE 4.3

Newsprint Duty payable according to Article 20 of L.D.346/1969

<u>Circulation</u>	<u>Duty and ancillary taxes payable</u>
0 - 25,000	Nil
25,001 - 50,000	50%
50,001 - 75,000	75%
75,001 - 100,000	90%
over 100,000	95%

---

Source: Helen Vlachou: The colonels and the Press.

In practice, this measure punished large circulation papers, and so seriously affected the most popular of the opposition papers which were forced to increase their prices by 67 per cent in six weeks. As a result, instead of benefiting from the abolition of censorship, the opposition papers saw their circulation rates falling in 1970 (by 1971, however, they had started to win back their readers). By the same decree the

junta also eliminated all tax privileges of newspapers: tax according to circulation was abolished and replaced by tax on income revenue. According to I. Agathangelou, alternate Minister to the Prime Minister, with the new system newspaper taxes were to increase up to five or six times<sup>80</sup>.

Another way of exercising economic pressure on newspapers was through the introduction of preferential state advertising. The latter had always been a major source of income for the Greek press, as a large number of public organizations, state agencies, banks and local authorities, let alone the government, frequently published their decisions, accounts, notifications and various other advertisements in newspapers. The dictators used newspapers selectively for the publication of state advertising, with preference for the pro-regime ones. Hence, Eleftheros Kosmos, which had had the smallest share of state advertising in 1966, occupied the second position behind the other pro-regime paper Nea Politeia in 1971, and passed to the first place a year later. At the same time, To Vima saw its share of state advertising - the highest until 1966 - decreasing by 76 per cent<sup>81</sup>. In this way the preferential use of state advertising became a reward for support to the regime and a punishment for the expression of opposition.

Finally, whenever legal action or economic pressure did not prove very effective, the authorities sought to prevent the circulation of newspapers in various areas and especially in the provinces. This unofficial interference with circulation was realized in the form of an order by the gendarmerie to the local distribution agency not to release opposition papers to specified villages; or, when papers were released, agents were "advised" not to sell them and to return the bundles unopened<sup>82</sup>.

However, the stick was not the only means used by the dictators against the press. In order to attract the support of

publishers, they also used the carrot in the form of loans to different newspapers. Borrowing had always been a major source of dependence of the press on the government, as no loan could be allocated, even from a private bank, without the approval of the Cabinet. Nevertheless, despite the danger of increased dependence on the dictatorial government, some publishers accepted loans from the junta. Most publicized of all cases were those of the Lambrakis group (To Vima; Ta Nea) and the Botsis brothers (Acropolis; Apogevmatini), who each received a loan of 50 million drachmas<sup>83</sup>. The allocation of loans to the press contributed for a time to a lowering of the opposition tone from those papers which were involved<sup>84</sup>. In the long run, however, the dictators failed to buy off any newspaper.

In short, like the majority of the population, the Greek press resisted the dictatorship passively rather than through open confrontation. Nevertheless, even the passive opposition of the press against the regime was a major blow for the junta and must have contributed to the aggravation of the regime's contradictions. The publishers' refusal to cooperate with the dictators reflected the failure of the latter to achieve a new alliance of forces headed by the military. The stance of Helen Vlachou was a first indication that a large section of the bourgeoisie did not endorse the dictatorship. This became more clearly manifested when the conservative Vradyni started its more overt opposition to the junta. The frequent references by Vradyni to politicians as the only remedy to the crisis often outraged and embarrassed the dictators and led to the newspaper's final closure in 1973<sup>85</sup>. A measure of the popular support for the junta was the circulation of the four pro-regime papers. Two folded within four years, while the remaining two saw their daily circulations drop significantly after the lifting of prior censorship. The dictators' failure to achieve any substantial cooperation from the press in the propagation of their militaristic ideals led them to place particular emphasis upon other media, notably broadcasting. In



particular, they sought to exploit in full the great propaganda potential offered by the newly arrived medium of television.

#### **4.6 Repression and propaganda: The policy on broadcasting**

##### **4.6.1 The militarization of EIR and the advent of television**

On the first day of the coup, the dictators sent both tanks and raiding forces to secure control of EIR's headquarters at Zappeion, five minutes away from the Parliament building. The radio network of EIR and that of the Armed Forces were linked into a unitary national grid which broadcast news bulletins prepared by EIR. Thus, for the first six days of the coup a single military network was the only source of broadcast information in most of Greece<sup>86</sup>. Such was the importance attached to the control of broadcasting by the dictators, that EIR's headquarters were occupied by a military unit for a long time<sup>87</sup>. EIR went on air on the seventh day, after instructions for censorship had been given<sup>88</sup>. The previous management of the network was dismissed and replaced by people loyal to the regime, with Lieutenant Colonel Ioannis Anastassopoulos as the Director General. He was the head of communications at ASDEN, the Higher Military Command of the Interior and the Islands and one of the most prominent members of the 'Revolutionary Committee', a kind of executive body of the junta which defined the general policy line under the chairmanship of Papadopoulos<sup>89</sup>.

The junta sought not only to establish firm control over the existing radio networks, but also to develop the television services which until then had remained at an experimental stage. The reform and development of state monopoly broadcasting were a major component of the military government's overall effort to improve its image and to win support for its policies both within the country and abroad.

In the absence of any substantial popular support for the dictatorship and facing the political and diplomatic isolation of the junta, Papadopoulos decided in December 1970 to assume personal control over the information policy of his government. For this reason the General Directorate for Press and Information which supervised both the press and EIR was detached from the Ministry to the Prime Minister and reformed into an independent secretariat, the General Secretariat for the Press and Information (GSPI). It was placed under the direct control of<sup>90</sup> the Prime Minister, that is of Papadopoulos himself. The main purpose of the GSPI was the information of public opinion inside the country and abroad on all national issues, so that "an accurate and objective picture of the existing regime" could emerge<sup>91</sup>. Among other things, the Secretariat would seek to send special envoys and press officers abroad to inform foreign 'opinion leaders' on the aims of the 'revolution' and on the work of the military government. The creation abroad of a climate favourable for the regime was necessary not only for political reasons, but also because the dictators were anxious to attract tourism and foreign investment - both crucial elements in their plans for economic development.

For the influence of domestic public opinion, a special directorate was to be formed within the GSPI to deal with all aspects regarding the functioning of the press, broadcasting, cinema and the theatre. Among the competences of the directorate were the supervision of the above media and the setting of guidelines for the "proper use" of radio, television and "all other means which formed public opinion"<sup>92</sup>. Papadopoulos was to appoint the Secretary General, send envoys abroad and supervise all activities pertaining to the control of information, the exercise of censorship and the application of propaganda techniques.

The new law on information policy was complemented by a significant modification of EIR's 1953 statute, which enabled the dictators to tighten their grip upon the 'civilian' broadcasting organization. With Legislative Decree 745 of December 10 1970, the name of the Institute changed to EIRT (literally, National Institute of Radio and Television) to cover the network's recent expansion into the new medium. According to the new law, EIRT was to be administered by a five-member Board of Governors, whose chairman was to be none other than the Secretary General of Press and Information. The board also included a top-ranking civil servant, a top-level technician of the Ministry of Communications and another two members with knowledge and experience on matters pertaining to broadcasting. All members of the board were to be appointed by the Prime Minister for a three year period, but could be freely dismissed whenever the government considered it necessary. Day by day operations were to be the province of the Director General under the supervision of the General Secretary.

According to the dictatorial decree, the organization, functioning and distribution of tasks among the different directorates of EIRT were to be defined by royal decree issued at the request of the Prime Minister. In practice this meant that every aspect of the network's operation was to be dealt with by Papadopoulos directly. Thus, with its quasi independence abolished de jure as well as de facto, EIRT was practically transformed by the military junta into a department of central government, with many of the competences previously reserved for the Board of Governors and the Director General now performed by the head of another government department - the General Secretary of Press and Information - and by the arch-dictator himself. This more than anything else reflected Papadopoulos' personal interest in broadcasting as a powerful propaganda medium.

The first General Secretary to become the chairman of EIRT's board was its previous Director General, I. Anastassopoulos. Three of the four remaining posts were taken by former junta cohorts: Brigadier L. Paravantis, an electronics specialist and Director General of the National Telecommunications Organization (OTE); Brigadier V. Frangos, former tank commander and also Director General of the National Theatre, and Major General G. Raptis. The fifth post was taken by a State Legal Councillor. Yet another, albeit retired, army officer, Major General Ioannis Ploumbis of the Signal Corps<sup>93</sup> was appointed Director General of the Institute. Thus, like every other section of the state apparatus, EIRT was run primarily by military officers<sup>94</sup>.

Anastassopoulos was not to last long in the post of General Secretary. In 1971 an acute crisis erupted within the junta as most of its cadres, disillusioned with Papadopoulos's leadership demanded his resignation. However, the dictator managed to hold on to power, largely thanks to the support of the chief of the military police D. Ioannidis, and sought to secure his position by removing all of his major opponents from the key positions in government. Among those to go were G.Georgalas, the government spokesman and propagandist and Anastassopoulos who was transferred to the Ministry of Public Order. His successor as Secretary General of Press and Information was the lawyer Loukas Papangelis, a civilian who had fully embraced the ideals of the 'revolution' and was now keen to propagate them through radio and television. The post of Director General was taken by Major General Constantine Mitrelis, former head of the Psychological Warfare Directorate of the General Staff and hence a propaganda expert. Ostensibly, the change of heads at EIRT had to do mainly with the internal balance of forces within the junta and with the appointees' experience in propaganda methods, rather than with the actual policy they implemented at the Institute. In fact, the military government had not articulated any specific policy for

modernization of Greek society, they did not see it as an essential priority.

Nevertheless, in 1963 Karamanlis's government laid plans for the renovation of EIR's radio and the establishment of a complete television system. For this reason seventeen new transmitters were to be installed for both media to provide coverage for 80 to 85 per cent of the population. At the same time, experts invited from the Italian Broadcasting Corporation (RAI) made a voluminous report with recommendations on the technical and economic re-organization of EIR<sup>98</sup>. Additionally, the ERE government forged ahead with a scheme for the construction of new buildings for the Institute, which would house both television and the various radio services which had until then been dispersed in a number of public buildings all over Athens<sup>99</sup>. The whole project remained in draft, however, due to Karamanlis's resignation later that year and to the successive defeats of ERE in the elections of 1963 and 1964.

In 1965 the Centre Union government publicized new plans for the establishment of a television network, which included the holding of a new international competition for the provision of technical equipment. At the same time, following a decision by G. Papandreou, EIR set up an experimental television station. Nevertheless, the first transmission was not carried out before September 1965, amid the political upheaval caused by the downfall of Papandreou's government. Five months later the network started a limited schedule of regular broadcasts for two hours daily<sup>100</sup>. The start of television was made in a haphazard fashion without any previous planning. As there were no proper television studios, the service had to be housed on the fifth floor of the new building of the Telecommunications Organization, OTE. All in all, EIR's television 'headquarters' consisted of a main studio of ten square metres and another two rooms for the technical processing and transmission of the audiovisual material<sup>101</sup>.

broadcasting. According to Papangelis, the mission of radio and television was to "contribute to forming democratic citizens within the framework of the overall effort to build the new state of the Constitution of 1968. New educational broadcasts will fulfil their aim within the framework of our ever developing modern society.(...) Greek film serials based on the nation's struggles will be shown for the first time on television.(...) Radio and television will make a constructive effort (...) to create democratic citizens of whom the new democracy is in such great need"<sup>95</sup>.

In view of the above statement it is no surprise that the dictators vigorously pursued the expansion of the undeveloped television service which had started to operate in February 1966 for a mere two hours daily. Until the mid-1960s Greece was the only Western European country without a television network. Deliberations for the introduction of television had started as early as 1952. Throughout the 1950s three international competitions were held for the installation of a preliminary television system, but all were annulled for reasons which were never fully explained in public<sup>96</sup>.

In 1960 it was announced by the ERE government that a significant part of the Italian war reparations was to be used for the technical refurbishment of the radio network, the installation of television transmission equipment and the establishment of an industry for the production of cheap radio and television receivers. The decision generated an uproar within the opposition who accused the government of wasting vital resources for the provision of a luxury good such as television that, given the economic conditions of the time, the country could ill afford. Eventually the project was dropped and the Italian money directed to other sectors of the economy<sup>97</sup>. It seemed that whereas politicians considered the introduction of television as an important step towards the

However, as early as December 1967 the dictators decided to proceed quickly with the development of television; thus, they took up ERE's architectural scheme in its entirety and proposed to construct new headquarters for the Institute in the Athens suburb of Aghia Paraskevi at an estimated cost of 85 million drachmas excluding the technical equipment. The actual construction started in 1970 and finished three years later, six months behind schedule and at a final cost of 250 million drachmas - almost three times above the original estimate. There were allegations of embezzlement and fraud, but these were never proved<sup>102</sup>. The completed building had an excessive number of radio studios, corridors and...toilets and was in all respects completely unsuitable for television production. There were only three television studios, the smallest with an area of 70 square metres and the biggest of 165 square metres<sup>103</sup>. This was due to the fact that the 'white marble monument' which was erected for EIR was in fact only the rear wing of the initial plan, which was to house the radio studios and the laboratories of film processing for television programmes. There was to be a front wing for offices, two large television studios and a huge theatre for concerts and performances<sup>104</sup>. The front part was never to be built and so all offices, laboratories and studios had to be squeezed into the rear building. An explanation for this must have been the enormous increase in the cost of the project which prevented the construction of the most important front part of the building. Another major reason must have been the dictators' need to add as soon as possible the new headquarters of EIR to the large number of embellishing constructions with which they intended to give the impression that they were well engaged in the huge task of 'national reconstruction'.

The colonels forged ahead with the re-equipment plan as this had been formulated by the ERE government. A new international competition was held in March 1968, though not without complications. The successful bidder with a tender of just over

\$16 million was the American-Italian company Page Europa SPA, which was not a producer of transmitting equipment but acted as an intermediary for other manufacturers. The loser in the tendering process was Thomson-Houston CSF of France with a higher bid. Thomson challenged the deal which showed Page as being the most competitive and alleged that secret negotiations had taken place between government officials and Page. It appeared that although Page did not fulfil many of the terms of the tender, it was favoured by the dictators. The pro-regime Estia twice called on Papadopoulos to investigate the matter and end the controversy. In response to this pressure, Papadopoulos rescinded the deal in January 1969, but after a brief period of consideration Page was eventually awarded the contract<sup>105</sup>. Due to preventive censorship, no further details were publicised at that time. In the period following the downfall of the junta, the press and various politicians made passing references to what was termed the Page-Europa scandal, but despite calls from the opposition the Conservative government conducted no investigation on the matter and the whole story was soon forgotten<sup>106</sup>. EIRT, however, was to suffer for a long time the effects of the junta's excessive expenditure in developing broadcasting. The construction of the broadcasting house together with the purchase of new equipment bestowed the Institute with a deficit amounting to 743 million drachmas for the period 1971-74, which it struggled to cover for years through interest bearing credit from the Loan and Consignment Fund<sup>107</sup>.

#### 4.6.2 The establishment of the 'military channel'

The dictators also sought to organize the various radio stations of the armed forces into a unitary broadcasting network which would include the newly established television service. The military had started efforts to expand into television as early as 1964, but permission had been refused by



the Centre Union government. Nevertheless, under the palace-backed governments which succeeded the EK, the armed forces managed to start their television service in April 1966 for three nights a week<sup>108</sup>. Such was the eagerness of the military leadership to establish a regular television service, that the whole venture started before the necessary headquarters were built and the technical infra-structure obtained. Initially, the military television service was housed in the Geographical Service of the Army in Athens and later moved to a building which had formerly served as dormitories for conscripts<sup>109</sup>. Soon after the establishment of the dictatorship, however, the construction of a new building for television began next to the dormitories. This was intended to cover the needs of daily programming which had commenced in 1968 for three hours in the evening.

In 1970, the same year that the new legislation on EIRT appeared, the dictators decided to put their broadcasting house in order by establishing a new unitary service for both radio and television. The new Information Service of the Armed Forces (YENED) which was established by Legislative Decree 722/1970, was nothing more than a military unit placed under the control of the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. It was to be administered by a military commander and his deputy and was to employ military personnel, officers, warrant officers and conscripts as well as civilians. The main functions of YENED were: the operation of psychological warfare according to the guidelines given by the General Staff; the national, moral and social education and information primarily of the armed forces and secondly of the people; the information of the public on the work done by the armed forces; the strengthening of national morale in wartime; and the training of military staff on the use of audiovisual technology. These functions clearly reflected the militaristic mentality that the junta wanted to inspire to the new institution. The aims of the second broadcasting organization of Greece had nothing to do with the

traditional principles of public service broadcasting, that is, to educate, inform and entertain. Instead, YENED would aim at the indoctrination of both the armed forces and the public with the 'national' ideals of the dictators. For this reason, in addition to the radio and television services, YENED also included a directorate for cinema which was responsible for the production of films and other visual material to be used mainly for propaganda purposes. Among others things, this directorate would be responsible for productions aiming at "the promotion of major events, the exaltation of heroic deeds and the boosting of national morale"<sup>110</sup>.

The organization and operation of YENED were imbued with the militaristic mentality which characterised all units of the armed forces. All aspects of YENED's policy such as administration, selection of personnel and general programming, were the province of its military commander and his deputy<sup>111</sup>. Also, all directorates of the network (radio, television and cinema) were manned by military officers. Within the service operated a personnel bureau, dealing among other things with matters of military recruitment and the preservation of order and discipline<sup>112</sup>. There was also, a bureau of information which among other tasks was responsible for the 'enlightenment and national education' of personnel, the issuing of special identification cards for all employees and most important of all, for the scrutiny of all employees' loyalty to the regime<sup>113</sup>. Strikes were forbidden, as was any activity which could cause disruption to the operation of YENED. Also forbidden were all public discussions of political matters by personnel while on duty; the reading of the press; the disclosure of any kind of information regarding the network and the organization of any meeting for any purpose without previous authorization by the Commander in Chief of the armed forces. One of the main characteristics of the internal regulations was their moralising language and content. The personnel had to behave impeccably and with decency, to respect

all commands pertaining to security, order and discipline and to show hierarchical obedience"<sup>114</sup>. Apparently, one of the purposes of the regulations was to educate the employees on discipline, one of the main components of militaristic ideology.

Like EIRT, YENED was under the control of Papadopoulos, not only in his capacity as Minister of Defence, but also because the dictator had appointed to the post of network's chief a personal friend and classmate, Brigadier General Tryphon Apostolopoulos<sup>115</sup>. The control of both networks became even more centralized in 1972 when Papadopoulos decided to set up a committee at the General Secretariat of Press and Information with the sole task of defining the terms of operation of radio and television<sup>116</sup>. It consisted of the Undersecretary of the Ministry to the Prime Minister, the Secretary General of Press and Information, the Director General of EIRT, a top-rank official of the Armed Forces High Command and the commander of YENED. The committee would set the guidelines for the content of programmes on both networks "according to the cultural, social, national, and other needs of the state". It would also, coordinate the programming of both networks, outline a common economic policy regarding advertising and define the prices and method for the purchase of films for television. In this way, every aspect of programming policy was to be defined centrally by this committee which in turn was answerable to Papadopoulos, not only because it was part of the GSPI, but also because most of its members were appointed to their posts by him. At the same time, the two broadcasting organizations, deprived of the relative independence to make decision on even secondary matters, were turned into mere instruments of the regime's propaganda.

Nevertheless, despite the domination of both networks by military men, there was still a major difference between EIRT and YENED. The former continued to be a 'civilian' network

under the control of the government, employing civilian staff. EIRT was no more militarized than most other sectors of the state apparatus under the military dictatorship. YENED on the other hand was organized as a military unit; it operated according to the general rules applied to the operation of any other sector in the armed forces. In some cases the operation and needs of a nationwide broadcasting service were incompatible with the mission of the military. For instance, the main source of revenue for YENED was income from advertising on both radio and television. Advertising, as a profit-making activity, was incompatible with the mission of a military unit. Apparently the dictators, cautious not to overload the budget of the MoD with the huge expense of a broadcasting network, resorted to advertising in order to cover YENED's financial needs<sup>117</sup>.

#### 4.6.3 Television programming policy or junta-style propaganda?

It was in this climate of militarism and improvisation that regular programming started on television. There was no properly organized news department, or indeed any other department for television in either network. Initially news bulletins consisted of a studio announcer reading the news to the camera. The only visual material were photographs and footage from the Greek Newsreel - an account of the week's events prepared by the Ministry to the Prime Minister and released to cinemas to be shown usually before the scheduled film. It contained general interest information and coverage of political events, mainly projecting the government of the day. Soon, however, EIRT started to organize a special news department for television. A camera for outdoor filming was bought and footage of one or two minutes was added. By the last years of the dictatorship EIRT had increased its news programmes to three daily bulletins and enriched its visual material with footage from Visnews, UPI and Eurovision<sup>118</sup>.

The television service of the armed forces was much less organized; news was written by the same team which prepared the radio bulletins and consequently the content of radio and television news programmes was basically the same. This team was housed in a building formerly used as the dressing rooms of the Army School of Gymnastics, which was scornfully called by the employees the 'hen-coop' of news. Later, however, the news department of YENED moved to the new premises built by the dictators especially for television<sup>119</sup>. On Sundays YENED television presented a 'tele-newspaper', prepared by a team of journalists of the pro-regime paper Nea Politeia; later, the 'tele-newspaper' became the daily news programme of the network.

News programmes were the regular slots in television programming for the image projection of the dictatorial government. Both networks were compelled to transmit all Papadopoulos' tape recorded speeches in full. Later, however, some editing was made, as the dictator could consume with his verbosity the entire broadcast time<sup>120</sup>. In addition to the Prime Minister's speeches, news also involved constant coverage of all government activities. In view of the general stagnation of the regime the dictators were keen to appear to be engaged in constructive work. Television screens, therefore, were constantly occupied with pictures of ministers cutting ribbons and turning sods. The most common feature of all was Deputy Premier S. Pattakos, who appeared on television laying so many cornerstones that he became publicly known as 'Mr Trowel'.

It is impossible to obtain accurate information as to how censorship committees operated. According to one source most journalists employed by the two networks subjected themselves to self-censorship<sup>121</sup>. In a number of cases, members of staff who had escaped dismissal following thorough scrutiny of their political affiliations could not cope with the policy of hymns

and praises to the regime and consequently were either dismissed or forced to resign<sup>122</sup>.

As part of an overall propaganda programme, government information on radio and television was organized by the Minister to the Prime Minister, George Georgalas, who as a wartime Communist had been trained by Agitprop. Each Friday evening he would practise his skills on YENED television in a programme called New Horizons. No matter the topic, he would always come to the same conclusion, that the coup was a popular revolution aimed at saving the country from disaster<sup>123</sup>.

The rest of the programming consisted of ancient American series and British, French, German and American documentaries and travelogues. With the introduction of commercials in September 1967, the television service of the armed forces began transmission of a large number of popular foreign series, mostly American, which attracted large audiences and subsequently a large number of advertisements<sup>124</sup>. A similar policy was followed by EIRT which introduced commercials in 1970. Before long, both networks had started the production of their own series. Not surprisingly, the main themes were often inspired by Greek history and tradition. The armed forces were glorified. In the most popular of all series, a heroic Greek colonel of the armed forces intelligence service was fighting during peace-time to defend national ideals.

Television also promoted sports, and especially football which was offered in heavy doses to the audience as an antidote for lack of participation in politics. The encouragement of sporting activity was one of the main projects of the colonels who added to their embellishing constructions a large number of sports grounds. One of the main slogans constantly repeated on radio and television was: 'Every city with a stadium, every village with a gymnasium'. In the four-year period 1967-1970 the average annual rate of expansion in central government

spending was particularly pronounced in sport (estimated at more than 50 per cent)<sup>125</sup>.

Daily programming was dominated by light, easily digested material on both radio and television. The colonels imposed their own standards on broadcasting production; at YENED, with a decree issued by Papadopoulos in 1970, three censorship committees were set up to vet all output of radio and television. According to the decree, the content of programmes should not offend public decency; convey political messages; rekindle political passions; or be imbued with pessimism<sup>126</sup>. As might be expected, the dictators were completely indifferent to questions regarding programme quality or the cultural role that broadcasting could perform within Greek society. Television production was almost entirely left in the hands of external producers who received the lion's share of the channels' advertising revenue. Programming policy was based on the profitability of a particular programme and television output was flooded with light entertainment programmes and commercials<sup>127</sup>. This was particularly true for YENED, about which Apogevmatini wrote in 1971: "If Greek television as a whole possesses the European record of babble and bad taste, YENED is - save for very rare examples - a can in which the most unbelievable advertising concoctions are preserved". The paper also urged the government to set up a programming committee of academics and artists to draw up the standards for television output and to free the two networks from the exploitation of self-proclaimed producers <sup>128</sup> but to no avail.

In general, television was exploited by the dictators as a major means for the propagation of their ideals and the promotion of their policies. It also reflected the dictators' attempt to create a society preoccupied with consumerism, entertainment and sport, and indifferent to politics. Through an economic policy which encouraged demand and turned consumerism into a social value the dictators sought to create

the basis for a new social consensus. In this context, possession of a television set was popularly seen as an additional source of social prestige, while through commercials the medium promoted the new consumerist lifestyle. This was reflected in the increase of set ownership throughout the dictatorship: while in 1966 the ratio of television sets per 1,000 inhabitants was 0.4, by 1972 it had increased to 58.7 and reached 107 a year later<sup>129</sup>. By the early 1970s, television had already become the dominant form of mass entertainment, a development which had disastrous consequences for cinema. Between 1970 and 1975 the number of cinema-goers fell by nearly two thirds (from 128.6 to 47.9 million)<sup>130</sup>.

Greek popular drama series and quizzes reproduced the model of cheap and light entertainment that the domestic cinema industry offered to the large mass audience which was uneducated culturally and indifferent towards the arts<sup>131</sup>. As a result, within a decade (1965-1975) production plunged from 131 to 38 films annually; consequently, a significant number of film producers who had been attracted to the cinema industry because of the great profit opportunities it offered, turned their attention to television production<sup>132</sup>.

In short, Greek television developed at a time that cultural production was at a standstill, party politics had disappeared and free expression was deemed to be an offence. The main purpose of the new medium was to serve the junta's need for propaganda. As a result a great part of the population tuned in to the Greek-language programmes of many foreign radio stations (London, Paris, Moscow) and especially Deutsche Welle from Cologne, whose transmissions were the most outspoken and critical of the regime<sup>133</sup>. In practical terms, the hasty fashion in which television was established caused severe disruptions to both networks' operation, many of which are felt to the present day. Greek television is still suffering from a lack of proper premises and technical equipment, as well as



from an irrational and incoherent organization which has its roots in the years of the dictatorship. These effects will be examined in the chapters which follow.

#### **4.7 Deadlock: The failure of the regime to be legitimated**

Despite the blatant propaganda via the media, public opinion both domestic and international was hostile to the junta. Moreover, Papadopoulos' determination to exercise power alone appeared to have resulted in the complete disorganization of the state machine. The state of the 'revolution' was most explicitly outlined in a letter from Pattakos to Papadopoulos in 1968. In it, Pattakos asked the arch dictator to reorganize government, accept collective leadership and deal more effectively with the information apparatus in order to counter-balance the negative publicity which the regime had received worldwide<sup>134</sup>. It seemed that, due to lack of popular consent and to internal fighting within the junta, the dictatorship was already in a position of deadlock only a year after the coup.

A major blow for the military government was its continuous political isolation by Greek politicians as well as by foreign governments and organizations. The opposition of most prominent political figures, not only from the Centre and Left but also from the Right demolished the dictators' plans for a long-term coalition of forces with the support of the Conservatives. Through statements and declarations to the foreign media and appearances as defence witnesses at the trials of political prisoners, politicians such as G. Papandreou, P. Kanellopoulos, K. Karamanlis and many others expressed their rejection of the dictatorship as a solution to the country's chronic political problems. Moreover, international reaction to the coup from a very early stage indicated that the regime was short of political support outside the country. Opposition to the

regime was most explicitly expressed by international organizations such as the Council of Europe, the European Commission of Human Rights, the International Press Institute and Amnesty International<sup>135</sup>.

At the same time, within the country and abroad various resistance organizations were set up, mostly by politicians and activists of the Centre and the Left. Prominent among these organizations were the Patriotic Antidictatorial Front (PAM) established as early as May 1967 mainly by members of EDA and trade unionists; the Democratic Defence, the major resistance organization of the Centre; the Panhellenic Liberation Front established by A.Papandreou in exile; and other smaller groups. Although these organizations lacked the massive membership required for an effective confrontation with the dictatorship, their activities aroused public opinion, especially abroad, and became a constant reminder to the junta of its lack of popular support. To these organizations must be added the large number of artists, intellectuals and journalists who fled abroad and engaged themselves in an intensive anti-junta campaign<sup>136</sup>.

More importantly, the dictators were confronted with the passive opposition of the population within the country. On some occasions in particular, this opposition took a massive and overt character as in November 1968 when as many as 300,000 gathered for the funeral of G. Papandreou, shouting slogans against the dictatorship. As Pattakos's letter indicated, after a year in power the junta had realised that the creation of a new social consensus was a very difficult task.

The colonels had set as their main objective the intensification of the process of economic development which the civilian governments had started in the early 1960s. Rapid economic growth and a spectacular rise in living standards, constituted for the dictators a political necessity in their

effort to win the support of the people and consolidate their power.

In fact, the first three years of the dictatorship were characterized by a substantial increase in GNP (from 162,280 million drachmas in 1966, to 185,600 million in 1968, and to 219,500 million in 1970)<sup>137</sup> and in industrial production<sup>138</sup>. This growth, however, was largely the outcome of the extensive investment (especially in key areas such as chemicals, metallurgy and refineries) which had taken place in the period preceding the coup, and of the development by the junta of unproductive sectors such as construction and tourism. In general, the economic policy of the dictators aimed at creating the impression of rapid development and increasing prosperity. For this reason, resources were mainly directed to construction, tourism and the manufacture of light consumer goods at the expense of other productive sectors of the economy.

As a result, in the period 1967-1972, investment in construction of public works and buildings doubled, while investment in tourism increased sixfold between 1967 and 1973. During the same period, investment in housing increased by 115 per cent. By contrast, the share of investment in industry as part of total investment fell from 12.5 per cent in 1965 to 10.3 per cent in 1971. It is characteristic that no industrial unit of advanced technology was built during the seven years of the dictatorship<sup>139</sup>.

The junta promoted a consumerist model of society and consumption increased to an unprecedented extent due to the significant rise of income, especially of the middle and upper classes. Private per capita consumption increased from \$780 in 1970 to \$1,413 in 1974<sup>140</sup> and excessive demand (demand which cannot be satisfied by national production) increased sevenfold between 1967 and 1973<sup>141</sup>.

The disastrous effects of this policy on the economy as a whole were soon to appear and to become particularly pronounced during the international crisis of 1973. Between 1965 and 1973 imports as a remedy against imminent inflation increased three times<sup>142</sup> and this seriously affected the balance of payments deficit which in the period 1972-73 alone increased from \$367,000 to \$1,175 million. In order to pay for the increased imports, the junta resorted to external borrowing. As a consequence, in 1973 foreign debt reached \$3.3 billion<sup>143</sup>. Moreover, the dictators proved unable to control inflation which due to the effects of the international economic situation and especially the energy crisis, rose from 4.4 per cent in 1972 to 15.5 per cent in 1973 and to a record 31.9 per cent in 1974, the second highest of all OECD countries<sup>144</sup>.

The dictators had been keen to attract foreign capital in order to accelerate the pace of economic development and to achieve the political support of foreign governments. Yet, never throughout the seven years of the dictatorship did foreign investment reach the proportions of the 1965-66 period. On the contrary, the influx of foreign capital fell dramatically in the first three years of the dictatorship to start rising again only in 1970. All in all, in the period 1967-1973 foreign capital invested in industry did not exceed \$300 million, only \$80 million more than the seven-year period preceding the coup<sup>145</sup>. The average rate of increase in industrial investment fell from 20.5 per cent in the period 1961-66 to 10 per cent in the period 1967-71. Apparently, the dictatorship did not constitute a guarantee for political stability or social calm for either domestic or foreign capital holders.

Finally, the dictators' economic policy combined with the prevention of strikes and other repressive measures, deepened social inequalities and seriously affected the lower income groups. To give only one example, within 1973 average wages in

manufacture increased by 12 per cent while food prices had gone up by 21.2 per cent and the price index by 16 per cent. Hence, in practice there was a substantial decrease in real wages<sup>146</sup>.

#### **4.8 Internal contradictions and the failure of liberalization.**

Setbacks in economic policy as well as the constant expression of opposition against the regime aggravated the contradictions within the junta itself. From the early years of the dictatorship there was a continuous fight among the different factions within the junta, which reflected the colonels' complete lack of a coherent policy. A major reason for the conflict was Papadopoulos' insistence on monopolizing power, which ran counter to the interests and ambitions of other groups within the junta. Moreover, there was a clash between the 'moderates' and the 'intransigents'. The former, headed by Papadopoulos, were in favour of measures which would give the impression of a gradual liberalization and would subsequently generate support for the regime. The latter insisted upon the application of more 'radical' policies, such as the abolition of the monarchy, and stricter measures of repression against political opponents. The result was the eruption of periodical crises within the junta, estimated at one a year. The continuous fighting led Papadopoulos gradually to concentrate most powers in his own hands, so that he could control the state machine more effectively. By June 1973, Papadopoulos was simultaneously Regent, Prime Minister, Minister responsible for government policy, Minister of Defence and Minister of External Affairs.

Anxious to generate political support for the regime both within the country and internationally, Papadopoulos started as early as the end of 1967 to introduce measures which gave the impression that the coup was a temporary aberration from

parliamentarism and that representative institutions would be gradually restored. Thus in the wake of the King's abortive counter-coup Papadopoulos decided to free most of the political leaders, including George and Andreas Papandreou and Kanellopoulos. In 1968 a referendum on the new Constitution was also announced. In this way the regime would be vested with a sort of constitutional legality and appear as having the endorsement of the overwhelming majority of the people. Papadopoulos' tactic to create the illusion of an imminent return to parliamentarism was the reason for the establishment in 1970 of a 'mini Parliament', an advisory body whose members were elected by unions and organizations approved by the junta. Other measures included the abolition of 'certificates of social beliefs', a major component of the post-war repressive apparatus; the gradual lifting of martial law; the release of most political prisoners; and the closure of all concentration camps<sup>147</sup>.

Nevertheless, none of these measures helped the junta to increase its popularity. The dictators also failed to attract the support of a large part of the Greek bourgeoisie, as the stance of the latter's parliamentary and publishing representatives made clear. New measures were therefore necessary to bring the dictatorship out of the impasse and guarantee its continuation.

A significant development in 1973 became the catalyst for a major reform of the regime. In May that year a large group of royalist navy officers staged a revolt which aimed to overthrow the dictators, bring back the King and restore parliamentary institutions. Although the attempt eventually failed, it proved nevertheless that the basis of support for the junta had become dangerously narrow, even within the armed forces<sup>148</sup>. The revolt of the largely royalist navy gave the dictator the opportunity to get rid of the monarchy officially, although there was no evidence of any immediate involvement by the King.

The abolition of an institution which had been identified with many of the country's misfortunes and the post-war repressive regime could be presented as a measure towards the democratization of the political system. By eliminating a much hated institution, Papadopoulos could appear as a reformer and even hope to gain the support of the more progressive, anti-royalist part of the population. The package of reforms included the establishment of a 'Presidential Republic', the return to parliamentarism and the preparation of general elections. Papadopoulos was to become the first President of the Republic for a period of seven years, that is until June 1981. The constitution of 1968 was to be modified accordingly and a referendum was to be held in July 1973 for a popular endorsement of the Republic<sup>149</sup>. The reform of the Constitution was accompanied by the application of a number of major measures of liberalization. Hence, the law on the 'state of siege' was lifted completely and an amnesty was granted to all political prisoners. Moreover, the freedom of the press was restored and newspapers were free, for the first time in six years, to openly criticize the regime.

To mark the transition from dictatorship to parliamentarism, Papadopoulos resigned as Prime Minister on 8 October 1973 and a new government was formed, consisting only of civilians. No member of the junta was included. The new Prime Minister was the only prominent politician who agreed to cooperate with the junta, the right-wing Spyros Markezinis. The new government was to hold general elections by the end of 1974.

Papadopoulos' reforms reflected the major contradiction of the regime: the dictatorship was established in order to preserve the post war balance of forces and the domination of the military within it. Then, as repression failed to secure the new regime, the restoration of parliamentarism was the only option left if this domination was to be legitimated and the powers of the military preserved.

Nevertheless, the regime established by the 1973 constitution could hardly be considered a democracy, so far as the powers of the government and Parliament severely restricted. The real centre of power was to be the President of the Republic who was to be directly elected for a seven-year term. The competences of the head of state would be both executive and legislative, with most important of all his exclusive control over three key areas of policy: defence, public order and foreign affairs<sup>150</sup>. Moreover, the President was empowered to activate the law on the 'state of siege', suspend the civil liberties provisions and dismiss the Prime Minister whenever he considered it necessary. Finally, he was to appoint 20 of the 200 members of Parliament.

Behind the parliamentary facade the role of the military would continue to be central, but now the latter would not be immediately involved in politics. It would exercise its powers through the President, who would also be the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Hence, Greece would continue to be a military state, with the domination of the armed forces concealed behind a weak Parliament and a powerful President of the Republic.

It was to be shown before the end of 1973, however, that the prospects of legitimating the dictatorship even under its 'democratic' disguise were limited. The reforms were rejected by the majority of politicians, who even staged a campaign against the new Constitution before the referendum. Moreover, the junta's liberal measures did not attract the anticipated support of the masses. On the contrary, in a climate of general discontent, these measures became the fissures through which opposition to the regime was finally and fiercely expressed. Throughout 1973, dissent against the dictatorship was manifested on several occasions, most serious among them the occupation of the Athens Law School by students in February. It was not until the uprising by the students of the Athens



Polytechnic, however, that a major confrontation between the junta and the masses took place. In November that year, after the demands of University and Polytechnic students for reforms in higher education had been rejected by Markezinis's government, the students occupied the Polytechnic school in the centre of Athens from where they protested against the authoritarianism of the regime and called on the citizens to join them. Although this event did not lead to a popular uprising, the massive support offered by the people to the students, the clashes of protestors with the police and the disruption of daily life in the capital, were enough to prove that liberalization could not generate support for the dictatorship. After three days of embarrassment for the government, troops and tanks were sent in to end the uprising, killing at least 23 the protestors injuring another 1028<sup>151</sup>.

The declaration of martial law all over the country which followed the student revolt marked the end of Papadopoulos' experiment and proved that there was no half-way house to democracy. The dictatorship had either to collapse or reinforce its repressive mechanisms. The situation was similar to that in the period immediately before the coup and once again the solution was to be repression. On November 25 a faction of hard-liners headed by the chief of the notorious military police (ESA) brigadier Dimitrios Ioannides, overthrew Papadopoulos and the government of Markezinis. After the events at the Polytechnic, the new powerful men of the junta were convinced that there was no possibility for the regime to be legitimated. The only way to preserve their power was overt terror. All liberal measures introduced a few months earlier were abolished, either officially or in practice. The concentration camps were once again opened and many prominent politicians arrested.

On July 15 1974, Ioannides made a last desperate effort to consolidate his power through a 'nationalistic triumph'<sup>152</sup>

in Cyprus. Regrettably, the aims of the military junta and the conditions under which the Cyprus adventure was planned and executed have so far remained obscure with the official silence on the issue preventing a full explanation of the Cypriot crisis. Briefly, the venture involved an attempt to overthrow the head of Cyprus, Archbishop Macarios, which, according to the more convincing explanation offered by political analysts and historians, was to result in the partition of the island into North and South and the annexation of the two parts by Turkey and Greece respectively<sup>153</sup>. Whatever the reason, Ioannides's coup in Cyprus led to disaster in the island and near war with Turkey. The dictators suddenly appeared powerless and unable to cope with a major national crisis. The danger of a Turkish attack on other fronts and the chaotic situation within Greece - caused mainly by the general mobilization - created the conditions for a peaceful downfall of the dictatorship.

The leadership of the armed forces decided to dissociate itself from Ioannides's junta and to hand over power to the politicians in order to save the military's prestige and dominant position within the power structure<sup>154</sup>. In this way, the armed forces would appear as being at the centre of the process for a solution of the crisis and the restoration of democratic institutions. It was the only option left if the prestige and domination of the military were to be preserved before popular discontent, aggravated by a national disaster, threatened not only the political regime but also the established social order<sup>155</sup>.

For this reason the military officers who decided to give up power also selected the political leader who was to succeed the dictators. Their choice was the right-wing Constantine Karamanlis, former leader of ERE. They hoped that Karamanlis with his authoritarian, anti-communist past as Prime Minister, could guarantee that the political change would not endanger

the post-war structure of power and that the participation of the masses in politics would be limited. Such a solution, however, was incompatible with developments in civil society. Karamanlis had realized that a return to the pre-1967 situation would only perpetuate the crisis of political institutions. The current of democratic change which had been stopped forcefully in 1967 was now irreversible.

#### **4.9 Conclusion**

The 1967 dictatorship was an attempt by the military to preserve the repressive post-war regime and its dominant role within it at a time when they were both threatened by an unprecedented political mobilization. The clearly political character of the crisis of the 1960s, the absence of a class struggle and the broad acceptance of parliamentary institutions as the only means through which this crisis could be resolved are the keys for understanding the unpopularity and final collapse of the dictatorship. The dictators enjoyed neither the support of the masses, nor that of the largest part of the Greek bourgeoisie, as was demonstrated by the stance adopted by the latter's publishing and parliamentary representatives and also by the reluctance of industrialists to invest.

Although opposition to the regime remained passive and not widespread, it was enough to prove that the dictatorship could not be legitimated. Thus, the pursuit of popular consent and consequently of the legitimation of the regime became the major determinant of the colonels' general policies.

The junta seized power without a clear-cut and coherent political strategy. In practice, it took over the programme of economic development introduced by previous governments and sought to apply it in a way that could generate political

support for the regime. However, as the colonels' policies failed to create a new social consensus and as the regime sank deeper into stagnation, it became clear that the power of the military could not be preserved through repression. A degree of liberalization was necessary to safeguard military domination. This was the major contradiction of the dictatorship. With Papadopoulos' experiment of liberalization ending in a fierce showdown between the junta and the masses, and in the reinforcement of repression, it was finally evident that the road of the dictatorship was in fact an impasse. Finally, faced with the danger of a national disaster after the events in Cyprus, the military consented to surrender power to the politicians in order to secure its central role in the restored democratic regime, before a mobilization of the masses threatened not only the power of the military but also the domination of the bourgeoisie.

Faced with opposition at home as well as international outcry, the dictators saw the mass media as key weapons in their fight for legitimacy. Papadopoulos' decision to conduct personally the junta's information policy reflected the importance that the colonels attributed to the mass media as means of propaganda.

Broadcasting, due to its organization as a state monopoly and the long-established practice of tight government control, was particularly vulnerable to manipulation by the junta. During the dictatorship radio and especially television became the prime means for the conduct of the colonels' propaganda. The junta sought to expand the medium of television which, through its capacity to present events visually, offered the unknown dictators the opportunity to promote their policies and to become familiar faces to the public. Hence, television output largely consisted of programmes projecting the military government and the ideals of the Greece of Christian Greeks that the dictators intended to create. Moreover, through

advertising and populist programming, television was used as a means for the promotion of a new lifestyle characterized by political apathy, consumerism and a passion for sport and light entertainment. Finally, television as a consumer durable came to symbolize the raised standard of living of the Greeks and the illusion of prosperity that the dictators were keen to create as part of their attempt to establish a new social consensus.

In order to satisfy their needs for propaganda, the dictators set up television in a haphazard fashion without any prior planning and without having understood the particular needs of the new medium. As a result, the television services in Greece suffer up to the present day from a lack of suitable premises, outdated equipment and an irrational internal organization, all of which have had their effects on the quality of daily output. Radio and television were left completely discredited by the dictators. In the following chapter we will examine how, if at all, the role of broadcasting changed with the restoration of parliamentary institutions.

## NOTES

1. According to Legislative Decree 2387/1953, responsible for the defence policy of the country was the elected government. For the relationship between the King and the military, see N. ALIVIZATOS: The Political Institutions in Crisis, 1922-1974 (in Greek), Themelio, Athens 1986, p. 260-271.
2. See S. GREGORIADES: The History of the Dictatorship (in Greek), Kapopoulos, Athens 1975, vol. 1, Chapter 1.
3. See for instance Alivizatos's analysis on the operation of the Council of the Crown, in, The Political Institutions... op. cit., p. 255-260. For the role of the Greek monarchy see also J. MEYNAUD: Political Forces in Greece (in Greek), Byron, Athens, p. 332-348 and especially p. 347 for examples of intervention in government politics.
4. Alivizatos, op.cit., p. 247.
5. For the relationship between the monarchy and the military see D. CHARALAMBIS: Military and Political Power, (in Greek), Exandas, Athens 1985, p. 222-241.
6. For instance, whereas productivity in all sectors except agriculture increased by 44 per cent between 1956 and 1963, the lowest wage increased only by 21 per cent. See S. KARAGIORGAS and Th. PAKOS: 'Social and Economic Inequalities'. In, Greece In Evolution, Greek edition of Les Temps Modernes, Exandas Athens 1986, p. 273.
7. National newspaper readership rose from 395,947 copies daily in 1960 to 650,440 in 1964. In the same period the annual imports of radio sets increased from 123,412 to 362,877. For newspaper statistics see ESIEA and for imports, the National Statistical Service of Greece, ESYE.
8. N. MOUZELIS: Parliamentarism and industrialization in the semi-periphery (in Greek), Themelio, Athens 1987. Also see his article: 'Capitalism and Dictatorship in Post-war Greece', New Left Review, no 96, 1976, p. 71.
9. See N. ALIVIZATOS: The Political Institutions in Crisis, 1922-1974 (in Greek), Themelio, Athens 1986, p. 224, note 110.

10. Karmocolias provides a notable account of the political atmosphere during that period, and especially of how the party polemics were extended to the press where fanaticism and partisanship in favour of one party or the other went beyond any proportion; D. CARMOKOLIAS: Political Communication in Greece, 1965-1967, National Centre of Social Research, Athens 1974.
11. For a detailed account of the preparations of the coup, see Gregoriades, op.cit., vol 1, chapter 2; I. KATRIS: The Birth of Neofascism in Greece (in Greek), Papazisis, Athens 1974, ch 6; Charalambis, op. cit.
12. Charalambis ibid, p. 231.
13. Mouzelis, Parliamentarism...op. cit., p. 250; also, N. MOUZELIS: 'Capitalism and Dictatorship in post-war Greece', New Left Review, 96, March-April 1976.
14. By 1967 there had been 2,000 captains in the armed forces. According to the rate of promotions, those at the bottom of seniority would have to wait fifteen years before they were to be promoted; Mouzelis, Parliamentarism...ibid, p. 249. See also Th. VEREMIS: 'The military in Politics after the War' (in Greek), in Greece In Evolution, op. cit., p. 140-41.
15. Gregoriades, op. cit., Vol. 1, chapter 2.
16. See for instance, Katris op. cit., p. 221-236; and A. PAPANDREOU: Democracy at Gunpoint, The Greek Front, Pelican, London 1973, p. 223-256.
17. Veremis is citing statistics of the American Ministry of Defense, according to which throughout the 1950s and 1960s 11,229 Greek officers had been trained in the US on the basis of the Military Assistance Program and another 1,965 in other NATO bases. op. cit., p. 142.
18. Mouzelis, Parliamentarism...op. cit., p. 251.
19. See the Report of General Panourgias to Karamanlis in June 1967, in Gregoriadis op. cit., vol. 1, p. 46.
20. Ibid, Vol. 1, chapter 1. Also, N. MOUZELIS: Parliamentarism and Industrialization in the semi-periphery (in Greek), Themelio, Athens 1986, p. 251.

21. See for instance, Mouzelis, Capitalism...op.cit., and Mouzelis, Parliamentarism...op.cit.; Charalambis op. cit., Veremis op. cit. and Gregoriadis op. cit.
22. Charalambis ibid, p. 217.
23. Carmocolias, op. cit., chapter 2.
24. The Andreadis group for instance, or shipping tycoons like Onassis and Niarchos.
25. For the text of the decree, see Gregoriadis, op.cit., vol. 1, p. 85.
26. Shortly after the coup Constantine discovered that many of his personal guards had joined the junta and that all telephones in the palace had been bugged; ibid, p. 124-125.
27. For details about the royal counter-coup see ibid, ch 7.
28. As the King said in his message "(...) Also, I declare straightforwardly that there will be no co-operation with the communists who have been preparing the destruction of the country. During the last 25 years the communist minority has had no other plan than to overthrow the social and political order by violent and fraudulent means. They have caused destruction, infected our youth and menaced the real substance of the nation"; ibid, p. 166.
29. Ibid.
30. For a detailed review of the 1968 constitution see Alivizatos, The Political...op. cit., p. 300-312.
31. According to a. 129, par 2, "the administration of the armed forces was exercised by the government through the Commander of the Armed Forces"; ibid, p. 303.
32. Ibid, p.307.
33. Ibid, p. 305.
34. Ibid, p. 304.
35. Ibid, p. 301.
36. See a. 58, par. 2, 4, 5 and 6 of the Constitution in Gregoriadis, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 219.
37. This was implied by the forged royal coup of April 21 which spoke about "internal dangers" as the reason for the coup. See R. CLOGG: "The Ideology of the 'Revolution of April 1967'", in



- R. CLOGG and G. YIANNPOULOS (eds): Greece Under Military Rule, Secker and Warburg, London 1972, p. 36-54.
38. Ibid.
39. According to a leaflet titled 'We Accuse' and published in 1973 in London by the Committee of Greek Political Refugees, until May 1973 87,000 people had been arrested and interrogated by the police; 10,000 were deported for one year on average; 4,000 had been tried by courts and of those 2,800 had been tortured. Alivizatos, The Political...op. cit., p. 605-606.
40. For details see G. YIANNPOULOS: "Workers and Peasants under the Military Dictatorship", in Clogg and Yiannopoulos op. cit., p. 109-126.
41. With their policy vis-a-vis trades unions, the dictators had violated international labour conventions 87 and 98 which Greece had signed in 1961; ibid.
42. Declaration of the Chief of Staff no 1 of 22 April 1967, mentioned by Alivizatos, The Political...op. cit., p. 613.
43. Ibid, p. 617-618; and Gregoriadis op. cit., p. 112.
44. From a French translation of a questionnaire that civil servants had to answer in Alivizatos ibid, p. 620, footnote 58.
45. Ibid.
46. Gregoriadis, op.cit., Vol. 1, p. 115.
47. Constitutional Act of May 24 1968, mentioned by Alivizatos, The Political...op. cit., p. 622.
48. For details about the stance of the Council of State see Gregoriadis op. cit., vol 2, p.76-85.
49. Gregoriadis, op.cit., vol. 1, p. 118-119.
50. Ibid, p. 114.
51. C.M. WOODHOUSE: The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, London 1985, p. 35.
52. See, for instance, Gregoriades, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 114.
53. Ibid.
54. Clogg, op. cit.
55. Quoted in ATHENIAN: Inside the Colonels Greece, Chatto and Windus, London 1972, p. 115.
56. Gregoriadis op. cit., vol 1, p. 127.

57. Athenian, op. cit., p. 113-123.
58. R. McDONALD: Pillar and Tinderbox, Marion Boyars, London 1983, p. 36.
59. For instance, see Katris, op. cit.
60. Speech of G. Georgalas quoted by McDonald, op. cit., p. 36.
61. On the attitude of the press before the coup, see Carmocolias, op. cit.
62. Legislative Decree 744/1970.
63. McDonald, op.cit.
64. Report of the International Federation of Journalists, quoted in Gregoriadis op. cit., vol 1, p. 50.
65. Information given by N. Farmakis, the first official spokesman of the regime, in McDonald, op. cit., p. 41.
66. See the Mandatory regulations of 29 April 1967; Ibid, Appendix A.
67. For details about the junta's information policy, see McDonald ibid, the Athenian, op. cit., and H. VLACHOU: "The Colonels and the Press", in Clogg and Yiannopoulos op.cit., p. 59-74.
68. The fact that Vlachou had not been hostile to a dictatorial solution becomes apparent from her above mentioned article.
69. Pattakos had promised Vlachou that censorship would not apply to her papers. McDonald, op.cit., p. 48-49; Vlachou, op. cit.
70. For instance, conservative Acropolis had in 1966 an average daily circulation of 78,559 copies and Messimvrini 72,329 copies.
71. Circular of 25 January 1968, from the PM's office; McDonald op. cit., p. 217-222.
72. Ibid, especially section 4, part 1; and Gregoriadis, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 122.
73. Gregoriadis ibid, p. 222-223.
74. Newspapers resorted to various tricks in order to express their opposition to the regime such as through the reporting on foreign elections, for instance, Robert Kennedy's campaign for the presidency.

75. Announcement to the Journalists' Union ESIEA on July 22 1969, Gregoriadis op. cit., vol 1, p. 71-2.
76. Executive Decision on the freedom of the press, October 3 1969, McDonald, op. cit., appendix C.
77. Legislative Decree 346 of November 17 1969. For an analysis of the dictators' press legislation see Alivizatos, The Political...op. cit., p. 642-649.
78. Legislative Decree 372/1969.
79. For the trial of Ethnos see McDonald op. cit.
80. **Taxation of newspaper profits according to LD 345/1969**

Circulation	Tax acc. to LD 3787/57	Tax acc.to LD 345/69
50,000	290,000	1,920,000
100,000	960,000	4,870,000

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Source: McDonald, op.cit..

81. D.STAMOU: The Political Line of TO VIMA, 1967-1974 (in Greek), unpublished Doctoral Thesis of the Panteios School of Political Sciences, Athens 1981, p. 414.
82. McDonald, op. cit.
83. Ibid, p. 129-143.
84. Ibid.
85. See for instance, the letter that Pattakos addressed to Papadopoulos on September 15 1972, in which he urged the arch-dictator to introduce heavier penalties for publications which "insulted authority" or "did harm to national interests". Gregoriadis, op. cit., vol 2, p. 305.
86. See M. LAMBRINIDES: 33 Years in YENED (in Greek), Philippotis, Athens 1982, p. 110.
87. For a colourful picture of the tragicomic situation at EIR on the first days of the coup, see McDonald op. cit., p. 165.
88. Labrinidis, op. cit., p. 109-113.
89. Gregoriadis op. cit., vol 2, p. 182.
90. Legislative Decree 744 of 10 December 1970

91. Royal Decree of 22 January 1971, a. 1, par. 2.
92. Ibid, a. 4, par. 1.
93. McDonald op. cit., p. 171-172.
94. See Gregoriadis op. cit., vol 2, p. 63 and Athenian op. cit., p. 104-113, for details about the occupation of the state machine by military officers. We must note, however, that Anastassopoulos had retired from the army as early as December 1967. On the aftermath of the King's abortive counter coup, Papadopoulos decided to turn the military government into a civilian one, as a proof of his intentions to liberalize the regime. For this reason he retired from the army together with Pattakos, Makarezos and most of the prominent members of the junta, including the then director General of EIR, I. Anastassopoulos; Gregoriadis, op.cit, vol 1, chapter 9.
95. Quoted by McDonald op. cit., p. 172.
96. McDonald op.cit., p. 167, suggests that the reasons for the annulment of the competitions were political or had to do with business irregularities. No further details are given however. For a brief account of the pre-history of television, see G. KARTER: Histories of Television (in Greek), Techniki Eclogi, Athens, 1979, p. 13-17.
97. For this particular case see two articles in the monthly periodical AION (Century): no 18, August 1960, p. 16-17 and no 20, October 1960, pp. 13-14 and 48.
98. N. ANASTASOPOULOS: "Chronicle of the Greek Television" (in Greek), in OPTICOAKOUSTIKI (Audiovisual) April 1976, p. 65-69. Also, see report in KATHIMERINI: "Excesses of 165 million drachmas for the EIRT headquarters", 30 November 1975.
99. Karter op. cit., p. 14.
100. Ibid; also, Anastasopoulos op. cit., p. 68.
101. Anastasopoulos ibid. Also, Interview of the then editor of EIR's television news Efthymios Papageorgiou with the author, January 16 1989.
102. See Kathimerini op. cit., for the interview of one of the architects who had been assigned with the preparation of the architectural plan by Karamanlis in 1963.

103. Ibid.

104. Ibid.

105. See in particular, the follow up of the story in ESTIA, 26 and 31 July and 29 October 1968. See also the letter of Thomson-Houston in the same paper, 5.11.1968.

106. See for instance, the speech of the PASOK deputy A. Koutsogiorgas in the Gazette of Parliamentary Debates, Session A', Sittings 1-33, Sitting 32 of 26 November 1975.

107. See the revealing report of KATHIMERINI: "Television needs Money and Independence", 4.11.1975.

108. Anastasopoulos op. cit., and McDonald op. cit., p. 167

109. Labrinidis, op. cit., p. 117.

110. See a. 17, par. 2 of Presidential Decree 300 of 30 April 1974, Government Gazette, Issue A', no 114, which set the rules for the organization of the network.

111. a. 7, 8.

112. a. 9

113. a. 10.

114. a. 21, 22.

115. McDonald op. cit., p. 171.

116. Prime Minister's decision 10627/1606 of 6.10.1972 and 13.11.1972, in Dagtoglou op. cit., p. 30.

117. For the introduction of advertising see G. DAMBASIS: "An Exorcist is Needed", article in the journal ELEFTHEROTYPIA, no. 46, February 1975, p. 78-81.

118. Interview with Papageorgiou, op. cit. The advent of television was the main reason for the abandonment of the Newsreel as a source of information of the public.

119. According to Labrinidis, op. cit., p. 133, 75 per cent of the news presented on television was written for radio. There was only little footage for foreign news. YENED was not admitted as a member of the EBU, and for this reason it could not have access to the visual material provided by Eurovision to EIRT.

120. Interview with Papageorgiou, op. cit.

121. *ibid.*

122. Interview of radio announcer Nikos Hakkas, who was dismissed from EIRT, on 16 Dec. 1986, with the author. It is not easy to define the exact number of those employees, dismissed from the two networks for political reasons. After the dictatorship, 161 ex-employees of EIRT applied on the basis of a law passed by the Conservatives, for re-admission to the organization. Of them only 40 were re-admitted as dismissed for political reasons. Many more were restored to their posts by a committee set up by the Socialist government to reconsider the issue. See also, the question of a group of MPs to the Undersecretary to the Prime Minister and the latter's answer, in Parliamentary Debates, Vol A', Sessions 1 to 31, from 12 Dec. 1977 to 15 Feb. 1978, session 13, of 20 Jan. 1978.
123. Author's personal experience.
124. Dambasis op. cit.
125. JOHN PESMAZOGLU: "The Greek Economy since 1967", in Clogg and Yiannopoulos, op.cit., p. 87.
126. "YENED and Censorship", article in Ta Nea, 29 Sept. 1979.
127. The amount of advertising time was four minutes for foreign films lasting 1.5 hours on average and six minutes for a Greek series lasting between 45 and 60 minutes. YENED would receive only 40 per cent of the advertising revenue from foreign films while its share was reduced to only 25 per cent for advertising revenue from Greek series. See article: "TV...The Sinner", in APOGEVMATINI, 4.12.1971.
128. Ibid. See also the press conference of the Union of Greek Advertisers in which the union maintained that the existing system of programme production and exploitation had led among other things, to the fall of television programme quality. See ACROPOLIS, 8.8.1978.
129. Statistics on Radio and Television, Unesco Statistical Report, no 23, p. 55.
130. Chr. SOTIROPOULOU: Greek Cinematography (in Greek), Themelio, Athens 1989, p. 58.
131. It is characteristic that cinema-going was dramatically reduced (from 36.3 million tickets in 1966, to 9 million in

1974) in the suburbs of Athens and Pireaus which were largely inhabited by lower income groups and migrants from the rural areas. By contrast, the decrease in the number of viewers in the centre and the middle and upper class areas of the capital was much less pronounced (from 11.4 million in 1966 to 8.1 million in 1974); *ibid*, p. 59.

132. *Ibid*, p. 82-86.

133. See for instance, Athenian, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

134. See Pattakos's letter dated 7 July 1968 and addressed to Papadopoulos, in Gregoriadis *op. cit.*, p. 234-236.

135. For the international reaction towards the dictatorship, see *ibid*, vol 1, chapter 14 and for the stance of the Greek political world see T. VOURNAS: History of Modern Greece, 1967-1974 (in Greek), Tolides, Athens, chapter 5.

136. For the resistance see Gregoriadis *ibid*, chapter 12 and Vournas *ibid*, chapter 6.

137. National Statistical Service of Greece, ESYE, Provisional Accounts of the National Income, 1960-1970.

138. The indicator of industrial production rose from 187 in 1966, to 205 in 1968 and to 254 in 1970. Gregoriadis, *op. cit.*, vol 1, p. 357.

139.D. KARAGIORGAS: "The Economic Consequences of the Dictatorship", first published in the journal ANTI, no 1, 7.9.1974 and re-published in ANTI, no 400, 7.4.1989, p. 23-28. For a general review of the dictators' economic policies, see Gregoriadis *ibid*, Vol. 1, chapter 15, and Vol. 3, chapter 10.

140. National Statistical Service of Greece, *op. cit.*

141. Karagiorgas, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

142. Gregoriadis, *op. cit.*, vol 3, p. 307.

143. Karagiorgas *op.cit.*, p. 26.

144. OECD statistics, quoted by Gregoriadis *op. cit.*, vol 3, p. 303.

145. *Ibid*, p. 345.

146. Karagiorgas *op. cit.*, p. 26-27.

147. Gregoriades, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, pp. 168 and 185; and Vol. 3, chapter 1.

148. For the revolt of the navy, see Gregoriadis op. cit., vol 2, chapter 8.
149. The result of the referendum which was held on 29 July 1973, produced an overwhelming majority of 'yes' for the "Republic". According to Alivizatos, The Political...op.cit., p. 292, the figure was 72.2 per cent for 'yes' and 25.35 per cent for 'no'. Gregoriadis's figures are respectively 78.4 and 21.6 per cent; *ibid*, Vol. 2, p. 273.
150. The President was empowered to appoint the three competent ministers, issue laws on these three areas of policy and prepare the budget of the three ministries. Alivizatos *ibid*, p. 313.
151. These figures were given by the resolution of the Athens Court of Appeal. Gregoriadis op. cit., Vol. 3, p. 105.
152. Mouzelis, Capitalism...op. cit., p. 76.
153. See for instance, Charalambis op. cit., p. 314-329, and Gregoriadis, op. cit., Vol. 3, chapters 7 and 8. See also, the Appendix on the Cyprus file in Vournas, op. cit., p. 292-369.
154. See in this respect, the letter of the Navy Commander Arapakis to Karamanlis, in Charalambis op. cit., p. 336.
155. For a similar position, see Mouzelis, Capitalism...op.cit, p. 77; and Charalambis *ibid*, p. 319.



## CHAPTER 5

### THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY: THE YEARS OF CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT 1974-1981

#### 5.1 Introduction

The reforms which were introduced after the collapse of the dictatorship gave birth to a democratic system the main characteristics of which were: the legalization of the communist parties and the establishment of a fully competitive party system; the abolition of the monarchy and the retreat to the political backstage of the military; and the emergence of a new dominant force of the Right, New Democracy, which had fully dissociated itself from its anti-communist, royalist past.

However, there was also a significant degree of continuity between the pre-1967 and the post-1974 systems as many traditional structures and practices persisted within the Greek political forces and especially the governing ND. The latter failed to develop into a modern mass party similar to its European counterparts as its leader Constantine Karamanlis had intended. Instead, it continued to rely heavily on clientelism and the charismatic personality of its leader and remained largely under the influence of its ultra-conservative wing. Thus, although it introduced some significant measures aiming at the modernization of the economic and social structures, ND's policy was also characterized by paternalistic practices which contributed to a high degree to the political polarization. In this chapter we will examine the conditions and factors which shaped the content of the democratic reforms

after 1974, and evaluate the changes in the party political system and ND's policies in the seven years that it held power.

## 5.2 The political reform of 1974-1975

The democratic reforms which took place after July 1974 were largely determined by the particular conditions under which power was transferred from the military to the politicians. In considering the transition to democracy in Greece two points should be highlighted: i) the downfall of the dictatorship was not caused by any massive pro-democracy movement. With the exception of the student uprisings in 1973 and the activities of a number of resistance groups with limited membership usually based abroad, the largest part of the population remained inactive, manifesting its resentment of the dictatorship through passive opposition. Thus, the Greek junta never experienced the unprecedented pressure of an increasingly militant working class movement as did the Francoist regime in the late sixties and early seventies<sup>1</sup>. Nor was the collapse of the dictatorship the result of a counter coup by a radical faction within the armed forces as in the case of Portugal. The initiative for the transfer of power to the politicians was taken from above, by the top ranks of the military itself amid the debacle caused by the Cyprus adventure - the last desperate attempt of the junta to legitimate the dictatorial regime through a nationalistic 'success'- and the subsequent danger of war with Turkey. As a national disaster could threaten not only the dominance of the military, but also the existing socio-economic order, a part of the military leadership decided to dissociate itself from the Ioannides junta and to turn to the politicians in order to safeguard both the status quo and in particular the power of the armed forces within it.

The aim of the military leadership was the liberalization of the regime and the preservation of the post-war authoritarian political structures. The choice of Constantine Karamanlis to preside over the first civilian government in seven years reflected most clearly the plan of the military to safeguard a high degree of continuity with the pre-1967 political system. Karamanlis' authoritarian anti-communist past as leader of the Right in most of the 1950s and early 1960s, coupled with his powerful charismatic personality, led to the abandonment of an earlier proposal for a government under the more liberal leader of the Right-wing ERE, Panayotis Kanellopoulos, as Prime Minister and the titular leader of the Centre Union (EK), George Mavros, as deputy Prime Minister. In contrast to the outspoken anti-dictatorial stance of the latter two, Karamanlis' criticism of the regime was moderate and limited to a few occasional statements from his self-exile in Paris; he enjoyed, therefore, the confidence of the military while appearing at the same time as a critic of the dictatorship.

ii) On the other hand, despite the absence of widespread opposition to the junta, the fact remained that the primary reason for the collapse of the dictatorial regime was its inability to gain legitimacy among the vast majority of the people, as was most clearly manifested by the failure of Papadopoulos's strategy of liberalization. Until the end, the military junta had to face popular rejection together with political and diplomatic isolation. Moreover, with the unprecedented radicalization of major parts of the population throughout the previous decade, demands for thorough democratic reforms, which had led to the crisis of the repressive parliamentary regime in the 1960s, were now repeated more fiercely than ever before.

Karamanlis was faced with the delicate task of reconciling and balancing the interests of the military with the popular pressure for democratic reform. Thus, in order to win the

consent and cooperation of the social and political forces beyond the Right, and to maintain national solidarity at a time when a peaceful settlement with Turkey was a top priority, Karamanlis formed a coalition government with the participation of representatives of both right-wing and centrist forces, but to the exclusion of the Left. His strategy of maintaining the sensitive balance between the military and the people was reflected in the appointments of G. Mavros as deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign affairs and of the conservative Evangelos Averoff to the post of Minister of Defence. The latter enjoyed considerable confidence within the military as one of the very few politicians to have called for a rapprochement between the junta and the political world during the dictatorship. Also, Karamanlis maintained as interim head of state General Phaedon Gizikis, the President of the so-called Republic appointed by the Ioannides regime. Extreme caution was applied in the handling of what constituted one of the most sensitive issues of the transition and the most pressing of popular demands, the punishment of those responsible for the establishment of the dictatorship and their accomplices in the security forces. It was only in October, and only after the initiation of three private prosecutions by five lawyers alleging high treason, that five protagonists of the 1967 coup, including Papadopoulos, Pattakos and Makarezos, were arrested and banished to an island. Ioannides was not placed in custody until January 1975. All in all, charges of high treason were passed on 24 of those involved in the establishment of the dictatorship. Of these, Papadopoulos, Pattakos and Makarezos were tried and sentenced to death on 23 August 1975, but a couple of days later the government decided to turn their sentences into life imprisonment<sup>2</sup>. Eight other defendants in the same trial also received life sentences.

The trial of those responsible for the Polytechnic massacre was held in the Autumn of 1975, while another two trials were held for the torturers of the military police. Three of the

commanders were sentenced to 20-23 year imprisonment and another thirteen people received shorter sentences. In contrast, the torturers from the Security Police were either acquitted or imprisoned for very short periods of time<sup>3</sup>. Additionally, some 104 members of the dictatorial governments escaped prosecution through a legal device introduced by a Supreme Court decision<sup>4</sup>. In all, the prosecutions were restricted to those at the top of the decision-making hierarchy of the military regime. Similarly, there was only a limited number of purges in the state machine, mainly concerning prefects, mayors and civil servants appointed by the Colonels. According to one estimation, about 100,000 appointees of the junta were still in the state apparatus four months after the change of the regime<sup>5</sup>. In the armed forces, according to information given to Parliament by Averoff himself in February 1975, only 106 officers were placed on forcible retirement, in contrast to the huge wave of retirements during the first years of the dictatorship (almost 3,000 officers between 1967-1972, who were subsequently replaced by friends of the military regime)<sup>6</sup>. The only sector which was thoroughly and relatively speedily purged by all those who had openly collaborated with the junta (Constitutional Act of 3 September 1974) was that of higher education, mainly thanks to the great pressure for 'de-juntification' exercised by a highly radicalized student movement.

Thus, under the conditions that the transfer of power took place in July 1974, the military managed to safeguard not only its authority (characteristically, the 1967 coup was attributed by the government to a "handful of foolish officers" so that the vast majority of the military corps were distinguished from those directly responsible for the dictatorship), but also a significant degree of power and influence within the state. This significant element of continuity with the pre-1967 practice was due not only to the need of the first post-dictatorial governments to achieve the support or tolerance of

the military in order to secure basic democratic reforms; it was also due, as it will be explained in more detail below, to the unwillingness of the conservative majority in power during the first period of the transition to make an abrupt and complete break with the pre-dictatorial political structures especially under conditions of widespread radicalization within society.

Nevertheless, the coalition government also introduced substantial measures of democratization. The constitution of the dictatorship (1968/1973) was abolished and replaced with the 1952 one, while at the same time the clauses pertaining to monarchy were kept in abeyance; the nature of the head of state was to be settled later by popular referendum<sup>7</sup>. The decision to subject the future of the monarchy to the popular vote, reflected the increased concern of the provisional government for the peaceful settlement of an issue which had divided the country for more than half a century. It was also a response to the widespread anti-royalist mood of a large part of the social and political forces resulting from the controversial interference of the monarchy in post-war politics, particularly during the 1965 crisis, and from King Constantine's ambivalent attitude towards the junta. It is indicative of the extent of the popular pressure for thorough democratization that in regard to the monarchy Karamanlis abandoned the position he had adopted a year earlier, that only the King could lead successfully the process of regime transition<sup>8</sup>. This pressure from below offered at the same time to Karamanlis a wide basis of popular support vis-a-vis the military for the introduction of extensive democratic reforms which far exceeded his own pronouncements during the dictatorship. Thus, apart from the suspension of martial law (September 23, October 9), the release of political prisoners, the proclamation of amnesty for political crimes and the reinstatement of all those purged by the junta in the civil service, local government, judiciary and the universities, the

provisional government proceeded on 23 September with the legalization of all political parties including those of the communist left. The abolition of not only the legislation on political parties passed by the dictatorship, but also of the civil war law 509/1947 which banned the Communist Party marked the major break of the new regime with the pre-1967 political structures, with the repressive parliamentarism of the post-war period and with anti-communism as the official ideology of the state<sup>9</sup>.

Early in October the government announced that elections were to be held on 17 November, followed by a national plebiscite on the question of monarchy<sup>10</sup>. Despite the claims of the parties outside the coalition government that free elections could not be held with the presence of a large number of junta appointees within the state apparatus, the electoral campaign was fairly and vigorously conducted and the result (54.37 per cent for Karamanlis's newly established New Democracy party) was not disputed by any of the participants. A fair campaign was also conducted with regard to the referendum on the constitutional issue, which was held on 8 December. With the exception of New Democracy which adopted a neutral position, all other parties overtly supported the republic, whereas the King was not allowed to return to Greece but instead was given the chance to put his case on four television broadcasts. The result was 69.2 per cent of the vote for the republic and 30.8 per cent for the restoration<sup>11</sup>. The referendum of December 1974 was the first out of the six held on the same issue in the twentieth century, the result of which was not disputed by the defeated side. As such, it reflected the true preferences of the people towards monarchy more accurately than all previous ones<sup>12</sup>. Finally, on 11 June 1975, the government of New Democracy implemented the Constitution of the Third Hellenic Republic which had been passed by the Fifth Revisory Assembly four days earlier. The nature of the post-dictatorial state and the structure of the regime as it was

defined by the new constitutional framework will be examined in detail below. The development of political institutions in Greece after 1974, however, would be better understood and evaluated if it were seen in the light of the conditions and factors individual as well as collective which determined the form of transition to democracy.

The process of democratic reform which started in July 1974 was not the outcome of a revolution, that is of an abrupt break with past practice; it was not evolutionary either, for there was no gradual adjustment of the system to the demands from below as in the case of Spain<sup>13</sup>. Unlike the Francoist regime, the much shorter-lived Greek military dictatorship failed to institutionalize itself and to generate a considerable amount of popular support which could have enabled it to maintain more strongholds within the state and society throughout the process of democratic transition. Nevertheless, the decision of the military leadership to call in the politicians at the peak of a national crisis which made imperative a policy of conciliation, allowed it a degree of power within the state machine; it also allowed it space for manoeuvre, particularly in regard to the choice of the person to lead the transitional process.

On the other hand, the pressure which was exercised on the coalition government by the radicalized segments of society postponed the military's plans for a controlled liberalization of the political system. Although Greece did not experience the unprecedented working class mobilization of the last years of Francoism, yet the passive opposition to the junta which culminated in the fierce student protests of 1973 and the popular demand for the punishment of the dictators in the aftermath of the regime's collapse, was a clear indication of the widespread rejection of authoritarianism and of the support for democratic institutions within society. Under such conditions, a return to the repressive parliamentarism of the



period preceding the coup would involve the risk of generating a political crisis much more severe than that of the 1960s. Thus, whereas Karamanlis was chosen by the military for his anti-communist past, the reforms that he introduced constituted a break with the pre-1967 political structures, to an extent which far exceeded the expectations of the military leaders. The transition to democracy, should be considered therefore, within the more general context of the post-war political system rather than in reference to the seven years of the dictatorship. Viewed from this wider perspective, the process of transition to democracy in Greece, exhibits many similarities to the first two stages of Rustow's model of transition<sup>14</sup>:

First, there is the preparatory phase in which the process of democratization is under way through "a prolonged and inconclusive political struggle" led by a movement of the lower classes. In the case of Greece, growing economic inequalities, and significant social developments, such as emigration and urbanization, led in the early 1960s to the increasing mobilization and radicalization of the masses and consequently, to the breach of the system of political controls based on clientelism and repression. Nevertheless, for reasons already explained, the evolution to democracy which was set off under the Centre Union government was finally "deflected" by the military intervention of April 1967. The preparatory stage came to an end only after the military decided to surrender power to the politicians at the climax of the Cyprus crisis.

Secondly, there came the decision phase in which a part of the political leadership proceeds with the adoption of democratic rules in order to avoid the prolongation of the struggle as well as the danger of a civil war. What needs to be emphasized about this stage is that the end of the military rule in Greece did not become synonymous with the institutionalization of democratic procedures. The content of

the democratic reform was shaped by the response of the "small circle of political leaders"<sup>15</sup> who formed the coalition government to popular pressure. Most crucial in this respect, was the role of the right-wing elite and particularly of Prime Minister Karamanlis. An adjustment of the Right's positions to the new social and political conditions had already become clear during the dictatorship as Karamanlis's own statements from Paris had indicated: "Greece must and is able to create a modernized, progressive (...) democracy combining freedom, social justice and order (...) A democracy which relieved from the prejudices of the past will (...) be able to carry out daring reforms in all sectors of our national life"<sup>16</sup>. In any case, what mattered at this stage, was not "what values the leaders held dear in the abstract, but what concrete steps they were willing to take"<sup>17</sup>. Thus, whereas certain measures aimed at securing both the consent of the military and a degree of continuity with the past, the institutional reforms initiated by Karamanlis reflected the acknowledgement of the social, economic and ideological changes which had taken place in the previous decade. The crises of repressive parliamentarism appeared to have convinced the right-wing leadership that the integration of all social forces in the political system was imperative for the long term legitimacy of the new regime especially under conditions of extensive radicalization. It is in this light that both the demolition of the post-war anti-communist state and the establishment of a fully competitive system must be seen.

The acceptance of a democratic compromise by both the military and the politicians of the Right was also facilitated by the absence of fierce social antagonisms such as those which divided the country in the 1940s. The rejection of dictatorial rule was based upon popular support for democracy; it was not associated with any challenge to existing class relations. The crisis of the dictatorship, like that of the mid-1960s regime

was a crisis of the political institutions, not of bourgeois domination.

Despite the growing inequalities (see previous chapters), the positive effects of the post-war economic development continued to be extensively felt throughout the dictatorship. Between 1970 and 1974, the gross income per capita increased from \$999 to \$1,953; also, private per capita consumption was in 1974 twice as high as in 1970 (increased from \$782 to \$1,456) and four times higher than in 1960 (\$338)<sup>18</sup>. Similarly, so far as these are indicators of affluence, the number of private cars increased from 81,617 in 1964 to 380,388 ten years later<sup>19</sup>. The penetration of another luxury item, television, also increased from 0.4 sets per thousand inhabitants in 1966, to 107 sets per thousand in 1974<sup>20</sup>. Economic growth must have contributed to the continued legitimacy of the existing socio-economic order. The absence of a mass left-wing movement (although it can be attributed to a complex of factors lying beyond the scope of this analysis) is indicative of the profound social and ideological changes which had taken place in the two previous decades.

Whatever the ideological orientation of the pro-democracy forces<sup>21</sup>, the electoral result of November 1974 showed that the consolidation of democracy was given priority over any essential social and economic reform. The overwhelming majority in favour of Karamanlis (54.4 per cent) and the poor showing of the Communist alliance (9.5 per cent) and even of the Centre Union (20 per cent as compared to 52.7 per cent in 1964), reflected the determination of the electorate to prevent any regression to authoritarianism.

In summary, the democratic reform of 1974-75 was the product of a compromise among all social and political forces. Because of the extreme circumstances under which the transfer of power took place, and faced with mounting popular pressure, the

military, at least the majority, also consented to Karamanlis's programme of institutional change. This compromise constituted the main difference between the new democracy and the pre-1967 parliamentary system. The latter was established on the aftermath of a civil conflict and was based largely on the exclusion of the defeated side from politics. In contrast, the basis of the post-1974 democracy was to be the consent and participation of all social and political forces in political process. As it will be demonstrated below in more detail, the political change in Greece created a competitive pluralist system which could offer the opportunity for alternatives in power. Another major characteristic of the new democracy was the disappearance, or the retreat to the background of the political scene, of two dominant power centres which had been the pillars of the post-war repressive system, the monarchy and the military. This development largely reflected the profound changes that had taken place within the post-war ideological framework. The monarchy was no longer the symbol of legitimacy of the social and political order ; as for the military, the seven years of dictatorship and the debacle of July 1974 had undermined irreparably its position as the guardian of the nation against the "enemy within".

However, if the changes of the first year of the transition laid the foundations for a new modernized political system, the conditions under which the transfer of power took place enabled also a significant degree of continuity with the past structures. Thus, an unspecified number of junta appointees continued to work in the state apparatus, which had been before the dictatorship and remained during the transition dominated by the Right; the military retained a considerable degree of power, though not the institutional autonomy of the past; and finally, a cautious reform of the constitutional framework established a powerful executive able to safeguard the existing social order against future threats. All in all, the post dictatorial political system was a mixture of elements of both

continuity and change with the past. To the analysis of these very elements we will now turn.

### **5.3 The organization of powers under the Constitution of June 11 1975**

If there was an agreement on the fundamental rules of the democratic game between the political forces involved in the transition process, yet there was still a profound disagreement on the content of the democratic reform. Two main trends emerged on the aftermath of the junta's collapse: a more radical one which was expressed by the forces of the opposition and which demanded a definite break with the institutions, practices and ideology not only of the dictatorship but of the entire post-war period; and a more conservative one which was identified with Karamanlis's party of New Democracy which although favouring a break with the dictatorial institutions wished to maintain a considerable degree of continuity with the pre-1967 political structures. The eventual prevalence of the latter view determined both the process of democratic transition and the content of the new political institutions.

Continuity with post-war practice was underlined in the coalition government's decision to revise the Constitution of 1952. Notwithstanding the calls by the parties of the opposition for a constituent assembly, with the Constituent Act of 3/4 October 1974 the government postulated that the assembly that was to emerge from the November elections could amend, abolish and/or supplement all clauses of the Constitution, defining thus its role as merely revisory. The same act made it obligatory for the government of the day to prepare a draft of the new Constitution which was to be the basis of the debate at the Fifth Revisory Assembly<sup>22</sup>.

The Constitution of 1975 was shaped according to the way that recent political experiences had been interpreted by the right-wing majority under Karamanlis. As the latter had made clear in his 1974 government declaration:

"Greece needs a constitution which suits the particular circumstances prevailing in the country and not one which is an imitation of foreign models; a constitution which will be democratic but which will at the same time allow the government to act effectively and with dispatch; which will therefore strengthen the executive without reducing its responsibility to parliament"<sup>23</sup>.

Seeing a powerful executive as the only safeguard against political instability, the drafters of the Constitution proposed the institutionalization of a bi-polar executive (government-President of the Republic) with extensive powers. In particular, the new head of state who was to be elected by the Parliament for a five year term was vested with prerogatives which according to the opposition diluted the fundamental principles of parliamentary democracy and led to the establishment of a semi-presidential system<sup>24</sup>. These prerogatives, to mention but the most crucial as well as the most controversial included:

- The imposition of a delaying veto on legislation passed by Parliament. By exercising his veto, the head of state could even turn a bill into an opportunity for a political showdown with a government with whose policies he disagreed<sup>25</sup>.

- The suspension in certain cases of fundamental civil rights, the declaration of a state of emergency and the setting up of special courts of justice.

- The dissolution of Parliament when the latter was in 'clear disharmony with the public feeling' or if its composition did not guarantee governmental stability.

- Finally, the power to dismiss the incumbent government at his discretion, even if the latter enjoyed the confidence of Parliament; in this as in other cases, the president could then

appoint as Prime Minister any person, member of Parliament or not, who enjoyed his confidence<sup>26</sup>.

The dominant position of the President of the Republic in the organization of powers became the main focus of controversy between the government and the opposition. Central to the disagreement was the problem of the accountability of the executive, particularly the President, vis-a-vis Parliament. According to the draft, the latter was to elect a head of state over whose powers it could have hardly any control and whom it could not dismiss under any circumstances<sup>27</sup>.

The role of the President of the Republic as prescribed in the 1975 Constitution is that of the main arbiter who could solve political crises before these could lead to the destabilization of democratic institutions. As the Minister of Justice remarked, "there is no obstacle now which could prevent us from vesting the Head of State (...) with competences which are necessary for the state to function effectively and to be ready to cope with difficult situations. The lack of such competences in the past had led the state machine either to act unlawfully or to be paralysed"<sup>28</sup>. Although an obvious attempt to safeguard political stability, the constitutional provisions pertaining to the powers of the President revealed nevertheless a paternalistic view of the people and a distrust of Parliament's ability to cope effectively with major political crises. The President was to act as a breakwater against political turmoil and party antagonisms which could threaten the democratic regime or, in extreme cases, the established social and economic order.

The preoccupation of the conservative majority to avert any political crisis which could emerge through the free function of democratic institutions was also reflected in the clauses referring to citizens' rights and freedoms. On the one hand, all the remnants of the civil war legislation known as the

'para-constitution' (see previous chapters) were abolished (a.111 par. 4) and more detailed provisions were introduced for the more effective protection of human rights which had been repeatedly violated during the dictatorship. Thus, among other things, torture was explicitly banned ( a. 7 par. 4) and so were the withdrawal of citizenship (a. 4 par. 3) and the trial of citizens by martial courts (a. 96 par. 4). Moreover, the Constitution established the right to request legal protection from the courts (a. 20) and the right to strike for civil servants (a. 23 par. 1). Finally, article 120 asserted the right and duty of citizens to resist any attempt at the overthrow of the Constitution (par. 4) and provided for the prosecution, as soon as lawful authority were restored, of all 'usurpers of the sovereign powers of the people' (par. 3).

On the other hand, however, a significant number of restrictions to the exercise of civil liberties were introduced, which provided the legal basis for their future suspension. Most notable were the banning of the "abuse of civil rights" (a. 25 par. 3), the institutionalization of preventive deportation under certain conditions (a. 5 par. 4) and restrictions to the right of strike, particularly for civil servants (a. 23 par. 2). Moreover, article 103 (par. 1) prescribed as prerequisites for employment in the civil service the candidate's 'belief' in the Constitution and 'devotion' to the country, terms which as it has been rightly suggested<sup>29</sup> go beyond the definition of an individual's activities and reach the sphere of the affected person's profound ideas and beliefs.

Commenting on the constitutional draft the representative of the opposition in Parliament summarized as follows the aims and mentality of the governing majority:

"Dear colleagues, we either accept that a competitive society can lead to decisions safeguarding both the existence and unity of the polity, in which case we accept parliamentarism, or we do not believe in the possibility of



unity at the social base, in which case with the legal device which is called the presidential system, we struggle to construct the unity of the polity at the top"<sup>30</sup>.

The leader of the Socialist party (PASOK), Andreas Papandreou, called the Constitution "a framework of absolutism with a parliamentary cover"<sup>31</sup>. Eventually, the entire opposition abstained from the vote in protest, and the draft was voted only by the government deputies<sup>32</sup>. Hence, the Constitution which was implemented on June 11 1975 was in essence the creation of the right-wing majority under Karamanlis, rather than the product of compromise or convergence between all political forces represented in Parliament. Like De Gaulle in France, Karamanlis, who has been rightly called the architect of the post-dictatorial regime<sup>33</sup>, sought to secure political stability by "balancing the executive and the legislative, the authoritarian and the popular"<sup>34</sup>. As Karamanlis himself said to Parliament, elements of the Gaullist constitution (version of 1962) had been included in the Greek draft, particularly in the provisions pertaining to the powers of the executive<sup>35</sup>. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the significant prerogatives that the President was accorded, no occupant of the office ever activated his considerable powers until these were finally abolished by a constitutional amendment in 1986. The formation of effective governments with safe parliamentary majorities and the fact that the head of state lacked the legitimation of a direct election, largely explain why the President's powers remained dormant<sup>36</sup>. As the practice until 1986 suggested, the powers of the President were kept in reserve to be used at times of serious crisis, rather than for normal policy-making. The President of the Republic has come to **symbolize**, rather than actively to realize the national unity, exercising, thus, what Bagehot has called "ceremonial" or "dignified" leadership in contrast to "efficient" leadership which rests with the government and particularly the Prime Minister<sup>37</sup>. Therefore, the political system in operation since 1975 has been

parliamentary rather than presidential in character. However, it is far from being a "supremacy of Parliament" either. We refer here not so much to the relatively weak role of Parliament in influencing policy-making (a common feature of modern government in most liberal democracies), as to the limited powers of the Greek assembly to hold the government accountable for its policies.

Following the pattern prior to the dictatorship, the post-1974 political system, has been "cabinet-dominated", with the government based upon the support of strictly disciplined majorities in the assembly<sup>38</sup>. The need for executive stability after 1974 led to the re-adoption of the 1958 electoral system of the so-called "reinforced" proportional representation and to the consequent formation of single-party governments with absolute majority support in Parliament. The combination of electoral and party discipline has produced governments with remarkable "durability", that is with least frequent changes in terms of party composition<sup>39</sup>. In a recent study Lijphart et al.(1988) demonstrated that between 1975 and 1986 Greece had the most durable cabinet among 31 liberal democracies: Cabinet durability in Greece was 70 months, compared to 64 in New Zealand, another main example of majoritarian government, 55 in Spain, 30 in Portugal and an average 52 in 25 other democratic regimes<sup>40</sup>. Sustained by large parliamentary majorities, successive governments have seen almost all their proposed legislation enacted with the opposition having only marginal impact on policy-making. Further limitations to the legislative functions of the assembly have been imposed by the Constitution; thus, according to article 73, Parliament cannot initiate legislation on some particular issues (mainly of financial or administrative nature).

Also, by characterising a bill as urgent, the government can limit the length of the debate substantially, and hence, the ability of the opposition to influence law-making (a. 76 par.

4). In general terms, the role of the Greek assembly has been limited to the ratification rather than to the initiation of legislation. Yet, it could be argued, that the decline of Parliament in its role as legislature has been a common phenomenon in most democratic countries. For example, according to one estimation, about 90-100 per cent of bills passed by Parliament in Britain and 85 per cent in France are of government origin<sup>41</sup>.

On the other hand however, whereas assemblies in other liberal democracies perform a central role as instruments of executive scrutiny, the powers of the Greek assembly to oversee the executive and force it to account for its policies were considerably restricted under the 1975 Constitution. Hence, at times of crisis, Parliament could only a posteriori, if at all, make decisions upon the actions taken by the executive, such as the declaration of a state of emergency and the suspension of civil liberties (articles 48 and 44). Substantial limitations were also imposed upon the assembly's powers to monitor the executive's foreign and defence policies. As already noted, the President of the Republic was empowered to make treaties the content of which he could keep secret at his discretion. Additionally, the Constitution virtually forbade the investigation of matters pertaining to foreign policy and defence by a special parliamentary committee of enquiry, without an endorsement by the governing majority (a. 68 par 2). With this latter provision which had been first introduced by the dictatorial constitution of 1968/1973, the government has become solely responsible and at the same time unaccountable for an extremely sensitive area of policy, namely the organization and control of the armed forces.

In August 1977, the New Democracy government introduced law 660 according to which the post of the commander-in-chief of the armed forces with its over-concentrated powers (see previous chapters) was abolished and responsibility for defence

matters was transferred to the government, particularly to the Supreme Council of National Defence (ASEA). The structure of command of the armed forces followed largely the same pattern as the pre-1967 one, with a powerful Minister of Defence at the top, counselled by the leadership of the armed forces<sup>42</sup>. In view of the recent dictatorial experience, the lack of any effective parliamentary control over the military could lead as before to the formation of separate spheres of autonomy within the armed forces and thus to situations dangerous for the democratic regime. An abortive coup by junta nostalgics in February 1975 had already indicated that the acceptance of a democratic solution was far from unanimous within the officer corps and underlined the need for effective mechanisms of scrutiny of the military. The absence of such institutionalized mechanisms after the dictatorship has, in our view, constituted one of the main weaknesses of Greek democracy.

Finally, the monitoring powers of the assembly were limited by the constitutional arrangements for the vote of no confidence. Article 84 postulated that a motion of no confidence had to be passed by an absolute majority of all elected deputies, whereas a motion of confidence required only an absolute majority of deputies present in the chamber. Designed to ensure stability, these provision which was introduced for the first time in 1975 and is similar to article 49 of the French constitution<sup>43</sup> minimized in practice the government's dependence on the confidence of Parliament. Given the large parliamentary majorities that successive governments have commanded and the degree of party discipline, a motion of no confidence is most likely to be rejected, as the practice so far has suggested. In all, the Constitution of 1975 combined with the arrangements of the electoral law and the particularities of the party system, has reinforced the subordination of Parliament in both its legislative and controlling functions.

In view of the preceding analysis, the dominant centre of power within the institutional context of the Third Hellenic Republic has been the government and particularly the Prime Minister, whose position has been strengthened by a variety of factors. In regard to the Constitution, article 82 (par 2) made a special reference to the role of the Prime Minister, postulating that the latter "is responsible for the unity of the government and guides its activities as well as those of the public administration in the execution of government policy within the framework of the law". Under this provision, the Prime Minister is no longer *primus inter pares* among the other ministers as he used to be according to the previous constitutional arrangements; he is not only the chairman of the cabinet, he also directs the latter's action and appoints or dismisses the members of his government as he sees fit.

Moreover, the establishment of a fully competitive political system and victories in fairly conducted elections, the result of which has never been disputed by any side, have also increased the legitimacy and authority of the Prime Minister. Since 1974, the power of the government has been solely based on the support of the electorate, rather than on that of the head of state, the military and even para-state organizations as in the pre-1967 period. The authority of the office has been also reinforced by the powerful personalities of the occupants. Karamanlis's strong personality and status as the founder of democracy, and successively Papandreou's charisma, dominated the political scene almost throughout the first fifteen years of the democratic transition. This dominance has been also sustained by the authoritarian structure of the biggest parties, in which the leader's appeal to the electorate has proven to be their main asset. Policy outcomes in modern liberal democracies, Roberts<sup>44</sup> suggests, are the result of a triangular relationship between the government, legislature and party. In the case of Greece, the predominance of the leader-Prime Minister in all three institutions after 1974, has

reinforced the personified character of Greek politics. Paraphrasing "chancellor democracy", the term used to describe the system of the German Federal Republic, one could speak in Greece of "prime minister democracy" emphasising at the same time the independence of the premier from party influence and control to which the German chancellor, as indeed the British Prime Minister and even the French President are vulnerable. A closer look at the party system and individual party structures is therefore necessary for a better evaluation of the workings of democratic institutions in the first period of the transition.

#### **5.4 The new party system and New Democracy: continuity and change.**

The overall structure of the party system which emerged after the collapse of the dictatorship revealed a significant degree of continuity with the patterns which had prevailed in the pre-1967 period. The three historical political camps or families ('parataxeis'), which in the post-war period were defined in the context of Greek politics as Right, Centre and Left, reappeared in 1974, and so did most of the personalities and notables who had dominated the political scene before the coup. Despite the dictators' efforts to discredit politicians and eradicate the party system altogether, political loyalties proved to be highly resilient and with deep roots within the electorate. Seven years of dictatorship appeared to be too short a period to destroy political identifications and alignments, which had developed amid the major political conflicts of the twentieth century, the national schism of the inter-war period and the civil war of the 1940s<sup>45</sup>. Moreover, the credibility and popularity of the 'politikos kosmos' (political world) were reinforced by the unanimous opposition of the latter to a military regime profoundly resented by the vast majority of the people.

In each one of the political camps, however, major organizational changes took place, due to the ideological developments of the previous decade and the institutional reforms carried out in the first few weeks of the transition. The most significant element of change in the party system was to be found within the Left, where the abolition of Compulsory Law 509/1947 enabled the Communists to re-enter public life legally. Thus, apart from the United Democratic Left party, EDA, which throughout the period preceding the coup had been the sole expression of all left-wing forces, the Left was now represented by another two parties, the Communist party of Greece, KKE, and the Communist Party of the Interior, KKE-Esoterikou (henceforth KKE-es).

KKE-es was created after the split of KKE in 1968, when a narrow majority of the KKE's Political Bureau (four out of seven) decided to hold the twelfth plenum of the Central Committee in Budapest, without any significant participation from the party's members who were in the "interior" of Greece. Underlying the dispute on apparently procedural matters was a profound disagreement on political and ideological questions ranging from the party's organizational methods and its relations with Moscow to policies during and after the civil war and the need for democratization of its structures<sup>46</sup>. Those party members dissenting from the exiled leadership's line formed the Interior Bureau of the KKE which later developed into the KKE-Esoterikou. The new party adopted many of the principles of Eurocommunism (rejection of the "dictatorship of the proletariat", commitment to parliamentary democracy and pluralism) and declared as one of its main objectives the renewal of the Greek Communist movement<sup>47</sup>.

By contrast, the KKE which remained faithful to Moscow, considered itself as the representative of communist orthodoxy and as the "vanguard of the Greek working class and that class's organizational expression"<sup>48</sup>. The party adhered to

the principles of "democratic centralism" as the basis of party organization and "dictatorship of the proletariat" and envisaged a future economic and political change in Greece along the Soviet model. The split of the historic KKE caused a major crisis within EDA itself, as the majority of its members aligned with either the KKE or the KKE-es. Those who remained tried to restructure the party organizationally and adopted new political principles which in effect brought it very close to the positions of the KKE-es<sup>49</sup>.

In the Centre camp, the most important development was the emergence of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement, PASOK, under the leadership of Andreas Papandreou. PASOK's position within the political spectrum has been the subject of a wide academic debate; different writers have viewed the party as socialist, or populist similar to the Latin American type, as a direct descendant of the traditional centre or as a completely new political formation without precedent in the Greek political tradition<sup>50</sup>. Later in this thesis, there will be a more detailed analysis regarding PASOK's political identity, an important question, especially since this very party has performed a crucial role in the development of the post-1974 democratic institutions. There can be hardly any doubt, however, that PASOK's historical origins lay in the pre-1967 Centre Union, EK, and particularly in its left-wing which, led by Andreas, came to exercise considerable influence within the party after the constitutional crisis of 1965. PASOK itself strongly claimed to be the political heir of the EK and particularly of the latter's "unyielding struggle" of the 1960s. It is indicative of PASOK's 'centrist' roots that the vast majority of its MPs in the seventies came from the left wing of the EK and particularly from that party's youth organization EDIN<sup>51</sup>. Yet, at the same time PASOK presented itself as an entirely new political formation within Greek public life. It adopted a distinctively radical discourse, accepted Marxism as a method of political analysis and



declared as its ultimate aim the socialist transformation of Greek society. All these reflected the radicalizing effect that the experiences of military dictatorship and the resistance against it had on the political development of both Papandreou himself and of a substantial part of the pro-democracy forces of the 1960s. PASOK was essentially established by two major resistance groups, PAK (Panhellenic Liberation Movement) which was created by Papandreou in exile and D.A. (Democratic Defence) which was founded by former EDIN and EDA members with the participation of a number of university students and a small group of former EK members<sup>52</sup>.

Concurrently, the EK re-emerged in the political arena under the leadership of George Mavros and in alliance with a group called Nees Dynameis (New Forces) which consisted of prominent social democrats who had actively opposed the dictatorship. The alliance known as Enosis Kentrou-Nees Dynameis (henceforth EK-ND) declared its rejection of traditional clientelistic practices and personified politics, and its determination to build up a modern mass party organization. The party's programme which we will examine below in more detail, was very similar to that of the pre-1967 EK, advocating a free economy but with emphasis on state intervention in key sectors and indicative planning.

Finally, the Right underwent a complete reorganization with the establishment by Karamanlis of a new political formation, named New Democracy (ND). Karamanlis's powerful personality, enormous prestige as the founder of the democratic regime, and consequently his great appeal to the electorate must have served as major guarantees of the new party's bright political future for the old ERE cadres and deputies who rallied to ND en masse<sup>53</sup>. Yet, ND was not the same party as ERE under a new name. Karamanlis's objective was the formation of "a powerful moderate party"<sup>54</sup>, which was to carry through the "renovation" of public life<sup>55</sup>. ND which was presented as an "entirely new

political camp" abandoned the fierce anti-communism of the now defunct ERE and declared its commitment to the protection of civil liberties and "the freedom of the individual to develop his/her personality and participate in public life"<sup>56</sup>. Moreover, the party adopted a more radical social and economic programme, which although it advocated a free economy, emphasized the need for more state intervention, for the achievement of "greater social justice" and "the fairer distribution of the national income"<sup>57</sup>. Karamanlis sought also to renew the political personnel of the new party by recruiting from among a younger generation of politicians with a more "technocratic" outlook and more liberal background than the traditional cadres of the Right. Characteristically, more than half of ND's deputies in 1974 (127 out of a total of 220) had entered Parliament for the first time while of the rest only 68 had run for office as candidates of ERE or the Greek Rally<sup>58</sup>.

The liberalization of the Right under Karamanlis left space for the development of a party of the extreme Right; the National Democratic Union, EDE, was led by Petros Garoufalias, an ardent royalist and a Minister of Defence in the EK government of the early 1960s - the man who had been at the centre of the crisis which led to the resignation of George Papandreou as Prime Minister in July 1965. The restoration of the monarchy was in fact the main issue of EDE's campaign. Moreover, although the party sought not to identify with the military dictatorship directly, it nevertheless favoured the institutional autonomy of the armed forces and the return of Greece to the military wing of NATO from which the country was withdrawn by Karamanlis in the aftermath of the Cyprus disaster, for reasons which will be discussed below<sup>59</sup>.

As the above brief analysis has shown, after the dictatorship each one of the broad historic camps underwent a major restructuring with the emergence of new political formations. Although political loyalties towards the Right,

Centre and Left had survived, the actual strength of the individual parties within the electorate was yet to be proven. The general election of 17 November 1974 was to be the first test of political support for each party. Yet, the result of the election (Table 5.1) can only partly serve as an indicator of the real changes in the ideological and party political affiliations of the electorate. Of course, the lack of adequate survey data on the factors influencing the voters' attitudes and preferences (party ideology and programme, the impact of leadership, social class or family tradition etc) in that first period of the transition (as indeed in any other) makes the evaluation of electoral results very difficult. However, a number of factors contribute to the conclusion that the overwhelming majority that ND polled in 1974 (54.4 per cent of the vote) although an undisputed victory of the party, cannot be easily interpreted as the reinforcement of right-wing affiliations. The elections were held a mere four months after the downfall of the military regime, at a time when the predominant issue was the consolidation of democratic institutions and the management of foreign affairs, especially the continuing Cyprus crisis, the tension with Turkey and relations with NATO and the USA. ND's electoral victory was to a large extent due to Karamanlis's prestige as the leader who had achieved the smooth transition to democracy and perhaps as the only one who could prevent any regression to authoritarianism. Composer Mikis Theodorakis's much quoted phrase "Karamanlis or the tanks" summarized best in its simplicity the prevailing mood of that time. Moreover, the dismantling of the anti-communist state by the politician who had been associated with it more than any other in the post-war period won Karamanlis additional sympathies within the Centre and even the Left.

In fact, ND based its entire campaign on its leader's charismatic personality and projected him as the sole guarantee of political stability. A characteristic example mentioned by

Clogg was a small party pamphlet that circulated during the campaign, which in six pages of text contained seven full-page portraits of Karamanlis<sup>60</sup>. On the other hand, the parties of the opposition had barely two months to develop effective electoral organizations and communicate their positions

**TABLE 5.1**  
**ELECTION OF 17 NOVEMBER 1974**

	% of votes	seats	% of seats
New Democracy	54.37	220	73.3
EK-ND	20.42	60	20.0
PASOK	13.58	12	4.0
EA(United left alliance of KKE,KKE-es and EDA)	9.47	8	2.7
EDE	1.08	-	-
Others	0.98	-	-
TOTAL	100.00	300	100.0

properly to the electorate, a factor which must have contributed to their rather poor performance in the elections.

The vote for EK-ND (20.42 per cent) fell to less than half of the 52.72 per cent that the Centre Union had obtained in the elections of 1964. One should not discount the possibility, however, that a large part of the EK voters from the 1960s might have switched to PASOK, which received 13.58 per cent of the vote, a rather positive result for a newly established party. The Left also saw its share of the vote decrease substantially in comparison to the result that EDA had achieved in the elections of 1963 and 1964 (14.34 per cent and 11.80 per cent respectively); the United Left (EA), the alliance that

KKE, KKE-es and EDA formed for the purposes of the election, scored a mere 9.47 per cent.

In summary, the main conclusion to be drawn from the first elections of the transition is that the consolidation of democracy was given priority to any demand for social and economic reform. It is in this light that the overwhelming majority for ND (18.7 per cent increase from ERE's 1964 result) and the low share of the vote for the Centre and Left must be considered, rather than regarded as a clear indication of a redistribution of political alignments after the dictatorship. The unanimous support for democracy was also underlined by the low proportion of the vote (1.08 per cent) for the extreme-Right EDE.

Three years later, the result of the 1977 general election (Table 5.2) proved that support for different parties was far from crystallized and that the party system was still in a state of fluidity. Again, the absence of detailed data on reasons for the voters' preferences (party ideology and programme, impact of leadership, social class, family tradition etc) imposes limits to the analysis of the parties' strength among the electorate. The four major developments of the 1977 elections were the significant losses of ND which saw its support shrink by 12.5 per cent; the spectacular gains of PASOK which became the official opposition in parliament; the serious decline of the traditional centre and the dominance of the orthodox KKE in the Communist Left.

ND obtained 41.85 per cent of the vote and thanks to the workings of the electoral law secured a new comfortable parliamentary majority with 171 deputies. Significantly, the party lost supporters not only to the benefit of the parties to its left, but also to the ultra-right National Front (Ethniki Parataxis, EP) founded in summer 1977 by monarchists and supporters of the junta, was the third attempt of the

undemocratic Right to organize politically, after the poor performance of EDE in the 1974 elections and the establishment of the short-lived National People's Party (ELK) in 1976. EP demanded the re-entry of Greece into NATO's military command

**TABLE 5.2**  
**ELECTION OF 20 NOVEMBER 1977**

	% of votes	seats	% of seats
New Democracy	41.85	171	56.9
PASOK	25.33	93	31.0
EDIK	11.95	16	5.3
(Union of the Democratic Centre, previously EK-ND)			
KKE	9.36	11	3.7
National Front (EP)	6.82	5	1.7
SPAD	2.72	2	0.7
(Alliance of Left-wing and Progressive Forces including the KKE-es, EDA and three minor groups)			
New Liberals(K.Neophil.)	1.08	2	0.7
Others	0.89	-	-
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>300</b>	<b>100.00</b>

and the granting of an amnesty to the imprisoned members of the junta as a precondition for national reconciliation<sup>61</sup>. Moreover, the party accused ND of splitting the "nationally minded camp", betraying the King, undermining national ideals and family life and of surrendering education to the hands of "communists"<sup>62</sup>.

Eventually, the party obtained 6.82 per cent of the vote, and five seats in Parliament. The increased support for EP came

as a result of the dissociation of the Right under Karamanlis from its monarchist, anti-communist past. Moreover, the shift of voters to the extreme-Right, was to a considerable extent the manifestation of discontent for certain economic measures taken by the government, such as the introduction of a wealth tax and the nationalization of key sectors of the economy, which EP considered a "socialist" development<sup>63</sup>. On the one hand, EP's electoral success enhanced the moderate, even Centre-Right image of ND; on the other, however, this result, together with the increased support for ND's hard-liners in the elections, forced the party to take into greater account the most conservative sections of the electorate.

ND appeared also to have suffered losses to the parties of the Centre and Left, which was partly due to the stabilization of the democratic regime. In the absence of an immediate threat to democracy, many voters of these two camps who had voted for ND in 1974 must have switched to their old political loyalties in 1977. According to one estimation, ND's lost vote to its left was on average 6.2 per cent<sup>64</sup>. Indicatively, the combined vote for the Communist parties increased by 2.6 per cent, reaching EDA's 1964 level of support (although a shift of preference from EK-ND and PASOK can be hardly ruled out).

The most salient feature of the 1977 result was the great advance of PASOK, which nearly doubled its 1974 share of the vote to 25.33 per cent and displaced the traditional Centre as the official opposition by obtaining 93 seats in Parliament against the latter's 15. What was more important, support for PASOK was not coming only from urban centres and some rural areas with long-standing liberal tradition as in 1974, but from all over the country; its share of the vote was more or less evenly distributed between the 56 urban and rural constituencies, of which only eight gave PASOK less than 20 per cent<sup>65</sup>. Moreover, as a 1980 survey by the Centre for Political Research and Information, KPEE (ND's "think tank") showed, the

1977 vote for PASOK was also evenly distributed among different social and economic groups<sup>66</sup>. Hence, PASOK appeared to becoming increasingly the political expression of large segments of the electorate. Many factors had contributed to this success.

First, PASOK's political platform which combined a highly nationalistic stance on foreign issues, with a radical programme of socio-economic reform and the promise of a vaguely defined change, "Allaghi"; the above, together with Papandreou's charisma and his uncompromisingly anti-Right rhetoric, appealed to a largely radicalized electorate, which was no longer inspired by the traditional Centre and which due to its distrust for Communism could not be attracted to the parties of the Communist Left. Moreover, the party had developed an impressive organizational structure, unmatched by that of any other non-communist party in Greece. By the time of the election, more than 1,000 organizational units all over the country were active in spreading PASOK's ideas and programme and mobilizing a considerable part of the population<sup>67</sup>.

Other factors which increased PASOK's electoral appeal were the contradictions in the organizational strategy of the parties of the Centre and Left. Within the latter, the alliance of the three parties had been dissolved, mainly due to the profound doctrinal differences between the KKE on the one hand and KKE-es and EDA on the other. In 1977 the KKE contested the elections alone for the first time in a period of forty years. Instead of putting forward a concrete programme of social and political reform, however, the KKE concentrated its efforts in achieving the predominance of the Communist Left at the expense of EDA and particularly its main rival, the KKE-es. Its campaign, riddled with slogans and references to the party's "glorious struggles", aimed primarily at attracting the vote of the traditional Communists and the working class. Eventually, its strategy won KKE 9.36 per cent of the vote, almost as much as EA had polled in 1974.



On the other hand, the Alliance of Progressive and Left-wing Forces, (henceforth SPAD), that the KKE-es had formed together with EDA and three smaller groups, obtained a mere 2.72 per cent and only two seats in Parliament, in contrast to KKE's 11. Although SPAD had put forward a radical programme addressing all major issues, its impact on the electorate was limited. Clearly, it could not persuade the voters that it was anything more than an occasional electoral pact, let alone a credible alternative to ND. Moreover, the contradictory strategy of SPAD's major participant the KKE-es, which while retaining its Communist title and identity appeared to be too conciliatory towards the Right, disaffected non-communists who had been radicalized by political and economic repression throughout the previous decade<sup>68</sup>.

Finally PASOK benefited from the inability of the traditional Centre to recover the role that it had played in the 1960s as the only force of political change. Despite its earlier pronouncements, EK-ND failed to renovate itself both organizationally and ideologically. Its organizational structure remained authoritarian, as power was concentrated in the hands of the leader and the parliamentary group, most members of which were old Liberal notables with strong local clienteles<sup>69</sup>. More importantly, EK-ND lacked a concrete ideology and an appealing programme of social and political reform. With the establishment of democratic institutions in 1974, the Centre Union was deprived of what constituted the main tenets of its 1960s platform, namely republicanism and the democratization of the political system. Moreover, the efforts of the New Forces group to transform EK-ND into a modern social democratic party failed primarily due to the opposition of the party's traditional cadres. Thus, after the liberalization of the Right under Karamanlis, the EK-ND blueprint looked like a somewhat more liberal version of ND's own proposals.

The absence of an effective electoral machine and the uninspiring leadership of G. Mavros who could in no way compete with the charisma of Karamanlis and Papandreou, also explain why the traditional Centre failed to capitalize on the widespread radicalism of the post-junta period. Thus, in the elections of 1977 the party, which after four New Forces deputies had broken away in 1976 was re-named Union of the Democratic Centre (EDIK) experienced a drastic decrease of its support from 20.52 to 11.95 per cent. The result marked the beginning of a period of acute crisis, which led to the final disintegration of the Centre and the integration of its members into ND and PASOK alike.

In all, the process of restructuring the party system continued throughout the 1970s, making extremely difficult any classification, for instance according to Sartori's typology<sup>70</sup>. This transitional phase, largely explained by the ideological fluidity of that time, was most clearly manifest within the Centre and the Left. Parties within these two camps, with the possible exception of the KKE, found themselves in competition for the objectives of political leadership of large parts of the social forces calling for political change. Among other things, public demands included the purge of the state from all junta elements, the democratization of the administration and the labour movement, the development of the social and health services which were in a deplorable state and the improvement of the quality of life in the urban centres, which by the end of the 1970s had attracted almost 60 per cent of the entire population<sup>71</sup>.

Political radicalism was particularly pronounced among the younger generation of voters - those who had no memories of the civil war. Indicatively, a 1985 survey conducted in the greater Athens area suggested that the vast majority of the electorate under 49 were hostile towards the West and capitalism, while about 60 per cent of those under 35, who had

matured politically during the dictatorship and the first years of the transition, expressed strong anti-Right feelings<sup>72</sup>. Additionally, the above cited KPEE survey suggested that within the same age group support for ND was particularly weak<sup>73</sup>.

In the 1977 elections, PASOK appeared to have displaced the traditional Centre as the force that could remove ND from power, while the KKE had achieved the hegemony within the Communist Left. Yet, it was not until the 1981 elections, as we shall see below, that the process of restructuring within the Centre and Left had more or less run its course and the features of the post-1974 party system had become easier to define.

On the other hand, New Democracy, under the firm guidance of Karamanlis and with the added advantage of being in power ever since its creation, became from the start the predominant force within the Right. In view of the ideological and social developments of the previous decade, the long-term prospects of the Greek Right required a complete break with the authoritarian legacy of the pre-1967 period. The main components of right-wing ideology, namely monarchism, anti-communism and since the civil war an unquestioning adherence to the policies of NATO and the USA had been discarded or bankrupted by the military junta.

The establishment of ND in September 1974, constituted Karamanlis's attempt to renovate the Right through a new political formation with a well developed mass organization and a liberal democratic strategy. ND's ideological platform laid emphasis upon its commitment to parliamentary democracy and on its respect for the individual, condemned totalitarianism and declared the party's determination to fight for the protection of civil liberties. The party's main aim was to "build a system of social peace, justice and order in which the people could enjoy the fruit of freedom and material or intellectual

creativity"<sup>74</sup>. Moreover, while ND believed in a free economy, it also acknowledged the need for compensatory action by the state in order to "balance economic and social conflicts and reduce inequalities"<sup>75</sup>. ND identified political freedom with social justice, for as Karamanlis stressed, the former could be safeguarded only through the fairest possible distribution of the national product<sup>76</sup>. Although these pronouncements could be seen as rhetoric aimed at increasing ND's appeal amid the general climate of radicalization, they were nevertheless accompanied by an ambitious programme of social and economic modernization which included significant reforms in education and the extension of state control over key sectors of the economy. A main part of this modernizing programme was the accelerated entry of Greece into the European community, which in Karamanlis's view could guarantee democratic stability within the country and act as a catalyst of economic and social development.

In the field of foreign policy, ND abandoned ERE's unconditional pro-NATO and pro-USA stance in favour of a more independent line. In August 1974, largely expressing the public feeling, Karamanlis withdrew Greece from NATO's military command in protest at the alliance's failure to head off the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. He also called into question the status of the American bases on Greek soil and improved the country's political, economic and cultural relations with Communist and Arab countries<sup>77</sup>.

Efforts were also made towards the development of a modern organizational structure which culminated in the party's pre-congress in April 1977 and the congress of May 1979. The Chalkidiki congress, the first ever to be held by a party of the Right, approved of ND's charter and elected a 70-member Administrative Committee. At the same time, a significant number of organizations had developed at the regional and local level and by 1981 fourteen regional congresses had also been

held<sup>78</sup>. Finally, in May 1980 when Karamanlis resigned from the party to become President of the Republic, ND chose as his successor George Rallis, in what was the most democratic election of this kind in Greek political history.

Yet, notwithstanding these impressive innovations, ND failed to transform itself into a modern mass party. In effect, its ideology and programme, having been elaborated largely by the party leader, proved to be confusing (for instance, Karamanlis's definition of ND's ideology as "radical pluralism" or the declaration that ND was a social democratic party) and difficult to assimilate by party members and cadres<sup>79</sup>. Moreover, the persistence of many elements of Right-wing tradition in the party's mentality and practice eventually led to the failure of the moderate, catch-all strategy that Karamanlis had initially adopted<sup>80</sup>.

At the ideological level this continuity with the past was reflected in a set of policies, such as the labour and anti-terrorist legislation and the considerable institutional autonomy of the armed forces. It was also expressed by the large group of hard-liners, the bearers of ERE's anti-communist legacy, most prominent among whom was the Minister of Defence, E. Averoff. It is indicative of this group's strength that in the leadership contest, Averoff scored almost as much support as the moderate Rallis (84 to the latter's 88 votes).

Moreover, at the organizational level, power remained concentrated in the hands of the leader and the parliamentary group. The party organizations were unable to influence the formulation of policy or the selection of candidates for the elections. As a writer associated with ND commented, "the party was far less significant as a mass organization than as a group of leaders and professional politicians"<sup>81</sup>. This must have been one reason for the apathy of members and the unwillingness of supporters to join the party's

organizations<sup>82</sup>. Furthermore, the significance of the latter as mechanisms for the mobilization of ND supporters and the communication of its positions to the electorate was largely reduced by the operation of extensive clientelistic networks. In many cases, the development of local party organizations was met with the opposition of ND deputies who feared that the disappearance of patron-client ties would lead to the decline of their personal influence within the party<sup>83</sup>.

A dominant feature of modern Greek politics, clientelism has been directly related to the country's particular economic and social development and to the dominant role that the state has come to play consequently, not only in the economy, but also in providing employment and distributing resources to society at large<sup>84</sup>. Successive parties in government always relied on state mechanisms in order to distribute favours to their political clienteles and thus to secure their electoral basis. The involvement of the state in economic development increased further in the post-war period to the benefit of the right-wing parties which nearly monopolized power until 1967. By allocating foreign aid resources, providing employment in the expanded public services and offering opportunities for the creation of wealth in the booming sectors of construction and public works, the Greek Rally and especially ERE managed to maintain considerable support.

After the dictatorship, the clientelistic networks of the Right were reconstituted, helped by the fact that ND was in government since its very creation and therefore able to utilize state resources in order to consolidate its power. The vast majority of ND supporters were linked to the party through local MPs who distributed personal favours as in the pre-1967 period. ND's parliamentarians therefore played a much more central role in mobilizing mass support than the party's extra-parliamentary organization. The party's 1979 charter also emphasized the predominance of the parliamentary group by

designating it as the only body involved in electing and revoking the party leader<sup>85</sup>.

Nevertheless, during Karamanlis's leadership, the parliamentary group exercised only limited influence upon ND's policies, because of the dominance of the leader over all aspects of the party's affairs. Major decisions such as the selection of K. Tsatsos as ND's presidential candidate in 1975, were taken by Karamanlis alone, rather than being the result of collective deliberations within the parliamentary group<sup>86</sup>. Additionally, the party leader performed two vital functions of modern mass party organizations. The elaboration of the party ideology and programme and selection of candidates for election. According to the party charter, although the candidates were, and still are, proposed by a democratic process, the final decision and therefore the control over the composition of the parliamentary party rested with the party leader<sup>87</sup>. The mode of candidate nomination has largely accounted for the strict discipline of MPs to the policies of the party leadership, insofar as their political future was determined by the latter. Expulsions from the party, although isolated incidents during Karamanlis's leadership, were carried out in a characteristically autocratic fashion by the leader alone, without prior reference to the parliamentary group<sup>88</sup>.

Beyond the rulings of the party statute, Karamanlis domination of ND was explained by the fact that the party was his personal creation. It was Karamanlis who provided the new party with an ideological basis, acted as a unifying force among its different, even opposed groups and secured the party's electoral victory with his charisma and enormous prestige. Characteristically the party's statute postulated that the founder of the party was also to be its leader and that only his successors were to be elected<sup>89</sup>.

Nevertheless, a genuine effort to transform ND from a personal to a mass party was made with the pre-congress of 1977 and the congress of May 1979 held exactly a year before Karamanlis resigned from the party leadership to become President of the Republic. Among other things, the congress replaced the leader's portrait as the party's emblem with the flaming torch. Also, Karamanlis's successor George Rallis, who represented the party's liberal wing, adopted a less autocratic stance towards the cabinet and the parliamentary party<sup>90</sup>. Yet, having been elected by a very narrow majority, Rallis lacked the unanimous legitimacy that Karamanlis enjoyed as party leader. Deprived by the latter's firm guidance, ND was plagued by internal divisions between the liberals and the "nationally minded". Its ideological contradictions became more apparent in the run up to the 1981 elections, when Rallis, faced with the dynamic rise of PASOK and under the increasing influence of the hard-liners sought an electoral pact with the extreme Right.

In conclusion, throughout the first seven years of the transition, the Right as embodied by New Democracy failed to transform itself into a modern mass party according to the West European standards. The autocratic mentality of its leadership and the vested interest of its leading cadres in clientelistic relations prevailed over all attempts to develop a modern organizational structure. It was only after the electoral defeat of 1981 and the consequent loss of state resources that ND intensified its efforts to establish an effective mass organization, being in need of new mechanisms to mobilize supporters and communicate with the electorate<sup>91</sup>.

Moreover, ND lacked a coherent and convincing ideological platform. Instead it oscillated between modernizing policies and authoritarian practices and consequently failed to establish itself as a party of the Centre-Right as its founder had clearly intended.



### **5.5 The policies of New Democracy and the political climate after the general elections of 1974.**

The difficult task that the political elite was faced with after the 1974 election was the consolidation of democracy amid conditions of acute economic crisis. Inflation was running at 27 per cent, the GNP was declining at a rate of 3.8 per cent annually and industrial production by 1.6 per cent. Moreover, the balance of payments deficit had reached \$1,212 million<sup>92</sup>. Yet, unlike Spain where the coincidence of the transition with the economic crisis gave rise to a social and political contract between Right and Left, the reforms that were introduced in Greece constituted the political choices solely of the governing party<sup>93</sup>. This can be attributed to several reasons: first, the social and political forces had played only a marginal role in the downfall of the dictatorship and were not in a strong enough position to negotiate the terms under which the transition was to be carried out; secondly, the overwhelming majority in favour of Messiah Karamanlis vested the ND government with the broad legitimacy that it needed in order to implement its own programme, without having to seek a compromise with the other political parties and interest groups. Moreover, ND's position was further strengthened by the workings of the electoral system which provided the governing party with a disproportionately large parliamentary majority, while it condemned the smaller parties, particularly those of the Left, to under-representation (see Table 5.1 above).

Nevertheless, ND showed a considerable degree of liberalism with a set of measures which aimed at achieving the consent of the electorate at large. Thus, a new income policy was introduced which compensated lower income groups for the losses they had suffered during the dictatorship; in the period 1975-1978 the real wages of industrial workers increased by 46 per cent and salaries by 31 per cent<sup>94</sup>. Also, between 1974 and 1977

subsidies to agriculture were doubled (from 94 to 180 million drachmas), while through a new taxation policy in the same period 45 billion drachmas were transferred to the poorer classes<sup>95</sup>. Also, the government responded to some of the trade union demands such as the reduction of working hours from 48 to 43 per week<sup>96</sup>. Expenditure for social services (including health and education) exceeded the 3 per cent of the Gross National Income for the first time in the post-war period to surpass 5 per cent in 1981<sup>97</sup>.

Major reforms were also introduced in the sphere of education of which the most important were the expansion of compulsory education from six to nine years; the promotion of technical education; the establishment of a Centre for Educational Planning and Research (KEPE) and the modernization of the curricula. Moreover, ND put an end to the long-standing and controversial language issue by establishing the demotic (spoken) as the official language of the country to replace the katharevousa (purist).

The first years of the transition were also marked by an unprecedented expansion of state control over the economy and social services. ND carried out large-scale nationalizations which included Olympic Airways, the Commercial Bank group, transportation and oil refineries. It also invested extensively in new industries such as fertilizers, sugar and military equipment<sup>98</sup>.

Additionally, there was a redefinition of the state's relations with the business world. After the dictatorship, the latter met with the hostility of the entire political spectrum, including the Right, due to the close cooperation of a significant part of big business with the junta. For some political analysts in particular, the takeover of the Commercial Bank (by which state control expanded to over 95 per cent of the banking sector<sup>99</sup>) reflected most clearly the

politicians' hostility towards those businesses which had profiteered heavily from the junta's protectionist measures<sup>100</sup>.

Industrial development in the post-war period had been based to a considerable extent, on high state protectionism, suppression of wages and salaries and a variety of other measures<sup>101</sup>. During the dictatorship alone, thanks also to the suppression of the labour movement, industrial profits nearly doubled compared to the pre-1967 period<sup>102</sup>. After 1974, however, ND's income policy, the democratization of industrial relations, the elimination of major concessions to individual businesses and the gradual easing of protectionist measures in view of Greece's forthcoming entry into the EEC, created a less favourable environment for profits. Serious tensions arose as a result between the governing party and Greek industrialists, who adapted very slowly to the new situation always hoping for a restoration of their privileged relations with the state<sup>103</sup>. Nevertheless, in general terms ND's economic policy produced positive results; inflation in 1975-76 was down to 13.3 per cent, while industrial production increased by 4.4 per cent in 1975 and by 10.6 per cent in 1976<sup>104</sup>.

On the other hand however, the benefits of democratization of state and society were counter-balanced by a high degree of continuity with pre-dictatorial practices. The government's labour policies offer a major example of this reproduction of past authoritarian structures. It is true that after the dictatorship trade unions and agricultural associations were purged of junta collaborators by Karamanlis's government which also appointed provisional leaderships until proper union elections were held<sup>105</sup>. The elimination of mechanisms for the policing and persecution of unions and their activists, combined with the radicalizing effect of the dictatorship injected new dynamism into Greek trade unionism; after 1974 trade unions and agricultural associations became more active

in organizing and demanding income increases and better working conditions<sup>106</sup>.

These first liberalizing measures, however, did not lead to the introduction of free trade-unionism as might have been expected. On the contrary, ND restored the pre-1967 structures which were designed to guarantee state manipulation and control over the labour movement. The main objective of successive governments in the 1950s and 1960s had been to achieve control over the General Confederation of Labour (GSEE) which represented (and still does ) the majority of the unionized workforce and which was solely empowered by law to negotiate the annual national wage agreements of workers. Through a variety of manipulations, the right-wing governments of that time secured the over-representation of their friendly unions in the GSEE<sup>107</sup>. Thanks to the same system, ND was able after the demise of the dictatorship to assume and retain effective control over the GSEE throughout the seven years that it remained in power. By controlling the GSEE, ND governments could secure the implementation of their income policy, appearing at the same time to have the endorsement of the working class. In addition, the Ministry of Labour was empowered to modify or declare void national and lower level agreements, if they were deemed to be "contrary to the general or specific aspects of the government's economic and social policy"<sup>108</sup>. Finally, when arriving at a deadlock, collective disputes had to be referred to an arbitration tribunal, through which the government was able to impose its income policy on trade unions and employers alike<sup>109</sup>.

In addition to these regulations, ND introduced in 1976 at a time of mounting industrial unrest new labour legislation which further restricted the freedom of trade unions. Among other things, Law 330/1976 allowed employers to institute lock-outs in response to strikes, and to recruit strike-breakers to continue production. It also allowed the interference of

employers in union activities, while depriving union activists of any substantial protection against employers<sup>110</sup>. It has been estimated that under these provisions 15,000 trade unionists lost their jobs prior to 1981<sup>111</sup>.

Beyond the level of industrial relations, ND failed also to carry out a thorough democratization of the state machine. The popular demand of "de-juntification" was only partly met and an unspecified number of appointees of the dictatorship remained both in the administration and the public sector. ND also maintained YENED as a military broadcasting service despite the opposition's calls to alter it into an independent organization. Moreover, the governing party saw the state apparatus as its own territory; all parties of the opposition - even the Centre Union which had participated in the government of national unity - were excluded from key positions in the state and the state-run organizations. Owing its victory to the extreme circumstances that prevailed in 1974 and the personality of its leader, ND relied heavily on the state machine to consolidate its position among the electorate.

The unprecedented expansion of the public sector, which according to the then Minister of Industry amounted to over 60 per cent of the entire economy<sup>112</sup>, provided increased opportunities for the distribution of spoils to the party's clientele. This policy, which as a prominent member of the Centre remarked, "divided the citizens into the privileged supporters and friends of the party in power and the non privileged ones towards whom the state machine was indifferent or even hostile"<sup>113</sup>, contributed to the popular discontent and the polarization between the government and the parties of the opposition. Additionally, ND's monopoly of the broadcasting media was, as will be shown in the following chapter, a constant source of tension between the government and the opposition both inside and outside Parliament.

Karamanlis's government also placed particular emphasis on law and order. A new security force was created, the Units for the Restoration of Order (MAT) which became notorious for their clashes with demonstrators and strikers. In November 1980, such a clash with marchers commemorating the seventh anniversary of the Polytechnic uprising in Athens led to the death of two people and caused an uproar within Parliament and among public opinion.

Moreover, although anti-communism ceased to be the official ideology of the state, Greece remained perhaps the last country of Europe which had not recognized the resistance to the Axis forces. References to the resistance movement and the civil war were totally banned from the state-run media and education; the same applied to literature and art inspired by left-wing ideas. At the same time celebrations for the victories of the army against the guerillas in the civil war continued to be held and even to be covered by the television services of YENED<sup>114</sup>.

These policies, largely reminiscent of ERE's authoritarian mentality and practice, caused bitter conflicts between the government and the opposition, particularly PASOK and the KKE. The latter two adopted an uncompromisingly anti-Right stance which, as the elections result of 1977 showed, appealed a lot to the electorate. By contrast, policies of conciliation and compromise like those promoted by the KKE-es had little support among the Centre and the Left<sup>115</sup>.

The aggravation of the economic situation, particularly after the second oil shock of 1979, led to more tensions and mounting industrial unrest. In industry the process of de-investment which had started after 1973 especially in the sectors of advanced technology was accelerated; the crisis affected also more traditional industries (food, clothing, textiles) which in the same period had achieved some growth<sup>116</sup>. Between 1979 and 1981 real wages decreased by 5.5 per cent

while inflation was running at over 25 per cent annually<sup>117</sup>. The rate of unemployment doubled from 1.8 to 4 per cent at that time<sup>118</sup>. In the same period Greece was shaken by a wave of industrial action: working hours lost in strikes approached 10 million in 1979, to reach a record 20.5 million a year later<sup>119</sup>. The strikes were supported vigorously by the parties of the opposition; in particular, PASOK's labour branch (PASKE), was actively involved in the organization of strikes which were targeted clearly against the government<sup>120</sup>. Therefore, by the end of its second term in office, ND was facing a major decline in its popularity and a third electoral victory seemed a rather unlikely prospect.

## 5.6 Conclusion

The collapse of the dictatorship led to democratic reforms which were the product of a broad compromise between all social and political forces. A fully competitive system was thus established for the first time in the post war period, which enabled the alternation of different political parties in power. Nevertheless, the political institutions which were established after 1974 were not the product of a compromise between all the political forces; instead, they constituted the choices of the political forces under Karamanlis, which were called to lead the transition process.

The model of democracy which was introduced was based on a strong executive, as this was seen by the governing party and Karamanlis in particular as the only safeguard of political stability. The components of this model were a President of the Republic with enormous reserve powers to use at a time of crisis; an electoral system which guaranteed large parliamentary majorities; and a strong government with limited accountability to Parliament. This system produced strong

right-wing governments which thanks to their large parliamentary support were able to implement their programme of reforms. Yet, it also led to the dominance of one party in the political sphere. ND's political programme was based on a model of government which was to express the "unity of the polity at the top" rather than providing the conditions under which a social and political compromise was to be reached through the dialogue and cooperation of all the political and social forces. ND's purpose was not to provide the basis for a social and political contract, but to impose the terms according to which the social and political forces were to participate in the political process so that the viability of democracy could be guaranteed. The emphasis on law and order, the government tutelage of trade unions and the underrepresentation of the parties of the Left in Parliament were all parts of this strategy. This does not mean however, that this was the only political option available given the difficulty of the circumstances (the combination of the transition and the economic crisis)<sup>121</sup>.

The strategy of the ND governments reflected to a large extent the contradictions of the governing party itself: the co-existence of the bearers of the civil war legacy with new liberal cadres; the consequent oscillation of the party between liberalizing measures and authoritarian policies; the attempts at the creation of a modern mass organization and the persistence of patronage and personalistic politics. These contradictions have been also largely reflected in ND's policy on broadcasting. A detailed analysis of this policy will enhance we believe our understanding of the functions of political institutions in the first years of the transition.



## NOTES

1. For instance, the amount of working hours lost through strikes increased from 1.5 million in 1966 to 14.5 million in 1970. J. MARAVALL: The Transition to Democracy in Spain, Croom Helm, London 1982, p. 9
2. S. GREGORIADES: History of the Dictatorship (in Greek), Kapopoulos, Athens 1975, vol 3, p. 353-357. Also, R. CLOGG: A Short History of Modern Greece, Cambridge University Press, 1979, ch. 8 and his Parties and Elections in Greece, C.Hurst and Company, London 1987, ch. 3. Also, P.N. DIAMANDOUROS: "Transition and Consolidation of Democratic Politics in Greece, 1974-1983: a Tentative Assessment", in West European Politics, April 1984, issue on the New Mediterranean Democracies, ed. by G. Pridham.
3. N. ALIVIZATOS: The Political Institutions in Crisis, 1922-1974 (in Greek), Themelio, Athens 1986, p. 683.
4. Decision 684 of 1975, according to which the crime of high treason for which the main conspirators had been prosecuted was "instant" rather than continuous and therefore those who collaborated with the junta after the coup had not committed it; *ibid.*
5. Clogg, Parties...op. cit., p. 62.
6. Also, Th. VEREMIS: "Security Considerations and Civil-Military Relations in Post-war Greece", in R. CLOGG (ed): Greece in the 1980s, Macmillan, London 1983, p.179.
7. Constitutional Act of 1st August 1974. See D. Th.TSATSOS: Constitutional Law, Vol Ia, Sakkoulas, Athens 1982, p. 4-12.
8. Karamanlis's article published in Vradyni, 23 April 1973; quoted by Gregoriades op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 224-229.
9. Legislative Decree 59 of 23 September 1974, in Alivizatos, op. cit., p. 682.
10. Constitutional Act of 4 October 1974.
11. See for instance, Clogg, Parties...op. cit., p. 67.
12. The other five referendums were held in 1920 (99 per cent

- for the monarchy); 1924 (69 per cent for the republic); 1935 (97.8 per cent for the monarchy); 1946 (70 per cent for the monarchy); 1973 (74.6 per cent for the colonels' "Republic").
13. Maravall op. cit., especially Chapter 1.
  14. D.A. RUSTOW: "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a dynamic model", Comparative Politics, no 2, 1970.
  15. Ibid, p. 361
  16. See VRADYNI, 23.4.1973.
  17. Rustow op. cit., p. 357.
  18. Provisional National Accounts of Greece 1981, Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Coordination, National Accounts Service, Athens, April 1982.
  19. Gregoriades op. cit., vol 3 p. 308.
  20. UNESCO Statistical Report, no 23, p. 55.
  21. Due to a lack of special surveys in the early period of the transition, it is difficult to establish with adequate precision the ideological preferences of the population. As an indication of profound radicalization at least within the younger groups, let us mention here the result of the student elections held just before the national ones of November 1974: Four fifths of the vote went to organizations affiliated with the socialist PASOK, the two communist parties and other leftist groups; Clogg, The Parties... op. cit., p. 66.
  22. See the Introductory Report on the Constitutional draft by the Minister of Justice C. Stefanakis, on 21 December 1974, in The Constitution of Greece 1975, (in Greek), Sakkoulas, Athens, p. 4-5.
  23. Quoted in B.KOHLER: Political Forces in Spain, Greece and Portugal, Butterworth Scientific, London 1982, p. 146.
  24. See the comments of the speaker of the Opposition D. Tsatsos, op. cit., p. 330-338.
  25. Ibid, p. 349.
  26. Clause 38 par 2 has been rightly called the anti-parliamentary provision par excellence; ibid, p. 328.
  27. According to article 49, par 1 of the constitution, the president can be prosecuted only for high treason and for

intentional breach of the constitution.

28. The Constitution of Greece... op. cit., p. 6.

29. Alivizatos, The political institutions..., op.cit., p. 691.

30. Tsatsos, op. cit., p. 358.

31. Quoted in The Constitution of Greece (in Greek), edition of the weekly newspaper Pontiki, Athens 1987.

32. See F.VEGLERIS: "Parties and Political Decisions in Greece", in G.D. KONTOGIORGIS (ed): Social and Political Forces in Greece (in Greek), Exandas, Athens 1977.

33. Alivizatos op. cit., p. 694.

34. G.ROBERTS: An Introduction to Comparative Politics, Edward Arnold, London 1986, p. 36.

35. Alivizatos, op. cit., p. 685.

36. It is important to note that the President refrained from using his extensive powers not only when both the government and the head of state came from the same political camp (as in the period 1975-81), but also during the co-habitation of Karamanlis as President and the Socialist A. Papandreou as Prime Minister in 1981-85.

37. W. BAGEHOT: The English Constitution, as mentioned in R.HAGUE and M.HARROP: Comparative Government and Politics, an introduction, Macmillan, London 1987, p. 220.

38. The term is used by Hague and Harrop *ibid*, p. 223, in reference to Westminster-style systems, like those of Britain, Australia and New Zealand and in contrast to "assembly dominated" systems, such as Italy, or the Fourth French Republic.

39. The term is used by A. LIJPHART et al.: "A Mediterranean Model of Democracy? the Southern European democracies in comparative perspective", West European Politics, January 1988, no 1, p. 22.

40. *Ibid*.

41. Roberts, op. cit., pp. 110 and 122.

42. For the post-1974 organization of the armed forces, see Charalambis op. cit., especially p. 348-350; Alivizatos op. cit., p. 688; and Veremis op. cit., p. 180-181.

43. On the contrary, the constitution of 1952 required the same majority for both motions, which could not be smaller than the two fifths of the entire number of deputies (a. 78 par 6). See A.RAIKOS: Lectures on Constitutional Law (in Greek), vol A, Athens 1979, p. 316.

44. Roberts op cit, p. 143.

45. Maravall makes a similar observation for Spain, where loyalties towards the Right or the Left appeared to have survived the thirty five years of Francoism; op. cit., chapter 2.

46. See M. PAPAYANNAKIS: "The Crisis in the Greek Left", in H.R. PENNIMAN: Greece at the Polls, American Enterprise Institute, Washington 1981. See also T. VOURNAS: History of Modern Greece, 1967-1974, Tolides, Athens, p. 186-198.

47. See The Programme of the KKE-Esoterikou (in Greek) as it was passed by the 1st party congress in June 1976.

48. Quoted by Kohler op. cit., p. 134.

49. The emergence of a fiercely anti-KKE Extreme Left in the post-1974 period is another development within the Greek Left. The Revolutionary Communist Party of Greece, EKKE, is perhaps the most significant among a number of small, mostly Maoist, groups. Its influence is nevertheless limited particularly to University students; its performance in the 1974 and 1977 elections was very poor (it polled 0.03 per cent and 0.23 per cent respectively). Ibid, pp. 136 and 163. It is because of its very limited appeal to the electorate that it is not included in our analysis.

50. For a brief reference to some of the most significant views, see Clogg, Parties...op. cit., p. 122-123.

51. A. ELEPHANTIS: "PASOK and the elections of 1977: The Rise of the Populist Movement", in Penniman op. cit., p. 128.

52. M. SPOURDALAKIS: PASOK, Structure, Intra-party Crises, and Concentration of Power (in Greek), Exandas, Athens 1988, chapter 2.

53. Clogg 1987, op. cit., p. 149.

54. J.C LOULIS: "New Democracy: The New Face of Conservatism",

in Penniman op. cit.

55. "The Ideological Principles of New Democracy", in KATHIMERINI, 12.7.1975.

56. Ibid

57. Ibid.

58. Loulis, op. cit., p. 59.

59. Kohler, op. cit., p. 113.

60. Clogg, Parties...op. cit., p. 64

61. Kohler op. cit., p. 115.

62. Clogg, Parties...op. cit., p. 158-159.

63. Kohler, op. cit.; Mouzelis, on the other hand, suggests that discontent for the government's economic measures, was expressed in the increase of support for ND hardliners and a respective decrease of votes for the party's moderate candidates. See N. MOUZELIS: "On the Greek Elections", New Left Review, No 108, March-April 1978, p. 115.

64. Loulis op. cit., p. 78.

65. Mouzelis, op. cit.

66. According to the social categorization of the survey, PASOK's support within the Upper middle and middle classes, was 28.4 per cent, in the lower middle class 26.9, in the skilled working class 25.8 and in the semiskilled or unskilled working class 31.9 per cent. Loulis op. cit., p. 76.

67. In June 1977, PASOK's membership had reached the 27,000, while that of ND was around 20,000. Loulis ibid, p. 72; also, Clogg, Parties...op. cit., p. 160.

68. For the strategies of the communist parties, see Papayannakis, op. cit., p. 154-156.

69. For a critical view of the Centre Union's strategy after 1974, see: Th. VEREMIS: "The Union of the Democratic Center", in Penniman op. cit., p. 89-104; and K. KALLIGAS: "The Centre: Decline and Convergence", in K. FEATHERSTONE and D.K. KATSOUDAS (eds): Political Change in Greece, Croom Helm, London 1987.

70. G. SARTORI: Parties and Party Systems: A framework for Analysis, Cambridge University Press 1976, chapters 6 and 7. For an overall review of the post-1974 party system see also,

G. MAVROGORDATOS: "The Emerging Party System", in Clogg, Greece in the 1980s, op. cit.

71. Clogg, Parties...op. cit., p. 242.

72. P.E.DIMITRAS: "Change in Public Attitudes", in Featherstone and Katsoudas op. cit., p. 76.

73. Of those between 20-24 only 8.6 per cent were found to have voted for ND and of those between 25-35 30.2 per cent did so. In the same groups PASOK's share of the vote was 45.7 and 42.1 per cent respectively. Loulis, op. cit., p. 76.

74. The Ideological Principles of New Democracy, in KATHIMERINI, 12.7.1975.

75. See Karamanlis's speech at the Chalkidiki Congress, KATHIMERINI, 6-7.5.1979.

76. The Ideological Principles, op. cit.

77. For Karamanlis's foreign policy, see Th. COULOUMBIS: "Defining Greek Foreign Policy Objectives", in Penniman op. cit.

78. According to Loulis, op. cit., p. 71, by the time of the congress, ND had set up 51 regional and 233 local organizations. According to another estimate, the party had 380 local, 25 occupational and 220 youth organizations. ND 1974-1987: The foetus that became a giant and the "challenge of politics", in ANTI, no 357, 9.10.1987.

79. For a critique of ND'S ideological platform, see the articles of two writers close to the party: Loulis *ibid* and D.K.KATSODAS: "The Conservative Movement", in Featherstone and Katsoudas, op. cit.

80. By catch-all strategy, we mean here the abandonment of an ideological framework that appeals to a specific class in favour of a strategy that can attract the electoral support of all social classes. See O. KIRCHHEIMER: "The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems", in J. LAPALOMBARA and M. WEINER (eds): Political Parties and Political Development Princeton University Press 1966. Karamanlis himself had repeatedly stated that ND was a party which transcended social classes and organized interests (see for instance his speech at

the 1979 congress, op. cit.); he also avoided to use the term 'conservative' because of its negative connotations in Greek.

81. Loulis op. cit., p. 72.

82. By the time of the Chalkidiki congress party membership was estimated at 100,000 or about 4.65 per cent of the party's 1977 electoral strength. See Clogg, *Parties...* op. cit., p. 160 and ANTI, op. cit. Loulis on the other hand, suggests that this number of people were mobilized only for the purposes of the congress and that in practice the number of active members was much smaller; Ibid p. 80.

83. Loulis *ibid*, p. 73.

84. For an analysis of clientelism in Greece, see K.R. LEGG: Politics in Modern Greece, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California 1969. Also, see K. TSOUKALAS: "About the Problem of Political Patronage in 19th century Greece" , and N. MOUZELIS: "Class Structure and the System of Political Patronage: the case of Greece" (both in Greek), in *Social and Political Forces in Greece*, op. cit. See also, Ch. LYRINTZIS: "Political Parties in Post-junta Greece: A case of Bureaucratic Clientelism?", in *West European Politics* 1984, no 7, p. 99-118.

85. Loulis op. cit., p. 80.

86. Clogg, *Parties...* op. cit., p. 159.

87. Clogg *ibid*, p. 162 and Kohler op. cit., p. 121.

88. For instance, the expulsion of maverick deputy I. Savvouras, in 1976. See Clogg *ibid*, p. 160.

89. *ibid*, p. 161.

90. *ibid*, p. 163-164.

91. For details about ND after 1981 see Katsoudas op. cit., p. 100-105 and Clogg, *Parties...* op. cit., p. 165-169.

92. Loulis op. cit. p. 65.

93. See in the Spanish case the agreements known as 'Pactos de la Moncloa', in Maraval, op. cit, chapter 3.

94. S. KARAGIORGAS and Th. PAKOS: "Social and Economic Inequalities", in Greece in Evolution, Greek translation of the French journal 'LES TEMPS MODERNES', No. 473, Exandas, Athens 1986.

95. Loulis op. cit., p. 66.
96. See ND's brochure "The Truth to the People" (in Greek) published for the electoral campaign of 1981.
97. K. TSOUKALAS: State, Society, Employment (in Greek), Themelio, Athens 1986, p. 89.
98. See Karamanlis's speech at the Chalkidiki Congress, op. cit. and Clogg, Parties...op. cit., p. 157.
99. Account of a ND Minister, quoted by Clogg ibid, p. 157.
100. G. MAVROGORDATOS: Between Pityokampes and Prokroustes, The professional Organizations in Greece (in Greek), Odysseas, Athens 1988, p. 137; Spourdalakis op. cit., p. 222; R. FAKIOLAS: "Interest Groups: An overview", in Featherstone and Katsoudas, op. cit., p. 183.
101. See Karagiorgas and Pakos, op. cit., p. 273.
102. Mavrogordatos op. cit., p. 148.
103. For a synoptic analysis of post-war economic development, see T. GIANNITSIS: "Greece: Industrialization in Crisis", in, Greece in Evolution op. cit. and K. VERGOPOULOS: The de-development today? An essay for the dynamics of stagnation in Southern Europe (in Greek) Exandas, Athens 1986, especially p. 197-203.
104. Loulis op. cit., p. 65.
105. Mavrogordatos op. cit., p. 49.
106. See G. KRAVARITOU-MANITAKI: "The Labour Relations in Greece", in, Greece in Evolution op. cit.; also, Kohler, op. cit., p. 136-142.
107. Particularly crucial for the manipulation of unions has been their vital dependence on the state-run organization Ergatiki Estia (Workers Hearth) for their finances. A concise account of the post-war labour policy is offered by G. CATEPHORES and Z. TZANNATOS: "Trade Unions in Greece: 1949-81 and 1981-83", in Z. TZANNATOS (ed) Socialism in Greece, Gower, London 1986, especially p. 130-137; also, Mavrogordatos op. cit., p. 90-136.
108. Catephores and Tzannatos ibid, p. 136.
109. Kravaritou-Manitaki, op. cit., pp. 294-8.



110. Catephores and Tzannatos op. cit., p. 136-137.
111. Mavrogordatos op. cit., p. 116.
112. Clogg, Parties...op. cit., p. 157.
113. Speech of G.A. Mangakis at the conference 'For the Quality of our Democracy', published by Kastaniotis, Athens 1983.
114. Z. TZANNATOS: "Socialism in Greece: Past and Present", in Socialism in Greece, op. cit., p. 18. Also, TA NEA, 9.9.1981.
115. KKE-es acting according to its policy for National Antidictatorial Democratic Unity, the well known EADE, proposed and attempted the co-operation with the other political forces including the Right on many occasions, especially in the trade union movement.
116. See Vergopoulos op. cit., pp. 197-203 and Giannitsis op. cit., p. 250.
117. Spourdalakis op. cit., p. 273.
118. Vergopoulos op. cit., p. 97.
119. Mavrogordatos op. cit., p. 128.
120. Ibid, p. 130.
121. It is of course questionable whether the social forces were ready for a policy of accommodation. Both employers and trade unions adopted after 1974 a defensive stance towards the policies of the government, the former seeking the return to the pre-1974 privileges and the latter a stance of anti-Right radicalism which was not based on any positive policy proposal. Certainly, however, the authoritarian framework within which industrial relations developed under ND did not encourage any tendency of reconciliation.

## **CHAPTER 6**

### **BROADCASTING IN THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION: 1974-1981.**

#### **6.1 Introduction**

At the time of the military junta's downfall television had already acquired a central position in the life of Greeks, especially as a medium of entertainment. The transition to democracy appeared to open up new opportunities for the development of broadcasting into a medium of culture and pluralistic information. Amid the euphoria generated by the collapse of the dictatorship and the electoral victory of New Democracy in the 1974 general elections, Karamanlis and the party's liberal cadres pursued a policy of modernization and democratization of the Greek broadcasting organizations. Yet, notwithstanding their initial ambitious plans for a thorough reform of broadcasting institutions, the Conservatives made little effort to break with the long-standing tradition of partisan political control of radio and television. In this chapter we will concentrate on the organization and operation of broadcasting institutions under Conservative rule and evaluate their contribution to the general process of political communication in the first seven years of the transition.

#### **6.2 New Democracy and the politics of the press**

Before we embark on an analysis of broadcasting under New Democracy (ND), it is first of all necessary to make a brief reference to developments in the sphere of the press after the

dictatorship. Such a reference will provide a more complete picture of ND's media policy and of the overall structure of political communication in Greece during the period of the democratic transition.

The establishment of democratic institutions and the consequent change in the ideological climate were clearly reflected in the operation of the press in the first weeks of the transition. With the legalization of the Communist party in September 1974, Rizospastis, the official organ of the KKE, emerged from underground as a morning paper for the first time since the party had been outlawed in 1947. After its re-emergence the paper followed the policy of the KKE and its line was clearly doctrinaire, aiming mostly at attracting party supporters rather than a wider reading public.

Avgi, which until 1967 had been published as the morning paper of EDA, re-appeared too, now as the official organ of the KKE-es. An effort was made, nevertheless, for the paper to adopt a broader political outlook in order to attract readers from the broader Left, albeit without success. Eventually, the paper followed the political fortunes of the party and its daily readership declined threefold within five years.

Of the other papers which had closed down during the dictatorship, Athinaiki and Vradyni re-opened in the very first days of democracy. Both papers attempted to capitalize on their credentials of opposition against the junta, but the re-launch of Athinaiki proved unsuccessful and the paper folded within the following two years<sup>1</sup>. Vradyni was rewarded for its stance against the dictatorship with the highest circulation in 1974 (a record of 217,764 copies), but after that its circulation started to decline and dropped to less than a quarter of the 1974 peak level. A possible reason for this decline was that Vradyni identified so closely with ND to the extent that it

became the mouthpiece of the party and its leader, thus alienating a large part of its Centrist readers<sup>2</sup>.

Vlachou re-entered press publishing with the traditional paper of the Vlachos family, Kathimerini, which was re-modelled on the London Times. Although conservative in its general outlook, the paper followed an independent editorial line, ostensibly aiming at attracting readers who did not belong to the traditional Right. Nevertheless, although it established a reputation as the most prestigious paper in the country, Kathimerini had only limited appeal to the public; between 1974 and 1980 its daily circulation dropped by over 50 per cent. Due to these financial straits Vlachou was unable to re-open her afternoon paper Messimvrini which had been a publishing success of the 1960s<sup>3</sup>. Eventually the title was sold to a book publisher in 1979 and Messimvrini re-appeared in January 1980 as a centre-right paper, never to approach the circulation of the pre-1967 era.

Another two papers which closed down after the coup did not re-appear at all. These were Dimokratiki Allaghi EDA's afternoon paper and the Centrist Eleftheria. The publisher of the latter, P. Kokkas, had died in 1973 and subsequent plans by his family to re-open the paper did not materialize. Finally Ethnos, which had been forced to close down in 1971, did not re-appear until seven years after the collapse of the junta, as the first tabloid and colour paper under a new proprietor.

Of the papers which had continued to circulate throughout the dictatorship, the morning Acropolis and the afternoon Apogevmatini owned by the Botsis brothers, which had supported Papadopoulos's liberalizing strategy in 1973, maintained their right-wing line, after the fall of the dictatorship. Despite the competition that they faced from the restored publications, both papers retained a large share of the market and Apogevmatini in particular, with its sensationalist

reporting, continued to have by far the largest circulation of all right-wing papers.

To Vima and Ta Nea, respectively the morning and evening publications of the Lambrakis group, benefited considerably from the establishment of democracy. Ta Nea reached and even exceeded the daily circulation of the pre-dictatorial period, while To Vima saw its circulation increase substantially in the first years of the transition, although in general terms it experienced like the rest of the morning papers an overall decline. Having closely identified with the traditional Centre until 1967, both papers had to broaden their outlook gradually after 1974 due to the fluidity within the Centre and the rapid advance of PASOK. After 1975 they had also to face the competition of a new afternoon paper, Eleftherotypia (Free Press) which aimed at appealing to the widely radicalized segments of the population; Eleftherotypia actually achieved the second largest circulation of the opposition papers and the third largest of all papers after Ta Nea and Apogevmatini.

Finally, the pro-junta papers Estia and particularly Eleftheros Kosmos turned their support to the extreme Right and campaigned for the restoration of the monarchy and the granting of an amnesty to the dictators. Despite the relative electoral success of EP in 1977, however, the papers' circulation declined steadily and Eleftheros Kosmos finally closed down in 1982<sup>4</sup>. Despite their close association with the junta, neither paper faced any purge. Early in 1975 the Union of Journalists of the Athenian Dailies (ESIEA) issued a petition in which journalists requested that those publishers found guilty of collaboration with the dictatorship be punished and lose the right to publish for five years. The issue was discussed in Parliament and the opposition ardently supported the idea. No legal action was taken, however, as the government evoked an absence of specific legislation under which offenders could be prosecuted<sup>5</sup>. Moreover, as the Undersecretary for the Press

suggested, under the existing legislation the prosecution of a paper for its political ideas could be considered as a violation of the freedom of the press: "Unfortunately democracy (...) has the luxury of allowing even the fascists to talk"<sup>6</sup>.

In general terms, the press was completely unfettered after 1974. The laws of the dictatorship limiting the freedom of the press were abolished<sup>7</sup>, while the new Constitution explicitly banned press censorship<sup>8</sup>. Moreover, Karamanlis' increased concern on matters pertaining to media policy was reflected in the appointment to the post of Undersecretary responsible for the Press and Information of the journalist P. Lambrias, a moderate Conservative who had been the editor of Messimvrini until 1967. One of Karamanlis' closest friends, Lambrias had been actively involved abroad in the campaign against the dictatorship. As the Prime Minister's personal advisor, he had also contributed decisively to the formulation of ND's ideological principles and modernization strategy<sup>9</sup>. Karamanlis also established for the first time the post of Government spokesman, whose task was to inform reporters on a daily basis about the progress of government work<sup>10</sup>. This post was occupied by Lambrias too.

In 1975 Lambrias prepared a draft for a radical reform of press law. Among other things, his proposals included a code of professional practice for journalists, a Press Council copied on the British model and the establishment of the 'legal claim' of the press to information from the government<sup>11</sup>. There was nevertheless opposition to the draft from both journalists and publishers' associations and Lambrias decided not to submit it to Parliament until an agreement was reached<sup>12</sup>. After Lambrias' defeat in the 1977 elections and his subsequent departure from the government, the draft was finally shelved. The attempts at press law reform were finally abandoned after a second draft produced by the new Undersecretary A. Tsaldaris, who had eliminated all innovations from the initial proposal, also met

with adverse reactions, particularly from the journalists' unions<sup>13</sup>.

Ever since the downfall of the dictatorship, journalists had maintained a defensive stance against the idea of a press law, regarding it as an attempt by the state to restrict their professional freedom. ESIEA argued that journalistic practice should be governed solely by the laws which apply to the community as a whole. Even a code detailing the fundamental principles of professional practice was treated with scepticism<sup>14</sup>. Moreover, major problems such as lack of access to accurate official information, although acknowledged by union representatives<sup>15</sup>, did not become a subject of union proposals or pressure. Instead, throughout the 1970s journalists' unions devoted their activities and militancy to the improvement of their members' welfare<sup>16</sup>.

Press-state relations expand beyond the definition of the legal framework within which newspapers have to operate. In Greece newspapers depend also largely on the state for their economic survival. By 1981, ND had allocated 1.6 billion drachmas to newspapers, most of which faced an aggravating economic crisis. Soaring production costs, a loss of advertising to the rapidly growing television networks and a declining readership were the main reasons for the papers' mounting debts<sup>17</sup>. Apart from state-controlled loans, financial support from successive post-war governments has included: the allocation of advertising from state and state-run organizations to the papers; tax concessions; and other privileges such as duty-free newsprint and technical equipment<sup>18</sup>. Loans and other concessions to publishers were not arranged collectively; instead, they were based on bi-partite agreements between individual publishers and the government. Moreover, available evidence suggests that there was preferential treatment for some Conservative newspapers by the ND governments, and particularly for Vradyni which belonged to

a personal friend of Karamanlis. There were also tax concessions to journalists and, what was more important, after the fall of the dictatorship an ever increasing number of journalists were offered parallel employment in the state and state-run organizations (for instance, in broadcasting or in various press and public relations offices) mainly on a clientelistic basis<sup>19</sup>. Journalists have often claimed that the centrality of the state for the economic welfare of both newspapers and individual journalists has been a constraint on the freedom of the press and its ability to function as a 'fourth estate'<sup>20</sup>.

Yet, although this might be the case, the impact of state subsidies on the newspapers' overall policy has not been easy to define. There has been no systematic research either academic or by an ad hoc commission of inquiry on the distribution of power within the Greek press. Who makes the selection of stories, who confers legitimacy to this or that government, policy or political organization and by what criteria, are questions which have yet to be answered. What can be said is that the press has been more free to operate than ever before in the post-war period. There has been no persecution since 1974 of any paper or of its readers on ideological grounds; on the contrary, the expression in the press of different political views, at least those which have been represented in Parliament, has been seen by successive governments as an essential prerequisite of democracy. Moreover, state loans and other subsidies, even in those cases where they have been used as 'carrots' for the press of the opposition, have contributed to the survival of weak papers like Avgi and thus to the preservation of a plurality of opinion. On the other hand, the persistence of serious problems such as the limited access to official information and the absence of a broadly accepted code of professional practice have affected the overall performance and credibility of the press.



### **6.3 EIRT in transition: the plans for reform and the reports of foreign experts**

The collapse of the dictatorship marked the end of military control over EIRT. In August 1974, the provisional government under Karamanlis appointed new management to the Institute, headed by a personal friend of the Prime Minister, actor D. Horn, as Director General and P. Bakoyiannis, a journalist of liberal persuasion, as his deputy. For reasons that were never officially explained the purge that took place was confined to the upper echelons of the administration and the key area of news and current affairs; it did not expand to all parts of the hierarchy. Thus, out of a total of 1,500 staff, only 45 people were removed from the senior administrative posts and the news and current affairs department<sup>21</sup>.

The establishment of democracy found EIRT on the verge of collapse, overburdened as it was by massive debts accumulated through the extravagant expenditure on the Institute's new headquarters. There was also a huge bureaucracy, which in Bakoyiannis's view was completely incompatible with the function and needs of a broadcasting organization<sup>22</sup>. For Lambrias, who as Undersecretary for the Press was also responsible for broadcasting, a complete reorganization of the EIRT was necessary if radio and television were to become really cultural media in a democratic society<sup>23</sup>.

#### **6.3.1 The report of Sir Hugh Greene**

In drawing up plans for EIRT's reorganization, Lambrias requested the assistance of the former Director General of the BBC, Sir Hugh Greene. As became apparent from the post-junta parliamentary debates on radio and television, the British model was considered by Greek politicians as the archetype of

democratic broadcasting. Characteristically, Lambrias told Parliament that Hugh Greene had been chosen because he was "the most successful director general of the most successful radio and television organization in the world"<sup>24</sup>. There was another, more personal reason behind Lambrias's decision: Greene, who was also an old friend of the Undersecretary, had been actively involved in the campaign against the dictatorship and because of this had been highly appreciated by Greek politicians. His visit was thus greeted with enthusiasm by the parties of the opposition and particularly EK-ND which hoped that Hugh Greene would instil some of his 'liberal democratic spirit' into the Greek broadcasting organization<sup>25</sup>.

In his report submitted to Lambrias in January 1975, Greene suggested that instead of a reform, Greek broadcasting organizations should undergo a 'radical change'. The main problems of EIRT that he underlined in his report were the huge and sluggish bureaucracy, the total dependence of the Institute's management on the Ministry of Finance for the approval of every item of expenditure, the absence of an efficient organizational structure and the lack of modern equipment and of trained personnel, especially in the sphere of programme production. The most important problem according to the report was that EIRT operated as part of the state machine and according to the regulations of the civil service: "the civil service mentality and the creative outlook on which good broadcasting depends are like oil and water", he remarked. "Promising men and women will never be attracted to a broadcast system which strangles initiative with civil service regulations"<sup>26</sup>. More specifically Sir Hugh Greene made the following proposals:

- The transformation of EIRT into a corporation functioning under private law with the state as its sole shareholder. The new organization should be empowered to hire and dismiss personnel and to set its own salaries according to its own

rules, without any reference to civil service regulations or any government interference;

- of the 770 civil servants, whose presence contributed to the bureaucratic congestion of the administrative services, those considered as redundant should be transferred to other government departments.

- an administrative structure, which was modelled on that of the BBC and which was to consist of: i) a Board of Governors with six members, appointed by the President of the Republic or the Prime Minister following consultations with the leader of the official opposition. The members of the board should be chosen for their personal achievements within society and should not be representatives of political parties, ministries or any other organization. The board was to deal with overall programming, administrative and economic policy. ii) a Director General who was to run the day-to-day affairs of the organization. The director was to be appointed and dismissed solely by the board. iii) an Advisory Body representative of the nation politically, socially and geographically, whose main aim would be to bring to the broadcasting organization the views of the audience at large. In particular, it should deal with programming and the preservation of political objectivity and impartiality<sup>27</sup>.

- the separate existence of YENED should be brought to an end and a unified national broadcasting service should come into being by the end of 1976.

- on programming, which Hugh Greene found to be of very low cultural and intellectual standards, steps should be taken urgently towards the increase of EIRT's own programme production. For this purpose the Institute's facilities should be increased and a programme of training, especially for programme and technical staff, should be urgently undertaken<sup>28</sup>.

Apart from the above proposals, Hugh Greene also suggested to Lambrias that he should seek the assistance of another two

British specialists, the deputy editor of BBC news Alan Protheroe and Joanna Spicer, an expert on organizational matters, to make more specific recommendations on the reform of EIRT's news department and of the television service respectively. Both Protheroe and Spicer submitted their reports to the Undersecretary in April 1975. Together with those of the Greene report, their findings constitute the best illustration of the problems that Greek broadcasting was facing at that time.

### 6.3.2 The Spicer report

As Spicer wrote in the introduction to her report to Lambrias, her aim was to "suggest how the output, organization and operation of EIRT could be developed on the basis and in the spirit of Sir Hugh Greene's report"<sup>29</sup>. According to her observations, EIRT completely lacked the organizational structure that was necessary for the development of television output. There was no managerial staff responsible for different sectors of programme production below the Deputy Director General in his television capacity and the Television Programme Director. Moreover, there was a lack of knowledge, of trained staff and of the facilities necessary for large-scale television production. Even existing facilities and staff were under-used. Under these circumstances, EIRT programme production was confined to News and Current Affairs and to minor talk shows, while the bulk of Greek material was supplied by independent production companies to which EIRT granted long-term contracts. According to Spicer's own estimate<sup>30</sup> the comparison between EIRT-made programmes and external production in the entire Greek produced material transmitted weekly was as follows:

EIRT:	54%
External:	46%

Excluding EIRT News and Current Affairs, the comparison was even worse:

EIRT:	32.3%
External:	67.7%

It was Spicer's view, however, that not even the external producers had any particular experience of television production<sup>31</sup>.

Additionally, EIRT relied heavily on foreign material which accounted for 41 per cent of the entire weekly output. In general terms, EIRT output was particularly low in quality and limited in variety:

"There are many programme formats not yet represented in EIRT schedules. No feature programmes using outside broadcast cameras have been developed (...) and there is as yet a limited development of serious music productions. There are a number of programmes which are not visual in character (...) the programmes for children (...) are all foreign and nearly all of trivial standard below EIRT guidelines acceptance"<sup>32</sup>.

There were no rules to guide the organization's policy on commercials. On many occasions there was a readiness to 'chop up' a programme before it was due to finish in order to add advertisements which had arrived on the day of the transmission. Also, advertising agencies were able to specify the exact placing of a commercial in the daily programme schedule. All in all, according to Spicer, EIRT's programme output fell far short of the standards required from a public service broadcaster<sup>33</sup>.

The main step that EIRT should take in the direction of public service television, she argued, was to become "a programme producing organization no longer using external companies and foreign purchases for the greater part of its transmission and all major programmes in peak hours"<sup>34</sup>. To this end, Spicer recommended the organization of a programme

structure which was to build up expertise in the creation and selection of programmes. Such a structure would consist of programme 'heads' to specialize in different programme categories<sup>35</sup>. Training should be also provided for them at the BBC and elsewhere.

In terms of facilities for programme production, the building of another two large studios was necessary. Moreover, there should be a review and renovation of technical equipment. Furthermore, investment should be transferred from the work of external production companies to the development and increase of work within the organization. Finally, there should be a review of the policy of foreign purchases. EIRT should seek a reduction in the quantity of foreign material in its schedules and at the same time a more critical selection should be made, leading to better quality. Also, EIRT should tighten its advertising regulations and seek their enforcement on every occasion.

In Spicer's view, these steps and in particular the organization of a programme structure should and could take place until the end of 1975. For, as she explained:

"The decision to create an independent National Broadcasting Service is needed urgently: but new legislation necessarily requires debate and preparatory time. It is my belief that actions can be taken now in some areas by the Director General and the Board of Governors which will be conducive to a new situation and a gain in themselves (...) If some steps can be taken in the next few weeks, it is possible to expect a fresh impetus in television in Autumn 1975"<sup>36</sup>.

### 6.3.3 The Protheroe report

Commenting on EIRT news, Alan Protheroe did not hesitate to suggest that " EIRT transmitted some of the worst broadcast news" that he had seen and that the news department was in a state of chaos with regard to technical standards and

professional specialization<sup>37</sup>. Many years later, Protheroe referred to the EIRT news department as a "teddy bear with its stuffing taken out". There was no permanent head, nor permanent journalists and reporters. The news operation depended almost entirely on people who were coming in after a day's work in the daily press and for whom work on television was only a secondary job.

Neither was there any permanent technical staff with any experience in the production of television news. Technicians, such as cameramen for instance, were transferred from the preparation of other programmes to help with the transmission of news<sup>38</sup>. The news department also lacked a budget specifically designed to meet its needs and was suffering from a bureaucratic organization which put further constraints on its operation.

News programmes consisted mainly of an announcer reading the news to the camera; there was a lot of speech and very little visual material. There was an excessive dose of political news with most emphasis placed on the activities of the government. "What are the Greeks doing and saying? Where are the industrial developments, the accidents, (...) the successes, the human stories of the people"<sup>39</sup>. Moreover, the news covered events which were taking place almost solely within the area of Athens: "Greece expands beyond Syntagma square, but this is not apparent in the bulletins"<sup>40</sup>.

As remedies, Protheroe recommended the following:

- the news department should acquire its own permanent staff, a total of 56 people of whom 22 should be journalists. Those chosen to work in the production of news and current affairs should have special training, possibly in another country, to reach the high standards required for such work.
- additionally, the news department should acquire its own technical equipment and its own budget. It should also move

from the main building of Aghia Paraskevi to the centre of Athens in order to facilitate access and speedy reaction to events, particularly political ones.

- there should also be more extensive coverage of events taking place outside Athens and this could be achieved through the development of a network of reporters situated in different parts of the country. Finally, there should be greater variety of news stories which should be reported with accuracy and impartiality<sup>41</sup>.

In the same spirit the three British experts pointed to the problems that the forty year-long authoritarian political practice and the absence of a specific philosophy on the role of broadcasting had created and made recommendations for the modernization of the radio and television services. Yet the implementation of their proposals presupposed a re-definition of the role of broadcasting in a democratic society. In the following sections we shall examine the impact of the three reports on the developments that took place within Greek broadcasting in the first period of the transition and evaluate these developments in the light of the recommendations.

#### **6.4 The post-dictatorial legal framework for broadcasting.**

##### **6.4.1 The provisions of the Constitution of 1975**

The abuse of radio and particularly of television by the dictators led after 1974 to an increased concern among politicians about the definition of the principles which should guide the operation of broadcasting in a democratic society and the need to enshrine these principles in the new Constitution. Under the Constitution of 1952 broadcasting was mentioned only in a negative sense, as an exception from the clauses which protected the press against censorship and any other



restrictive measures imposed by the state<sup>42</sup>. Underlying this provision was the rapid expansion of radio and the belief that the new medium could exert enormous influence upon audiences<sup>43</sup>. State control was seen therefore as the only effective safeguard for the responsible operation of broadcasting, although the social obligation of radio, and later also of television, that the state was supposed to safeguard was never explicitly defined.

The same mentality was reflected in the draft of the new Constitution that the ND government submitted to the Assembly in 1975. Clause 15, paragraph 1, of the constitutional draft was only a repetition of the 1952 provision with the addition of television to the media which were excluded from the protective measures provided for the press. A second paragraph containing a positive provision for broadcasting was for the first time proposed by the opposition, namely EK-ND, PASOK, EDA and KKE-es. There were two main components to this proposal: first, radio and television should abide by the principles of objectivity and impartiality; secondly, broadcasting should be subject to the control of the state as the guarantor of the application of these principles. It is worth noting that the parties of the opposition also proposed the establishment by the Constitution of the state monopoly of broadcasting which, nevertheless, was not accepted by the government<sup>44</sup>.

The ND government, however, did respond to the opposition's proposal by adding a second paragraph to Article 15. According to the new provision, the objective of broadcasting was to provide information and news as well as works of literature and art, based on the principles of impartiality and objectivity. In order to fulfil this purpose radio and television were placed under 'immediate state control'<sup>45</sup>. Thus, by common agreement of the government and the opposition, the Constitution of 1975 defined for the first time the social mission and the character of Greek broadcasting as a public

service<sup>46</sup>. State control of broadcasting was unanimously acknowledged as the only safeguard of objectivity and impartiality in programming. There was, however, a broad disagreement between the ND government and the parties of the opposition as to the general framework within which this control was to be organized. The opposition demanded the establishment by the Constitution of mechanisms which would guarantee the implementation of the above principles. Among other things, they proposed the participation of representatives of all parties in Parliament in the administrative bodies of the broadcasting organizations and the explicit banning of government control over them<sup>47</sup>. According to the government's view, however, once the Constitution had established the main obligations of broadcasting, the details of the organization of state control could be defined by a common law<sup>48</sup>. As a distinguished lawyer commented, "it was obvious that the governing majority of the time did not want to bound itself with a provision which would deprive it of control of the most important medium it had at its disposal in order to elicit the tolerance or even the consent of the masses"<sup>49</sup>. The ensuing analysis of the 1975 law for broadcasting will provide a better understanding of the government's intentions and its view of the role that radio and television should perform in the period of transition.

#### 6.4.2 Law 230/1975

By the end of 1975, the ND government had put forward the new bill for broadcasting which was to replace the existing legislation for EIRT. Following Hugh Greene's recommendation, the government planned the transformation of the EIRT into a public limited company which would allow it to operate with more fiscal flexibility and independence. The preparation of a first draft of the bill was entrusted to lawyer D. Synadinos who had had long experience in the organization of public

administration. Synadinos, who followed the law on public limited companies, submitted his proposal to a committee whose main members were the Undersecretary P. Lambrias and lawyer G. Oikonomopoulos. The latter had been a member of the junta-appointed committee for the drafting of the Constitution of 1968 and was to become the first Chairman of the new broadcasting company's Board of Governors<sup>50</sup>. However, Synadinos was not allowed to present his proposal before the committee, which made extensive changes to the initial draft, particularly to those parts dealing with the composition and appointment of the new organization's administrative bodies. A major example was the appointment of the Director General by the government rather than by the Board of Governors as Synadinos had proposed<sup>51</sup>. Apparently the draft was reviewed so that it could guarantee greater government control over the future broadcasting organization.

Implemented in December 1975, Law 230 transformed EIRT into a public limited company, Hellenic Radio and Television (ERT). The new Corporation had the state as its sole shareholder and was to operate under the rules of private enterprises with 'financial and administrative autonomy' and with the aim of serving the 'public interest'<sup>52</sup>. The law re-affirmed the state monopoly of broadcasting which was to be enjoyed jointly by ERT and YENED, until the two networks merged into a unitary organization<sup>53</sup>. The principle of the state monopoly was accepted by all sides in Parliament as the only form of ownership which would safeguard the social role of broadcasting as it was prescribed in the Constitution. No other forms of broadcasting - such as community radio or stations run by social groups - were proposed. On the contrary, all the parties unanimously agreed to include a provision for the prosecution of pirate radios which had proliferated after the collapse of the dictatorship<sup>54</sup>.

In general terms the new broadcasting law did follow the broad outlines of Hugh Greene's proposal, but it failed to incorporate its liberal spirit. Thus, ERT was placed under the direct supervision of the Minister to the Prime Minister who was empowered to transfer his competences on broadcasting to the Undersecretary for the Press and Information<sup>55</sup>. In effect, the Minister's control over the ERT consisted of extensive powers on financial and organizational matters such as the Corporation's annual budget, balance sheets, investment programmes, salary increases, organizational questions and internal regulations. The Minister's powers therefore limited the financial and administrative independence and flexibility that ERT should have enjoyed as an enterprise operating under private law. What was more important, the Minister, or the Undersecretary, could influence programme content, as he was empowered by the law to ban any programme or part of it 'in extreme cases' without having to justify his decision<sup>56</sup>. The law also established an obligation for the ERT to transmit announcements of the government whenever this was requested by the Minister<sup>57</sup>.

Beyond the Minister's extensive competences, the new law reproduced the government's firm control over all key appointments in the ERT. Thus the seven members of the Board of Governors were to be appointed by the government at its sole discretion, with no other criteria than their 'well-established reputation'. Moreover, although the duration of their office was to be three years, they could be dismissed before the end of their term if the government considered it necessary. The Board of Governors was not even empowered to elect its chairman and vice chairman who were also to be nominated by the government<sup>58</sup>.

The main executive organs of the Corporation, the Director General and his two deputies - one responsible for programming and the other for administration - were also to be appointed by

the government (and not by the Board, as Hugh Greene and Synadinos had proposed) for a three-year term. Like the members of the Board of Governors, they could be dismissed by the government before their term of office was due to end, while the terms of their contracts were to be subject to the approval of the Minister to the Prime Minister<sup>59</sup>.

Finally, the General Assembly that was established by the new law was a far cry from the highly representative body that Hugh Greene had proposed. It was to consist of 20 (not 50) members, fourteen of whom were appointed 'ex officio'<sup>60</sup>. From the remaining six, who should not be MPs, three were to be nominated by the Prime Minister and three by the leader of the official opposition<sup>61</sup>. Explaining its composition to Parliament, Lambrias suggested that the legislation on limited companies provided for an assembly of shareholders; since in the case of the ERT the only shareholder was the state, the General Assembly was to be composed of 'those who represent the state'<sup>62</sup>. In practice the General Assembly would not be the active body serving as a channel of communication between ERT and the public as Greene had proposed (six meetings a year, wide publicity). Nor was it the 'dominant and supreme organ' of the corporation that Lambrias had suggested<sup>63</sup>. Its role was mainly advisory rather than supervisory, with a concern for financial and administrative matters as well as programming<sup>64</sup>.

To summarize, the new statute was only a marginal improvement on the previous legislation of the EIRT, since the government's control of broadcasting continued to be tight. In effect, the government's practice vis-a-vis broadcasting from the first year of transition left little doubt about its real view of radio and television. The first Director General, D. Horn, and his deputy P. Bakoyiannis, had resigned shortly after the 1974 general election blaming government intervention in their policies and a general authoritarian outlook with regard to broadcasting<sup>65</sup>. Moreover, by the time the bill was introdu-

ced in Parliament for discussion in November 1975, the second Director General, A. Vlachos, his deputy, A. Solomos and the Chairman of EIRT's Board of Governors were also preparing their resignations for the same reasons as their predecessors.

Incidents of censorship had been reported by the press<sup>66</sup>, while the constant exclusion of the opposition from news and current affairs had generated a lot of discontent and criticism among politicians<sup>67</sup>. At the beginning of November, the press had published for the first time Alan Protheroe's report on EIRT's news service which gave the opportunity even to Conservative papers to attack the government for its authoritarian mentality and practice<sup>68</sup>. In view of this state of affairs, the government's assurances that the new law was intended to turn EIRT into an 'instrument of objectivity and impartiality'<sup>69</sup> could hardly convince the other political parties who grasped the opportunity of the debate to stage an attack against the government's authoritarianism vis-a-vis broadcasting<sup>70</sup>. The opposition rejected the bill as perpetuating one-party control over the broadcasting media and as vesting the responsible minister with 'the power to exercise preventive censorship on programming'<sup>71</sup>. Not surprisingly the issue of objectivity and impartiality dominated the parliamentary debate. The opposition made various proposals seeking to minimize the government's control over appointments and to secure a broader political and social representation in the administrative bodies of the new organization<sup>72</sup>. It is remarkable, however, that no party of the opposition presented any concrete and coherent proposal for an overall reform of the broadcasting system; rather, the opposition's criticism and proposals centred on political broadcasting and the need for a balanced coverage of all political activities.

The parliamentary debate revealed a lack of any serious consideration among politicians about the social and political role that broadcasting could perform in a democracy. If for the

government radio and television were the official organs of the state, for the parties of the opposition they were little more than an extension of the political arena. For instance, the highly centralized system of organization and the idea of direct state control were not challenged from any group in Parliament. There was no consideration of the establishment of an independent public authority on the lines of the British model, otherwise much discussed during the debate, which could supervise the application of the principles of public service broadcasting in practice. It is also indicative that there was no discussion of the need for a code to regulate journalistic practice and commercial advertising, or of the development of a regional information network which could give voice to the largely neglected provinces.

The system of formal controls that was introduced by the new statute constituted a continuity with the pre-1967 practices towards broadcasting. Law 230/1975 did not provide any guarantees for the application of impartiality and objectivity in practice. As the KKE-es deputy L. Kyrkos commented during the debate,

"the protection of objectivity and the democratic spirit that Mr Lambrias has praised is left to the discretion of the government. If the government so wishes, it guarantees them; if not, it suspends them. In any case, these principles are not institutionalized in this Bill"<sup>73</sup>.

## **6.5 YENED: Militarism and commercial orientation**

The developments in YENED during the transition are here dealt with separately because the policy that was followed by the governments under Karamanlis towards the military channel was completely different to that on EIRT.

In the aftermath of the junta's collapse, the new Minister of Defence E. Averoff, sought to place YENED under his direct personal supervision. The junta-appointed commander and the other officers of the network's hierarchy were removed and replaced by officers who enjoyed Averoff's personal confidence<sup>74</sup>. In effect Averoff's powers over YENED extended beyond the control normally exercised by the Minister of Defence over the activities of a military unit. He assumed effective control of all appointments and chose the two successive heads of the network's news department from among his personal confidants<sup>75</sup>. He also dealt personally with many aspects of YENED's everyday operation; as he emphatically told Parliament, "I make every effort to place YENED under the greatest possible control exercised by myself or a close associate of mine to the point where I deal with certain issues personally"<sup>76</sup>. In addition to the control exercised by the Minister of Defence, YENED's news department was also placed under the supervision of the Undersecretariat for the Press in order to follow the general government guidelines on news coverage in the same way as did the EIRT. Thus, after 1974 YENED came under a peculiar regime: on the one hand it retained its status as a military unit under the command of the General Staff, and on the other the control over its operation was transferred to two separate government departments. Ostensibly, the main aim of this policy was to limit the military's autonomy in such a vital sphere as information, and to minimize the risk of a resurrection of juntist propaganda. Averoff was in a position to claim in January 1975, "YENED is not an uncontrollable organization that is under bad influence. On the contrary, it is a military organization controlled by the civilian government"<sup>77</sup>.

However, insofar as YENED remained a military unit under the command of the General Staff, it retained its organizational structure and militaristic mentality (as described in the previous chapters). It also retained its arch-conservative



political outlook. Purges were limited to its senior military staff while the civilian personnel went largely unchanged<sup>78</sup>. Characteristically, as head of news and current affairs remained the same person who had been appointed by the dictators (K. Sismanis). Moreover, programmes which had started during the dictatorship and become renowned for their nationalistic, ultra-conservative style and content continued or were repeated<sup>79</sup>. People who had cooperated with the junta, such as the former deputy Director General of EIRT during the dictatorship, I. Moschovitis, were also invited to make their own programmes by YENED<sup>80</sup>. Whereas any reference to the anti-fascist resistance movement and the civil war was excluded from the programmes of both networks, YENED regularly covered events such as, nationalist gatherings for the commemoration of the military victories against the Communists in the civil war (it should be noted here that EIRT did not broadcast similar reports). Asked by a newspaper about the necessity of such programmes, an YENED commander was reported as saying that historical facts could not be changed and that "on these historical matters there was a lot of sensitivity"<sup>81</sup>.

Throughout the seven years of ND government there were repeated allegations that committees of censorship continued to operate within YENED, effectively vetting radio and television programmes<sup>82</sup>. In September 1977 the newspaper Ta Nea published a long article containing details of the composition, aims and rules of operation of these censorship committees. This information, which the newspaper claimed was drawn from a report from the unions of YENED employees, suggested that within the network there were three censorship committees which had been in operation since the dictatorship. These had been set up by Papadopoulos himself to vet radio and television broadcasts<sup>83</sup>. To our knowledge, this report was never officially rejected. Nonetheless, in 1980 Averoff denied in Parliament the existence of any committees of control or censorship. He emphasized, however, that,

"the administration of YENED which is responsible for the selection of programmes, used (...) employees of specialized knowledge to preview certain programmes and to make suggestions regarding their historical accuracy and their social, religious and aesthetic deontology, but the views of these employees are simply advisory for the commander of YENED"<sup>84</sup>.

Throughout the 1970s, YENED became a target of the parties of the opposition as well as for the press (especially the Conservative Kathimerini<sup>85</sup>) who maintained that a broadcasting organization run by the military was an insult and a danger to democratic principles<sup>86</sup>. Replying in early 1975 to the opposition's claims that "it was unacceptable, after the horrific experience of the dictatorship, for the military to control such a dangerous medium for democracy"<sup>87</sup>, Averoff argued that the latter was a successful organization which, thanks to its "good housekeeping", had made considerable profits. Comparisons were also made between the "economically sick EIRT", which had accumulated a deficit of 800 million drachmas, and the "healthy and strong" YENED<sup>88</sup>.

Many factors had contributed to the latter's economic robustness. First, YENED employed a much smaller number of employees than EIRT. By the time the transition took place, the ratio between the two organizations was almost one to three (580 employees for YENED compared with more than 1500 for EIRT)<sup>89</sup>. Almost a fifth of the personnel (military officers and MoD employees) received their salaries from the Ministry of Defence<sup>90</sup>. Moreover, YENED received a military subsidy in the form of technical staff, transport and communication equipment and energy<sup>91</sup>. Most important of all, however, YENED had a huge income from advertising, which in 1974 alone amounted to 200 million drachmas<sup>92</sup>. Notwithstanding the considerable subsidy from the MoD, YENED was forced to be self-supporting, which in practice meant recourse to advertising and a programme policy which could guarantee high audience ratings. Its programme schedule was dominated by sport, American series, Greek popular films of the 1950's and 1960's and low budget Greek series.

Such a diet made the channel decidedly popular, attracting in 1974 sixty per cent of the entire viewing public<sup>93</sup>. As a consequence, and thanks to a policy of relatively cheap advertisement rates<sup>94</sup> YENED received high advertising revenues through which it financed its programme production<sup>95</sup>. Although a military unit, YENED was operating by the criteria of a commercial enterprise and with the main aim of maximizing profits by selling air time to advertisers<sup>96</sup>.

The argument of YENED's economic success was repeated by many ND deputies during the debate on the new broadcasting law, when the issue of the organization's merger with EIRT was put forward by the opposition<sup>97</sup>. To those who claimed that YENED's programmes were a menace to democracy because they "cultivated a jingoistic and militaristic spirit and were imbued by a reactionary mentality"<sup>98</sup>, it was suggested that "YENED has a viewing rate of 60 per cent to 40 per cent for EIRT. This is the democratic principle (...) That's what the people want and we must support it"<sup>99</sup>. These arguments are indicative of the absence of any clear perspective or consideration by politicians regarding the purpose of Greek broadcasting. Thus, YENED's performance was evaluated solely according to criteria of profitability. These arguments, especially when they involved references to the crisis-stricken EIRT, implied that it was precisely the organization and the operation of YENED by the military which had led to the network's popularity and success.

Another argument in favour of YENED's continued existence was presented by Averoff: that the abolition of the network as a military operation would be a great affront to the armed forces. "YENED was born in a (...) period of war and (...) became a child that the Greek people came to love; and it was especially loved by the Armed Forces which I would not wish to upset today with the abolition of their successful child"<sup>100</sup>. It is possible that the retention of YENED was an additional

component in Karamanlis' strategy - which included a limited purge of the junta, the institutionalization of the military's considerable autonomy (Law 660/1977) and the absence of any criticism against the officers' corps - to achieve the consent of the Armed Forces to the democratic institutions.

This view, however, could be challenged. First, there appeared to be disagreement on what constituted the government's policy on the future of YENED. On the one hand the Minister of Defence had declared that "any discussion about the abolition of YENED should be ruled out"<sup>101</sup>. On the other hand, the Undersecretary for the Press, P. Lambrias, although defending YENED from the opposition's criticism, stated during the parliamentary debate on EIRT's new statute: "It is necessary to have a clear idea of what is the government's policy on this issue (...). Radio and television cannot progress if we do not aim at a unitary organization"<sup>102</sup>. Moreover, it is difficult to accept that the parties of the opposition would have insisted on the network's 'demilitarization' especially in a period of transition, if this could have had a destabilizing effect for the new democratic regime. It should be noted here that since the downfall of the dictatorship there had been a general consensus in Parliament on military issues. The armed forces had scarcely been criticized; all political parties had made a clear distinction in their discourse between the junta and the officers' corps at large; and unlike the pre-1967 period, the opposition has never pressed for any cuts in the military budget<sup>103</sup>. It is characteristic that during the debates on the broadcast media the representatives of the opposition took care not to appear to attack the military itself. Instead, it was argued that the maintenance of YENED constituted an obstacle to the process of reconciliation between the military and the people<sup>104</sup>.

Finally, even if the security of democracy entailed YENED's continued existence in the first years of the transition, it is not easy to explain why the network was not amalgamated with EIRT at a later stage. After the aborted coup in February 1975, which Averoff himself attributed to a few 'stagonidia' (droplets) of pro-junta officers<sup>105</sup>, there was no other known attempt against parliamentary institutions; on the contrary, though the allegiance of the military to democracy might be questionable, the armed forces seemed to be content to confine themselves to barracks. Insofar as the legitimacy of the young democracy was firmly rooted among both the electorate and the political elites, it seemed unlikely that the abolition of the military channel could have presented any real risk for parliamentary institutions.

In our view, therefore, the preservation of YENED must have been favoured by a large part of the governing party headed by the Minister of Defence for reasons that could be best described as ideological: the military network was a relic of the civil war legacy and nationalistic mentality, represented by ND's right wing under Averoff. The organizational structure, with military officers 'guarding the gates' of radio and television, and Averoff's overall supervision could ensure that no other approach which would challenge the nationalistic view of Greek politics and history would be shown on YENED's programmes. As such, YENED could be a counter-balancing factor vis-a-vis EIRT, which, at least during the first years of the transition, appeared to be influenced by the general climate of liberalization. Comparing the two channels, an ND deputy remarked that "EIRT has generated the gravest of all accusations: it distorted the history of Greece when it identified the history of the 28th October 1940 with ELAS and EAM<sup>106</sup>". And another MP argued that "YENED produces work which is really national, which really helps and informs the conscripts and the people"<sup>107</sup>.

It was perhaps due to the pressure from the governing party's ultra-conservatives that the new broadcasting statute did not contain a binding provision for the future merger of YENED with ERT. Article 4, paragraph 4, of Law 230/1975 provided for the networks' amalgamation to be carried out two years after the implementation of this law and, most importantly, the decision for the merger was left to the government's sole discretion. To a question on YENED's demilitarization submitted by a PASOK deputy in 1981, the then Undersecretary for the Press A. Tsaldaris, replied : "Since I have not (...) started the merger process, it means that I do not wish to do so"<sup>108</sup>. The preservation of YENED must have also been facilitated by Lambrias's departure from government in 1977 and the ND's gradual turn to more right-wing policies.

Thus, internal contradictions within the governing party and a lack of a clear vision on the purpose of broadcasting led to the continuation of the incoherent, haphazard policy of the previous decades. The only difference was that in practice the two separate broadcasting organizations were not controlled by two conflicting centres of power (the elected government and the military) but by two different government departments.

The co-existence of two public networks with a different policy outlook and largely in competition with each other for audiences and advertisers was a constant hurdle to the development of Greek broadcasting along public service lines. Political considerations prevailed to all other views about the social and cultural role of broadcasting. As we will see in the following sections, these political considerations did not only determine the formal distribution of power and control within EIRT/ERT and YENED, but also the informal processes through which government power was wielded during the first seven years of transition.

## **6.6 Distribution of power and control in post-junta Greek broadcasting: appointments and intervention**

In this section we will examine the formal relations between the Greek broadcasting institutions and the government, as well as the informal processes through which the latter influenced the overall policies of the former. In particular, attention will be drawn to the role of the managerial staff, the policy options which were open to them and the ways in which external pressure was internalized in the daily practices of the organizations. It should be stressed from the outset, however, that the ensuing analysis will deal with the distribution of control and the policy of appointments mainly within the EIRT/ERT. This is because the organization of YENED as a military unit substantially limited both the possibilities of choice for the network's administrators and the means of pressure that could be exercised on the latter by various departments in the government. Moreover, the discipline inherent in the military profession was sufficient to guarantee that no conflicts would easily arise among the military/administrative staff.

By contrast EIRT/ERT continued to suffer from frequent changes of heads and discontinuities in its programming policy. Despite its transformation from a state administration into an independent public corporation, ERT did not escape government intervention in all aspects of its policies. The result was a series of crises which are best reflected in the sheer number of appointees to the three highest posts of the organization. Within seven years ERT had four different Chairmen of the Board of Governors, five Directors General and five deputy Directors<sup>109</sup>. Most of the occupants of the above posts were selected among friends of the government. Karamanlis appeared to have a personal interest in EIRT/ERT affairs and in many cases the appointments included some of his close friends. The

first two Directors General (D. Horn and A. Vlachos) as well as the deputies (A. Solomos, R. Manthoulis and G. Stefanakis) were chosen by Karamanlis himself. Director General N. Delipetros was in turn asked to accept the post by Karamanlis' successor as Prime Minister, G. Rallis, while he was concurrently General Secretary for Press and Information<sup>110</sup>.

Nevertheless, two of the three Deputy Directors General to be appointed in the first two years of the transition belonged to the opposition. The first was P. Bakoyiannis, a journalist and self-proclaimed supporter of the Centre Union, who during the dictatorship had been actively involved in the anti-junta campaign in Germany. His appointment by the government of 'national unity' was made amid the general climate of political reconciliation and unanimity that characterized the first days of the transition<sup>111</sup>. The second was R. Manthoulis, a film director working for the French ORTF, who had been close to Karamanlis<sup>112</sup> and was invited by the latter to help with the organization of EIRT in 1975. Both appointments reflected a significant degree of confidence by the government and, as Manthoulis suggests, a genuine will, particularly on Karamanlis's part, to proceed with the renovation and democratization of broadcasting. Yet, a retreat from this position by the government led to the resignation of Bakoyiannis only three months after he had been appointed and of Manthoulis after he had completed just a year in office.

Most of the appointees were selected for their achievements and reputation in the arts and journalism. Among them, there were actors, directors, journalists and writers (see Appendices 1 and 2). The selection of such people for the top administrative posts was an indication that the government was concerned about the improvement of quality standards in programming. Only two of them, Director General K. Hondros and deputy Director General M. Vallindras, were selected mainly for their previous experience and reputed skills in administration:



Hondros was a former Chairman of Olympic Airways and deputy director general of administration at the ERT and Vallindras was a former programme director of YENED<sup>113</sup>.

There was, however, another reason for this preference for members of the Greek intellectual elite: in the absence of personnel with experience in broadcasting production and administration, managerial staff had to be sought after from spheres more relevant to radio and television. Inevitably, therefore, amateurism and improvisation prevailed in the daily practice of the organization. A major implication of this policy on appointments was that the managerial posts were held by people with different professional backgrounds and different perceptions of the needs of the medium. Joanna Spicer was quick to point out this problem in a letter to Lambrias shortly after she had submitted her report:

"I believe that a number of steps can be taken towards a new character for EIRT, if EIRT management has a united purpose and will to do so (...). What I can mention only to yourself is my anxiety that this essential consensus of purpose does not at the moment exist in the Directorate of EIRT. It is normal in broadcasting organizations that strong differences of opinion should exist among senior officials on policy, programme and organization subjects; but it is axiomatic to air the differences and arrive at a consensus (...). It is my fear that this process is not occurring in EIRT and its absence means a weakness in central policy. In this situation it is not easy to make proposals for the future"<sup>114</sup>.

What Spicer observed was a lack of mutual confidence between the heads of different areas which, in her view, was due to the fact that none of them "had grown up in the same sort of organization or in the same sort of national life"<sup>115</sup>. At the time that she compiled her report, the Director General was A. Vlachos, a retired career diplomat and writer, and his deputy was theatre director A. Solomos. In an interview to the newspaper Ta Nea ten years later, the latter alleged that when it came to policy making he was usually ignored and that his

relations with the Director General were strained most of the time<sup>116</sup>.

Personal distrust and conflicts between different heads of the ERT also emerged because of the vagueness with which the competences of each office-holder were defined in the new broadcasting law. This vagueness particularly affected the relations between the Chairman of the Board of Governors and the Director General. Far from being "the trustees of parliament and the nation" in safeguarding the principles of public service broadcasting, as Sir Hugh Greene had suggested, the Board of the ERT had purely administrative functions, copied from the law on private limited companies<sup>117</sup>. What was particularly confusing was the way in which the new law for broadcasting prescribed the competences of the Chairman of the Board and the Director General. According to article 11 par.2, "the Chairman of the Board of Governors exercises supervision and control over the services of ERT", while, according to article 12 par.1, "the Director General heads the ERT services (...)"<sup>118</sup>. In the 'absence of a consensus of purpose' and with the existence of strong personal ambitions, this vagueness became the breeding ground for conflict between the first Chairman of ERT, G. Oikonomopoulos and the Director General, I. Lampsas. This was so because the Chairman of the Board sought to perform the role of the organization's chief executive. For this reason, he moved his office from the centre of Athens, where the EIRT Board used to be housed, to the headquarters of Aghia Paraskevi. As Lampsas characteristically remarked later, "he demanded an office opposite mine to control me better. I slammed the door in his face"<sup>119</sup>. A proposal made by the then deputy director for administration, D. Synadinos for the Board to designate in detail the competences of the D.G. was hastily rejected by Oikonomopoulos<sup>120</sup>. The result was internal wrangling and disruption in the everyday operation of the ERT; Lampsas's resignation in 1978 was partly due to this conflict with the Chairman<sup>121</sup>.

Nevertheless, the main reason for the frequent resignations of ERT senior managerial staff was, according to the testimonies of almost all appointees, the persistent government intervention in the day-to-day activities of the organization. Apart from the firm control over news and current affairs programmes, government intervention expanded to all aspects of ERT policy, from programme content to administration.

First and foremost, there was control of the ideological content of programmes by the supervising Ministry to the Prime Minister and particularly the Undersecretary for Press and Information. In general, governments under Karamanlis exhibited a high degree of sensitivity regarding political matters and, especially, contemporary Greek history. For Director General I. Lampsas, such caution was entailed by the need to safeguard the young and fragile democracy:

"The civil war of 1947-1950 left behind a lot of hatred within Greek society, and the dictatorship of 1967-1974 did nothing but add to the discord. Although the transition from dictatorship to democracy took place peacefully, great care was needed to avoid a revival of dangerous controversies. The management of ERT tried to avoid extremism from whatever direction it came"<sup>122</sup>.

It is true that feelings about the civil war continued to be very strong in the first years of the transition. However, instead of airing all views, the government preferred to avoid any reference to the issue. Apparently, this policy was also based on another political calculation: insofar as television was regarded by politicians as a powerful instrument for the manipulation of public opinion, the government might have feared the influence that left-wing views could have on the electorate. In radio and television practice this meant that any approach challenging the views held by the governing party were continuously excluded from programmes. This does not mean, however, that programmes underwent scrutiny before they were

shown; usually, intervention came after the transmission as a 'reproach', rather than in advance as a guideline<sup>123</sup>.

A major incident which created uproar in the press of both sides, and finally led to the resignation of EIRT's Director General, occurred in October 1975 following the transmission of two programmes commemorating Greece's entry into World War II. The first of them challenged the dominant nationalistic view of Metaxas as the inspirator of the struggle against the Axis forces and attributed the victories against the Italians solely to the Greek people and their anti-fascist feelings. In the second programme, references were made to the left-wing resistance movement and pictures of Communist guerillas were shown<sup>124</sup>. The transmission of these programmes prompted the immediate reaction of the government<sup>125</sup>. The next day, Lambrias visited EIRT and criticised the Board of Governors for what, he alleged, constituted a distortion of recent Greek history. Subsequently, the Board asked the Director General, A. Vlachos to hold an investigation to punish those responsible<sup>126</sup>. A month later, the person considered to be responsible for the transmission, Television Director S. Payatakis, resigned. He was followed by Vlachos, who also considered himself responsible<sup>127</sup>.

On other occasions EIRT/ERT management was asked by the government to end a series before it was due to finish, because it was deemed controversial or 'annoying'. For the same reasons some current affairs programmes were stopped while the transmission of others was indefinitely postponed, although they had already been published in the EIRT/ERT weekly schedules<sup>128</sup>. The production of programmes could also be abandoned at the government's request. On one such occasion, the preparations for a documentary about the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of the Second Hellenic Republic ended abruptly - ironically after a phone-call from the President of the Republic (K. Tsatsos), who suggested that

the content of the programme was offensive to the royalist part of the electorate<sup>129</sup>.

After the crisis caused by the programmes of 28th October 1975, EIRT management became more cautious with historical or political matters. In some cases, plans for programmes were submitted to the Undersecretary in order to obtain the government's endorsement for the subject and even for the specific producers of the programmes<sup>130</sup>.

In general terms, the government's stance created confusion even among its own appointees to the network, who, although coming from the same political camp, proved unable to perceive what could please or annoy their political masters. As a former deputy Director General remarked, "the guideline, silent and vague, was there: the interest of the government. But nobody had the courage to provide a practical definition of how it should be pursued"<sup>131</sup>.

During his period in office at the ERT, deputy Director General M. Vallindras proposed the introduction of a code for programme content, which would set guidelines according to which a programme could be acceptable to the government. Such a code, he believed, would safeguard a considerable degree of independence for ERT's managers and producers and limit the powers of the responsible Minister and Undersecretary. Needless to say, such a plan never materialized, in Vallindras's view because the government did not wish to see its powers over television programming curtailed<sup>132</sup>.

Intervention was not restricted, however, to the content of individual programmes, nor did it come only from the Ministry to the Prime Minister. The heads of EIRT/ERT had also to put up with pressure exercised by many other members of the government. For one thing, ministers would press for the coverage of the daily activities of their ministries by

television. Additionally, ministers would often request, over the phone or in brief written messages, the allocation of favours to political supporters. Such favours included the provision of employment and the granting of contracts for drama series to actors, writers, directors or producers, who were friends of the governing party or of the ministers themselves. Requests such as these were not exceptional; in effect they were part of the daily exchanges of the ERT administrators with the government. Although impossible to quantify, according to the testimonies of most former heads of the period under study, patronage to a large extent determined the policy of employment and programming<sup>133</sup>.

Constant government intervention meant that the policy options of the EIRT/ERT managers and broadcasters were in practice limited, even minimal. Vlachos said characteristically: "I was like a magician with handcuffs. How could I perform?"<sup>134</sup>. And Lampsas stated: "When one is appointed to ERT, one must give up hoping. Like in Dante's 'Inferno'"<sup>135</sup>. Resistance to pressure seemed to be pointless insofar as the government was empowered by law to dismiss its appointees. Bakoyiannis was sacked only three months after he had been appointed. Even such an outspoken advocate of the government's broadcasting policy as Lampsas was finally asked to resign after a row with the new Undersecretary Tsaldaris. In an acidic statement to the Press, Lampsas spoke of "government intervention that was coming, not only from the Ministry to the Prime Minister, but from all ministries without exception and from all public authorities" and he alleged that "intransigent elements had prevailed, who, for a long time pressurized the management of ERT for radical changes in personnel using the sole criterion of political sympathies"<sup>136</sup>.

Those who enjoyed the personal support of the Prime Minister like Manthoulis, could be ignored when it came to decisions on programmes whose content was deemed as embarrassing to the

government. At a press-conference following his resignation, Manthoulis spoke of a McCarthy-like psychosis in both the ERT and the government: "There is a fear that they will give more freedom than is necessary; and there is also a tendency to return to stricter control"<sup>137</sup>. The general feeling appeared to be one of total disappointment and the inability to realize any ambitious programme of reform. The achievement of a surplus in the balance sheet or the introduction of two or three new programmes appeared to be the most that a Director General and a deputy D.G. for programmes were able to accomplish. To quote some indicative examples:

"I am afraid that all I managed to do was to prevent the realization of plans which were unnecessary or were against my aesthetic. On the positive side, I introduced modern Greek plays on television and got some BBC television productions of Shakespeare"<sup>138</sup>.

"I left EIRT with an economic surplus (...). Apart from that, I found chaos and I left chaos"<sup>139</sup>.

"My ambitions were limited; I wanted to improve the standards of Greek programmes (...). But even there we missed the target"<sup>140</sup>.

Most heads left the network as soon as they had started to understand its problems and needs and to gather experience. This resulted in an inconsistent programme policy, the absence of a coherent programme philosophy and the perpetuation of ERT's perennial organizational problems. As long as the ultimate control on broadcasting rested with the government, the introduction of real reforms required strong political will. And, as Vallindras remarked:

"all governments have the vague impression that television is a weapon in their hands. (...) Looking for its hidden trigger they see everyday practice as an annoyance.(...) No government was ever interested in the programme schedule as a whole, only in the influence that certain programmes could exercise"<sup>141</sup>.

## **6.7 Broadcasting as a political actor: news, current affairs and elections.**

Throughout its history, Greek broadcasting adopted its own peculiar concept of newsworthiness, which was defined according to the needs of each government to generate and maintain the tolerance and support of the population. In crude terms, this meant that priority was given to the promotion of the activities of the government irrespective of their practical significance to the electorate. A tour by the Prime Minister in the provinces or the laying of a foundation stone by a minister could take up a significant part of a news bulletin. As long as the government was identified with the interests of the existing political regime, the principles of objectivity, impartiality and balance could be sacrificed in favour of political stability.

This approach to broadcast news was influenced by two assumptions: first, that each government was faced with a generally hostile press and, therefore, manipulation of broadcasting was necessary in order to redress the balance; and secondly, that radio and, to a larger extent, television, were powerful machines for indoctrinating a highly volatile public<sup>142</sup>. These assumptions, ostensibly reinforced by the spectacular expansion of television in the 1970s (Table Int.2), also influenced to a large extent the stance of ND governments vis-a-vis broadcasting. According to News Director Ev. Bistikas, "(...) the press exaggerates things. Before waiting to see what happens, it jumps to conclusions. There must be a kind of equilibrium. When the newspapers exaggerate, I don't say television must distort the truth, but it must restore the balance"<sup>143</sup>.

After the general elections of November 1974, the spirit of reconciliation and liberalization which had prevailed in EIRT



under the government of national unity gave way to a stricter government control over the content of news broadcasts. The first sign of this change in the government's attitude was the dismissal of deputy Director General of EIRT P. Bakoyiannis, which took place on the very day that the new ND government was sworn in<sup>144</sup>. As both Bakoyiannis and Director General D. Horn maintained, their policy of objective and balanced reporting which they had applied particularly during the electoral campaign, had met with fierce opposition from within the governing party. Bakoyiannis alleged that he had clashed with people close to Karamanlis, who pressed for a more favourable coverage of ND's campaign; this, he suggested, "reinforced the view that they consider EIRT at least as property of their party and a personal instrument for the promotion of their leader"<sup>145</sup>. Remarkably, Bakoyiannis' dismissal generated a wave of resignations of senior members of EIRT staff who had been appointed during the first few days of the transition; with most prominent among them D. Horn himself and the Chairman of the Board, O. Elytis<sup>146</sup>.

After the brief opening to pluralistic information during the first four months of the transition, the EIRT's news department was turned again into an instrument of the government's information policy. It goes without saying that the same applied to YENED, the news service of which had been placed under the control of the Undersecretariat of Press and Information since the collapse of the dictatorship. The prevailing view was that broadcast news should concentrate primarily on the work and activities of the government<sup>147</sup>. The explanation for this was nothing more than a mere repetition of arguments that had been frequently presented by pre-1967 governments. In the words of Undersecretary Tsaldaris "only the government's activities and decisions created rights and obligations for the people" and, therefore, the government should inform the electorate "on the way it dealt with the problems that it was facing and the solutions that it intended

to provide"<sup>148</sup>. On the other hand, radio and television should avoid the reporting of any social or political conflict, as this could have a destabilizing effect for what was perceived as a fragile democracy.

Apart from general instructions, the heads of both networks were the recipients of specific guidelines issued by the Ministry to the Prime Minister and especially by the Undersecretary for the Press in an unofficial and unwritten manner. A set of such criteria postulated that there should be no reporting of unconfirmed rumours, no reporting liable to create propaganda from events, and no reporting of political remarks of a personal nature<sup>149</sup>. This in practice meant that stories which had not been confirmed by the government could not be reported and the same applied to strikes and demonstrations - as they would constitute propaganda - and to criticisms by opposition leaders of the government.

In the case of YENED, instructions and guidelines for the editorial policy of the network were given to the News Editor who was directly accountable to the Undersecretary of the Press<sup>150</sup>. At the ERT, the government's rules were conveyed by the Director General to the Head of News and Current Affairs. The Director General was in effect, to repeat Schlesinger's phrase, the Editor-in-Chief of the organization<sup>151</sup>. Regarding the news, his main task was to observe the application of the pro-government line in news programmes. In turn, the task of the News Editor was to coordinate the production of the news according to the received instructions<sup>152</sup>. On matters of crucial importance - for instance, foreign policy or matters deemed as liable to create a controversy - the Director General would receive specific orders from the Minister to the Prime Minister or the Undersecretary for the Press and communicate them to the staff of the news department<sup>153</sup>. This is not to say that the news was dictated; it meant, however, the strangulation of any initiative and a working framework which

allowed hardly any freedom to journalists to exercise their own news judgements.

The editorial power of the news head and also the Director General were further restricted by pressure exercised by different ministries and even public authorities to have their policies promoted on television. The daily routine in the newsrooms of both ERT and YENED included a series of phone calls from ministers or senior civil servants asking for a crew to cover the day's activities of their sectors<sup>154</sup>.

Instructions were fully respected and, unlike general programming, news and current affairs programmes did not provoke any fierce reaction from the government. For one thing, the heads of ERT were government nominees; the same applied to News Editors on both networks, who were appointed in ERT's case by the Undersecretary of the Press in agreement with the Director General<sup>155</sup> and in the case of YENED by the Minister of Defence. Political loyalty, however, is not the only explanation for such compliance. Not all ERT Heads shared in full the government's views on news policy<sup>156</sup>. Nevertheless, the fact that they were appointed by the government seemed to create an obligation for them to conform with the latter's requirements. As an ERT news editor who belonged to the Centre-Left said characteristically, "Lambrias could trust me that I would behave without any ideological biases"<sup>157</sup>. Moreover, compliance appeared to be rewarding. One of the ERT's news editors, E. Bistikas, went on to become President Karamanlis' personal press officer<sup>158</sup>. Another news editor, Th. Karzis, who fell from grace because of a report on the Helsinki Conference, was removed from the news department only to become Head of ERT's Directorate of Educational Television<sup>159</sup>.

Securing one's career in broadcasting under these circumstances was also a major determinant of the professional attitude of newsmen in both channels. This applies particularly

in the case of sub-editors who, in the Greek context of television news production, are primarily responsible for the compilation of each bulletin and often double as news presenters<sup>160</sup>. Employment in television news production was prestigious, promising a celebrity status and, since 1974, financially rewarding, particularly for the senior staff of the news department<sup>161</sup>. It has been argued by ERT heads and top journalists that editorial freedom in broadcasting depends entirely on the personality of the individual in charge of the news and his ability to resist the pressures exercised<sup>162</sup>. It is true that on occasion a Director General or a news editor (even the sub-editors) could afford to refuse coverage of a minister's activities, particularly if the latter belonged to the lower levels of the cabinet hierarchy<sup>163</sup>. Yet, the pro-government line was never seriously challenged by the editorial policy of any Director General or news editor. From what has just been said, it is no surprise that the presentation of news was, as McDonald has observed, a "nightly cavalcade of the activities of the cabinet to the almost total exclusion of any mention of the opposition"<sup>164</sup>.

It has often been suggested by writers on the media that "news values are explicitly hierarchical, stressing the importance of people at the top of political and social organizations"<sup>165</sup>, and that television "creates a rigid hierarchy among politicians"<sup>166</sup>, as those considered most important are usually invited to participate in the news or other programmes. In the case of Greek radio and particularly television, this hierarchy was even more pronounced, as attention was directed exclusively to the government and especially to those occupying the top positions in the cabinet. Most emphasis was placed upon Prime Minister Karamanlis, who was projected as the central figure in Greek public life. Television news covered a variety of his activities, from being on a state visit in a foreign country, to presiding over a cabinet meeting. So often did he feature in news programmes

that some opposition MPs claimed that the two networks were suffering from "a Karamanlis psychosis"<sup>167</sup>. Furthermore, the insistence on promoting the work of the government and of particular figures in it meant that a significant, if not the largest, part of the daily news was taken up by trivialities, such as a Minister's visit to a hospital or the official inaugurations and ceremonies attended by members of the government. In addition, some ministries had their own weekly programme on radio and television of both networks aimed at informing the public about their activities. For the parties of the opposition, however, these programmes were deemed to be promoting the policies of the government as well as the personality of individual ministers<sup>168</sup>.

By contrast, there was no coverage of the activities of the other parties, and their comments on the government's policies and general performance were never transmitted. Representatives of the opposition, though not the leaders, were occasionally invited to participate in discussions, usually on topics of general interest where any reference to their party's policies or any criticism of the government would be out of context. The banning of the opposition from news programmes led to absurdities, such as viewers listening to government's replies to criticisms by the opposition leaders which had never been broadcast<sup>169</sup>. The official explanation for this policy was that the transmission of party conflicts would be a threat to political stability. Karamanlis himself had repeatedly stated that "party politics (in television) divide the nation"<sup>170</sup>. And as Undersecretary, Tsaldaris said characteristically, "it is not possible to transfer party conflicts to television (...). I believe that television would then be turned into an arena for bullfights and the final result would be the demise of democracy"<sup>171</sup>. The avoidance of any conflict also meant that events such as strikes and protest demonstrations received minimal coverage, while the statements of trade unionists and political activists were hardly ever transmitted. Prolonged

strikes in crucial sectors such as education or the banks went largely unreported save for a ministerial statement in which the strike was usually condemned or declared unlawful<sup>172</sup>.

In view of the above, it is not surprising that no political programmes were developed on either radio or television throughout the seven years of the ND government<sup>173</sup>. There were no round-table discussions among politicians on television, and on major national issues, such as the country's accession to the European Community, the broadcast analyses constituted an incessant government monologue<sup>174</sup>. The only occasion when political controversy was presented by television was during coverage of parliamentary debates. However, this occurred rather irregularly and then only to record sessions in which the Prime Minister was participating. The usual process was the transmission of the entire speech of the Premier and then an equal amount of time was divided among the leaders of the opposition according to the strength of their parties in Parliament<sup>175</sup>. Under this arrangement the recordings of parliamentary debates could run up to three or even four hours<sup>176</sup>.

The predominance of political factors over the need for accurate information left television news totally under-developed as a cultural form. Visual material was limited and usually focussed on individual figures rather than on collective activity. Talking heads remained the predominant characteristic of news programmes, with the news presenter reading lengthy statements and comments emanating from government offices to camera. Interviews were scarce and so were commentary<sup>177</sup> and analysis of major events. The lack of editorial freedom and initiative prevented any experimentation and imposed constraints on the building up of technical expertise. Technical resources for the production of news remained limited and this contributed further to the low standards of news programmes. The report of A. Protheroe was

largely ignored and ERT continued to lack the necessary equipment (machine for the montage and cameras for outside broadcasts), while the majority of journalists continued to be employed on a part-time basis<sup>178</sup>. At YENED the situation was even worse, with the television news service largely dependent on the radio office to supply news copy. The network did not develop a proper news department until as late as 1980<sup>179</sup>.

Television, and particularly its news programmes constituted a continuous source of conflict between the government and the opposition. Less than two months after the 1974 general elections EK-ND submitted an interpellation, accusing the government of having turned the two networks into "instruments for the propagation of its views"<sup>180</sup> to the detriment of all the other parties. Commenting on the performance of the Greek broadcasting organizations EK-ND deputy D. Tsatsos remarked: "The problem of television and radio is a problem of balance between the government and the opposition as a whole (...). If we build a political system without having safeguarded the (...) information of the Greek people, then we are building a stillborn system. For this reason, the way that both EIRT and YENED operate is unacceptable"<sup>181</sup>. The parties of the opposition proposed the establishment of an all-party committee to supervise the application of objectivity and impartiality in programming. However, no suggestions were made as to the specific composition and functions of such a body<sup>182</sup>. Early in 1978, PASOK, by then the official opposition in Parliament, refused to send representatives to the ERT General Assembly in protest at the 'decorative' role that the opposition had ended up playing in it<sup>183</sup>. A second interpellation was submitted at the same time by all political forces of the opposition criticizing the government for the continuous monopolization of radio and television. The opposition focussed its attacks on Law 230/1975 which, it claimed, perpetuated the government's control over broadcasting. A change in ERT's statute was stressed by all parties and pluralism had to be safeguarded.

PASOK and KKE-es in particular proposed a new composition for the Board of Governors which was to include representatives of all political parties, local authorities, trade unions and other social organizations<sup>184</sup>. In addition, broadcasting often became the target of the opposition press and of groups of intellectuals and professionals, who considered government intervention in television as a direct threat to democracy<sup>185</sup>. Yet, such protests had hardly any impact upon the operation of the two networks. Ostensibly, there was an implicit belief within the government that the transmission of views rival to its own would be more harmful to its supporters than any accusation of authoritarianism by the opposition.

Nevertheless, the government monopoly on broadcasting was to be broken during the periods of national election campaigns. As was shown in the previous chapter, the establishment of a fully competitive party system after 1974 and fairly conducted general elections were the basis of legitimation of the political system. Thus, in the entire period of the transition successive governments were to secure the organization of unfettered elections, the result of which no side of the political spectrum would be able to dispute. In this context, the access of all the major parties to radio and television for their campaigns was seen as an essential component of electoral competition. Yet, as Bakoyiannis' case revealed, the idea of sharing the broadcast media on equal terms with the other parties was not fully accepted within ND. Lambrias himself told Parliament that far from being an obligation on the government, the allocation of equal amounts of time to all major contestants in 1974 was due to Karamanlis' "magnanimity"<sup>186</sup>. In general terms, however, during election campaigns ND governments were increasingly sensitive to the complaints and demands of the opposition. Hence, in the 1977 general elections the government replaced the Undersecretary of Press, P. Lambrias, and ERT's Director General, I. Lampsas, who had both been repeatedly attacked by the parties and press of the



opposition for a policy of bias on radio and television<sup>187</sup>. Similarly, in 1981 the government of G.Rallis agreed to replace Lambrias's successor, A. Tsaldaris<sup>188</sup>. In addition to these measures, during the election campaigns of 1977 and 1981 orders were given to the two networks to avoid the coverage of activities of individual ministers<sup>189</sup>, while in 1981, following a bilateral agreement between the government and PASOK, ERT and YENED cancelled the transmission of twenty two radio and television programmes which were considered by the opposition to be government propaganda<sup>190</sup>.

During the 1977 and 1981 election campaigns ND consented to the formation of an all-party committee to propose terms under which the parties' activities would be covered by radio and television and to supervise the implementation of these terms<sup>191</sup>. It should be noted here that in 1974 and 1977 the campaign was covered only by EIRT/ERT, for as Averoff explained to Parliament, YENED as a military organization had to keep out of politics as much as possible<sup>192</sup>. It was only in 1981 and due to the strong protests of the opposition that YENED was eventually allowed to transmit summaries of the party leaders' speeches at those rallies which were extensively covered by ERT<sup>193</sup>.

In Seymour-Ure's terms<sup>194</sup>, non-partisanship was to be judged by purely quantitative criteria, with the inter-party committees themselves deciding how much time was to be allocated to each of the major contestants. The political polarization of the party system and the government's eagerness to prove that "democracy was working" made the coverage of the electoral campaign too crucial an issue to be left to the broadcasters. The latter were not allowed to make their own programmes about the election and interviews with or debates between politicians were absent from both channels.

**TABLE 6.1**  
**1977 Election coverage on television (as decided by the inter-party committee for the elections)**

Parties	Type of coverage	Duration
ND	Three rallies	25'-50' each
	Two studio appearances of leader	12' each
EK-ND	Three rallies	25'-47' each
	Two studio appearances of leader	12' each
PASOK	Three rallies	25'-30' each
	Two studio appearances of leader	12' each
Alliance	Three rallies	20'-25' each
	Two studio appearances of leader	12' each
KKE	One studio appearance of leader	12'
EP	One studio appearance of leader	12'

Source: The national press, 25-29.10.1977

**TABLE 6.2**  
**1981 Election coverage on television (as decided by the inter-party committee for the elections)**

Parties	Type of coverage	Duration
ND	Two rallies	1h 15' each
	Two studio appearances of leader	12' and 10'
PASOK	Two rallies	1h 15' each
	Two studio appearances of leader	12' and 10'
KKE	One rally	1h 15'
	Two studio appearances of leader	12' and 10'
KKE-es	One rally	35'
	Two studio appearances of leader	12' and 10'
EDIK	One rally	35'
	Two studio appearances of leader	12' and 10'
KODISO	One rally	35'
	Two studio appearances of leader	12' and 10'
K.Proodeft.	Three studio appearances of leader	12'(2), 10'
Ep.Aristera	Two studio appearances of leader	12' and 12'
EKKE-KKE M-L	Two studio appearances of leader	12' and 12'

Source: The national press, 3 and 5.10.1981.

In the general elections of 1974, the first ever to be covered by television, EIRT transmitted rallies of the four biggest parties (ND, EK-ND, PASOK and United Left), while each evening television provided a thirty minute-long compilation of the day's campaign activities<sup>195</sup>. Following a similar inter-party agreement, four of the competing parties in the 1977 election (ND, EDIK, PASOK and SPAD) had their largest rallies broadcast by ERT's radio and television services; moreover, party leaders (including in this case those of KKE and EP) addressed for the first time the electorate from the television studios (see Table 6.1). A fairer arrangement was made by the Rallis' government in 1981 so that airtime was also allocated to the smaller parties, including those of the extra-parliamentary Left (see Table 6.2).

All in all, television had only limited impact upon the format of the election campaign in the first three electoral contests of the transition. Far from becoming a new arena where politicians were to compete for support, television was a passive transmitter of the parties' traditional methods of electioneering and especially of the central activity of the campaign, namely the tours of political leaders around Greece and their speeches in massive open-air rallies. Thus, in the elections of 1981 for instance, out of a total of fifteen hours of election broadcasting on television, ten and a half hours were given over to the coverage of the parties' rallies<sup>196</sup>.

The attendance of election rallies had always been a major mode of political participation in Greece<sup>197</sup>; although there are no comparable data available, it might be suggested that the significance of such participation was reinforced after the dictatorship due to a number of factors. First, the disappearance of persecution against political opponents of the Right and also improvements in transportation made participation in political rallies easier for large numbers of people. Secondly, such events offered an opportunity for

political expression to a population which had been deprived of freedom of speech for seven years. Finally, the political polarization which prevailed in the 1970s and the particular party political culture with its emphasis on the role of the leader<sup>198</sup> also contributed to the dominance of party rallies as a form of election campaigning.

Moreover, open-air rallies, although not especially staged for television, when televised constituted spectacular events. The huge crowds, the sea of flags with the parties' colours, the slogans, the party messages delivered in an emotional manner by the leaders and received enthusiastically by the gathered supporters, all created a fervent atmosphere which, thanks to television, could now be conveyed to audiences in the remotest villages of the country. The size of a mass rally was regarded by all political parties as a clear indicator of likely electoral success. Huge efforts and considerable expense went into the organization of rallies so that they could appear on television as large 'laothalasses' (seas of people), which would perhaps influence the votes of the undecided members of the electorate<sup>199</sup>. In view of this, it does not seem surprising that political parties did not seek to exploit the possibilities for new forms of presentation of the election campaign that the advent of television offered. By contrast, the parties developed new kinds of publicity activities, such as the extensive political advertising by the press and the unprecedented use of huge posters which absorbed enormous resources<sup>200</sup>.

The emphasis on mass rallies and the absence of sophistication regarding television coverage of the election can also be attributed to the attitude of Greek politicians towards the new medium. Political leaders might have considered television as a means of mass persuasion which presented a "menace to democracy greater than the tanks", but they did not seem to be fully aware of its potential as a medium of

political communication. Moreover, most of them had been used to the traditional ways of electioneering and appeared to be sceptical, or perhaps fearful of the impact that their appearance in television studios might have upon their votes. Thus, Karamanlis did not even bother to use the second slot allocated to ND for a studio broadcast in the 1977 elections<sup>201</sup>, while Papandreou when presented in 1981 with a choice between a televised debate with Premier Rallis and the coverage of yet another PASOK rally opted for the latter<sup>202</sup>. Clearly, political leaders preferred the fervour of a party rally where they could manipulate their audiences with their oratorical skills to the risk of being manipulated by an interviewer in the much more sober atmosphere of a television studio. Nevertheless, there was a degree of adaptation to the needs of television, as mass rallies became increasingly stage-managed for the cameras. For instance, at his final speech prior to the 1977 elections, Karamanlis appeared at the balcony of Athens' Syntagma Square stern, erect, surrounded by white pigeons, deliberately reminiscent of the national heroes' statues, a true "Ethnarchis" (the Nation's Leader), as his supporters liked to call him.

To summarize, the election campaign as presented on television reflected and emphasized the personalistic character of Greek politics and the dominance of political leaders as the embodiment of their supporters' ideas and aspirations. The rest of the parties' leading cadres were remarkably absent from the television screens, although they were intensely involved in electoral activities especially at the local level. Certainly, television coverage of the elections did not help to promote the parties' images or programmes. What it did underline was that major characteristic of Greek political culture which a political analyst has aptly described as 'apolitical over-politicization'; that is, the Greeks' passionate approach to politics, exemplified by their enthusiastic participation in mass rallies, the centrality of the activities of the state in

the daily political discourse, the emphasis on the role of leadership, and at the same time the absence of any serious discussion of the political process and social structures<sup>203</sup>. The electoral campaign was not so much about real problems and proposed solutions, as about the performance of political leaders and their appeal to the mass of their supporters. Moreover, the coverage of the election campaign created a different political hierarchy to that presented by radio and television in the periods between elections. If everyday politics on television appeared to be the task of the Prime Minister and his ministers, the fight and potential success in an election was clearly the task of the parties' leaders.

## 6.8 Conclusion

The transition to democracy and the establishment of a competitive pluralist system were not accompanied by any thorough, democratic reform of the broadcasting organizations, as one might have expected. Instead, New Democracy seized upon the opportunity to further its political ends through the new medium of television. Thus, early considerations for the re-organization of Greek radio and television following the BBC model of public service broadcasting were very soon abandoned in favour of a system which perpetuated the subjugation of the broadcast media to the will of the government. Law 230 on ERT enabled ND to impose political control over broadcast output, either by appointing trusted political friends or party members to the organization's key editorial and managerial posts or through direct ministerial intervention in the formulation of programme content. Additionally, the preservation of YENED provided a channel for the expression of the party's ultra-conservative wing.

In all, ND's policy on broadcasting revealed a paternalistic

outlook of politics and a profound mistrust for the independent operation of institutions within civil society. Opposition parties and organized groups were offered no scope to express their alternative views of society on radio and television, for the coverage of political and social conflict was considered by ND as undermining political stability. Thus, news programmes presented politics as the exclusive province of those holding executive power, rather than as a process involving conflict, debate and accommodation.

The Conservatives seemed to be convinced that the exposure of Greeks to the exclusive influence of the government would confer legitimacy to their policies and secure their electoral interests. Yet, the political and ideological monopolization of the broadcast media by ND became a permanent source of controversy and tension between the government and the parties of the opposition.

ND's broadcasting policy revealed also an indifference to the cultural and educational functions of broadcasting. All recommendations of foreign experts were ignored completely and the Greek broadcasting organizations continued to suffer from bureaucracy, irrational distribution of personnel and resources and lack of technical equipment. The objective of operating a real public broadcasting service, although enshrined in the new Constitution, was never seriously pursued, far less achieved by the Conservatives.

## NOTES

1. R. McDONALD: Pillar and Tinderbox, Marion Boyars, London 1983, p. 180.
2. Ibid.
3. See L. KOMINIS: The Crisis of the Greek Press, Kaktos, Athens 1985, p. 202-210.
4. McDonald, op.cit., p. 183.
5. See ELEFTHEROTYPIA (journal) September-October 1975. See also Gazette of Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 3, Sessions from 10 May 1975 to 4 July 1975, pp. 2790-91 and 2861-67.
6. Speech of P. Lambrias, ibid, p. 2865.
7. Lambrias's speech at the ESIEA offices, 7 April 1977 in Problems of the Press and Journalism (in Greek), ESIEA, Athens 1977, p. 160.
8. Article 14 par 2.
9. See "Essence and Style of Government Information", ANTI, no. 345, 24 April 1987, p. 40.
10. Ibid. Also, Interview of journalist E. Papageorgiou with the author, 8 January 1990.
11. See the entire draft in P.D. DAGTOGLOU: Press and Constitution, Greek University Publications, Athens 1989, p. 281-331. For a brief analysis, see McDonald op. cit., p. 192-198.
12. As in note 7. The reasons for the reaction have not been known, but most likely they had to do with the draft's provisions for the abolition of government intervention and concessions to the press and the establishment of a fully competitive system which would favour large groups.
13. McDonald, op. cit., p. 198
14. Ibid. See also, minutes of the conference for the mass media in December 1985, published in ANTI, no. 320, 27 June-24 July 1986, p. 31-55. Also, reply of ESIEA members to questionnaire presented by the author, 12 September 1988.
15. See the speech of the Esiea president G. Anastassopoulos,



- 17 March 1977 as in note 7.
16. McDonald op. cit., p. 188-92.
17. Ibid, p. 189; also, ANTI, no. 320 op. cit., p. 32.
18. ANTI ibid.
19. Ibid, p. 38
20. For such views see the comments of many journalists, ibid, p. 31-55. See also, A. PHILIPOPOULOS: The Information Today, (in Greek) booklet from the seminars organized by ESIEA, in May 1988.
21. Interview of P. Bakoyiannis in TA NEA, 6.9.1985. Of those who had left EIRT during the dictatorship a small, though unspecified, number who had been dismissed by the military government were reinstated according to Legislative Decree 76 of 27 September 1974. Those who had resigned in the same period were given the opportunity to apply for re-admission. Out of 161 applicants, 40 were recognized as having been forced to resign while the three-member committee which considered the applications rejected the remaining 121. See answer of the Undersecretary of the Press to parliament in Gazette of Parliamentary Debates, Vol 1, Sittings 1-31, 12.2.1977-15.2.1978, Session 13, of 20 January 1978, p. 343.
22. See Bakoyiannis's interview in KATHIMERINI, 16.2.1975.
23. See Gazette of Parliamentary Debates, vol 1, Sittings 1-48, 9.12.74-5.3.75, Sitting 20, 17 January 1975, p. 353.
24. Ibid.
25. Speech of MP G.A. Mangakis ibid, p. 340.
26. Quoted by McDonald op.cit., p. 201.
27. The 50 members of the Advisory Body should be elected by the political parties in parliament; the local authorities; the Church; the Union of Newspaper Publishers; the Union of Journalists; trades unions and agricultural associations; the union of industrialists unions of independent professionals; women's and students' associations and unions of artists.
28. See the report of Hugh Greene to Lambrias in R. MANTHOULIS: The State of Television (in Greek), Themelio, Athens 1981, p. 202-211.

29. See her report to the Undersecretary of Press and Information: "Television in Greece: Programme Output, Organization and Operation", April 1975, typescript, p. 2., author's archive.
30. See Appendix A, *ibid*, p. 31.
31. Interview with the author, 14 August 1989.
32. The report *op. cit.*, p. 11.
33. Interview, *op. cit.*
34. Report, *op. cit.*, p. 10.
35. This middle-management structure was to include the following posts: Television Programme Director, Programme Heads (possibly four), Head of programme Planning, Head of Purchasing and Head of Presentation; *ibid*, p. 14.
36. *Ibid*, p. 5.
37. See TA NEA, 10.11.1975 for extracts of his reports.
38. Interview of Alan Protheroe with the author, 5.9.1989.
39. TA NEA *op. cit.*
40. *Ibid*. See also for extracts of the report in KATHIMERINI, 9.11.1975.
41. TA NEA *op.cit.*
42. Article 14 par. 8 of the 1952 Constitution. This provision was repeated in the dictatorial constitutions of 1968 and 1973. See also N. ALIVIZATOS: State and Broadcasting (in Greek), Sakkoulas, Athens 1986, p. 20.
43. As the MP B. Paparrigopoulos, who proposed the above provision, suggested,  
"I would like to distinguish cinema and more generally the public spectacles and radio from the concept of the press. I want to impose greater restrictions. Especially in reference to radio, because its expansion...and influence is so great that I believe a special provision should be made." Alivizatos *ibid*.
44. *Ibid*, p. 22-23.
45. Article 15, par. 2, full text:  
"Radio and television are placed under immediate state control; their aim is the objective and impartial transmission of information and news as well as of works of literature and art, provided that they safeguard a high level of quality that is required by their social purpose and the cultural development of the country.
46. This public service character derives from the definition

of the objectives of broadcasting by paragraph 2, in combination with the exclusion of broadcasting from the protective provisions for the press.

47. See Alivizatos, op.cit., notes 22-25, p. 22-23.

48. Ibid, p. 24.

49. Ibid, p. 26.

50. Synadinos, interview with the author, 12.1.1988; also, TA NEA, 9.9.85.

51. Synadinos, interview with the author, ibid

52. Law 230, article 2, par. 1.

53. Law 230, article 4, par. 1.

54. Law 230, article 4, par. 2.

55. Law 230, article 2, par. 4.

56. Law 230, article 5, par. 1

57. The opposition had proposed the law to establish also an obligation for ERT to transmit the statements of the parties of the opposition but this was not accepted by the government. Speeches by H. Heliou and V. Tsouderou, Gazette of Parliamentary Debates, Vol. A, Sittings 1-33 6.10.1975-27.11.1975, Sitting 32 of 26 November 1975, p. 1042-1043

58. Law 230, article 10.

59. Law 230, article 12.

60. These were to be rectors of universities, top civil servants, a military officer specializing in communications, the Chairman of the Council of the State, the Chairman of the Athens' Academy, and the Head of the Bank of Greece acting as Chairman. Law 230, article 13, par.1.

61. Law 230, a. 13 pars. 1,2.

62. Gazette of Parliamentary Debates op. cit., p. 1045.

63. Ibid

64. Law 230, a. 14.

65. The national press, 25.11.1974.

66. For instance, in early November both channels refused to transmit an advertisement about a series of reports on the civil war, published by newspaper To Vima. See TA NEA, 8.11.1975.

67. As early as January 1975, four deputies of EK-ND, submitted a motion of interpellation to the government about the operation of both EIRT and YENED; at the debate which followed, the government came under fierce criticism by the opposition for monopolizing the news programmes. See Gazette of Parliamentary Debates, op. cit., Sitting 20, 17.1.1975, p. 340-361.
68. KATHIMERINI, 2.11.1975.
69. Gazette of Parliamentary Debates, op. cit., 26.11.1975, Sitting 32, Vol. A, p. 1032.
70. Speeches of Heliou (EDA), Kaklamanis and Koutsoheras (PASOK), *ibid*, p. 1042, 1051 and 1055 respectively.
71. Speech of Manavis (EK-ND), *ibid*, p. 1037.
72. See speeches of Manavis (p. 1038), Mangakis (p. 1058), Gazis (p. 1121), Tsouderou (p. 1121), Papadopoulos (p. 1122). It should be noted here that a more representative composition of ERT's administrative bodies was also requested by deputies of the government majority such as Paparrigopoulos (p. 1035) and Vassiliou (p. 1058); *ibid*.
73. *Ibid*, p. 1069.
74. The new appointees were: Air Force Brigadier S. Vavaroutsos as commander; Air Force Major Lykos as deputy commander; and Colonel M. Vallindras as programme director; M. LAMBRINIDIS: 33 Years in YENED (in Greek), Phillipotis, Athens 1982, p. 154.
75. These were the journalists K. Sismanis and D. Giannarakos. The latter was transferred to YENED from the press office of the Ministry of Defence. Interview with YENED's news editor A. Chrysochoou with the author, 16.1.1989.
76. Gazette of Parliamentary Debates, op. cit., Sitting 20, 17.1.1975, p. 347. Chrysochoou, *ibid*, said characteristically: "Averoff was almighty. Every decision depended on his own will"
77. Gazette of Parliamentary Debates, *ibid*, p. 347.
78. Lambrinidis op. cit. p. 154, mentions six names of those who were dismissed, some of whom returned shortly afterwards.
79. The famous Aliki Nikolaidou, for instance, with a programme about Greek history and religion. Lambrinidis, *ibid*, p. 154.

80. Moschovitis was also appointed by the ND government to the General Secretariat of Press and Information. TA NEA, 9.9.1981.
81. Ibid.
82. See for instance, Parliam. Debate for Law 230, p. 1111, Kaklamanis. Also, Tsouderou submitted a question for Averoff in parliament on 28.9.1979. See also, TA NEA, 29.9.1977 and 9.9.1981.
83. According to the dictator's regulations, the content of broadcasts should not: be offensive to public morals; contain political messages; stir up political passions; be pessimistic or have a negative view of life. TA NEA, 29.9.1977.
84. Gazette of Parliamentary Debates, Sitting 69, 11.2.1980.
85. Vallindras' interview with the author, 20.1.1988. See for instance KATHIMERINI, "The seven sins of YENED", 12.1.1975.
86. Pressures for the de-militarization of YENED were also exercised by the civilian personnel of the network; employees went on strike a few times, mostly within 1979, demanding the transformation of YENED into a public limited company. Chrysocoou, 16.1.1989.
87. Speech of Mangakis (EK-ND), Gazette of Parliam. Debates, op. cit, 17.1.1975.
88. Speech of Lambrias (ND), ibid, p. 354.
89. Speech of Angelousis (EK-ND), ibid, p. 343.
90. Speech of Averoff (ND), ibid, p. 347.
91. Vallindras, interview with the author, op.cit..
92. Speech of Mangakis (EK-ND), Gazette of Parliament. Debates op.cit., p. 341.
93. For details on YENED's programme see Manthoulis op. cit., p. 65, and for the ratings his report to the Board of Governors of ERT, 1.1-30.4.1976. op. cit., p.224.
94. In 1971, YENED absorbed 79.3 per cent of the entire advertising revenue on television in contrast to 20.7 per cent for EIRT. By 1974 the latter had closed the gap substantially receiving 46.7 per cent of the advertising expenditure compared to 53.3 per cent for YENED.
95. Vallindras, interview with the author, op.cit.

96. Indicatively, a note that Vallindras found in his office when appointed Director of Programming said: "For the popular program (X) add more commercials, even if there is no time left for the programme itself". Vallindras, interview with the author, op. cit..

97. "YENED has been an organization which overcame all difficulties on its own, and was able to cope with all expenses only with the income from advertising and provide us with a programme which is faultless, enviable and profitable at the same time. This means that this organization has a management which is very efficient, and I do not know what will happen to it after the merger. Should perhaps undertake the management of the EIRT?". Speech of ND deputy N. Zardinidis, Gazette of Parliam. Debates, op. cit., p. 1105. See also for similar views, the speeches of the ND deputies E. Athanassakos and G. Apostolatos, p. 1109.

98. Speech of Manavis (EK-ND), *ibid*, p. 1038.

99. Speech of Papadakis (ND), *ibid*, p. 1108.

100. Speech of Averoff (ND), Gazette of Parliamentary Debates, op. cit., Sitting 20, 17.1.1975, p. 347.

101. This view seems to have been endorsed by the majority of ND's parliamentary party, as the number of speakers in favour of YENED's retention indicates, as well as the applause that Averoff's speech received in Parliament; *ibid*.

102. Gazette of Parliam. Debates, op. cit., Sitting 33, 27.11.1975, p. 1116.

103. Th. VEREMIS; "Security Considerations and Civil-Military Relations in post-war Greece". In R. CLOGG (ed) Greece in the 1980's, McMillan, London 1983, p. 181.

104. See for instance the speeches of A. Kaklamanis (PASOK), Parl. Debates as in note 102, p. 1104, and G.A. Mangakis (EK-ND), Parl. Debates as in note 100, p. 341.

105. Clogg, 1987, op. cit., p. 60.

106. Speech of Papadakis (ND), Gazette of Parliam. Debates, op. cit., Sitting 33, 27.11.1975, p. 1108.

107. Speech of Trikoupis (ND), *ibid*, p. 1116.

108. Gazette of Parliamentary Debates, Sitting 117, 14.4.1981, p. 5551
109. There has not been any known controversy about the appointment or resignation of a deputy D.G. for administration. The appointees to this post were, according to Law 230/1975, chosen from the senior administrative staff of the organization.
110. Horn's letter to Karamanlis; the national press, 25.11.1974; Vlachos's interview, TA NEA, 27.2.1984; Solomos's interview, TA NEA, 2.9. 1985; Manthoulis, op.cit., p. 111; Vallindras, interview with the author, op. cit.; Stefanakis's interview, TA NEA, 11.9.1985; Delipetros, interview with the author, 14.1. 1988. Stefanakis and Delipetros were members of the governing party.
111. Bakoyiannis interview in TA NEA, 6.9.1985.
112. Vallindras, interview, op. cit.
113. Ibid; and McDonald op. cit., p. 203-204.
114. Letter to Undersecretary for the Press P. Lambrias, 25.4. 1975; J. Spicer, op.cit.
115. J. Spicer, interview with the author, 14.8.1989.
116. The reason was that Vlachos had been told that the deputy director intended to replace him as head of EIRT; TA NEA, 2.9. 1985.
117. Law 2190/1920.
118. Law 230/1975.
119. Lampsas, interview in TA NEA, 2.3.1984.
120. Synadinos, interview with the author, 12.1.1988.
121. His interview in TA NEA, 4.9.1985: "The Board wanted to intervene everywhere; even to decide the type of make up for the programme announcer".
122. I. LAMPSAS: "Structure and Targets of Greek Radio-Television", p. 8. Typescript from the author's archive of article published in EBU Review, vol. 28, No 2, Geneva, March 1977.
123. M. VALLINDRAS: "The 'philosophy' of TV programme and how it is manufactured". Typescript from the author's archive of

article for publication to the press, 1981.

124. The national press, 30.10.1975.

125. Vlachos, in TA NEA, op. cit.

126. See press statement of the Ministry to the Prime Minister, the national press, 30.10.1975.

127. It is not clear whether the concurrent resignations of the EIRT Chairman I.M. Panayiotopoulos and the deputy D.G. A. Solomos were connected to this incident. The latter evoked other reasons for this resignation. See the national press, 1.11.1975 and 22.11.1975. Also, Vlachos's and Solomos's interviews op. cit.

128. Let us cite here two major examples: The French series 'Bitter Bread', which described the adventures of a poor peasant girl in the era of French industrialization was interrupted. Manthoulis op.cit., p. 159-162. and Stefanakis, interview, op. cit. That was also the case of a series of programmes made by Melina Merkouri which dealt with social issues. See her letter to the Press, 1.11.1975.

129. Manthoulis op.cit, p. 147 and 155.

130. Manthoulis op. cit., p. 147.

131. Vallindras, his article, op. cit.

132. Vallindras, interview with the author, op. cit.

133. Ibid; Lampsas's letter of resignation, the national press, 22.1.1978; Vlachos's interview, op. cit.; Bakoyiannis' interview, TA NEA, 6.9.1985.

134. Ibid.

135. His interview in TA NEA, 2.3.1984.

136. The national press, 22.1.1978.

137. Manthoulis, op. cit., p. 289. The last straw was the transmission of an unscheduled football match at the time that the march commemorating the third anniversary of the Polytechnic uprising was taking place. This decision which was taken during Manthoulis's absence, was considered as a sacrilege by the press and the parties of the opposition; see p. 157-158.

138. Vallindras, interview with the author, op. cit.



139. Vlachos, interview, op. cit.
140. Stefanakis's interview in TA NEA, 11.9.1985.
141. Vallindras's article, op. cit.
142. We only need to quote the statements of G. Mavros: "These terrible mass media (...) constitute the number one danger for democracy - this danger is greater than that of the tanks (...)", Sitting 20, 17 January 1975, op.cit., p. 348; and of A. Papandreou: "What constitutes the greatest danger in this era is television. Television is the most easily digestible food. It does not require any kind of education. It requires patience and passivity", speech at an ESIEA meeting, 5 April 1977, Problems of Press..., op.cit., p. 126.
143. See McDonald, op.cit., p. 205.
144. P.Bakoyiannis, interview in TA NEA, 6-9-1985.
145. See the national press, 25-11-1974. Also, in his letter of resignation, D.Horn stated that "the elections were the first occasion for the emergence of a new ethos that could be called objective information. Unfortunately, this mentality was not approved by all, and those dissatisfied took the opportunity to accuse me of bias".
146. Among those who resigned were the Directors of Television and of Radio programmes. In their letter of resignation they claimed that "(...) the change of the Director General (...) especially as it takes place a day after the new government was sworn in, creates a framework within which we believe it is impossible to carry out the work we have planned". The national press, 26-11-1974.
147. Karzis, interview with the author, 13-1-1988.
148. Gazette of Parliamentary Debates, Period B, Session 1, vol. 1, Sittings 1-31, 12.12.1977-15.2.1978, Sitting 25 of 7.2. 1978, p. 879.
149. McDonald, op.cit., p. 205.
150. See Lambrias, Gazette of Parliamentary Debates, op. cit., Sitting 20 of 17-1-1975, p. 351.
151. Ph. SCHLESINGER: Putting 'Reality' Together, Methuen, London 1987, p. 139.

152. Bouloukos, ERT sub-editor, interview in TA NEA, 29-2-1984.
153. Ibid.
154. Ibid. A. Chrysochoou, interview with the author, 16-1-1989; I.Lampsas, interview in TA NEA, 4-9-1985; Karzis, interview with the author, op. cit.
155. Karzis, interview, ibid.
156. N.Delipetros, for instance, who was also General Secretary for the Press and thus responsible for the government's information policy, was against the 'depoliticization' of television, as he called the exclusion of any criticism against the government or any conflict from the news. Interview with the author, 14-1-1988. Also, see Lampsas's interview in TA NEA, op.cit.
157. Karzis, interview, op.cit.
158. McDonald, op.cit., p. 206; also, Bouloukos, interview, op. cit.
159. Bouloukos, ibid.
160. Karzis, interview with the author, op.cit.; K.Houndas, ERT sub-editor, interview with the author, 12-1-1988; A. Chrysochoou, interview with the author, 8-1-1987. Chrysochoou suggested that self-censorship was a common practice among newsmen if they wished to safeguard their career.
161. See the detailed information about the salaries of ERT's senior staff and journalists in the speech of EDA MP H.Heliou, Gazette of Parl.Debates, as in note 148, Sitting 26, 8-2-1978, p. 947; see also TA NEA, 3-2-1978.
162. Bouloukos, op.cit.; Houndas, op.cit.; Karzis, op.cit., Delipetros, op.cit.
163. Houndas, ibid; Karzis, ibid, Bouloukos, ibid.
164. McDonald, op.cit., p. 204.
165. J.TUNSTALL: The Media in Britain, Constable, London 1983,p. 142.
166. ANTOINE DE TARLE: "France: the Monopoly that won't divide". In A.SMITH (ed.), Television and Political Life, Macmillan, London 1979, p. 69.
167. See, for instance, Kaklamanis's speech in the debate for

Law 230/1975, Gazette of Parliam. Debates, op. cit., Sitting 32 of 26.11.1975, p. 1051.

168. See for these programmes the detailed reports in TA NEA, 23-24.9.1981. This pro-government line had critics even within the governing party. See, for instance, the criticism of ND deputy Trikoupis in Gazette of Parliam. Debates, ibid, Sitting 33 of 27.11.1975, p. 1099, who claimed that the substantial news was constantly ignored by the two networks.

169. See examples in A.Papandreou's speech, Gazette of Parliamentary Debates, as in note 148, Sitting 26 of 8 February 1978, p. 917.

170. D.KATSLOUDAS: "Greece: A Politically Controlled State Monopoly Broadcasting System". In R.KUHN (ed.), Broadcasting and Politics in Western Europe, West European Politics, vol.8, April 1985, p. 149.

171. Gazette of Parliamentary Debates, as in note 148, Sitting 25 of 7 February 1978, p. 880.

172. See the report in Tachydromos, op. cit. Also, for a variety of examples see the speech of KKE deputy N. Kaloudis, ibid, p. 888.

173. There was a very small number of summaries of the political events of the week, which, nevertheless, did not contain any kind of commentary or interviews with politicians. The most notable was the 'Review of the Political Week'; M. Yiobazolias (former Head of political reportage, 1982-1989), interview with the author, 21-9-1990.

174. The radio and television of both networks presented a number of weekly programmes about Europe and the Community. See TA NEA, 23/24-9-1984.

175. Karzis, interview with the author, op.cit.

176. McDonald, op.cit., p. 207.

177. A political commentator who appeared only from time to time to present his analysis on major political issues, following the general line of the government, was removed at Karamanlis' request, possibly due to the protests of the opposition, as he had been a ND candidate in the 1977 election.

See the speech of A.Papandreou, Gazette of Parliament. Debates, as in note 148, Sitting 26 of 8 February 1978, p. 918.

178. Bouloukos, op.cit.

179. Chrysochoou, interview with the author, op.cit.

180. Sitting 20 of 17 January 1975, Gazette of Parl.Debates, op.cit., p. 350.

181. Ibid, p.345.

182. See Sitting 20 of 17 January 1975, Gazette of Parl. Debates, op.cit., speech of Mangakis, p.342; speech of Alevras, p. 359; and speech of Mavros, p. 350.

183. The national press, 26-1-1978.

184. Speech of A. Papandreou, Gazette of Parliam. Debates, as in note 148, Sitting 26 of 8 February 1978, p. 919. Also, speech of L. Kyrkos, ibid, Sitting 25 of 7 February 1978, p. 887.

185. A discussion was organized by journalists, academics and artists at the cultural centre ORA on 31-1-1978, mentioned by V.Tsouderou, Sitting 25, 7 February 1978 ibid, p. 875. See also the decision of 12-1-1978 by the Committee for Constitutional Rights and Civil Liberties of the Athens Lawyers Association, quoted extensively by A.Papandreou, Sitting 26, 8 February 1978, Gazette of Parl.Debates, ibid, p. 916-917.

186. Sitting 20, 17 January 1975, Gazette of Parl.Debates op.cit., p.352.

187. Lampsas left ERT on a month's leave and was replaced by deputy Director General M.Vallindras (interview with the author, op.cit.). Lambrias was replaced by the Chairman of ESIEA G.Anastasopoulos (McDonald, op.cit.). In addition to these measures, the government replaced three ministers who played a key role in the organization of the elections (ministers of Justice, Northern Greece and Interior) with generally accepted figures. It also agreed to disarm the TEA (The national press, 12-10-1977).

188. The government also replaced the ministers of Interior, Justice and Public Order.

189. In the 1981 campaign in particular, it was agreed between

ND and PASOK that in the news ERT and YENED should avoid to pronounce the names of individual ministers and instead refer only to the title of the office (i.e. the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Justice etc).

190. TA NEA, 24-9-1981.

191. The election of 1974 was held, as we have seen, by a coalition government and even then the terms of the election coverage had been agreed upon by representatives of all major political parties.

192. Gazette of Parliam. Debates, op. cit., Sitting 20 of 17.1. 1975, p. 346.

193. The national press, 23-9-1981.

194. C. SEYMOUR-URE: The Political Impact of Mass Media, Constable, London 1974, p. 236-237.

195. According to the Minister to the Prime Minister A.Vlachos, only the parties which had lists of candidates in all constituencies or in the majority of them were to have their campaigns covered by EIRT; the national press, 30-10-1974.

196. Clogg, Parties...op.cit., p. 89.

197. The concept of political participation used here is based on the definition by N.H.NIE and S. VERBA: Political Participation. In R.C.MAKRIDIS and B.E.BROWN (eds): Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings, The Dorsey Press, Illinois 1977, p. 328.

198. N.DIAMANDOUROS: "Greek Political Culture In Transition: Historical Origins, Evolution, Current Trends". In, Greece in the 1980s, op.cit., p. 43-67.

199. For instance, it was reported that at the ND rally in Thessaloniki in 1981, more than 1000 bus loads of supporters were brought to the city from various parts of Greece; Clogg, Parties...op.cit., p. 89.

200. For 1981 alone, there has been an estimation of 3 billion drachmas total expenditure for the electoral campaign; ibid, p.89.

201. J.C.LOULIS: "New Democracy: the new face of conservatism", in H. PENNIMAN (ed) Greece at the Polls, American Enterprise

Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington 1981, p. 75-76  
202. The national press, 9-9-1981.

203. M.SPOURDALAKIS: "Greek Populism and Authoritarian Statism". In Populism and Politics (in Greek), Gnosi, Athens 1989, p. 70-73. This book contains a selection of essays about populism by different writers.

## CHAPTER 7

### PASOK IN POWER:1981-1987

#### 7.1 Introduction

The general election of October 18 1981 was a major turning point in the history of post-war Greece. For the first time a political party of the Left was brought to power, putting an end to the almost uninterrupted thirty-year rule of the Right. PASOK scored an overwhelming victory with 48.07 per cent of the vote and a clear majority of seats in Parliament. The defeat of New Democracy constituted the first real test of parliamentary democracy. Yet, the smooth transition from a Conservative to a Socialist government proved that the regime enjoyed widespread legitimacy among both the electorate and the political elite in a country where the prospect of a Centre Union electoral victory had led to a military dictatorship fourteen years earlier.

The Socialist landslide reflected the disillusionment of large segments of the electorate with ND and its paternalistic practices and a consequent desire for political change. PASOK's policy pronouncements included the application of a fairer income policy; the establishment of a new health system; a solution to Athens' perennial environmental problems; the abolition of patronage and the use of meritocratic criteria in public appointments; and the democratization and modernization of the state machinery. Among other things, PASOK was expected to introduce a new ethos to the country's political life.

One aspect of this new political ethos was to be the independent operation of the broadcast media from any government interference. Significantly, the broadcasting reform was included in a number of institutional changes regarding the operation of Parliament, the political parties, the judicial system and the armed forces: changes which according to PASOK itself were essential for the safeguarding of political pluralism and of democracy.

However, in order to understand better the party's attitude towards broadcasting, it is essential first of all to examine PASOK's overall philosophy and general strategy while in opposition, as well as its performance in government during the period 1981-87. This is the aim of the present chapter. The following chapter will deal more specifically with PASOK's relationship with the media.

## **7.2 The General Election of 1981 and the Socialists' victory**

The result of the 1981 election marked the end of the restructuring of the post-1974 party system. One could now talk of a transition from a 'predominant party system' (if the prolonged reign of the Right was taken into account) to a two-party system, in terms of the possibilities for alternation in government under the existing electoral law, or to a three-party system in terms of parliamentary representation<sup>1</sup>. As G. Mavrogordatos has pointed out<sup>2</sup>, as in the period immediately before the dictatorship each one of the broad traditional camps (Right-Centre-Left) was represented after 1981 by a single political party: ND, PASOK and the KKE respectively, who together shared 95 per cent of the votes and all seats in Parliament (see Table 7.1).



PASOK's victory also terminated the competition between the parties of the Centre and the Left for the political leadership of all those social forces which were seeking political change. The traditional Centre was virtually eliminated. Following its 1977 election disaster, EDIK had undergone a profound crisis which had led to the resignation of G. Mavros as party leader and to the fragmentation of the centre forces into a variety of minuscule parties. Moreover, a significant number of centrist cadres had meanwhile sought a better political fortune in either ND or PASOK. Eventually, the combined vote of the

**TABLE 7.1**  
**OCTOBER 1981 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS**

<u>Parties</u>	<u>% of votes</u>	<u>no. of seats</u>	<u>% of seats</u>
PASOK	48.0	172	57.33
New Democracy	35.88	115	38.33
KKE	10.94	13	4.33
Party of the Progressives	1.69	-	-
KKE-es	1.35	-	-
Party of Democratic Socialism and Party of Peasants and Workers (KODISO-KAE)	0.71	-	-
EDIK	0.41	-	-
Liberal Party	0.36	-	-
Christian Democracy	0.15	-	-
Extreme Left	0.23	-	-
Other	0.22	-	-
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>300.00</b>	<b>100.00</b>

centre parties (EDIK; the electoral alliance between the Party of Democratic Socialism-KODISO-and the Party of Peasants and Workers-KAE; the Liberal Party) did not exceed a meagre 1.5 per cent.

The orthodox KKE increased its share of the vote by 1.58 per cent gaining 10.94 per cent and 13 seats in Parliament, whereas its main rival the KKE-es with only 1.35 per cent was deprived of parliamentary representation. The KKE thus completed its dominance within the traditional Left, but its result, which in fact fell far short of its stated objective of 17 per cent, indicated the limits of the party's influence upon the electorate.

PASOK, on the other hand, having increased its credentials within both the Centre and Left through the last-minute accessions of G. Mavros and M. Glezos, the secretary general of EDA and a wartime resistance hero, appeared to be the only force that could guarantee political change. The party's principal slogan was 'Allaghi' (Change), a vague term which could be given a variety of meanings ranging from the socialist transformation of society to the widespread popular desire to get rid of the Right.

The Socialist victory was also facilitated by the electoral system which favoured the formation of strong majoritarian governments. Given the extensive political polarization of the time, the so-called 'psychology of the lost vote' must have influenced the decision of a significant number of supporters of the Communist Left and other minor parties, to switch their preference to PASOK as the only force that could remove the Right from power. An indication that the workings of the electoral system favoured PASOK is the significantly different result of the concurrent election for the European Parliament, which was held under a system of proportional representation (see Table 7.2).

PASOK benefited largely from the unpopularity of the ND government; towards the end of its second term in office (1979-81), New Democracy appeared increasingly unable to cope with the country's economic and social problems (galloping inflation; lack of industrial investment; decrease of real wages; rising unemployment; the poor state of the health system) or environmental issues (like the heavy air pollution in the Athens basin). Moreover, the party's failure to develop fully a liberal philosophy and its gradual drift towards more paternalistic policies under the influence of its ultra-conservative wing added to the soaring popular discontent. The party's ideological contradictions and internal crisis aggravated with Karamanlis's resignation from the leadership in spring 1980. At the same time ND had been deprived of a major asset - Karamanlis's great appeal to the electorate. The new

**TABLE 7.2**  
**THE EUROPEAN ELECTION OF 1981**

Parties	% of votes	no. of seats
PASOK	40.12	10
New Democracy	31.34	8
KKE	12.84	3
KKE-es	5.30	1
Electoral Alliance of		
KODISO-KAE	4.26	1
Party of the Progressives	1.96	1
Christian Democracy	1.15	-
EDIK	1.12	-
Liberal Party	1.04	-
Movement of Greek		
Reformers (KEME)	0.87	-
TOTAL	100.00	24

party leader, G. Rallis, though a moderate and worthy politician, was a lacklustre and uninspiring figure who could not compete with Papandreou's oratorical skills and powerful personality. It is very likely therefore, that a part of ND's more socially liberal wing and potential party voters from the traditional Centre switched to PASOK and its charismatic leader.

New Democracy also failed to benefit from the strategy of 'dievrinsi' (broadening ) towards the Centre, which had been initiated by Karamanlis after 1977 and had led to the accession of a significant number of Centrist cadres to the party<sup>3</sup>. Liberal voters were disaffected by ND's attempt to win back those Right-wing voters who had switched their support to the National Camp, EP, in 1977. Faced with a potential Socialist victory, EP finally agreed to withdraw from the contest; instead, some of its deputies were included in ND's electoral lists<sup>4</sup>.

Apart from this, ND's programme did not offer an appealing and convincing proposal for the future. The party's campaign, although highly expensive and conducted under the supervision of a large advertising company, was dull and uninspiring, mainly drawing upon the policies and achievements of the previous seven years and promising more of the same<sup>5</sup>. Eventually, the party received 35.88 per cent of the vote (and 115 seats in Parliament), which was down 6 per cent from its 1977 result. In reality, however, the loss was much greater, since in the 1981 result the votes of the Extreme Right were also included. By contrast, the combined vote of the entire Right (ND and EP) in 1977 was 48.66 per cent. In 1981 the ultra-Right was represented by Markezinis's Komma Proodeftikon (Party of the Progressives) which received a mere 1.69 per cent of the vote and did not win a seat in Parliament.

It appeared, therefore, that PASOK had not only absorbed almost the entire support of the traditional Centre, but had also attracted a significant number of disaffected ND voters. What made the Socialist victory most remarkable was the fact that the pro-PASOK vote was evenly distributed both geographically and socially. Support for PASOK was almost the same in rural, semi-urban and urban areas (48.4, 46.7 and 48.2 per cent respectively) and in only seven out of 56 electoral districts did it fall below 40 per cent<sup>6</sup>. PASOK appealed equally to almost all social classes and groups. Thus, in addition to the peasants, the blue and the white-collar workers (who gave PASOK 47, 57 and 53 per cent respectively), the party gained the support of top-rank civil servants, managerial personnel and academics (62 per cent), artisanal simple-commodity producers (48 per cent) and the liberal professions (doctors, lawyers, architects etc, who gave it 40 per cent)<sup>7</sup>. Clearly, PASOK had united under its banner of 'Allaghi' all social interests and political tendencies who wished to put an end to right-wing rule.

The party's success, however, cannot be explained solely by the crisis within the Conservative government and the inability of the other parties of the opposition to present credible alternatives to ND. PASOK's success must also be attributed to its election strategy which aimed at attracting the support of all social strata rather than a particular class or classes. Perhaps the best expression of PASOK's catch-all strategy was the emphasis that the party put on the needs and interests of the 'under-privileged' Greeks (mi-pronomiourkei), a vague term which the vast majority of the population could identify with, as against the 'privileged' minority (pronomiourkei).

After 1977, the party had increasingly moved towards more moderate positions in order to give re-assurance to the large middle-ground population of small property owners who could be alarmed by any prospect of socialist reform. It is

characteristic that the word 'socialism' was not mentioned at all in the party's 1981 electoral manifesto. The socialist transformation of society might continue to be the party's ultimate objective, but it was not to be pursued in the foreseeable future. Instead, PASOK's government programme dealt with more immediate and pressing problems: its proposals included an increase in wages and salaries; more funds for the education and health services; the curbing of inflation; and the introduction of a new taxation system which was to benefit lower incomes and reduce tax evasion.

Another significant factor which contributed to PASOK's victory was its grass roots organization which was turned into a formidable electoral machine, mobilizing the party's supporters and spreading its message all over Greece. According to one estimate, by 1981 the members of the party had reached 110,000 and were organized in a large number of local and sectoral organizations as well as cells inside and outside the country<sup>8</sup>. Finally, PASOK's victory was the achievement of Andreas Papandreu himself, who apart from his strong appeal to the electorate had been the main architect of the party's catch-all strategy.

However important these factors were, to understand the reasons which led to PASOK's development and spectacular rise (support for the party had increased 3.5 times within seven years), a lengthier examination of the party's ideology, leadership and social basis is necessary. Such an analysis will provide an explanation not only of PASOK's key features, but also of its policies and contradictions while in government.

### 7.3 PASOK: a new force in Greek politics

The rise of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement as a political formation of the non-Communist Left has been considered by some analysts as the most notable development in the post-dictatorial party system<sup>9</sup>. PASOK's development and strategy have provoked a broad academic debate concerning the party's character and position within the Greek political system. Particular attention has been paid to the links between PASOK and the pre-1967 Centre Union party (EK) of which Andreas Papandreou was a prominent cadre. Some writers have stressed the elements of continuity between the two parties in terms of their political personnel and role as forces promising political change, that is, capable of removing the Right from power. As G. Mavrogordatos has argued, PASOK is the "prodigal son of the centre, rather than an illegitimate offspring of the left"<sup>10</sup>. Others have maintained that it is an entirely new political formation "substantially different from any other party in Greek political history"<sup>11</sup>.

It is true that PASOK is in many respects a new force in Greek party politics. The party's ancestry certainly goes back to EK and especially to its radical wing which, under Andreas Papandreou, became particularly influential after the crisis of 1965 and the subsequent defection of many of EK's more conservative cadres to the royalist camp. An indication that PASOK's historical roots relate to the traditional Centre is the fact that 53 per cent of the party's 1981 parliamentary group had been members of either EK or its youth organization EDIN<sup>12</sup>.

It would be wrong, however, to assume that PASOK is a direct descendant of the EK, a party which represented mainly bourgeois interests and operated in the mould of traditional party politics (a loose political formation of notables with

significant local clienteles, gathered around a powerful leader). It is more plausible to view PASOK's emergence as the outcome of the radicalization of the 1960s and the resistance against the dictatorship: its creation reflected the need for new political formations which would introduce different forms of political mobilization and participation.

During the dictatorship most members of EK's centre-left, together with some independent left-wing activists went on to join the Panhellenic Liberation Movement (PAK) one of the most important resistance organizations that Papandreou founded in exile in May 1968<sup>13</sup>. The experience of the resistance against the dictatorship and the influence of the various left-wing movements of that time had a major radicalizing effect upon PAK's centrist cadres. Papandreou's own political outlook changed significantly from a social-democratic to a neo-Marxist position<sup>14</sup>. PAK adopted the centre-periphery dichotomy as the basis of its political analysis, according to which the military regime was seen as the outcome of US imperialism and the resistance against it as an anti-imperialist liberation struggle. As Papandreou claimed in a letter to EK's 1971 conference, the collapse of the dictatorship could be achieved only through a "politico-military movement in the classic model of the Third World", which was to carry out "a dynamic armed struggle" against the regime, with the aim of establishing a democratic, socialist system, but not a merely social-democratic one<sup>15</sup>. Clearly such positions were incompatible with EK's mild reformist line and Papandreou's statement marked the inevitable political divorce between PAK and the Centre Union.

Although PAK found remarkable support abroad and especially from the Greek migrant workers in West Germany and the students in Italy, like the rest of the resistance organizations it had hardly any impact inside Greece, mainly due to the passivity of the vast majority of the population. Thus, despite its revolutionary ideas, PAK's resistance activities remained



insignificant and limited in scope (for instance, speeches delivered by Andreas Papandreou or participation in anti-dictatorial demonstrations and campaigns organized abroad). Nevertheless, despite its limited appeal in Greece, PAK's significance as a political formation should not be underestimated. PAK was the first well-structured organization outside of the Communist Left in the post-war era to advocate socialist ideas and to put forward a concrete programme for the socialist transformation of Greek society. It was also a pool which provided new political personnel with radical ideas and experience in political organization. It was precisely the core of PAK's cadres which played the central role in the creation of PASOK in September 1974, while, as we will see, the new party's ideological manifesto adopted many of the principles which characterized the programme of PAK.

Apart from the latter, PASOK also drew together a group of independent members of the student movement who had been involved in the Polytechnic uprising and a small number of former EK cadres who had apparently been disillusioned with the traditional party practices of the period prior to the dictatorship<sup>16</sup>. Finally, in October 1974 the group of Democratic Defence (DA) joined PASOK. DA had been one of the most important resistance organizations and, although numerically small, it had had an impressive record of resistance activities against the dictatorship within the country; before 1970 about two thirds of its members had been arrested and imprisoned by the junta<sup>17</sup>. All in all, PASOK rallied a significant number of members of the resistance organizations and cadres from the traditional Centre, the Centre-Left and even the Communist Left, thus becoming the main political expression of the forces which had been radicalized during the dictatorship and the political campaigns of the 1960s.

Having incorporated many of PAK's ideas, PASOK emerged as the only party of the non-Communist Left to declare the socialist transformation of society as its main objective. Its ideological manifesto, the 'Declaration of the 3rd of September' marked a major shift from the social democratic ideas advocated by the pre-1967 Centre-Left and at the same time proposed a model of socialism markedly different to the Marxist-Leninist one as this had been expressed by the traditional Left. Following PAK's line of analysis, PASOK viewed the complex problems of Greek society as the outcome of the country's political, economic and strategic dependence on the 'imperialistic establishment of the US and NATO'<sup>18</sup>. In this context, the 1967 military coup and the tragedy of Cyprus were nothing more than 'a crude form of colonization by the Pentagon and NATO' which aimed at best serving the interests of American monopoly capital in the South-Eastern part of the Mediterranean<sup>19</sup>. For PASOK, US imperialism was primarily responsible for the poverty and exploitation of peasants and workers, the unemployment, the consequent emigration and the devastation of the Greek countryside<sup>20</sup>. PASOK promised to put an end to this state of affairs through its struggle for 'national renaissance for a socialist and democratic Greece'<sup>21</sup>. This struggle was summed up in four major principles or aims: National Independence, which was considered a prerequisite for Popular Sovereignty, which was itself necessary for Social Liberation and in turn was an essential condition for Democratic Structures<sup>22</sup>. The achievement of these objectives would lead to the 'creation of a polity independent from foreign control and intervention (...) as well as from the control and influence of the financial oligarchy, a polity working for the protection of the Nation for the service of the People'<sup>23</sup>.

PASOK's declaration propounded a number of major reforms which were to lead to the socialist transformation of Greek society. The list included:

- the socialization of the banking system, of major industries such as chemicals, metallurgy and shipbuilding and of the main units of the import-export trade;

- the decentralization of economic planning and the introduction of workers' self-management in the productive sectors;

- the establishment of a new type of agricultural co-operative which would end the exploitation of peasants by middlemen, as well as co-operatives of artisanal simple commodity producers;

- and administrative decentralization and reinforcement of the powers of local government.

On foreign policy the declaration called for Greece's withdrawal from both the military and political wings of NATO and advocated the nuclear disarmament of the Balkan peninsula and the abolition of all international treaties which had led to the country's economic, political and strategic dependence on foreign monopolies<sup>24</sup>. Both the principles and the language of the 'Declaration of the 3rd of September' revealed a kind of political radicalism which was unknown to the parties outside the traditional Left in the pre-junta period. Moreover, obviously influenced by the international left-wing movements of the 1960s, PASOK referred to issues which were new to Greek political discourse, such as the 'social and economic equality of sexes'<sup>25</sup>, the protection of the mother and child, the protection of the environment, the improvement of the quality of life and cultural development<sup>26</sup>.

It was not only PASOK's ideas and programme that distinguished it from the other non-Communist parties; PASOK also proved to be completely different in terms of its organization. Right from its creation, it presented itself as a breakthrough in party politics and in its manifesto it fiercely criticized the pre-1967 bourgeois parties for their clientelistic policies and oligarchic structures<sup>27</sup>. It was a common belief among PASOK's founder members that new political

formations which would adopt new modes of organizational practice<sup>28</sup> were necessary. A formal party structure was developed, which reflected the influence of Communist organizational practices, as the introduction of organizational cells. PASOK's supreme body was to be the Congress which would elect the party's Central Committee and President. The activism of PASOK's organized membership proved to be very effective as the rapid growth of its grass roots organization shows: in 1977 PASOK had about 50,000 members; by 1979 the number had increased to 65,000 and to 75,000 a year later. By 1981 the party membership had reached 110,000 and was organized in 1,000 local and 500 sectoral organizations and 700 cells across the country as a whole<sup>29</sup>. Apart from the Communist Left, no other party in modern Greek political history had ever achieved such a massive and well-structured organization.

Another notable feature of PASOK was that the majority of its leading cadres were newcomers to Greek politics. For instance, in the 1977 Central Committee, 58 out of 80 members (72.5 per cent) had emerged during the dictatorship through the resistance organizations or had no previous experience in politics at all. In 1981, out of PASOK's 170 elected MPs, those who had entered Parliament for the first time through the party's list reached 150<sup>30</sup>. There was also an extensive renovation of political personnel in terms of the age of the members, as 65 per cent of PASOK's 1981 parliamentary group were between 30 and 49 years of age, while in the Central Committee about 70 per cent of its members were aged between 20 and 49 years<sup>31</sup>. All in all, PASOK's leading personnel consisted mainly of the generation and of the social strata which had been radicalized during the 1960s and the struggle against the dictatorship. It is characteristic that PASOK's 1977 parliamentary group did not include any leading cadres of the Centre from the period 1950-1960. The vast majority of the latter had become members of New Democracy or EDIK. It becomes clear from the above analysis that in terms of its

programmatic principles, its membership and its organization, PASOK was a completely new force in Greek politics.

Nevertheless, although it constituted a major break with traditional party politics, PASOK is not a mass party of the traditional West European type. A major difference with comparable European parties has been the entire domination of the party structure by the leader. Andreas Papandreou, PASOK's only President so far, determines the party's strategy and is primarily responsible for the selection of its leading personnel. So far, his extensive powers have been beyond the effective control of the party's institutionalized bodies and procedures.

The primacy of Papandreou's position within the party is due to a number of factors, some of which are related to his own personality and history as a political figure. Papandreou had been a reputed economist<sup>32</sup> and in 1961 Karamanlis had appointed him head of the Centre for Economic Research and Planning (KEPE). For many people Papandreou was able to "lead Greece out of its economic straits"<sup>33</sup>. During the political crises of the 1960s, Papandreou's opposition to the Right and the Throne, and his clashes with the conservative cadres in his own party, enhanced his prestige as a modernizer and an incorruptible and uncompromising politician<sup>34</sup>. Finally, the creation of PAK during the dictatorship and his close contacts with foreign political circles and personalities not only kept his star alive, but gave new momentum to his career as a politician. For all these reasons, he became a pole of attraction for a wide range of political tendencies and currents, including technocrats, those who rejected clientelism and traditional party politics and left-wing cadres outside the Communist camp. He had also gathered around him a significant following of activists and politicians, personally attached to him - the so-called 'Andreists'<sup>35</sup> - and willing to back the leader's political initiatives and decisions<sup>36</sup>.

Papandreou was able to impose his firm control upon his party largely due to the existence of numerous political currents within it, which held differing and often conflicting views about the party's aims and function. Soon after the 1974 general election, two main tendencies emerged regarding PASOK's future organizational structure. The first, which consisted mainly of members of the Democratic Defence and left-wing cadres sought a form of democratic mass organization within which PASOK's rank-and-file would be the dominant force in shaping the party's policy<sup>37</sup>. The second, which included members of PAK with a 'leninist' background and 'traditionalist' ex-cadres of EK (the so-called 'paleo-kommatikoi') favoured a centralized structure and a strong leadership<sup>38</sup>. Papandreou himself did not favour the idea of a democratic organization that would function according to institutionalized procedures, since this would seriously curtail his own powers<sup>39</sup>.

The disagreements about PASOK's role and organization quickly led to a major confrontation. In early June 1975 the Executive Bureau, which had been appointed by Papandreou himself amid a lot of controversy, expelled eleven members of the Central Committee with the allegation that they had formed a faction. This incident provoked a surge of protests, expulsions and resignations of numerous dissidents, a large number of whom had belonged to the Democratic Defence and other resistance groups. By mid-June 1975, thirty-five members of the Central Committee had been expelled and the body was dissolved by Papandreou, with a new one being elected only in July 1977<sup>40</sup>. A second major crisis erupted in 1976, which led to the near-dissolution of PASP - PASOK's youth organization - the expulsion of the vast majority of PAK's cadres and the resignation of many others. According to one estimate, by the spring of 1977 two thousand members had left the party<sup>41</sup>.

The end of what has been called 'the conflict between charisma and organization'<sup>42</sup> marked the consolidation of Papandreou's power over the entire party structure. As Spourdalakis argues, the 1975 split "underlined the fact that PASOK was the creation of Papandreou and that he was in the last analysis the only source of power within it"<sup>43</sup>. Now that the party was cleared of all advocates of democratic procedures, the leadership was able to crystallize a centralized organizational structure. In 1977, at the first Panhellenic Conference of the Movement, a new Central Committee was elected, which was dominated by members known for their loyalty to the party leader<sup>44</sup>. It is perhaps for this reason that the Central Committee, although the supreme organ in-between congresses (according to the party's constitution), restricted its role to the endorsement of policies decided by the President and the Executive Bureau. It should be noted here, that a party congress was not held until May 1984, almost ten years after the party's foundation. Hence, Papandreou effectively concentrated in his hands all the supreme powers within his party.

With the absence of any kind of internal opposition, PASOK acquired political homogeneity and a party base characterized by obedience to the decisions of the leadership<sup>45</sup>. The elaborate party base was thus reduced to a channel for the communication of the leader's positions to PASOK's rank-and-file and the execution of orders emanating from the top of the party hierarchy. Its main function was that of an electoral machine which, thanks to the enthusiasm of its members, could mobilize support for the party all over the country. PASOK's impressive 1977 campaign<sup>46</sup> and the huge 'laothalasses' (seas of people) of 1981 were the outcome of the intense activism and effectiveness of the party's organizations.

At the same time, there was a major shift in the party's political strategy and objectives. From a left-wing force

advocating social change, PASOK was gradually transformed into a 'catch-all' party, seeking a rapid elevation to power. PASOK's 1977 electoral manifesto constituted a first clear turn towards more moderate positions. The promise of the socialist transformation of the society was played down, while national independence was not seen any more as a precondition for 'popular sovereignty' and 'social liberation'; instead, it was linked to the need to rescue the country's integrity from foreign (especially Turkish) aggression. Regarding economic policy, PASOK abandoned its initial plan for a large-scale 'socialization' of 'major production sectors', in favour of a programme which would encourage the development of domestic capital and the attraction of foreign investors under conditions of fair competition. 'Socialization' was to take place only in the state-run sector of the economy<sup>47</sup>. If in 1974 PASOK had emerged as a new, radical force in Greek politics, by 1977 it sought to dissociate itself from any form of political extremism. It projected the image of a responsible alternative government, promising viable solutions to the country's immediate problems rather than major structural changes. PASOK's spectacular advance in the 1977 elections was definitive proof that its new strategy had been largely effective.

Having emerged as the official opposition in Parliament, PASOK appeared to be the only force which could provide a convincing alternative to the Right. The result of the 1977 election created widespread euphoria within the party, as it enhanced the belief that PASOK was now well on the way to power. In the following period 1977-1981, the party was to readjust its discourse and formulate its political line with the sole objective of winning the next general election. PASOK sought to cultivate the image of a moderate and pragmatic party of government. In the party's discourse, the advocacy of socialist reform was increasingly supplanted by a technocratic approach to economic and social issues. For instance, PASOK's



criticisms of Karamanlis' economic policy were no longer based on the party's socialist principles, but was focussed on the government's inability to provide a 'stable and coherent development policy'<sup>48</sup>. The same technocratic spirit also characterized the party's 1981 'Declaration of Government Policy' or, 'Contract with the People" . In general terms, PASOK's 1981 manifesto followed the same lines as that of 1977, but its moderation was now more pronounced. PASOK declared as its major objective the 'independent and decentralized development and reconstruction of the country'<sup>49</sup> and promised to support productive investment through a new policy of credit and incentives<sup>50</sup>. It also pledged to attract foreign investors who, as the manifesto stressed, could perform a significant role in the country's economic development<sup>51</sup>.

In addition, the party watered down its intransigence vis-a-vis NATO and the EEC (Greece had become a full member of the EEC in January 1981). On the European issue, it abandoned its initial positions which had rejected altogether the country's accession to the Community and had proposed the holding of a referendum to decide whether Greece was to remain a member of the EEC or establish a special relationship with it, similar to that of Norway and Yugoslavia<sup>52</sup>. Although PASOK continued its attacks against NATO for its failure to protect Greece from Turkish expansionism, it no longer advocated the country's withdrawal from the Alliance. Instead, withdrawal was made subject to the fulfilment of the party's strategic objective, namely, the dismantling of both cold war blocs<sup>53</sup>. Of course, PASOK's programme included a number of policies - such as, the 'democratic planning of the economy', economic and administrative decentralization, reinforcement of local government, the establishment of cooperatives in agriculture and small-commodity production - which, although not very specific, seemed to be rather radical in the Greek political context. Yet, the 1981 manifesto was a far cry from the third

worldish conception of socialism presented in the 'Declaration of 3rd September'.

The catch-all strategy that PASOK adopted after 1977 was also marked by the abandonment of any reference - vague as it might have been - to social classes and the presentation of Greek society as one split by the division between an all-embracing 'under-privileged' majority and a 'privileged' oligarchy of wealth. Moreover, as 1981 came closer, the promise of the socialist transformation of society was gradually replaced by a vague demand for 'Change' (Allaghi). Through these readjustments in its discourse, PASOK succeeded in becoming the political expression of all those forces which were discontent with right-wing rule. To summarize, PASOK emerged as an entirely new force in the political context of the transition and soon established its dominance within the Greek Left, becoming the main political expression of the radicalized forces of that transition. Nevertheless, PASOK remained a personalistic party - not very different in this sense from ND, ERE or the pre-1967 Centre Union - dominated by its charismatic leader. Under Papandreou's leadership, PASOK continuously changed its discourse on the basis of the political and social conjecture of the time and with the sole aim of achieving a rapid rise to power.

What is intriguing is that the party's authoritarian structure, the constant changes of policy and the abandonment of many of its radical ideas did not affect the party's popularity and electoral prospects. On the contrary, both the dominant role of PASOK's leader and the readjustments of its discourse proved to be crucial for the party's spectacular rise. This is not as paradoxical as it might seem at first; for PASOK's development and political practice emanate from and reflect the particularities and contradictions of Greek political tradition and society. First, unlike other European Socialist parties, PASOK was established from above, by small

groups of left-wing intellectuals and activists of the resistance against the dictatorship. No mass movement of the lower classes with concrete objectives and ideology had participated in its creation. Just as they had restricted themselves to passive resistance against the dictatorship, the social forces in their vast majority remained outside the political arena during the transition. Under these circumstances, Papandreou eventually prevailed as the most prestigious and powerful personality, and as the one who enjoyed the greatest support within the party and the electorate.

Papandreou's dominance over the party organization and PASOK's strong reliance on charismatic leadership must be seen in the context of Greek political culture and tradition. In a country where political parties - those of the Communist Left included - have suffered from lack of internal democracy and where charismatic leaders have dominated the political stage most of the time, PASOK's undemocratic organization seemed to be for the large part of the population a rather insignificant detail. Thus, the expulsions did not discourage would-be members from joining the party en mass from 1977 onwards. Papandreou became a main pole of attraction for PASOK's members and supporters, with whom he developed a direct relationship that bypassed intermediary structures. With his aura as an academic and fighter for democracy and, above all, with his unmatched oratorical skills Papandreou became the embodiment of the aspirations and hopes of all those social groups who were tired of right-wing rule.

The appeal of PASOK's vague, incoherent and even confusing discourse is largely explained by the ideological fluidity that existed in Greece after the fall of the dictatorship. Thus, the radicalization of the transition could be more easily defined by its negative, anti-Right, anti-Western aspects and by a general affection for everything termed 'socialist', than by

any concrete vision of a democratic socialist society. Under these circumstances PASOK succeeded in dominating the broad political space expanding between the Right and the Communist Left, by formulating a discourse which attracted the support of individuals and groups with markedly different political views. Its success was facilitated by the inability of both the traditional Centre and the Communist parties to present credible alternatives to the Right. By advocating ideas which until then belonged to the traditional Left, PASOK presented a programme that was far more radical than that of EK-ND or EDIK, yet without being branded communist. This last point was particularly crucial for the party's electoral fortunes in a country where the traumas of the civil war and the anti-communist propaganda of the state had generated a deep-seated distrust of - or even hatred - for communism. Moreover, by advocating national independence and anti-Western values, PASOK was able to capitalize on the nationalistic feelings of a population who had always felt persecuted and bound to fight for its survival.

The adoption of a catch-all strategy by PASOK must also be seen in connection with the political climate of the time and, particularly, the rapid drop in ND's popularity after 1977. The authoritarianism of the right-wing government and the monopolization of the state apparatus did not provide the grounds for the development of a broad and constructive debate among the different political and social forces about the country's complicated and serious problems. Instead, ND's practices contributed to political polarization and inflated the popular desire for a 'change here and now'. Following the public mood at the end of the 1970s, PASOK's projection of the Right as 'obsolete, morally wrong and responsible for all the evil present in Greek society'<sup>54</sup> appeared to be fully justified and convincing. Thus, the country's economic and political dependence on foreign power centres, the dangers posed to Greece's national integrity, the uneven economic development

and social inequalities, all were simplistically attributed by PASOK to the Right.

In addition to the above, another factor which shaped to a high degree PASOK's discourse were the particularities of the Greek social structure. Despite impressive rates of economic growth in the 1960s, Greece does not have a large working class as exists in advanced industrial societies. The overall percentage of wage and salary earners in the economically active population has remained significantly low (48.1 per cent in 1981<sup>55</sup>), compared not only to the countries of mature capitalism<sup>56</sup> but also to Spain (69.8 per cent) and Portugal (67.1 per cent)<sup>57</sup>. What is particularly important is that due to the economic crises and consequent de-industrialization the proportion of workers in the economically active population is declining, while a large and ever increasing proportion of the salaried population is employed in the state-controlled sector. While between 1975 and 1983 the number of workers in the Athens area dropped by 7.4 per cent (from 41.6 to 34.2 per cent), the proportion of those employed in the governmental and social services, banks and communications increased from 23 to 31 per cent<sup>58</sup>.

Also, with the exception of the small percentage of employers (about 4 per cent), almost half of the economically active population of Greece (approximately 48 per cent) consists of self-employed strata - farmers (28 per cent), artisanal simple commodity producers, merchants, shopkeepers, middlemen and professionals. It becomes clear, therefore, that the Greek social structure is dominated by the middle strata - self-employed population and other white collar workers. Despite their precarious economic situation - underpayment for state employees, the danger of bankruptcy for the plethora of small industrial and agricultural units, etc - these strata have not been preoccupied with the transformation of social relations; instead, they have oriented their demands towards

the state, depending on it for employment and economic support (wage increases, loans, subsidies for their products, tax relief etc). This attitude is explained by the tradition of state intervention in Greek society and the special role that the state has played as a massive employer or as a mechanism for extracting economic surplus and allocating resources to different social groups<sup>59</sup>.

The incoherence of the Greek social structure largely explains the vagueness of PASOK's discourse and the absence of any specific definition of the class or classes which were to carry out the socialist transformation of Greek society. In the 'Declaration of 3rd September' PASOK made a fleeting description of the social groups - peasants, workers, small commodity producers, salary earners, white collar workers and the youth<sup>60</sup> - whose views and interests the party intended to represent politically. Even this vague reference to social classes was replaced from 1977 onwards by the dichotomy 'privileged-underprivileged'. By dividing the terrain into two opposed camps, PASOK established a unity of purpose among the different social groups whose support it wished to attract, that is the fight of the underprivileged majority against the economic and political oligarchy.

PASOK's discourse glossed over the profound contradictions and differences inherent in Greek society. For instance, how could the broad demand for the modernization of the state apparatus be reconciled with the interests of all those who were benefiting from the continuous expansion of the state sector? Or, how could a welfare state be established at a time of acute recession? PASOK also presented all demands as 'legitimate rights of the people' and created the illusion that, once the Right was removed from power, all perennial problems of Greek society would be automatically solved. As Elefantis suggests in his analysis, "the masses wanted to hear their own voice. And indeed, it was their voice that came out

of Papandreou's lips, unchanged, contradictory, disjointed, neither more, nor less refined, but enormously amplified, like the echo of a voice in a canyon or in an empty room"<sup>61</sup>. Thus, like the rest of the bourgeois parties before and after the dictatorship, PASOK did not seek to educate politically its social base in new forms of political participation; instead, it sought to exploit for its own benefit the existing political culture and develop an oversimplified approach which seemed to suit the often conflicting interests of the various social groups.

In analysing PASOK's development and strategy, many scholars have disputed its ideological self-designation as a Socialist-Marxist party and have stressed particular aspects of its organizational structures, which, they argue, bring the party closer to the populist movements of Latin America than to its Socialist counterparts in Western Europe. According to these studies, PASOK's populism can be recognized in the party's discourse, the vagueness of its political platform, the emphasis on 'popular struggles' against whoever is defined as 'the enemy', as well as in its organizational structure - the dominance of the party leader, his direct relationship with PASOK's grassroots and the weakness of intermediary administrative levels<sup>62</sup>. Although this approach is indisputably valid and significant for the analysis of PASOK's rise as well as for its policy in government, populism is a complex and contradictory concept and an in-depth examination of it goes far beyond the scope of the present study.

What the previous analysis suggests, however, is that PASOK has not been a class-based party, nor did its rise and electoral victory signify the emergence of clear class cleavages in Greek society. PASOK sought and achieved the formation of a coalition of forces that transcended social classes. Yet, this strategy was to impose limits to its freedom of action. For, after its advent to power, PASOK had to

implement at least part of its programme and to cope with the various and often contradictory promises which had been given to almost everybody in order to hold this coalition of forces together.

#### **7.4 PASOK in government - the first term**

PASOK's victory, 'the appointment with history' as the party had itself called it, was greeted with wild enthusiasm by its supporters who on the night of the election flooded the streets of Athens waving green flags (the party's colour) and shouting pro-PASOK slogans. As we have seen, although the party had abandoned its radical strategic objectives for a socialist transformation of society as early as 1977, with its electoral campaign it had created high expectations for 'independent economic development', prosperity and the democratization of public life.

Shortly after its election the Socialist government carried out policies which would raise wage incomes and improve social welfare. Thus, through the system of indexation, wages and salaries were substantially increased in both the public and private sectors, partially offsetting the losses of the last two years of Conservative government. According to one estimate for example, the minimum wage was raised by 32 per cent<sup>63</sup>; there was also a sharp increase in pensions; the introduction of pensions for women peasants; and special provisions and benefits for students, pensioners and disadvantaged groups. The length of paid holidays was increased to one month per year for all workers and weekly working hours were reduced to forty. The Papandreou government also introduced a National Health Service and made substantial increases in public expenditure on social services and particularly health<sup>64</sup>.



Perhaps the most impressive of PASOK's reforms were those which related to the modernization of Greek politics and society. To start with, PASOK introduced a significant number of reforms which aimed at the democratization of public life. Many remnants of the anti-communist legislation of the 1930s and the post-war period were finally abolished and so were the celebrations of victories against the Communists in the civil war. Also, the PASOK government abolished military control over broadcasting as well as the Conservatives' law on terrorism. The use of torture was outlawed and could be punished by imprisonment from two years up to life. Finally, the anti-fascist resistance was officially recognized and political refugees to the East European countries were allowed to return to Greece; additionally, pensions and other benefits were granted to resistance fighters and their families. With these last measures, PASOK enhanced its image as a descendant of the wartime Left-wing movement and deprived the Communist parties of the monopoly of significant historical traditions and themes of the Greek Left. More importantly, a large part of the history, ideas and culture of the Left were incorporated in the official political discourse and together with the rehabilitation of the resistance movement inflicted a further blow to the anti-communism that has persisted within Greek society.

The Socialists' genuine efforts to advance the position of women within the family and the workforce<sup>66</sup> and to promote the general secularization of society should also be mentioned. Most notable of PASOK's policies in this respect were: the institutionalization of formal equality of the sexes; the abolition of the dowry institution; the reform of family law; the reduction of the age of consent to eighteen years for both sexes; the recognition of equal rights for illegitimate children and the introduction of civil marriage and divorce by consent. Moreover, christening ceased to be obligatory and a name can now be acquired through the local registry.

With regard to trade unionism, PASOK abolished ND's anti-labour legislation and introduced a number of new measures of unprecedented liberalism. Law 1264/1982 fully established the right of employees to organize; employers' lock-outs were outlawed; provisions for the 'legal' banning of a strike were abolished; and rubber-stamp unions, which as we saw were used in order to secure right-wing control of the trade union leadership, disappeared under the new law<sup>67</sup>. Finally, PASOK introduced significant, albeit never fully implemented, legislation for the modernization and democratization of further and higher education<sup>68</sup>.

The widespread euphoria that 'Allaghi' had brought about was not to last long, however, as PASOK faced the difficulties of a harsh economic situation. Only a year after its rise to power, the government had to admit publicly that its economic policy which aimed at boosting production through the stimulation of demand had failed. In reality PASOK's neo-Keynesian measures had led to a sharp increase in imports, while domestic production of both consumer and capital goods had continued to decline, as had the rate of investment<sup>69</sup>. Thus, by the end of its first year in office, the government was forced to introduce a programme of relative austerity which included a 15.5 per cent devaluation of the drachma, restrictions on a wide range of imports and a temporary wage freeze as a means of cutting production costs. Yet neither these measures, nor the significant incentives provided for both domestic and foreign capital were enough to encourage private entrepreneurs and to attract new investors<sup>70</sup>. In manufacturing the production of consumer and capital goods stagnated between 1981 and 1984, while in agriculture the growth was a mere 0.9 per cent for the same period, as a large part of the resources allocated to farmers in the form of loans and subsidies were used to finance consumption and the acquisition of real estate or were deposited with banks<sup>71</sup>. The economy continued to suffer from high rates of inflation (around 20 per cent in the period 1981-

1985) and unemployment rose to almost nine per cent by the end of PASOK's first year in office, compared to 4.3 per cent in 1981.

In its election manifesto PASOK had proposed to deal with the country's economic problems through a number of measures which included democratic, decentralized planning, the socialization of basic units of production, the introduction of workers' self-management and the curbing of tax evasion. Four years later, however, most of these policies had been either abandoned or only partially implemented. For instance, in 1982 the government had proposed the introduction of a tax on urban real estate which was to constitute a considerable state revenue. The Bill, however, caused such an uproar among a large section of PASOK supporters that Papandreou hastily withdrew it. Tax evasion remained difficult to tackle with a growing black economy, estimated to be responsible for almost one third of GNP<sup>72</sup>.

As for the much heralded socialization of 'strategic sectors of the economy', this did not go beyond the extension of state control over the production of pharmaceuticals and military equipment. What was more important was that in practice the idea of socialization appeared to serve other purposes than those stated by PASOK. In summer 1983 the government introduced employees' participation in the management of these companies which already belonged to the state such as electricity, communications, transport and banks (Law 1365/1983), though the law did not specify the terms under which employees were to participate. The decrees which were drafted in February-March 1985 for the implementation of the law determined that employees were to send representatives to the Representative Councils of Social Control (ASKE) which, however, had only advisory and supervisory functions, while real power was reserved for directors general and administrative councils.

Thus, in effect, employees had no decisive vote on crucial issues concerning their companies' policies.

To understand the logic of this policy, three points must be emphasized: first, the crucial importance of the public sector (which includes 90 per cent of the banking system, the whole of communications, transport, the electricity production and some sectors of heavy industry) for the Greek economy; secondly, public companies have been notorious for their inefficiency and huge budget deficits; and thirdly, their 100,000 employees are organized in particularly militant unions which since the end of the dictatorship have always been at the forefront of industrial action. Clearly, if the PASOK government was to fulfil its electoral promise to modernize these companies, it would need the employees' consent to a number of harsh measures that it would have to take, such as the introduction of modern technology, the potential dismissal of excess personnel, and the freeze on wages and salaries as a means of tackling these companies' deficits and also as part of the general austerity programme. Thus, as Lyrintzis has suggested, "the so-called socialization of these units was designed to neutralize the employees unions and to secure peace by offering them a minimum of participation, so that they would be co-responsible for the companies' policies"<sup>73</sup>.

More importantly, the law imposed significant restrictions on the right to strike. According to article four, a strike in the socialized companies was illegal unless it had gained the support of an absolute majority of the registered members of the union through a secret ballot. Not surprisingly, this particular provision led to fierce protests by trade unions and the Communist opposition. It also generated a controversy within PASOK itself as the government was criticized for virtually abolishing the right to strike in the public sector.

In general, PASOK's attitude towards labour was ambivalent, largely reflecting the contradictions of its policies and its difficulty in coping with the deepening economic crisis. As we saw, the government had already fulfilled many of its election pledges for the democratization of trade unionism during its first months in office. An early indication of the change in the climate of labour relations in the first months of "Allaghi" was the increased militancy of the unions; 7.9 million working hours were lost in strikes in 1982 as compared to 5.34 million in 1981<sup>74</sup>. On the other hand, while in its electoral manifesto PASOK had promised to free the labour movement from government tutelage, it demonstrated the same eagerness to control the trade union leadership as had the outgoing right-wing government. Only in December 1981, through a court injunction was the ND-controlled leadership of the General Confederation of Labour (GSEE) deposed and a new one was appointed with a majority of PASKE (PASOK's labour branch) representatives<sup>75</sup>. There was also a marked change in PASOK's attitude towards industrial action. Thus PASKE, once actively involved in the organization of strikes, now joined the government in condemning strikers as acting against popular interests. What was previously projected by PASOK rhetoric as the struggle of the 'working people' to defend their legitimate rights was now branded as the attempt of irresponsible and hostile unions to 'undermine the work of Allaghi' and bring about a right-wing comeback<sup>76</sup>. As the preservation of the social coalition that had brought PASOK to power proved to be an increasingly difficult task, the government was constantly to invoke the common cause of the 'underprivileged' in the fight for the consolidation of 'change'. Yet by presenting strikes as unjustified and damaging to the general interest, the PASOK government only contributed to the deepening of the legitimacy crisis that has always bedevilled the Greek trade union movement.

One of the most controversial aspects of the Socialists' policy was what has been broadly described as the 'ethos and style of power'. While still in opposition, PASOK had repeatedly criticized New Democracy for the monopolization of the state apparatus and the distribution of spoils to party supporters. It had subsequently pledged to end party favouritism and to establish meritocracy in the employment policy of the state and the allocation of resources. Nevertheless, as the new government inherited a gigantic, Right-dominated bureaucracy, it was expected to make dismissals and appoint new personnel, particularly to the top ranks of the administrative hierarchy in an attempt to establish reliable lines of communication and effectively advance its own policies. Indeed, according to Featherstone, 300 ND-appointed general directors and managers of the public sector were dismissed and replaced by an equal number of party members and affiliates during PASOK's first few months in office<sup>77</sup>. The government presented these changes as a necessary step towards the rationalization and democratization of the state bureaucracy and the effective implementation of its reforms, especially as the new appointees were considered as experts in the relevant areas of government policy<sup>78</sup>.

Soon, however, the recruitment of new personnel was expanded to all levels of public administration as party members, particularly from PASOK's sectoral organizations, were massively hired as employees, consultants, managers or researchers in the various departments. It has been estimated that about three to four thousand party members were appointed to various posts in the state sector throughout the first three years of Socialist rule<sup>79</sup>. Evidently, the government was now preoccupied with the consolidation of its power within both the state machinery and the electorate, even though this meant the further swelling of the hydrocephalic state bureaucracy. This policy was facilitated by the continuing crisis of the economy and the increasing unemployment which enhanced further

the significance of the state as an employer. According to the same OECD report, while in the period 1982-1985 employment in manufacturing declined by 2.5 per cent, employment in the public sector increased at around 3 per cent per annum<sup>80</sup>.

Most interesting was that PASOK introduced a new form of favouritism, as party membership became almost the exclusive criterion of selection for employment in the state sector. PASOK's mass organization was effectively turned into a channel for the allocation of spoils to the party membership. It is thus no wonder that the latter, despite the organizational inertia which followed the 1981 electoral victory, doubled within three years to reach 220,000 by 1984<sup>81</sup>. In many cases, the new appointees, the 'green guards' as they were scornfully called by the opposition and even by PASOK supporters, acted as the party watchdogs within the state apparatus, selectively promoting the interests of other party members. The practice of the 'green guards' in the state machine created tensions within the government and the party and led Papandreou himself to denounce them as 'government policemen' and to call for a separation between state and party, which however was never realized<sup>82</sup>.

PASOK failed to proceed with the democratization of some crucial sectors of the state as it had initially promised. Despite a relative opening to the views of the opposition, the broadcast media remained under the tight control of the government. Moreover, by invoking similar reasons as the ND governments before them, the Socialists effectively kept the military beyond the control of Parliament. The role of Parliament was not upgraded as PASOK had pledged in its electoral manifesto, while in contrast the power of the executive was particularly reinforced. This was largely due to the highly personalistic style of leadership exercised by Papandreou. The Prime Minister made rare appearances in Parliament and had only scarce meetings with PASOK's

parliamentary party. More important was that Papandreou became in essence solely responsible for all aspects of government policy and even for the appointment or dismissal of managerial personnel in the public companies. At times he would overrule his own ministers without even notifying them in determining issues that fell under their competence<sup>83</sup>. Papandreou appeared as 'the sole neutral power factor who could personally respond to the different popular demands and even settle the conflicts between his ministers and various interest groups'<sup>84</sup>.

Ministers or deputies who criticized the government's policies were soon to find out that with their stance 'they had placed themselves outside the movement'<sup>85</sup>. Papandreou's complete domination of the party and consequently the government was consolidated further with PASOK's first congress held in May 1984. It is characteristic that no criticism was heard during the four days of the congress about Papandreou's heavy-handed style of leadership and no attempt was made for the legitimation of the leader's position through an election procedure, symbolic as this might have been. Moreover, according to the party's new constitution, Papandreou effectively remained beyond the collective control of the party's elected organs<sup>86</sup>.

Finally, the Socialist government abandoned its plan to introduce straightforward proportional representation, the only system, as PASOK had argued in opposition, which could accurately reflect the will of the electorate. As the 1985 general election approached, PASOK sought to secure a new absolute majority in parliament by maintaining the system of reinforced proportional representation. Nevertheless, the new electoral law introduced in January 1985 contained some provisions which benefited the smaller parties, particularly the KKE-es which in 1981 had been left without representation in Parliament.



## 7.5 PASOK's second term - the politics of impasse

Notwithstanding the reversal of some of its most popular policies and the abandonment of many of its pre-electoral pledges, PASOK was safely returned to government in the election of June 2 1985 with 45.8 per cent of the vote (a marginal decline of only 2.3 per cent from its 1981 result) and a comfortable parliamentary representation of 161 seats (see Table 7.3). Ostensibly, the democratic reforms that the Papandreou government had carried out and the significant improvement in incomes and social welfare accomplished in the first year of "Allaghi", together with a new wave of high public spending during the first half of 1985, had played a significant role in maintaining support for PASOK.

Moreover, the party's image as a progressive political force had been undoubtedly enhanced by Papandreou's last-minute decision in March 1985 not to support Karamanlis' re-election as President of the Republic. Papandreou, who had repeatedly praised Karamanlis for his impeccable attitude as Head of State, announced that PASOK was to nominate instead Christos Sartzetakis, a Supreme Court judge highly reputed for his fight against the para-state in the 1960s and his opposition to the military dictatorship<sup>87</sup>. As the Prime Minister explained to PASOK's parliamentary party, the government's intention was to introduce a major constitutional reform which would abolish the extensive powers of the President; so far as the 1975 Constitution was in essence Karamanlis' 'brainchild', it would be hard for him to serve as President under a revised Constitution<sup>88</sup>. By effectively ousting Karamanlis, a figure who in the eyes of many within the Centre and Left symbolized right-wing authoritarianism, and by promising to abolish the reserve powers of the President, PASOK appeared to contradict those critics who had suggested that the movement had reconciled itself with the establishment.

As in 1981, the anti-Right syndrome played again a crucial role in determining the outcome of the election. Again, the central theme of PASOK's campaign was the fight of the democratic forces against the return of the Right. Papandreou described the election as a struggle between the light of the sun (the party's emblem is a green, rising sun) and the forces of darkness. He emphasized the achievements of the Socialist government and he warned that a victorious Right would seek revenge against the progressive movement and try to turn the clock back to the repressive regime of the post-civil war era. A vote for PASOK, it was stressed, was a vote against the Right and for the deepening of change<sup>89</sup>. As the result suggested, PASOK managed to maintain the support of the vast majority of the centre voters and even to attract some supporters of KKE which saw its share of the vote decline by one per cent since 1981.

**TABLE 7.3**  
**RESULTS OF THE ELECTION OF JUNE 2 1985**

<u>Parties</u>	<u>% of votes</u>	<u>seats</u>	<u>% of seats</u>
PASOK	45.8	161	53.7
New Democracy	40.9	126	42.0
KKE	9.9	12	4.0
KKE-es	1.8	1	0.3
National Political Union (EPEN)	0.6	-	-
Liberal Party (K.Phil.)	0.2	-	-
Others	0.8	-	-
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>300</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Nevertheless, the wait for the 'even better days' that PASOK had promised during the campaign was to be very long, as the country's economic situation was constantly deteriorating. In

order to finance its welfare programme the Socialist government had resorted to foreign loans and EEC subsidies; yet, the increasing debt burden had hardly any impact on domestic production. Exports had fallen from \$4.7 billion in 1981 to \$4.4 billion in 1984 while, due to the changed world economic conditions, invisible earnings which had been extensively used in the past to finance the expansion of imports had also been drastically reduced (from \$4.6 billion in 1980 to \$3.2 billion in 1984). There was a rampant increase in the balance of payments deficit and also in the foreign debt which by 1985 had reached \$14.8 billion compared to \$7.9 billion four years earlier<sup>90</sup>. With the worries of a coming election now removed, the new PASOK government introduced in October 1985 a new package of austerity measures, euphemistically called 'stabilization programme'. It included yet another 15 per cent devaluation of the drachma; serious cutbacks in state social spending; more incentives for private capital; more freedom for employers in setting the terms for the hiring and firing of personnel and, finally, the abolition of the indexation of wages. With the latter measure, which in fact constituted the basis of the stabilization programme, the government aimed at reducing production costs and thus at improving competitiveness especially of the light consumer industries. As a result of the government's new incomes policy in 1986 alone real wages declined by 8.6 per cent<sup>91</sup>.

The economic measures caused an uproar within the communist opposition and the trade unions, though the reaction from the Right was rather mild, since ND did not disagree with the substance of the government's economic policy. From the end of 1985, the Socialist government was confronted with an increasing surge of industrial action all over the country. The number of hours lost in strikes increased from 7.66 million in 1985 to 8.84 million in 1986 to reach a staggering 16.35 million in 1987<sup>92</sup>. The austerity measures caused a lot of strife within the ranks of PASOK itself, as numerous trade

unionists of the party broke party discipline and participated in strikes. In October 1985, seven members of the GSEE executive committee and leading PASKE cadres were summarily expelled from PASOK for criticizing the government's harsh measures, to be followed a little later by a number of militant PASOK trade unionists and even deputies who failed to support Papandreou's new economic and social policy. Even the GSEE president, G. Raftopoulos, well known for his loyalty to the government supported the decision for a general strike in January 1987<sup>93</sup>.

As PASOK's influence on the labour movement rapidly declined, the government adopted a highly aggressive attitude towards the unions. Major strikes were broken under the threat of military tribunals and pickets were confronted with the violence of the anti-riot police, while at times the latter were called in to provide protection to blacklegs<sup>94</sup>. The role of the repressive mechanisms of the state was particularly reinforced during PASOK's second term in office; for example, there was heavy policing of protests and marches, while the clashes between demonstrators and the police became a frequent occurrence<sup>95</sup>.

With a policy which served the interests of private capital and big business rather than those of the middle and lower strata, it seemed harder for PASOK to maintain the broad social coalition that constituted its electoral base. Yet while PASOK had clearly failed to carry out a social-democratic, let alone a socialist, reform of the economy and society, none of the other parties of the Left, including the political organizations formed by PASOK dissidents was able to articulate a concrete and convincing proposal for a solution to the crisis<sup>96</sup>.

In contrast, New Democracy was undergoing a major renovation which increased the party's appeal within the middle strata.

Having lost the control of the state machinery and consequently the ability to preserve and extend its base of support through patronage, ND for the first time made a genuine effort to develop an elaborate mass organization and to adopt a coherent political platform. Its 'New Proposal for Freedom', published in February 1985, marked a clear shift away from the Keynesian policies of the Karamanlis era and the espousal of 'neo-liberal' doctrine. In its new manifesto, the party defined the existence of an over-inflated, unproductive state sector as one of the country's major problems and promised to separate completely the state from the party, to limit state intervention in the economy and to create the conditions for more economic freedom as the only remedy for the country's critical problems. More important was ND's effort to project itself as a progressive and moderate party committed to 'strengthening freedom and democracy in the country'<sup>97</sup>.

With its new, liberal image and organizational activism, ND managed to establish a strong presence within the public sector unions, professional associations and the youth movement; in high schools the Right gained an absolute majority while in the students' unions it obtained between 30 and 40 per cent of the vote<sup>98</sup>. ND's commitment to modernization and its pro-European line appeared to be particularly attractive to the younger generation which had been politically socialized under PASOK's patronage and authoritarian practices and which was oriented towards consumerism and careers.

The growing appeal of the Right was clearly proven in the 1986 municipal elections when, after the refusal of the Communists to support PASOK candidates in the second round, the three largest urban areas of the country - Athens, Piraeus and Thessaloniki - came under ND control. The three new Mayors, Evert, Andrianopoulos and Kouvelas respectively, belonged to the younger generation of ND cadres and of them Andrianopoulos and Evert especially represented the new style and ethos of the

Greek Centre-Right, advocating political moderation, reconciliation with the Left and development through the transition to a free market economy. Although these local developments did not mean the definitive decline of the influence exercised by the party's traditionalist, anti-communist wing, they certainly improved ND's public image as a liberal, democratic party.

Under these circumstances PASOK seemed no longer able to exploit the Right-Left cleavage in order to rally support for its policies. Papandreou's fervent anti-Right rhetoric was increasingly failing to convince an electorate which was now realizing that the suppression of incomes, the monopolization of the state apparatus and party favouritism were not exclusively associated with right-wing rule. The personal appeal of the PASOK leader also appeared to be on the wane, while that of party cadres with a low-key style was steadily increasing<sup>99</sup>. Public discontent with the government gradually turned into resentment as numerous allegations about corruption scandals in the public sector and the companies run by state agencies surfaced the one after the other. The most highly publicized of them, involving the relationship of top government officials including Papandreou himself with the money embezzler tycoon George Koskotas, was the final blow to the popularity of the party. PASOK was finally defeated in the general elections of June 1989.

## **7.6 Conclusion**

PASOK emerged in the political scene of the transition as an entirely new force, bringing with it new political personnel and a new radical discourse. Moreover, it was the first non-communist party to develop an elaborate mass organization.

Nevertheless, PASOK failed to become a mass party of the West European type. It remained highly personalistic, depending on its leader for the formulation of its platform and for its electoral appeal. Collective procedures were never institutionalized and the party base had no essential participation in party affairs. The impressive mass organization was gradually transformed into a formidable electoral machine able to mobilize support from all over the country.

PASOK sought to exploit the Right-Left cleavage present in Greek society in the 1970s and the exasperation of a large part of the population with right-wing rule. Its strategy was specifically articulated to appeal to the large middle strata whose centrality within Greek society meant that their support was necessary if the party was to gain power. Thus, PASOK's references to the 'underprivileged' and the anti-Right discourse aimed at masking the contradictions inherent in Greek society and unite all social groups under its call for 'Change'.

However, the Socialists' strategy proved to be an impasse. PASOK had created the illusion that almost all problems present in Greek society would be solved once the Right was removed from power, thus generating high expectations to a large part of the population. Yet, its inability to deliver the "better days" it had promised and its gradual drift towards austerity measures, similar to those applied by ND, eroded the coalition of forces which constituted its electoral base. Additionally, PASOK's authoritarian practices towards trade unions, the reinforcement of the role of the security forces and the monopolization of the state apparatus - including broadcasting - generated widespread disillusionment among the Left, for which authoritarianism and suppression of lower incomes had been until then identified with the Right.

## NOTES

1. G. SARTORI: Parties and Party Systems, Vol. 1, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1976, p. 185-201.
2. R. CLOGG (ed) Greece in the 1980s, McMillan, London 1983, p. 88.
3. R. CLOGG: Parties and Elections in Greece, C.Hurst & Co, London 1987, p. 87.
4. Ibid.
5. According to one estimation, the party's total advertising expenditure for the election was 37.3 million drachmas. Clogg *ibid*, p. 89. For a brief critique of the campaign, see also M. SPOURDALAKIS: PASOK: Structure, Internal Crises and Concentration of Power (in Greek), Exandas, Athens 1988, p. 268-270.
6. According to the Greek census, an urban area is defined as one with over 10,000 inhabitants, semi-urban as one with 2,000-9,000 inhabitants and rural as one with less than 2,000 inhabitants; Clogg, *Parties...op.cit*, p. 92-93.
7. Survey by NIELSEN, published in Spourdalakis, *op. cit.*, p. 272.
8. Spourdalakis *ibid*, p. 255.
9. A. ELEPHANTIS: "PASOK and the Elections of 1977: The Rise of the Populist Movement". In, H. PENNIMAN: Greece at the Polls: the National Elections of 1974 and 1977, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington 1981, p. 107; also, K. FEATHERSTONE: "PASOK and the Left", in K. FEATHERSTONE and D. KATSOUDAS (ed) Political Change in Greece, Croom Helm, London 1987, p. 112.
10. In Clogg, *Parties...op. cit.*, p. 72. Also, Clogg has argued that of the three heritages that PASOK has claimed, that of EAM; that of EK and the "unyielding struggle" and that of the resistance against the junta, the second is the most convincing; *ibid*, p. 123.
11. A. ELEPHANTIS: "PASOK and the Elections of 1977: The Rise of the Socialist Movement", in Penniman (ed), *op. cit.* Also, Ch. LYRINTZIS: "The Rise of PASOK and the Emergence of a New



- Political Personnel". In Z. TZANNATOS (ed) Socialism in Greece, the first four years, Gower, London 1986, p.114. Also, Spourdalakis op. cit., p. 338.
12. Lyrintzis ibid, p. 122. For the centrist background of a large part of PASOK's leading personnel see also H. KARAS: "A First Introduction to today's 'unknown PASOK'" (in Greek) in ANTI, 31.12.1977.
13. Papandreou had been arrested on the day of the coup and imprisoned until January 1968 when he was released due to pressure exercised on the military government by top-rank officials in the US administration and other foreign personalities. See Spourdalakis op. cit., p. 69-76.
14. Spourdalakis ibid. Also, Ch. LYRINTZIS: Between Socialism and Populism. The Rise of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement, Unpublished Ph.D thesis, London School of Economics, 1983, p. 126-128.
15. Spourdalakis ibid, p. 70.
16. Ibid, p. 82-86.
17. Ibid, p. 76.
18. "Declaration of the 3rd of September", p. 7.
19. Ibid, p. 14.
20. Ibid, p. 8.
21. Ibid, p. 13
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid, p. 9.
24. Ibid, pp. 15-23.
25. Ibid, p. 17.
26. Ibid, p. 22.
27. Ibid, p. 12.
28. Ibid. See also Spourdalakis op. cit., p. 69-77.
29. Ibid, p. 255.
30. Lyrintzis, The Rise...op.cit., p. 122.
31. Lyrintzis, ibid, p. 123.
32. He had a Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard and headed the Department of Economics at the University of California.
33. Elefantis, op.cit., p. 108.

34. See K. TSOUKALAS: The Greek Tragedy (in Greek), Nea Synora, Athens 1981; J. MEYNAUD: The political forces in Greece (in Greek), Byron, Athens, part 2, p. 45-53; Elefantis op.cit.; Spourdalakis, op.cit.
35. Lyrantzis, Between...op.cit, p. 146.
36. Ibid.
37. Spourdalakis, op. cit., p. 124-131.
38. Ibid.
39. It is characteristic of his intentions that PASOK's provisional Central Committee had not convened at all during the first three months of the new party's life and PASOK was practically run by Papandreou and the Executive Bureau; ibid, p. 126.
40. Ibid, p. 154.
41. Ibid, p. 199.
42. Lyrantzis, Between...op.cit., p. 184.
43. Spourdalakis, op. cit., p. 162-163.
44. Characteristically, out of the 63 members elected, 50 had been nominated by Papandreou himself; ibid, p. 203.
45. Since 1976, no other major crises occurred, although incidents of dissent and expulsion have occasionally taken place.
46. J.C. LOULIS: "New Democracy: The New Face of Conservatism". In Penniman, op. cit., especially p. 77.
47. Spourdalakis, op.cit., p. 213.
48. Ibid, p.241.
49. "Contract with the People", p. 20.
50. Ibid, p.68.
51. Ibid, p.63.
52. For the party's position towards the EEC see K. FEATHERSTONE: "Socialist Parties in Southern Europe and the Enlarged European Community". Paper delivered to UACES/Centre of Mediterranean Studies Conference, 23-10-1987, Bristol.
53. "Contract with the People", p. 31.
54. C.LYRINTZIS: "The Power of Populism: The Greek Case". In, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 15, no 6 (1987),

p. 667-686.

55. Clogg, Parties...op.cit., p. 241.

56. For instance, Germany and Britain the respective percentages are 87.3 and 91.1; *ibid.*

57. *Ibid.*

58. See K. TSOUKALAS: State, Society, Employment (In Greek), Themelio, Athens 1986, p. 236-237.

59. For the role of the state in Greece, see: N.MOUZELIS: "Capitalism and the Development of the Greek State". In R.SCASE (ed), The State in Western Europe, Croom Helm, London, 1980. Also, see Tsoukalas, State...op.cit., and by the same author, Social Development and the State (in Greek), Themelio, Athens, 1983. In addition, see the introduction of C.SIMITIS in Populism and Politics (in Greek), Gnossi, Athens, 1989.

60. "Declaration of the 3rd September", p. 9.

61. Elefantis, op.cit., p. 119.

62. Lyrantzis, The Power...op.cit.; K.FEATHERSTONE: "The Greek Socialists in Power", West European Politics, vol. 6, no 3, July 1983, p. 237-250; K.FEATHERSTONE: "PASOK and the Left". In, Featherstone and Katsoudas (eds), op.cit.; Elefantis, op.cit.

63. Featherstone, The Greek Socialists...op cit, p. 247. According to PASOK, within its first term in office, minimum wages and salaries were increased more than twofold. See "To Ergo tis Allaghis" (The work of Change), PASOK publication, 1985, p. 94.

64. For instance, current public expenditure on health increased from 32.5 billion drachmas in 1981 to around 50 billion in 1982. See A. PHILALITHIS: "The Imperative for a National Health System in Greece in a Social and Historical context", in Tzannatos (ed), Socialism in Greece...op. cit., p. 160.

66. For the changing status of women in Greek society, see: A. YIOTOPOULOS-MARANGOPOULOS: "Some Aspects of the Legal Status of Greek Women", in Tzannatos (ed), *ibid.*

67. See G. CATEPHORES and Z. TZANNATOS: "Trade Unions in

Greece: 1949-81 and 1981-83", in Tzannatos (ed) *ibid*, p. 137-141; also, Kravaritou-Manitaki *op. cit.*

68. For a general evaluation of PASOK's performance in government, see: E. KALOGEROPOULOU: "Election Promises and Government Performance in Greece: PASOK's fulfilment of its 1981 election pledges", *European Journal of Political Research*, no. 17, 1989, p. 289-311. J. PETRAS: "The Contradictions of Greek Socialism" in *New Left Review*, no. 163, 1987, p. 9-23. Also, Z. TZANNATOS: "Socialism in Greece: Past and Present", in Tzannatos (ed) *op. cit.*, p. 18-20. Also, Spourdalakis, *op. cit.*, ch. 6 and Lyrintzis, *The Power...op. cit.*, p. 677-685.

69. See Petras *ibid*, p. 13.

70. Although the reasons for the continuous absence of investment in Greek industry are complex and difficult to explain within the narrow framework of this study, it seems that PASOK's rhetoric about workers' participation and socialization, although in essence these policies were never implemented, enhanced the insecurity of would-be investors.

71. See the OECD Report on Greece January 1986, quoted in Petras, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

72. Lyrintzis, *The Power...op. cit.*, p. 675.

73. *Ibid*, p. 679.

74. See G.T. MAVROGORDATOS: Between Pityocamptes and Procroustes (in Greek), Odysseas, Athens 1988, p. 128.

75. On the struggle for the control of the GSEE see *ibid*, p. 112-127.

76. See for instance, PASKE's role during the prolonged strike of bank employees in 1982; *ibid*, p. 119.

77. Featherstone, *The Greek Socialists...op. cit.*, p. 245.

78. See Spourdalakis, *op. cit.*, p. 308.

79. Information given by the newspaper TO VIMA, 13.5.1984, quoted by Spourdalakis *ibid*, p. 310-311.

80. Petras, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

81. Spourdalakis *op. cit.*, p. 363.

82. *Ibid*, p.310-315 and Lyrintzis, *The Power...op. cit.*, p.

681.

83. We need only remind here the manner in which Papandreou dropped the tax on urban real estate, following protestations by PASOK supporters, without even notifying his Finance Minister E. Drettakis who subsequently resigned from both the government and the party.

84. Spourdalakis, op. cit., p. 307.

85. Six PASOK deputies and ministers were expelled or forced to resign from the party during PASOK's first years in office.

86. For an account of PASOK's first congress see Spourdalakis op. cit., p. 320-331.

87. As an examining magistrate Sartzetakis had fought to bring to justice the assassins of the EDA MP Gregoris Lambrakis murdered in Thessaloniki in 1963. See S. LINARDATOS: From the Civil War to the Junta (in Greek), Papazisis, Athens 1978, Vol. 4.

88. See extracts from Papandreou's speech to PASOK's parliamentary group, on 9 March 1985, in The Constitution of Greece (in Greek), Pontiki publications, Athens 1987, p. 16-19.

89. For an account of the 1985 campaign see Clogg, Parties... op. cit., p. 101-118. See also PASOK's programme in the special issue of EXORMISSI (PASOK's organ), 17.5.1985.

90. Petras op. cit., p. 14-16.

91. Spourdalakis op. cit., p. 293.

92. Mavrogordatos, Between...op. cit., p. 128.

93. Petras op. cit., p. 20.

94. For a brief account of PASOK's changing attitude towards labour see *ibid*, p. 20-21 and Spourdalakis op. cit., p. 293-7.

95. See for instance, ANTI, 20.11.1987, on the clashes between the anti-riot police and marchers commemorating the 14th anniversary of the Polytechnic uprising.

96. Perhaps the two most notable political formations to be established by former PASOK members were the Socialist Workers Movement, SSEK, and the party established by the former Economics Minister, G. Arsenis. Another expelled member of the party, N. Kargopoulos also went on to establish the Independent

Socialist Party of Greece, ASKE, which participated in the 1985 election to attract, a mere 0.6 of the vote.

97. For a brief account of the party's new ideological line see D. KATSLOUDAS: "The Conservative Movement and New Democracy: From Past to Present". In, Featherstone and Katsoudas, op. cit., p. 100-103; also, Clogg, Parties...op. cit., p. 167-169. See also ND's "Political Programmatic Network", 2nd Congress of Thessaloniki, February 1986.

98. Petras op. cit., p. 24.

99. See for instance the opinion poll conducted by Eurodim in October 1987 in the greater Athens area, according to which Papandreou was third in popularity among his party cadres (he had the support of 46 per cent of those asked), with Gennimatas coming first with 57 per cent and the Speaker of the Parliament G. Alevras coming second, with 52 per cent. See ANTI, no. 360, 20 November 1987, p. 26-27.

## CHAPTER 8

### PASOK's POLICY ON BROADCASTING: 1974-1987

#### 8.1 Introduction

In its 1981 'Contract with the People' PASOK stated that Popular Sovereignty (one of the central principles-objectives of the party's 1974 ideological manifesto) "was firmly tied" to pluralism and the freedom of expression: "The conflicts between different classes and strata", the election manifesto wrote, "are not abolished by decree, nor are they suppressed through prohibition and exclusion. The free political expression of conflicts, the democratic debate, constitutes a fundamental right (of the people) "<sup>1</sup>. In the same document, broadcasting was defined as one of those institutions (including Parliament, local government, trade unions, education and justice) whose democratization and reinforcement was imperative for the consolidation of democracy in Greece.

Some changes did take place with regard to the legal framework of broadcasting as well as to the government's everyday attitude towards the two networks. Yet, PASOK's general performance vis-a-vis the broadcast media was primarily shaped by the existing political conjuncture and by the overriding criterion of 'political cost or benefit' as this has traditionally been defined in the context of Greek politics by the party in power. In this chapter, we will examine PASOK's position on the media while the party was still in opposition and in the light of these earlier pronouncements we will analyse the legal reforms and political practices introduced into the broadcasting organizations by PASOK in government.

Apart from its significance for a full understanding of recent developments in the sphere of Greek broadcasting, the study of PASOK's broadcasting policy will also exemplify the contradictions of PASOK's general strategy and organization and the limitations that these imposed upon the realization of the programme of reforms that the party had been elected to implement.

## **8.2 The media policy of the Socialists in opposition**

As the preceding analysis has shown (see chapter 6), throughout the seven years of Conservative rule, the content and tone of the political debate on broadcasting were highly influenced by the continuing government monopolization of radio and television. ND's broadcasting policy, particularly the exclusion of the entire opposition from news programmes, constituted a permanent cause of controversy and tension between the government and the parties of the opposition. Under these circumstances, the parties of the Centre and Left concentrated their attention on the question of balance and demanded the establishment of new forms of organization for the control of broadcasting, which would safeguard its institutional independence and enable the fair representation of different political opinions in radio and television programmes.

However, except for the fierce criticisms of ND's practices and the lengthy speeches in Parliament about the power of television, none of the opposition parties was able to put forward a concrete and elaborated proposal for the democratization and rationalization of the broadcasting institutions. The few suggestions made by representatives of the opposition in the frequent parliamentary debates<sup>2</sup> on broadcasting seemed to be impromptu and too general in content.



For instance, the opposition repeatedly called for the setting up of an all-party committee to deal with broadcasting matters; the definition of the committee's role, however, was set out in vague terms, and so it was by no means clear whether this body was to act as an ad hoc commission of enquiry or to be accorded the powers of a supreme broadcasting authority.

Moreover, insofar as politicians considered broadcasting mainly from the very restricted viewpoint of information, other aspects of the two networks' operation - such as their overall cultural policy, quality of programming or inadequate financial resources - were not given much consideration by the parties of the opposition. Questions related to the organization of programmes or the educational and cultural role of broadcasting were never seriously discussed by the opposition parties nor did they become the basis for a thorough investigation into the structures of Greek broadcasting institutions.

PASOK's own view of radio and television throughout the 1970s provides a clear example of this attitude of the opposition as a whole towards broadcasting. Remarkably, the Socialists did not offer any more coherent or detailed project for the reform of the broadcasting organizations than did the other parties of the Centre and Left. Apart from some brief and infrequent references to the issue in the party's official documents<sup>3</sup>, the main features of PASOK's broadcasting policy while in opposition emerge mainly from the various parliamentary speeches of its leading cadres and especially of Papandreou himself. In fact, as in all other areas of party policy, it was the leader who articulated PASOK's position in the field of the mass media.

Early in 1975, during the parliamentary debate on constitutional reform, PASOK published its own proposal for the new Constitution, which it called 'Constitution for a Democratic Greece'. In a special section of this draft, PASOK

made a first general outline of its position regarding the mass media. However, five out of the six paragraphs of the section were dedicated to matters pertaining to the freedom of the press and only one addressed the problems of broadcasting. In it, PASOK criticized the government draft for explicitly exempting broadcasting, the cinema and sound recordings from the provisions which protected the press from censorship.

"The constitutional draft", said the Socialist proposal, "...does not safeguard the free expression of opinion in the main media for the transmission of news, nor the formation of public opinion in the modern technological era. In this way, the constitutional draft not only runs counter to modern constitutional practice, but it also manifests a profoundly undemocratic intention to impose control on the basic mass media. Because of the one-party political exploitation of radio and television in the past, the Constitution should not only safeguard the free expression of opinion, but also stipulate that these essential media are placed under the control of an inter-party committee"<sup>4</sup>.

PASOK firmly supported the establishment of a state monopoly in broadcasting, regarding it as the only framework which could guarantee objectivity, fairness and quality in programming. For the same reason, PASOK and the other opposition parties called for the institutionalization of the broadcasting monopoly in the Constitution. Papandreou in particular, proposed that the ownership of the broadcast media should be shared between the "state and the other social institutions"<sup>5</sup>. The latter were defined primarily to include local government, trade unions and the "large organizations which express either in class terms or more generally the interests of the Greek people"<sup>6</sup>.

Nevertheless, as the analysis of ND's broadcasting policy has shown, if the establishment of the broadcasting monopoly was based on a broad political consensus, the way in which the Conservatives sought to organize state control over the EIRT caused a major controversy between the government and the parties of the opposition. PASOK dismissed the bill (later Law

230/1975) as merely changing the legal status of the EIRT<sup>7</sup>, whereas in essence it perpetuated the subjugation of the organization to the commands of the party in government. Commenting on the formidable powers of intervention in both management and programming that the law reserved for the Minister to the Prime Minister, PASOK's main speaker in the parliamentary debate said somewhat melodramatically:

"It is not the Board of Governors those who make appointments, who make decisions and who in the final analysis organize the services of the Institute. The relevant orders will be sent to the general management of the company directly from the Personnel Secretariat of the Ministry to the Prime Minister"<sup>8</sup>.

With reference to YENED, PASOK viewed the continuous existence of the military channel as a threat to the democratic system and called for its abolition and merger with ERT: "Taking into account the country's particular history" Papandreou told Parliament, "it is inconceivable for a sector of the state machine, namely the armed forces, to be in control of the people's mass media"<sup>9</sup>. "The reconciliation of the people and the army is the prerequisite for the survival of democracy in this country. We have a chance in this Parliament to find a solution to the problem once and for all"<sup>10</sup>.

During the first years of its life as a party, PASOK had followed a line of low-key opposition towards the broadcasting policies of the government, focussing its criticism primarily on the legal aspects of the organization of the broadcasting institutions. By 1977, however, the party had started to harden its position vis-a-vis ERT and YENED, becoming more critical of the continuous manipulation of radio and television by the Conservative government. This change of attitude was due not only to the increasingly tight grip of ND on the broadcast media; it had also a lot to do with a major change in PASOK's strategy which took place in the same period.

As we saw in the preceding chapter, in the period prior to the 1977 general election, the party sought to project the image of a responsible and reliable alternative to the Right by making a clear shift to more moderate positions. At the same time PASOK intensified its attacks against the government of New Democracy presenting it as incompetent, backwards and authoritarian. PASOK's increasingly aggressive tone of opposition to right-wing policies was apparent in the language that Papandreou and other party cadres used both inside and outside Parliament when referring to broadcasting. For instance, in April 1977 Papandreou told a conference discussing the problems of the Greek press: "Radio and television in Greece are a moral scandal. The parties do not express their views; (broadcasting) is an instrument of the one party state of the Right"<sup>11</sup>. Undoubtedly, the operation of radio and television provided a clear example of what PASOK defined as right-wing authoritarianism and the party leadership sought to exploit this at every given opportunity.

Thus, in January 1978 PASOK's press office announced that the party, now the official opposition in Parliament, would not send representatives to the General Assembly of ERT as it was entitled to do by Law 230. The reason given in the party statement was that the General Assembly was in essence a powerless body with a 'pre-arranged majority' in which the presence of the opposition served only to create the illusion of a broader political representation in the administration of the company<sup>12</sup>. At the same time, Exormissi, PASOK's official weekly paper, mounted a campaign on broadcasting by publishing a series of reports in which well known journalists spoke about the dangers that continuous government control of television created for the democratic system<sup>13</sup>.

More importantly, PASOK sought to bring the problem before Parliament. It requested the listing of broadcasting as a topic for discussion in the parliamentary agenda, but the ND

government dismissed the idea on the grounds that the operation of radio and television did not constitute a major national issue to be given particular consideration by the assembly<sup>14</sup>. Nevertheless, a group of PASOK MPs submitted an interpellation in Parliament criticizing the government for its continuous monopolization of the broadcast media. Early in February 1978, after a significant number of similar interpellations had been submitted by representatives of all other opposition parties, PASOK demanded a full debate on the issue, which meant that apart from those MPs who had signed the interpellations time would be given to other MPs who wished to participate in the discussion<sup>15</sup>.

By pursuing the idea of a broad debate on broadcasting, PASOK aimed to draw public attention to the question of the political independence of radio and television and to increase the pressure on the government to review its policy vis-a-vis the broadcasting organizations. Apart from this however, the debate was of strategic importance for PASOK itself. First, to the extent that the government would come under the concerted fire of the entire opposition, the debate could enhance the impression of mounting discontent against ND, which only three months before had seen its majority shrink by 12.5 per cent. Moreover, the debate would give the opportunity to PASOK's most eloquent deputies and especially to Papandreou himself to give strong performance in which he could once more manipulate the party's main themes of popular sovereignty and national independence. The debate to which ND eventually conceded lasted two days and was extensively reported particularly by the pro-PASOK press<sup>16</sup>, although the government did not give permission for televised coverage.

The main argument advanced by PASOK during the debate was that the government's broadcasting policy was unconstitutional in that it did not safeguard objectivity, balance and quality in programmes as postulated by clause 15, paragraph 2 of the

Constitution<sup>17</sup>. "The mass media in our country", Papandreou suggested, "lead to the creation of a citizen who is politically inactive (...) and culturally disorientated (...) whereas the foundation stone of popular sovereignty is a citizen who thinks, judges and decides"<sup>18</sup>. This malfunctioning of Greek radio and television, Papandreou argued, was the outcome of their continuous manipulation by the right-wing government.

"ERT is a peculiar (...) and queer organization. The government appoints the Board of Directors and, as if it didn't find this enough, it also appoints the Chairman, the Deputy Chairman, the Director General and the Deputy Directors (...). The news is the news of the Undersecretary of Information (...). It is the news of the government"<sup>19</sup>.

PASOK also criticized the broadcasting organizations for lacking an overall cultural policy and for feeding Greek audiences with cultural by-products of domestic or foreign - primarily American - production. As a result, Papandreou argued, the basic characteristics of Greek television were "obscurantism, imported culture (...) and rape - this is the right word - of our national tradition. Are all these accidental? For they clearly tend to undermine popular sovereignty as much as our national independence<sup>20</sup>". The dangers of such a broadcasting policy were so great, because of the enormous impact that television had upon the people. For Papandreou, the viewer was a "captive, a hostage of the screen", deprived of the freedom of conscious selection of information that a newspaper provided and unable to resist the brainwashing of programmes and commercials<sup>21</sup>.

For these reasons, PASOK's leader called for the complete elimination of advertising from radio and television.

"We must liberate the citizenry from this miasma, this pollution which comes through the networks (...). For advertising not only subjugates radio and television to the government's policy; it also subjugates them to the big monopolistic conglomerates which, in our country's case,

undermine not only our economy but also our national independence"<sup>22</sup>.

Clearly, the debate gave Papandreou the opportunity to utilize very skilfully the nationalistic themes and anti-Western values which had become a basic component of PASOK's rhetoric. Yet, beyond the militant language, PASOK's approach to broadcasting appeared to be shallow and certainly not the product of a thorough study of the problems of the two networks. Many of the points made were vague - for instance, how could advertising subjugate broadcasting to the policies of the government? - and sounded like slogans for public consumption. Papandreou's attacks against imported programmes were clearly verging on xenophobia as no distinction was made between high quality productions and cheap popular series, nor was any consideration given to the significant role that television could perform as a means of cultural exchange among different countries. The message that came across was that everything foreign was bad and should be exorcised. Moreover, PASOK's objection to commercials was not accompanied by any suggestion of alternative sources of funding the investment and programming policies of the broadcasting organizations.

Nevertheless, PASOK did offer some positive proposals for the re-organization of broadcasting. It called for the merger of ERT and YENED into a unitary organization. To safeguard the institutional independence of the broadcast media, Papandreou proposed their 'socialization', that is, the establishment of a Board of Governors with a broad political and social representation. This Board, which "ought to be the expression of the Nation", would include representatives of political parties, local government, trade unions, agricultural cooperatives, professional and artistic associations, students' and women's organizations, and unions of journalists and press publishers. For news and current affairs, Papandreou proposed the formation of a committee of journalists who, under the supervision of the Board of Governors, would prepare political

programmes, decide what was to be transmitted and allocate time to the political parties. Similarly, for entertainment programming, PASOK proposed the setting up of a Committee of artists (writers, actors, film directors etc.) to make programme policy. Finally, PASOK demanded the formation of an ad hoc Committee of all parties to prepare new broadcasting legislation which would guarantee the independence of radio and television from any form of political intervention<sup>23</sup>.

Although this was the lengthiest proposal ever made by PASOK, it was far from constituting a detailed draft for the institutional and organizational reform of broadcasting. Compared to the powers which PASOK attributed to television, its overall views of Greek broadcasting reflected disproportionately little consideration and understanding of the problems regarding the organization and operation of the medium. It is questionable, for instance, whether a broadcasting organization could function effectively if executive powers were vested in collective bodies, such as the news and general programming committees proposed by Papandreou. Furthermore, PASOK did not at all examine the development of new means of communication such as cable television or local stations and the new options they opened up for a more pluralistic model of broadcasting. PASOK's concept of broadcasting as an institution was based upon the idea of a state monopoly, run by a public authority, while the plurality of opinion would be safeguarded by the broad range of political and social forces represented in it.

This insistence upon the state monopoly of broadcasting - which as we saw was common among politicians of all colours at that time - was largely due to the general perception of the expansion of state control as a progressive, even socialist policy. This accounted to a significant extent for PASOK's refusal to consider any other form of ownership and control of radio and television, until well into the 1980s.



In the period between the 1978 debate and the 1981 general election, PASOK made no effort to develop a more concrete and substantial plan for the reform of broadcasting. A pledge made in 1978 to set up a specialist party committee to investigate the problems of Greek broadcasting and make a report to Parliament never materialized. In effect, the pronouncements included in the 1981 'Contract with the People' were less specific than the suggestions made in 1978

PASOK devoted less than a page of its 1981 election manifesto, to the broadcast media, listing all its proposals under the title 'Democratization of the mass media'. Here, PASOK declared its duty to "safeguard the objective information of the people through television and radio", and its aim of transforming broadcasting into an instrument of "information, entertainment, cultural development and also of open discussion and exchange of ideas"<sup>24</sup>. It also promised to secure proper access to radio and television for all political parties. However, apart from declaring its determination to abolish the military channel, PASOK avoided any explicit commitment to the institutional reform of broadcasting. Instead, there was a general promise to secure the participation of political parties, local authorities, trade unions and other interest groups in the administration of the broadcasting institutions to safeguard "pluralism and artistic expression". Unlike the 1978 proposals, there was no mention of what this broadly representative body would be called, nor of the competences it would be vested with.

Significantly, there was no promise to abolish Law 230, which PASOK had so fiercely criticized since its introduction. Another notable departure from its 1978 position was the abandonment of outright rejection of advertising in favour of a commitment to introduce a system of tight controls over the content and number of broadcast commercials. It seemed that the closer PASOK found itself to power, the more it avoided binding

itself with specific promises which might deprive a prospective Socialist government of control over what the PASOK leadership believed to be a powerful instrument of mass persuasion.

### **8.3 The dismantling of the military broadcasting service and the establishment of ERT-2**

In August 1982, ten months after their electoral victory, the Socialists realized their pre-electoral promise to abolish the military control of YENED. The organization was to continue to operate, though under a new institutional framework. As PASOK had stressed in its 'Contract with the People', the existence of a second and perhaps of more publicly-owned networks was essential if variety and choice were to be secured<sup>25</sup>. The reform of YENED was imperative, the Socialists argued, because the continuing operation of military-controlled radio and television was unconstitutional and counter to the principle of political neutrality of the armed forces<sup>26</sup>.

In effect, the Socialists had sought to establish political control over the network as soon as they had come to power in October 1981. YENED's commander, who had been appointed by the Minister of Defence, E.Averoff, was replaced by another military officer who enjoyed the confidence of the new government. Another of Averoff's proteges, the head of YENED's news, D. Giannarakos, was given monthly leave. His successor to the post was former editor-in-chief P. Korovilas, who had close ties with the governing party<sup>27</sup>. Moreover, along with the new military administration, PASOK formed a semi-official committee of party members to articulate the network's new programming policy<sup>28</sup> and exercise control over programme content.

The result was a dramatic change in YENED's political and ideological orientation which brought about fierce criticism

from New Democracy. As Conservative MP A. Pavlidis told Parliament: "Your friends (at YENED) try to spread through broadcasting their Marxist messages all over Greece: on Wednesday before Easter, for instance, the Greek People watched how the Communist system - the Comsomol - was training the young Ivan Ivanovich<sup>29</sup>". The projection by YENED of left-wing ideas, policies and works of art, reflected more clearly than anything else the change in the official ideology and discourse of the state. Yet, neither the 'Marxist propaganda', nor PASOK's determination to go ahead with the abolition of the armed forces network caused any known reaction from the military establishment. In view of the new balance of forces which had emerged after the dictatorship and the redefinition of the military's role within the state and society, the question of YENED's continuous operation no longer constituted a matter of controversy between the army and the political world.

Besides, given PASOK's cautious posture towards the military establishment since 1974, it seems unlikely that the party would have attempted any reform liable to strain its relationship with the latter or provoke a military intervention of any kind. As already said, since 1974 a consensus had been reached in Parliament over military issues, as political parties of all colours abstained from serious criticism of the military, in essence absolving the officers from any responsibility concerning the dictatorship. PASOK's own practice was no exception to this rule. On the contrary, Papandreou was quick to make a distinction between the small group of junta members and the army officers as a whole, whom he repeatedly praised for their contribution to the struggles and victories of the Greek nation<sup>30</sup>.

Also, unlike EK's policy in the 1960s, PASOK never pressed for cuts in the defence budget. Instead, the party had always been a keen supporter of the Conservatives' increases in

military spending, for, as Papandreou stressed, the "armed forces were the backbone of Greece's national defence"<sup>31</sup>. These gestures towards the military, together with PASOK's fierce nationalism and security considerations vis-à-vis the threat from Turkey, largely aimed at legitimating the party's version of socialism among the military establishment. The PASOK government made no effort to reinforce parliamentary control over the military, whose considerable institutional autonomy has remained intact to the present day.

The same attitude of caution and appeasement towards the armed forces also characterized PASOK's approach to the whole question of reforming YENED. Thus, the Socialists' attacks against the military channel were less frequent than those against ERT and their criticism never took the form of outright condemnation, as it sometimes did in the case of the 'civilian' broadcasting organization. Papandreou and the other PASOK deputies took great care not to offend the military when calling for an end to its control over radio and television. "We honour the armed forces" MP A. Kaklamanis told Parliament in 1975, "we honour the efforts and work of YENED staff, but following (...) democratic principles which are incompatible with the (...) existence of this organization (...), we demand its integration into the state-controlled network"<sup>32</sup>. As the PASOK deputy keenly stressed, the continuous existence of an army-controlled broadcasting service was harmful not only to the democratic system, but to the military itself.

Following the same line of argument, the Socialist government presented the reform of YENED in 1982 as an attempt to "safeguard the authority of the armed forces and to elucidate their role and mission within the framework of the Constitution and the Law"<sup>33</sup>.

PASOK'S decision to do away with the military broadcasting service found unanimous support from the opposition in

Parliament. New Democracy, although now under the leadership of the most ardent advocate of YENED's preservation, E.Averoff, expressed no objection to the transfer of the network to the civilian sector of the state. As the Conservatives had lost control over the state apparatus, YENED's particular structures and mentality were of no use to them. Nevertheless, while no disagreement was expressed against the idea of the institutional reform of YENED, both parties of the opposition (ND and KKE) strongly criticized the content of the bill. Despite its earlier pronouncements, PASOK did not proceed with the merger of YENED with ERT as Law 230/1975 postulated. Instead, the second broadcasting organization of the country was to be reformed into a 'decentralized department' of the Ministry to the Prime Minister, under the name "Hellenic Radio and Television-2" (ERT-2). ERT was subsequently renamed ERT-1.

The government stressed, that this was only a 'transitional legal framework' and that the final institutional reform of the broadcast media would be introduced later. According to the representative of PASOK in Parliament, with the new bill the government sought to do what was 'feasible', which was the abolition of military control over the network, whereas what was 'desirable', the final democratic reform of broadcasting, was to come later, when various problems involved with the operation of YENED had been resolved<sup>34</sup>. PASOK, however, did not specify the nature of these problems, nor did it set a timetable according to which the steps towards the final merger would be taken. Such vague arguments failed to convince the opposition parties, who dismissed the bill as offering too little, too late. KKE, in particular, stressed that conditions were ripe for the establishment of a unitary broadcasting organization<sup>35</sup>. The main source of disagreement between the government and the opposition parties, however, was the proposed organization of political controls over ERT-2, according to which the Minister to the Prime Minister was

vested formidable powers over the operation of the network. Among other things, the minister could:

- appoint the five members of the Board of Governors - of which one was to act as Chairman - and define the duration of their office at his discretion<sup>36</sup>;
- establish new posts for permanent staff or staff under freelance contracts<sup>37</sup>;
- define the organizational structure and operation of ERT-2, as well as the competences of its decision-making bodies;
- hire, dismiss or transfer personnel to different positions<sup>38</sup>;
- and change the institutional framework of ERT-2 and designate the mission, tasks and composition of its personnel, as well as determine any other matter regarding the network's operation which was not settled by the statute<sup>39</sup>.

In view of the above provisions and the long tradition of government intervention in the operation of the broadcast media, the new legislation not only failed to safeguard the institutional independence of ERT-2, but also subjugated it entirely to the control of the Minister to the Prime Minister. What was most ironic was the fact that PASOK was the first elected government to vest a minister not simply with extensive powers of intervention and control over those who held the right to broadcast, but also with the power to run a broadcasting organization. The Minister to the Prime Minister was effectively the supreme authority of ERT-2, whereas the Board of Governors was reduced to a subordinate executive organ. It should also be noted that ERT-2 was not to have a budget of its own. Instead, it was to depend on subsidy from the Ministry to the Prime Minister for its finances in the same way as YENED had been dependent on the subsidies of the Ministry of Defence in the past<sup>40</sup>.

The excessive powers of the Minister to the Prime Minister were criticized by leading lawyers who considered that the new broadcasting legislation was not only undemocratic, but unconstitutional too. According to Professor P. Dagtoglou,

"the complete subordination of the quasi-decentralized ERT-2 to the almost unlimited power of the Minister (...) exceeded by far the constitutional provision for 'immediate State control' over broadcasting and was in conflict with the principles of objectivity and fairness as these had been defined by the Constitution"<sup>41</sup>.

In our opinion, the reform of YENED is a clear example of PASOK's practice of paying lip-service to ideas and pronouncements which were main components of its political platform. Certainly, the 1982 legislation did not aim at resolving the perennial problem of the institutional autonomy of the Greek broadcasting organizations. It enabled the Socialist government, nevertheless, to present the dismantling of YENED as a major step towards the demilitarization of the state and as proof of its "intention to reinforce and broaden the role of the broadcast media"<sup>42</sup>. At the same time the government institutionalized its absolute control over the new organization.

A major indication of PASOK's true intentions vis-a-vis YENED was the method by which it chose to bring the matter to Parliament. In reality, the proposed reform of YENED consisted of a mere four clauses and was part of a broad bill which dealt with fourteen different issues regarding the competence of the Ministry to the Prime Minister. The bill, which inter alia transferred to the Minister significant powers concerning the structure and operation of public administration, was largely dismissed by the opposition as paving the way for the occupation of the state machine by PASOK members<sup>43</sup>. Thus, the debate on the institutional reform of YENED was squeezed among discussions on a variety of different and largely unrelated

topics. Moreover, the bill was introduced to Parliament during the summer session, when most deputies were absent, as the government claimed that the reforms were of an extremely urgent character<sup>44</sup>. These circumstances did not allow the thorough examination of the particular reform and of the general issue of broadcasting in Parliament. Apparently, the Socialist government sought to pass through a brief and impromptu procedure a piece of legislation which would facilitate and enhance its control over the second broadcasting organization of the country.

#### **8.4 Partisan control and internal conflict: PASOK's policy on appointments.**

Soon after its advent to power, PASOK replaced all ND-appointed personnel in the key posts of the state machine with persons from its own ranks. In the Greek political context, the practice of filling all important posts of the state administration and public utility companies with supporters of the party in power had always been considered as the natural outcome of alternation in government. PASOK did not try to overturn this long-standing tradition, although it had repeatedly attacked the outgoing ND government for its continuous occupation of the state apparatus.

However, the Socialists did try to rationalize their own version of party political favouritism by presenting the massive appointments of members and cadres as the only guarantee of the successful implementation of their programme of reforms. The party laid great emphasis upon the 'qualifications and eligibility' of the new appointees, who, it was argued, not only shared the same political objectives as the government, but were also experts in the respective areas



of policy and thus able to deal most effectively with the country's serious problems<sup>45</sup>.

For the same apparent reasons the PASOK government took care to appoint party members or personalities with close ties to the Socialists to administrative posts at ERT-1. As experts on broadcasting or professionals with long experience of radio and television have always been rare species in Greece, the Socialist government had to seek for the organization's new administrators among specialists from fields related to broadcasting, such as journalism, arts and science (see Appendices 1 and 2). The party organization included a far from negligible number of journalists, artists, intellectuals and academics, many of whom had been prominent within their particular field of expertise<sup>46</sup>.

Yet, despite their professional and party political credentials, none of the new appointees was able to carry out his plans unchallenged, nor to secure the smooth operation of the organization. Instead, the administration of ERT-1 became the scene for continuous conflict among different office holders or between them and members of the government, a situation which led to resignations and frequent changes of managerial personnel. Six Directors General and an equal number of Chairmen of the Board of Governors were appointed to ERT-1 within the first six years of Socialist rule, with the longest office holder lasting for twenty eight months and the shortest for just over two.

However, very little information has surfaced regarding the circumstances under which the various conflicts arose. The main protagonists have so far chosen to remain silent, with a persistence which suggests either a profound loyalty to the party or an unwillingness to refer to issues which were not about the principles that should govern broadcasting, but perhaps of a more personal nature<sup>47</sup>. Thus, no bitter letters

were exchanged, no acidic statements were made and no press conferences were held in the wake of an official's resignation. So cautiously were the particulars of the crises concealed, that in many cases the untimely change of heads appeared to be a normal, routine issue. Since each resignation was due to different factors, an examination of individual cases is necessary before we are able to reach any conclusion regarding PASOK's policy towards the broadcasting organizations.

The first Director General of ERT-1 to be appointed by PASOK was the journalist G. Romeos, who at the time was managing director of the liberal daily To Vima. A PASOK member, Romeos was chosen for the post by Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou<sup>48</sup>. As Chairman of the Board of Governors, PASOK appointed K. Beis, a professor of Law at the University of Athens. The post of Assistant Director General went to the highly acclaimed left-wing novelist V. Vassilikos, and that of the Director of Radio to the equally acclaimed playwright I. Kambanellis. The four together were to form a well-balanced combination of journalistic, academic and artistic talent which seemed to bode well for the democratic operation of ERT-1 and a qualitative improvement of its output.

The newly appointed team set about to implement the planned reform of programme policy, by postponing the transmission of fourteen programmes (series, quizzes and current affairs) which had been commissioned by the outgoing administration and which Romeos found to be of unacceptably low quality<sup>49</sup>. As Vassilikos explained in a flamboyant style, typical of PASOK, "We (...) stopped the supply of the heroin that the audience was receiving for fifteen years without providing any substitutes"<sup>50</sup>. Although this decision led to a substantial loss of vital resources<sup>51</sup> and to a large vacuum in the organization's peak viewing time schedule, it appeared to be an impressive gesture, indicating that the ERT-1 management was determined to improve programme quality at all costs. By the

end of 1982, there was a visible improvement in the quality of production, and for the first time television had opened up to the works of Greek avant-garde film-makers. The new administration substantially increased the expenditure on programme production (the number of internally produced programmes was up by 44 per cent) while advertising time was cut by a third.

The more pronounced change that the management of ERT-1 brought about, however, was found in the political and ideological content of the broadcast material. Radio and television espoused a new approach to history, which reflected the general change in the official state ideology. The largest part of daily programming - series, documentaries or discussions - acquired leftist undertones, as a wide range of productions referred to the Resistance movement, the civil war, the opposition against the dictatorship or historic strikes and other political or social struggles<sup>52</sup>. The Conservative opposition levelled hostile criticism against what it considered to be "Marxist propaganda"<sup>53</sup>, but the parties of the left-wing camp welcomed the new political line with a feeling of vindication of the struggles and ideas which had been penalized and outcast from the official state discourse for almost five decades.

The truth is that PASOK did not encourage the discussion of historical or ideological issues any more than ND had done. The approach to controversial matters such as the civil war, remained clearly one-sided and manichean in character. The opinions of the right were rejected as 'morally wrong' and excluded altogether from broadcast programmes. In general, the new ideological orientation of the broadcasting media seemed to enhance PASOK's left-wing image. Television - and also radio - included a variety of entertainment or current affairs programmes which were in line with the efforts towards the modernization of social life that PASOK was making at that

time. Programmes about the equality of sexes, the problems of youth, family relations and the proliferation of drugs were frequently broadcast on both media. Government intervention in programme content seemed to be non-existent or very limited. This was due not only to the widespread feeling of euphoria that PASOK's electoral landslide had generated within the party and the government, but also to the faithful application of the political and ideological line of the party by ERT's administrators. Describing the relationship between ERT-1 and the government, Romeos said that it was one of "cooperation but not dependence". And referring to his role in the organization he stressed: "so far as I am concerned, I work only as the Director General of ERT at the moment. Of course I belong to the movement which advocated 'Allaghi' (Change). And here, I am at the service of this change"<sup>54</sup>. The formulation of programme policy was largely a collective process involving managerial personnel from all programme departments and, remarkably, there seemed to be no petty conflicts for control at any level of the organization's hierarchy<sup>55</sup>.

This state of affairs, however, was to come to an abrupt end following Romeos' resignation in February 1984. A month earlier, in a reshuffle of his government, Papandreou appointed - for the first time in the history of Greek radio and television - a minister without portfolio with special responsibility for broadcasting. The new minister was to exercise control for both ERT-1 and ERT-2, taking over from the Undersecretary for Press and Information and the Minister to the Prime Minister respectively<sup>56</sup>. For the post Papandreou chose Anastassios Peponis, the EK appointed Director General of EIR in the period 1964-1965 and a former PASOK Minister of Industry. Peponis had also manifested a profound interest in the electronic media and had published many articles and studies on the role and purpose of broadcasting. The rationale behind the Prime Minister's decision to appoint a minister specifically responsible for broadcasting was never to become

officially known. As Peponis explained, state control over radio and television - as this had been defined in the Constitution - was to become more effective, so far as it was exercised by a minister "dealing only with this subject and not distracted by affairs in other (...) irrelevant areas"<sup>57</sup>.

Some press reports suggested, however, that Peponis' appointment was an effort by Papandreou to put an end to a bitter conflict between the Minister to the Prime Minister A. Koutsogiorgas, and the Undersecretary for Press, D. Maroudas, each one of whom was seeking to extend his personal control over both broadcasting organizations<sup>58</sup>. Whatever Papandreou's intentions, the fact was that by appointing a minister whose only responsibility was to supervise the operation of ERT-1 and ERT-2, the already extensive state control over broadcasting could only be reinforced.

Peponis settled himself in an office at the ERT-1 headquarters of Aghia Paraskevi and, in essence, he started acting as a super-Director General, exercising executive power over both networks<sup>59</sup>. Romeos, who had already expressed his objection to co-habitation with the minister, found that there was no ground for cooperation with Peponis and resigned a month later, along with the newly appointed Chairman of the Board of Governors Kovaïos<sup>60</sup>. Although no information has surfaced so far about Romeos' relationship with Peponis, a highly likely source of disagreement must have been their diametrically opposed proposals for the institutional reform of broadcasting. Just days before Peponis' appointment, Romeos had published a draft, in which he proposed the merger of ERT-1 and ERT-2 into a unitary organization which would operate under a modification of Law 230/1975<sup>61</sup>. On the other hand, Peponis' draft which was published two weeks later envisaged a competitive system with two independent broadcasting organizations. ERT-2 was to be transformed into a public limited company of mixed ownership (LORT), whose shares would belong 51 per cent to the State and

49 per cent to local authorities, trade unions and other social and cultural associations<sup>62</sup>.

With Romeos out of the way, Peponis felt free to choose the new occupants of the organization's top administrative posts from among his personal friends. The new Director General was a journalist and member of PASOK, D.Katsimis, who had also served as Director of ERT-1 News Department between 1981 and 1983. The Chairmanship of the Board of Governors went to E. Georgantopoulos, an ex-officer of the Port Police and professor of the Higher School of Industry. Personal ties, however, did not provide any guarantee of smooth cooperation between the three men. Four months after Romeos' resignation, ERT-1 was shaken by a new crisis when a dispute arose between the Director General and the Chairman regarding the organization's financial policy. Georgantopoulos imposed a programme of austerity at ERT-1 in an attempt to tackle the corporation's mounting debts (around £660,000)<sup>63</sup>. Katsimis on the other hand considered that an increase in expenditure for programme production was necessary for the substantial improvement of the quality of television output. Peponis took the Chairman's side in the conflict and after a row between the Minister and Katsimis, the latter resigned.

This new dramatic incident at ERT-1 marked the beginning of the end of Peponis' own career as minister. Undoubtedly, his controversial period of office had caused a lot of embarrassment within the PASOK government. His heavy-handed policy vis-a-vis the broadcasting organizations had not only generated two major crises within ERT-1, but also had become the focus of concerted attacks by the entire press. Moreover, his proposed reform of ERT-2 - which was in opposition to Papandreou's earlier pronouncements for the establishment of a unitary organization - had been condemned as authoritarian by the opposition parties and a large part of the Press<sup>64</sup>.

Papandreou stepped in to appoint the new Director General, yet another journalist, Vassos Mathiopoulos. The latter demanded the removal of the minister's office from the broadcasting building and substantial limitations of his powers of intervention in the formulation of the organization's policy. Peponis refused to cooperate and resigned, to be followed by his protege Georgantopoulos a few days later. Subsequently, the post of minister responsible for broadcasting was abolished. The Undersecretary for the Press D.Maroudas re-assumed his competences over ERT-1 and extended his control over ERT-2<sup>65</sup>. Whether it was a desperate effort by Papandreou to remove the 'apple of discord' - namely, state control over radio and television - from the hands of two powerful cadres within the government or an attempt to rationalize the system whereby this control was exercised, the appointment of a minister solely responsible for broadcasting created more problems than it was expected to resolve. It also revealed an entire lack of a coherent policy on broadcasting.

The Socialists appeared to be improvising in order to tackle the problems arising from the existing legislation, whereas what was needed was the democratic reform of broadcasting institutional framework which would free the networks from partisan political control and redefine their role within society. Instead, PASOK kept Law 230/1975 in force for most of its two terms in government. What was more important, the Socialists proved no better than the Conservatives in dealing with the various conflicts that the contradictions of the law generated within ERT-1. Some of the crises were directly linked to the vagueness with which the ERT-1 statute defined the competences of the Director General and the Chairman of the Board of Governors. Based on this vagueness, Chairman Georgantopoulos considered it legitimate to intervene directly in the formulation and execution of programme policy, cancelling any initiative that was taken by Katsimis<sup>66</sup>.

A similar dispute arose between Vassos Mathiopoulos, Katsimis' successor, and the Board of Governors of ERT-1, which was now under the Chairmanship of I.-A. Metaxas, a professor of Politics at the University of Athens. Metaxas sought to reinforce the competences of the board, so that it would be able to perform a dominant role in the policy-making of the organization. Thus, a resolution was passed by the board in January 1985, whereby the governors empowered themselves to determine every issue pertaining to the content, structure and general framework of daily programming. Among other things, the board would approve scripts and budgets allocated to ERT-1 productions, purchase foreign programmes and decide which cultural events were to be covered by radio and television. In this way, the ERT-1 governors deprived the Director General of all his major competences regarding the formulation of programme policy and reduced his role to the mere implementation of decisions taken by the Board<sup>67</sup>.

The vagueness of the legislation and the overlapping of competences between different office holders generated tensions at lower levels of the Corporation's hierarchy as well. For instance, there was a lot of competition between the Assistant Director General and the Director for Television for control of television programming policy. Passions ran so high that, according to Vassilikos, who had apparently faced the problem during his three years in office, "even brothers would fight each other to death if appointed to these competitive posts"<sup>68</sup>.

Former appointees have blamed the fighting within ERT-1 on the broadcasting legislation<sup>69</sup>. Yet, the defects of the law were not the only reason for these crises; rather, the defects constituted the breeding ground for the development of conflicts whose roots were to be found elsewhere, namely in the absence of a common vision for the operation and role of the broadcasting media. The appointees had different backgrounds, and the vast majority of them had no previous experience in



broadcasting. Hence, each one of them came to ERT-1 with proposals based on different perceptions of the organization's role and needs. Georgantopoulos, for instance, considered that the improvement of ERT-1 finances was a priority target that should be pursued at any cost, even at the expense of programming. "Whenever I made a plan", Katsimis confessed, "the Chairman would intervene to state that there was no money. But television is programming. It is not only salaries and administration"<sup>70</sup>.

A more important reason for this lack of unity of purpose among different office-holders was PASOK's failure to articulate a clear-cut policy for the broadcasting media and to set targets which could provide the basis for close work and cooperation among the ERT-1 administrators. Instead, the cultural, information and other policies of the Corporation were identified with each official's personal approach to broadcasting, based on his own set of priorities, standards and abilities. According to a former Director of Programming and, later, Assistant Director General, due to the lack of a coherent philosophy for radio and television programmes, the organization's programme policy was characterized by improvisation and confusion<sup>71</sup>.

In all the cases that we have examined so far, the resignation of ERT-1 heads was the result of conflicts which concerned the distribution of power within the organization or particular policy issues. There was, however, an occasion when the Director General, Theodoros Chalatsis, was dismissed by the government under circumstances which have not been clarified to the present day. A lawyer and a member of PASOK's Central Committee, Chalatsis was the first party official to hold an administrative post within ERT-1, and the first PASOK-appointed Director General who did not come from the domains of journalism, academia or the arts. His appointment took place in November 1985 at a time when, following the implementation of

the austerity programme, PASOK was facing its worst crisis in office. Within ERT-1 itself, the wave of demonstrations and protests against the government had wiped away the only independent administration ever appointed by the Socialists. Apparently, the appointment of a party official as Director General at a time of mounting social discontent was an attempt by PASOK to secure its control over the content of political broadcasts. Chalatsis, however, had been selected for the post for another reason as well: as Prefect of Kilkis in Northern Greece, he had won the acclaim of the press for the organization of the regional radio station in his prefecture which provided wide access to social groups and cultural organizations.

Together with Assistant Director General Nikos Sotiriadis, who had been promoted to the post from the Directorate of Programming, Chalatsis carried out a major re-structuring of ERT-1 programmes. Transmission time was increased from 60 to 80 hours weekly, the share of Greek productions in the television output as a whole was also up (to 70 per cent) and new live shows and current affairs programmes were added to the weekly schedules. By the end of their first year in office, ERT-1 had produced a surplus of 2.5 billion drachmas which was to be invested in the construction of new studios. Meanwhile, the new administrators of ERT-1 had carried out an extensive renovation of the network's technical equipment<sup>72</sup>. It seemed that after two years of instability and bitter conflict, ERT-1 had entered a new period of smooth operation.

Nevertheless, a year after his appointment to the post, Chalatsis was asked to submit his resignation which he did dutifully. Sotiriadis also decided to leave in silent protest against the Director's General dismissal<sup>73</sup>. Both men chose to remain silent about the reasons which led to their resignation, and at a press conference that was held shortly before their departure from ERT-1 they confined themselves to an account of

their policy at the Corporation. So far, no details of any controversy between them and the government have surfaced. The available evidence suggests, however, that Chalatsis had fallen from grace for reasons which were irrelevant to both ERT-1's political line and the organization's performance<sup>74</sup>. Chalatsis sacking revealed the indifference of the Socialist government to the disruptions that it caused to the operation of ERT-1 and, in the last analysis, to the development of broadcasting as a medium of information and culture.

PASOK's policy on ERT-2 was no more successful in securing the administrative stability of the organization and certainly no more liberal than its stance towards ERT-1. On the contrary, the direct dependence of ERT-2 upon the Ministry to the Prime Minister enabled the government to exercise more direct control over programme content, as well as over the general running of the organization. As in the case of ERT-1, this was achieved by means of appointments of party members to the post of the Chairman of the Board of Governors. All five chairmen appointed in the period 1982-1987 were PASOK members and three of them were at the time of their appointment, or had been in the past, members of the party's Central Committee (we do not include here the first ERT-2 Chairman journalist N. Alexiou who resigned from the post a month after his appointment invoking health reasons). There was, however, a marked difference from ERT-1 in the professional background of officials appointed to the post of ERT-2 chairman. Unlike top appointees of ERT-1, the chairmen of the country's second broadcasting organization came from areas which were largely irrelevant to broadcasting, such as finance, engineering or the legal profession. Indeed, in terms of PASOK's appointments to the two networks, ERT-2 looked like the poor relative of its much larger competitor, which monopolized all the journalistic, academic and artistic talent that could be found among the party's ranks.

By selecting widely reputed journalists and intellectuals for the top managerial posts at ERT-1, PASOK aimed to a large extent at improving the quality of programmes and adding credibility to its general broadcasting policy. On the other hand, the appointment of unknown party members to the highest executive positions at ERT-2 suggested that the Socialist government did not entertain similar considerations about the second channel.

Initially, PASOK's main objective seemed to be the smooth transition of ERT-2 from a military service to a civilian broadcasting organization. The person who was chosen by the government to carry out this task was Soulis Apostolopoulos, an engineer and economist, who had no experience of broadcasting and, as he later admitted, had scarcely watched television prior to his appointment<sup>75</sup>. He had a reputation, however, for his managerial skills and the government selected him in order to rationalize the network's organizational structure and to improve its finances<sup>76</sup>. Apostolopoulos set about re-structuring the internal organization of ERT-2 which, astonishingly, was still operating according to the regulations set by the dictatorial decree 300/1974 for YENED. New directorates were added (i.e. of economic and legal services, personnel, equipment purchases etc.) which corresponded to the operational needs of a broadcasting organization. An extensive renovation of personnel was carried out with the hiring of university graduates - according to Apostolopoulos, the first ones ever to enter the organization - to man all departments of ERT-2. For this purpose, a substantial increase in salaries was also introduced to offer incentives to specialized career oriented personnel. Moreover, Apostolopoulos transferred to the Ministry of Defence a significant number of employees who had been hired during the dictatorship and whose specialisms, though perhaps necessary for a military unit (shoemakers, locksmiths) were entirely useless for a broadcasting organization.

On the economic side, there was a major increase in the charge for commercials, although the government refused to endorse a drastic increase in advertising time in the daily schedules. Finally, a Programme Committee consisting of well-known artists and journalists was set up to outline the general programming policy of the network and to decide on the content, quality and budget of the programmes before these were finally endorsed by the Board of Governors<sup>77</sup>.

Despite the relative success of his re-organization project, Apostolopoulos was to resign in May 1984, amid a public furore that was caused when a disturbing satire of Greek family morals was shown in peak-viewing time during Saturday evening Greek film<sup>78</sup>. As he later maintained, however, this incident was only the opportunity he was seeking to submit his long-planned resignation. In reality, he had decided to leave the chairmanship of ERT-2 when the minister responsible for broadcasting vetoed his plan to hire ten new managers for the newly established directorates of the organization<sup>79</sup>.

The formidable powers of intervention in the running of ERT-2 that the legislation reserved for the Minister to the Prime Minister were the underlying cause of the resignation of another ERT-2 chairman in 1987. The crisis erupted when the Undersecretary for the Press, Yiannis Kapsis, to whom the minister had transferred his competences over ERT-2, sought to impose control on the organization's expenditure. Alleging that there was a considerable waste of ERT-2 money due to inefficient management, the Undersecretary demanded that Chairman Alekos Papadopoulos submit to him all decisions and projects of the board which involved expenditure of any kind so that he could endorse them before they were implemented<sup>80</sup>. Papadopoulos resigned immediately, claiming that Kapsis had effectively abolished the powers of the ERT-2 board regarding the formulation of the network's general policy<sup>81</sup>.

Ministerial interventions in the running of the organization were not the only cause of disruptions in the operation of ERT-2. According to the chairmen themselves, the main obstacles to the implementation of policy in the organization were the serious lack of financial resources and the sluggish bureaucracy. The amount of money allocated was considered to be insufficient to finance any ambitious project of programme production or technical renovation. Moreover, all income from commercials was not invested by ERT-2; instead, it was absorbed by the budget of the Ministry to the Prime Minister<sup>82</sup>. Furthermore, because ERT-2 was a department of public administration, all kinds of expenses had to be subjected to time-consuming procedures, such as submitting to tender even the purchase of a camera and then requiring approval of the expenditure by the Ministry of Finance<sup>83</sup>. Lack of adequate money and flexibility in expenditure accounted largely for the shortage of studios as well as of technical equipment - from vehicles to cameras. In the end, it was the quality of programming which suffered. For Antonis Stratis, who succeeded Papadopoulos as Chairman, ERT-2 continued to operate against all odds thanks to "the heroism of Greeks". Every night, when the programme schedule comes to an end, I feel relieved", Stratis said. "We made it yet again today, I say to myself"<sup>84</sup>. Under such circumstances, the most the ERT-2 management could do was to keep the organization going until the much anticipated and long delayed merger with ERT-1.

In short, an analysis of PASOK's policy of appointments to the two networks reveals a lack of an overall political strategy towards broadcasting. It also reveals an absence of political will by the Socialist government to change structures and to overturn traditional practices which had not only perpetuated the subjugation of radio and television to partisan political control, but had also led to recurrent crises and consequent disruptions in the operation of the two broadcasting organizations.

The appointment of party members to key administrative posts in ERT-1 and ERT-2 left little doubt as to PASOK's real intentions vis-a-vis broadcasting. Throughout the eight years of Socialist government both networks faithfully conveyed the political and ideological messages of PASOK. Unlike the period of Conservative rule, there seemed to be no confusion and no controversy relating to the political content of broadcast material. This was the case because the managers of both organizations were not just compliant to the dictates of the government, but shared in full its political objectives. Programme makers were also selected from party ranks or were ideologically close to PASOK. Those who had been associated with ND were either suspended from duty or transferred to other posts and were allowed no participation in the formulation of programming policy<sup>85</sup>. The result was most clearly seen in the content of programmes which favoured values and approaches to reality obviously in line with the political and electoral interests of PASOK. Indeed, in crude terms, the promotion of the party's policies and ideological platform ended up being the main, if not the sole, objective of PASOK's broadcasting policy.

The Socialist government failed to rationalize and modernize ERT-1. On the contrary, PASOK felt obliged somehow to gratify a large number of party members by providing employment to tens - even hundreds - of them in ERT-1, usually on a temporary contract basis<sup>86</sup>. As a result, ERT-1 continued to employ an excessive number of employees whose salaries absorbed 62 per cent of its annual budget. According to Sotiriadis, the organization needed no more than 1500 employees<sup>87</sup>. Instead, according to Sotiriadis estimation, vital resources of up to 2 billion drachmas (£6.7 million) which could have been utilized in programme production or technical modernization went in salaries of staff who were completely supernumerary. Moreover, there was a completely irrational distribution of personnel, as

2000 of the employees were occupied in the organization's administrative services and only 500 in production per se<sup>88</sup>.

The continuous changes of administrators meant that no long-term project of reform of the ERT-1 operation and structure could be realized. For instance, Romeos, as Director General of ERT-1 and Apostolopoulos, as Chairman of ERT-2, planned to set up a public company for television programme production. The scheme however, was abandoned after the two men's resignation in 1984<sup>89</sup>. Similarly, Mathiopoulos' plans to build new studios and to establish an effective system of internal production did not come to fruition as he resigned from the post only a year after his appointment as Director General<sup>90</sup>.

Equally, the Socialists' overall policy towards ERT-2 reflected a profound indifference to its development into a modern, democratic organization, and gave the impression that PASOK kept the network running only in order to serve its own short-term political ends.

### **8.5 News and Political Programmes**

As in other areas of policy of the PASOK government, its attitude in the sphere of news was characterised by an incongruity between pre-electoral promises and actual measures applied when in power. Instead of allowing the 'free expression of conflicts' or the development of 'democratic discussion' of issues, PASOK sought right from its advent to power to establish firm control over political programmes in order to secure social consensus and legitimacy for its policies.

Generally speaking, PASOK regarded the mass media as the means par excellence for the projection of the political discourse which had united its heterogeneous social base. The



party's interest in the media is seen not only in its attitude towards broadcasting, but also in its support for the pro-PASOK press<sup>91</sup>. PASOK made repeated efforts to establish new papers which would be more committed than the existing ones to the faithful promotion of the party line. Moreover, PASOK greatly increased the number of positions for journalists in the Athens Press Agency, the broadcasting organizations and the press offices of various ministries, state-owned banks and public utility companies. By the end of 1985, more than half of the members of the Union of Journalists employed in the Athenian press were working exclusively, or in most cases had a second job, in the state apparatus with a far from negligible salary<sup>93</sup>. Whereas the support of the press could not always be relied upon, broadcasting enabled PASOK to establish full control over the content of political news. The ND-appointed directors of news in both organizations were dismissed and replaced with journalists who were members of PASOK or had close political and personal ties with the party. Also, a significant number of journalists who had been associated with the previous government were suspended from their jobs or allowed no participation in the preparation of the news bulletins. A large, though unspecified, number of journalists, - members or friends of the governing party - were hired, while many experienced news-presenters disappeared from the screen to give way to entirely new faces<sup>94</sup>.

Change in the content of news programmes was already visible from the first days of the Socialist government. To start with, there was a clear shift to the Left in the ideological and political orientation of the bulletins. More emphasis was placed on events taking place in developing countries and left-wing or liberation movements world-wide always received favourable coverage. The same applied to the countries of the Eastern Bloc, whereas the presentation of USA or EEC policies became increasingly critical<sup>95</sup>. With reference to domestic political life, radio and television news programmes were

opened up for the first time to the activities, opinions and criticism of the opposition parties. So keen was PASOK to appear to pursue objectivity and impartiality in political output, that even the most trivial aspects of the parties' function - for instance, a party leader's meeting with representatives of the party's regional organizations - were covered on a daily basis by both channels at the expense of more crucial domestic and international events<sup>96</sup>. Although it constituted a significant change from the past practice of complete exclusion of the opposition from the news, this quantitative increase of references to the opposition did not bring PASOK very close to the achievement of balance in political coverage. Only rarely did politicians of the opposition appear live on the screen. Instead, still photographs were used to illustrate the text read by the announcer in the studio. There was also a tendency to trivialize important events of a political party, such as a regional or national congress. Television would usually show some 'live' shots from the place where the meeting was held, read over by the newscaster who would give details about the venue and the number of speakers. What was discussed or the significance of the event for the party and for political life as a whole were never the subject of commentary or analysis. Criticism of the government was presented in the form of written statements by the party's leader or press office, and was always followed by a written reply from the government spokesman. The news departments of both ERT-1 and ERT-2 had set a specific deadline for the parties to submit their statements, so that time was given to the government to issue a reply<sup>97</sup>.

PASOK had always to have the last word on every matter, and this was not simply a practice but an unwritten rule that had to be carefully observed. Those who underestimated its significance - and broke it - were immediately dismissed<sup>98</sup>. The news did not promote dialogue on major political issues; instead of substantive arguments in favour of or against a

particular policy, viewers were exposed to a war of bitter statements, full of aphorisms and accusations fired from the opposition against the government and vice-versa.

The government was always presented in a positive manner which either celebrated its achievements or projected the efforts and determination of its members to find solutions to serious impending problems. As in the past, news programmes were dominated by pictures of the Prime Minister and the members of his cabinet. Ministers were always shown at work - shots of their participation in inaugurations and celebrations were avoided - in their offices, or in situations and at events directly related to their competences. Still photographs were often used to illustrate the announcement of a statement or a new policy plan.

Only weeks after PASOK's electoral victory in 1981, Romeos accepted that there was an overdose of televised government activity in news programmes. He argued, however, that this was only a temporary practice which was justified by the Socialists' need to make themselves known to the public<sup>99</sup>. Nevertheless, once established, this practice was difficult to break and news about government activities continued to take up a disproportionately large part of news bulletins throughout the entire period of the Socialists rule. Unlike the Conservatives, PASOK ministers usually did not phone up the news departments directly to demand coverage of their activities. It was said that Papandreou himself had forbidden them to do so at various cabinet meetings<sup>100</sup>. In most cases, ministerial wishes and requests were conveyed to newsmakers by the Undersecretary for the Press, and then the decision was largely left to the broadcasters as to where crews were to be sent<sup>101</sup>.

A large part of news programmes was taken up by reports about the activities of Andreas Papandreou. He was not only

projected as working hard for the realization of 'Allaghi', but was also portrayed as a politician of international stature, devoted to the achievement of peace<sup>102</sup>.

Generally speaking, under PASOK the two broadcasting organizations continued to make their own evaluation of news, based not on the application of journalistic criteria but, to a large extent, on what was defined as the interest of the government in the light of a given political conjuncture. For instance, as long as Karamanlis was President of the Republic, the news programmes on both channels began almost every evening with a report on his activities. No matter how trivial these activities might have been, they would almost always take precedence over all other stories of the day. This practice had been initiated by the ND government, but it was continued by the Socialists apparently as part of their wider effort to maintain a working relationship with the Conservative Head of State. This practice was abandoned after Karamanlis' resignation in 1985.

News, of course, was not dictated from any ministerial office, nor did journalists receive specific instructions as to what should or should not be reported<sup>103</sup>. The government line was communicated to the newsroom by the Undersecretary for the Press in the form of general guidelines and suggestions<sup>104</sup>. News directors and journalists in both ERT-1 and ERT-2 usually had no difficulty in conforming with what the government saw as a profitable news policy. A large part of them were members and followers of the governing party, and even those who were not, usually applied a kind of self-censorship in order to secure their position and career in the organization<sup>105</sup>. Of course, there was always some room for resistance to pressure, especially if this came from individual ministers and if it referred to news of minor importance<sup>106</sup>. However, on matters which the government considered to be crucial or sensitive, or where there was doubt as to what the government line was, there

was always communication and counselling from the Undersecretary for the Press. Such matters included coverage of activities and statements of the opposition and of national defence issues<sup>107</sup>. This was particularly true for ERT-2, where the direct dependence on the Ministry to the Prime Minister appeared to increase the obligation of newsmakers to conform to the wishes or dictates of the government. According to one editor-in-chief of ERT-2 news, "there was always an open telephone line between the director of news and the Undersecretary of the Press"<sup>108</sup>.

Under these circumstances, news as a cultural form was not allowed to develop much further than it had done in the past. The truth is that in the first two or three years of the PASOK government, bulletins became more lively, fewer stills of politicians were used, and much more footage was included which referred not only to the policies of the government, but also to major social issues. Simple people from the Athenian suburbs appeared on the screen to talk about their problems and opinions. More foreign correspondents were sent to European countries and the U.S. and as a result the number and quality of foreign reports improved substantially<sup>109</sup>. On the whole, however, the face of the announcer continued to be the main feature of news programmes. Coverage of social and political issues was superficial, never reaching the substance of the problem, with the result that the significance of any event, action or opinion was lost in the sheer number of news items or images of government members. No events were really forbidden, not even controversial ones, but they were usually described in a fleeting, almost telegraphic way. Expression of popular discontent against PASOK's policies was almost non-existent in the news. Once they came to power, the Socialists did not appear to favour attacks against domestic capital any more than New Democracy had done. Thus, while television made lengthy reports on the British miners' strike in 1984-1985, there was little information about industrial action within Greece

itself<sup>110</sup>. Pictures from social tensions, strikes or demonstrations continued to be rare on television, and the same applied to the opinions of organized social groupings.

Apart from political control over news output, the quality of news programmes continued to suffer under PASOK from a lack of technical infrastructure, which, in the case of ERT-2, had reached a stage of desperation. The lack of studios and film crews meant that many significant events went uncovered. There was also a lack of proper offices to serve as news rooms, and news scripts were typed on no more than two antiquated typewriters<sup>111</sup>.

At the same time, a lot of money went on the salaries of an excessive number of journalists. According to available information, by 1987 ERT-1 employed at least 140 journalists and ERT-2 almost 200, whereas no more than 80-100 were necessary in either organization<sup>112</sup>. Both ERT-1 and ERT-2 had taken on an unspecified number of journalists who were either members or supporters of PASOK, or were recommended by influential figures within the government and the party<sup>113</sup>. Many of them were unqualified young people with almost no experience at all in journalism<sup>114</sup>, who were given unimportant assignments only thanks to the pressure exercised by their patrons on the management of the two networks<sup>115</sup>. More often than not, these young journalists were motivated by narrow political party criteria, posing as the only ones who genuinely expressed the government line within the broadcasting organizations. Their main preoccupation was the promotion of the work of the government and, in many cases, they also acted as the party's police in the news departments<sup>116</sup>, causing tensions between them and the rest of the employees.

Yet, the fact that PASOK failed to free news programmes from partisan political control should not lead us to overlook the introduction by the Socialists of a considerable number of

current affairs programmes and, above all, the first live programmes of political dialogue on television<sup>117</sup>. Most important among the latter was 'Open Cards' (Anoichta Hartia), which inaugurated a dialogue on social and political issues between the government, the opposition parties and major social organizations. The viewers could participate by posing questions to the panel of guests by phone. Anoichta Hartia reflected more than anything else the will of the first PASOK government and ERT-1 administration to make television an active participant in the political process. The programme went on air in mid-1983 and at the beginning it was something of an event. For one thing, it was the first time - outside of election campaigns - that politicians took time off their public duties to appear before a television audience. Indeed, it was also the first time that television did not passively watch the developments on the political stage, but was to become itself an arena where politics was taking place. However, politicians, nurtured in the heated atmosphere of Parliament and election campaigns, found it hard to adjust to the requirements of a televised debate. Most of them looked undisciplined, talked incessantly and supported fervently their views, with the usual result that the most crucial points of the debate were lost in a sea of statistical details and specialist jargon. The programme, the duration of which would at times exceed two hours, often appeared as a transfer of a crucial and inconclusive debate from Parliament or ministerial offices to the television studios. The host of the programme acted mainly as the coordinator between the different sides, and did not ask embarrassing questions or expose the actions of the participant politicians to public scrutiny<sup>118</sup>.

Apart from current affairs programmes, the Socialists also initiated weekly televised coverage of parliamentary proceedings. Each Saturday evening, at peak viewing time, ERT-2 transmitted a long account of the week's developments in the Greek Parliament. The programme included passages of the

speeches delivered by deputies, with each of the three parties being allocated airtime according to its strength in Parliament. The main feature of the programme were the appearances of the Minister to the Prime Minister, Menios Koutsogiorgas, an ardent advocate of the anti-Right struggle. Koutsogiorgas always appeared at the end of the programme to reply to the opposition and to launch his ferocious attacks against ND and the Right as a whole, whom he blamed for all the misfortunes suffered by Greece.

The programme provoked a fierce reaction from the leader of New Democracy, C. Mitsotakis, who called it a 'disgrace to Parliament' and threatened to prevent further transmission of speeches delivered by the party's deputies. The programme producers were accused of being biased against ND and of distorting the meaning of crucial points of the speeches through editing. Particularly hostile criticism was levelled at ERT-2 for having positioned the sole camera which recorded the programme in the rear end of the chamber behind the ND seats. The absurd result was that, when the ND deputies and leader spoke from the benches, they would always appear speaking with their back to the screen<sup>119</sup>. Eventually, the government conceded to the installation of a second camera to face the opposition benches. In response to pressure exerted by both opposition parties, PASOK also agreed to set up a three-member committee of party representatives to determine which parts of the parliamentary debates were to be included in the broadcasts<sup>120</sup>.

Controversy between the government and the opposition parties was also caused by PASOK's treatment of the broadcasting media during the 1985 election campaign. The terms according to which the campaign was to be covered by television were set unilaterally by PASOK, without any consultation with the other opposition parties. PASOK substantially increased the amount of television time allocated to each party, with the



TABLE 8.1

1985 Election Coverage on ERT-1 and ERT-2 television (as decided by the Socialist government)

Parties	Type of coverage	Duration
PASOK	Three Rallies	1 hour each
	One press-conference of leader	1 hour
	Two studio appearances of leader	15' each
ND	Three Rallies	1 hour each
	One press-conference of leader	1 hour
	Two studio appearances of leader	15' each
KKE	Two Rallies	1 hour each
	Two studio appearances of leader	15' and 10'
KKE-es	Two Rallies	45' and 15'
	One studio appearance of leader	15'
All other parties (but no coalitions)	One studio appearance of leader for each party	15'

Source: The national press, 3.5.1985.

major beneficiary being the KKE which was granted a further 48 minutes' coverage time compared to the 1981 general election. Again, the emphasis was placed on campaign rallies, the coverage of which took up by far the greatest part of the time allocated to each party (see Table 8.1). This was hardly surprising given PASOK's experience in organising mass events and Papandreou's formidable oratorical skills. On the other hand, ND protested against the arrangement and demanded that political parties should have been allowed to use their airtime in any way they considered to be most effective for their campaign. In addition, Mitsotakis repeatedly called for a televised debate between the Prime Minister and himself, but Papandreou dismissed the idea<sup>121</sup>. Nevertheless, time was allocated to both leaders of PASOK and ND for a 60-minute press conference, at which the interviewers were journalists of opposition and pro-government papers respectively<sup>122</sup>.

Complaints were also expressed by the KKE and the KKE-es, both of which demanded equal treatment with the two major parties. More protests were made by KKE, however, when, during the campaign the coverage of the party's rally in Thessaloniki was cut off just before the speech of Anastassios Intzes, a former PASOK deputy who had resigned from the party to join the Communists. In protest at this incident, KKE withdrew its representative from the all-party committee which had been formed to supervise the entire election campaign<sup>123</sup>.

Equally controversial was the coverage of PASOK's rally at the Athens' Syntagma Square on May 31 1985, which concluded the entire campaign. Pictures of this rally were accompanied by music from Karl Orff's 'Carmina Burana', while a pigeon flying above a huge chanting crowd was added in the montage; at the bottom of the screen was written: 'PASOK, The March Towards Victory ('Poria pros tin Niki'). The whole show looked more like a party political broadcast than a political event among many similar ones recorded by the state television. To put it

more crudely, it looked like the appropriation of the television for electoral purposes and as such did not escape criticism from the opposition<sup>124</sup>.

As a whole, PASOK's policy on news and current affairs reflected an oscillation between earlier promises for the democratization of the broadcasting system and the party's need to safeguard the social and political consensus which had led to its elevation to power. The applied changes were evidence of the new political ethos that PASOK had promised to introduce in public life and these were intended to reinforce the party's image as a democratic force in Greek politics. However, as the party's strategy started to show signs of strain in view of the deteriorating economic situation from 1985 onwards, the Socialists appeared to lose much of their democratic sensitivity vis-a-vis broadcasting. PASOK started to rely more heavily on radio and television as the means for the re-establishment of legitimacy and consensus through the promotion of government policies and especially of the leader's indisputable charisma<sup>125</sup>. The more the crisis deepened, the more did the government intensify its efforts to tighten control over the broadcasting institutions. At the same time, within PASOK those cadres who pursued a more active and efficient role for civil society in political life were marginalized, as the party's hard-liners appeared to gain ground.

The ill-fated attempts of the Undersecretary for Press Costas Laliotis, to bring about a major reform at ERT-1 in 1985 not only proved that PASOK's policy on broadcasting was directly linked to the existing social and political conjuncture, but was also indicative of the conflict between the so-called modernizers and the party's traditionalists. For this reason, it is worth giving a brief account of what ended up as a "romantic loner's experiment"<sup>126</sup>.

One of PASOK's youngest cadres - he was 34 at the time - Laliotis was appointed Undersecretary for the Press and Information after the 1985 election. With its confidence boosted by the new electoral landslide, PASOK appeared able to afford to loosen its control over the broadcasting organizations. Laliotis' plan was to redefine the relationship between broadcasters and the state by granting complete independence to journalists and programme-makers to determine the content of broadcast output. Changes in organization and working practices were to be safeguarded by the pending new broadcasting legislation<sup>127</sup>. With carte blanche given by Papandreou<sup>128</sup>, Laliotis chose to appoint to the key posts of ERT-1 personalities who were thought to be politically closer to KKE-es than to PASOK. The new Director General was the Rector of the Panteios School of Political Science George Kontogiorgis; the Chairmanship of the Board of Governors was given to lawyer and civil rights activist, Christoforos Argyropoulos; and as Head of the Directorate of News was appointed the journalist, Nikiforos Antonopoulos.

The first sector to undergo an immediate change during this transitional period was the news department. The new management's view was that a main task of democratic television was the 'visualization of political and social rivalries'<sup>129</sup> and the promotion and 'respect of pluralism and multi-party character of modern democracy'<sup>130</sup>. Thus, the news became more lively, enriched as it was with more footage, while the daily reports of trivial ministerial activities gave way to daily coverage of industrial action and activities of the opposition parties<sup>131</sup>. The main factor behind this change was Laliotis himself, who acted as a breakwater against any pressure exercised by members of the government upon journalists. The new policy in news programmes was soon to be praised by the majority of the press<sup>132</sup>.

Nevertheless, the 'spring of Greek television' was to be short-lived, for the three men were forced to resign in November 1985, amid the surge of popular discontent generated by PASOK's austerity measures. ERT-1 television news was dominated by scenes of demonstrations, strikes and union representatives waging fierce attacks against PASOK's new economic policy. Clearly the time was not right for PASOK to proceed with a major reform in the information policy of television. To allow the coverage of increasing anti-government protest by state-owned television at a time when PASOK was facing its most serious crisis was seen by many Socialist ministers as capitulation. Suddenly Laliotis became the target of attacks by other government ministers, who pressured him to reconsider his broadcasting policy<sup>133</sup>. The 'last straw' came on November 14 1985 when the Minister of Labour demanded the manuscripts of two ERT-1 reports covering industrial action which had been transmitted on the 13th and 14th of that month. This was considered by the three heads of the organization as an unacceptable intervention in their policy-making and on the same day they submitted their resignations to Laliotis<sup>134</sup>. In a letter of reply, Laliotis admitted that there was fierce opposition to their broadcasting policies. "It is an opposition emanating from people who are content with yesterday's patterns and unable to realize tomorrow's needs. It is a fight between the old and the new, not in terms of age but in terms of how they perceive politics, society and the institutions<sup>135</sup>. Having been isolated within the government, Laliotis also resigned from his post as Undersecretary for the Press as well as from PASOK's Central Committee. A few days later, commenting on Laliotis' policies regarding ERT-1, Papandreou outlined his position on the role of state broadcasting:

"In Greece there are no independent private networks, nor is the management of public ones appointed by mass organizations to which it should be responsible. In Greece there is state-owned television, and responsible for its operation is the (...) government. Therefore, all those appointed to key posts in television should implement the government's policy on the

subject and not their own. The managerial staff is not representing anything, since its powers emanate from the confidence placed in them by the cabinet which makes the appointments. (...) The government does not donate television to anybody to do whatever he pleases with it, as the three heads of ERT-1 might have thought"<sup>136</sup>.

This statement is particularly important, as in it Papandreou declared as legitimate the practice of political intervention in the operation of broadcasting, a practice which he had so fiercely opposed while in opposition. The Prime Minister's statement inaugurated a period of further government controls over the content of broadcast programmes, which only deepened the crisis of credibility and legitimacy of the Greek broadcasting institutions.

#### **8.6 The crisis of legitimacy of the broadcasting institutions and the introduction of 'free radio'**

The subordination of broadcasting to the political control of PASOK and the systematic promotion of those ideas and values which the party considered beneficial to its political interests made the performance of the two broadcasting institutions a source of continuous tension and polarization between the government and the Conservative opposition. New Democracy complained about lack of balance in political programmes and accused PASOK of pursuing the indoctrination of the Greek people with left-wing ideas. More importantly, the monopolization of radio and television by the Socialists provided ND with a major opportunity to fight PASOK with its own weapons. After their defeat in 1981, the Conservatives tried to reverse PASOK's anti-Right, anti-authoritarian discourse by exposing its effort to occupy the state and by presenting the Socialist regime as a 'junta' that should be brought down; hence, the slogans 'Down with PASOK's junta' ('Kato i hounta tou PASOK') and 'Deliverance' ('Apallaghi', as

opposed to PASOK's promised 'Allaghi'). The Socialist government's stance vis-à-vis ERT-1 and ERT-2 seemed to provide a good example of PASOK's authoritarianism, and ND sought to exploit to the full. Thus, a first move by C.Mitsotakis after he was elected ND's leader in September 1984 was to stage a campaign against the 'fascist television' and to organize a protest rally outside ERT-2<sup>137</sup>.

By contrast, the opposition of KKE to PASOK's media practices was initially rather mild, although it criticized the government for its hesitation in bringing about a major reform of the broadcasting system<sup>138</sup>. Generally speaking, the Communists seemed to be content with the new ideological orientation of the state-run media. It was only after the 1985 elections that the Communists changed their tolerant attitude towards the PASOK government. This was partly due to the latter's austerity measures and heavy-handed policies towards the unions and partly because they realized that the successful exploitation of the Right-Left cleavage by PASOK had worked against their own electoral interests<sup>139</sup>.

From the mid-1980s onwards, there was a change in the context within which the broadcasting issue was discussed. First, the debate was no longer confined to Parliament, nor was it the exclusive concern of the political elite; academics, artists and intellectuals also focused their attention on the problems of the Greek media, organizing conferences<sup>140</sup> and setting up special committees to monitor the content of television broadcasts<sup>141</sup>. What is more important is the fact that the debate was not limited to the search for organizational safeguards for the political autonomy of the state-run media. In Athens, intellectual groups such as 'Channel 15' and the political review ANTI set up their own radio stations - which were eventually suppressed by the police - to campaign against the state monopoly in radio<sup>142</sup>. The emergence of such currents was to a large extent, the result of

disappointment created by PASOK's policy on radio and television. When it became clear that PASOK's advent to power had not marked the end of authoritarian practices - until then associated with right-wing rule - a part of the Left, as well as representatives of the more liberal tendency within the Right, started to question the validity of the state-monopoly as a means of safeguarding the independence of broadcasting from partisan political control.

This new attitude towards the state monopoly was also influenced by trends in mass communications in Western Europe. The development of FM technology and its availability at cheap prices, the breaking of national monopolies, the authorised establishment of independent radio and television channels in many European countries, and the trend towards the deregulation of broadcasting, especially vis-a-vis the expansion of cable and satellite, undermined the adherence to the state monopoly model of Greek broadcasting. In the light of a potential common market for television within the European Community, attention was drawn to the deficiency of the national media and their inability to compete with a plethora of European programmes transmitted via satellite. For the supporters of free enterprise, only the establishment of private networks and the competition with the state-owned media would guarantee the quality of television production and prevent an absorption of audiences by the satellite channels. On the other hand, the development of cross-frontier transmission within the EEC was seen by many intellectuals, journalists and politicians as a significant means for the cultural integration of Greece into Europe<sup>143</sup>.

Apart from developments elsewhere, another challenge to the state monopoly was the high penetration of video cassette recorders<sup>144</sup> and the proliferation of parabolic antennae in the wealthy suburbs of Athens and Thessaloniki. Although largely the outcome of a shift towards a consumerist lifestyle, these



developments indicated a high level of dissatisfaction with existing output and the need for greater variety of choice felt by audiences. A notable change in the political climate of the media debate, however, was ND's support for private broadcasting, which was to a large extent, due to its espousal of the ideals of neo-liberalism and the free market economy. A first step towards a new policy on the media was ND's proposal on the reform of broadcasting published in 1986 which, although favouring the continuation of the state monopoly, called for a small-scale privatization of future cable and satellite systems. Since then the Conservatives have supported a mixed system of ownership and control, with the coexistence of both public and commercial broadcasters which in their view could guarantee a large variety of options for Greek viewers<sup>145</sup>.

The decisive change in the structure of Greek broadcasting was to come from within the Conservative opposition. In the 1986 municipal elections, PASOK, having failed to secure the cooperation of the Communist Left, lost the three major cities of Athens, Thessaloniki and Piraeus to Conservative candidates. Three of ND's younger cadres, the new mayors M.Evert, S.Kouvelas and S.Andrianopoulos, had announced during the election campaign that once elected, they would set up local authority-run radio stations in their cities, a pronouncement also made by the Communist-supported candidate for Athens. In June 1987 Evert proceeded with the de facto establishment of the Athens radio station, to be followed suit by the two other mayors. Although the three new stations were illegal, as they were in breach of the state monopoly, the government granted them provisional licences until the final framework for broadcasting could be implemented later that year. The establishment of "free radio" - as the new local stations were popularly called - was a major success for the Conservatives who appeared to have snatched the initiative in broadcasting policy-making from the government and to have presented it with a *fait accompli*. Apart from that, the crusade for independent

radio was also a vehicle for the three ND cadres to further their personal political careers by gaining popularity and, hence, consolidating their power base within their party. For M.Evert in particular, the emphasis on balanced and impartial coverage of politics became the flagship of his campaign for further democratization of political structures and the promotion of pluralism. It is worth noting that the setting up of the new radio station was keenly supported by the Communist opposition in the Athens local council who considered it as a breakthrough towards a more pluralistic broadcasting system<sup>146</sup>.

As far as PASOK was concerned, its stance throughout the revived media debate was characterized by embarrassment and hesitation. For a long time the Socialists seemed reluctant to proceed with a democratic reform of the broadcasting framework, fearing that this would deprive them of the main means they had at their disposal for the influence of public opinion. For the same reasons, the government hesitated to introduce independent radio stations, although pressure towards this end had been exercised by the younger cadres of the governing party<sup>147</sup>. In an effort to defuse the situation, the government set up an all-party committee to make proposals for a reform of the system. However, the committee failed to produce any concrete plan for the re-organization of broadcasting, based on a broad consensus among political parties<sup>148</sup>.

Eventually in 1987 PASOK introduced the long-due reform on broadcasting. Apart from the promised merger of ERT-1 and ERT-2 into a joint administrative body, ERT-AE, the new law (1730/1987) abolished the state monopoly for radio but maintained it on television. It also made provision for the establishment of a third channel within the public corporation. It seems that the Socialists responded to the pressures of the opposition to introduce independent radio in order to reap the benefits from the de facto breaking of the state monopoly by appearing to be the first to change the structure of the

broadcasting system. In essence, however, the new statute constituted a major effort by PASOK to minimize the political cost caused by the loss of control over radio. PASOK sought to retain its tight control over the state-owned media by reproducing the same pattern of centralized administration as in the previous law. Thus, the Minister to the Prime Minister retained the extensive powers designated by Law 230/1975 in making appointments to the key managerial posts of the company and in deciding on crucial issues (financial, organizational, etc) regarding its operation<sup>149</sup>.

As in other companies of the public sector, the new law established within ERT-AE a 'Representative Council of Social Control' (ASKE), a fifty-member body with wide social and political representation from political parties, local authorities, trade unions, social and scientific groups<sup>150</sup>. According to PASOK's law on the socialization of public companies, ASKE were to be the main administrative bodies of these companies. In practice, however, these structures - including that of ERT-AE - had only advisory and supervisory functions. The same applied to the newly established Broadcasting Council, which consisted of representatives of the government and the opposition<sup>151</sup>. The introduction of these two, largely decorative bodies was characteristic of PASOK's general strategy to appear as fulfilling earlier promises - in this case, the establishment of social control of broadcasting - while in essence it applied policies which served its narrow political interests.

It would be fair to say, however, that with the new statute PASOK made an effort to avoid the problems caused by the previous legislation. Thus, the dyarchy between the Chairman of the Board and the Director General was abolished; instead, the Chairman was to act as the company's Managing Director. ERT-AE was to consist of Hellenic Television-1 (ET-1), Hellenic Television-2 (ET-2) and Hellenic Radio (ERA). The latter

service was administratively separated from television and constituted the merger of the radio services of ERT-1 and ERT-2. Each one of the three services was to be administered by a Director appointed by the Board of Governors<sup>152</sup>.

The law also provided for the establishment of a subsidiary company for producing and trading programme material and an Institute to promote research in the sphere of broadcasting, create a national audio-visual archive and provide training to ERT-AE staff<sup>153</sup>. Both these institutions reflected PASOK's concern to rationalize the operation of the broadcasting media and improve the quality of output. However, by the time of its electoral defeat in June 1989, none of the two projects had materialized. Finally, the law introduced a code of deontology - a set of news values and principles to be applied in advertising and in general programming<sup>154</sup>.

With reference to the independent radio stations, the law set a significant number of regulations, such as limiting communication range to the local level, prohibiting the formation of networks and restricting ownership to Greek citizens only, a provision which reflected PASOK's preoccupation with the protection of Greek culture from foreign influences<sup>155</sup>. The Minister to the Prime Minister was given the right to grant licences at his discretion, following a proposal by the Committee for Local Radio, which was established by the new statute<sup>156</sup>. Only one licence could be granted to each private citizen or company, a restriction apparently aimed at preventing concentration of ownership. The stations could be financed by the local authorities or their private owners and/or by advertising. Licence fees were not permitted. The stations' operation should also conform to a significant number of regulations, some of which were also applied to the state-owned media: the stations' daily output had to be objective, pluralistic, of good quality and to safeguard and promote Greek culture, tradition and language. Moreover, the programmes

should have a local character and promote the tradition and culture of the region where the station operated. News of national interest - apart from local news - could be broadcast only by stations run by local authorities or private stations employing professional journalists. Like the national networks, the daily amount of advertising could not exceed 8 per cent of the total output. All stations were obliged to allow access to their programming for local social and cultural groups. The application of the regulations was to be supervised by a three-member committee of deontology appointed to each station by the local council or the private owners<sup>157</sup>.

All in all, the new legal framework reflected again the haphazard attitude and political calculation which had always characterized the policies of Greek governments in the sphere of broadcasting. Neither the dismantling of the state monopoly, nor the re-organization of the state networks were products of a carefully planned and coherent media policy. They were rather calculated moves in a political game, in which each of the two main players - the Conservatives and the Socialists - were trying to make most gains out of the communications explosion.

Despite the re-structuring of the public broadcasting organizations, the new law did not solve the chronic problems of Greek broadcasting. To start with, state control over broadcast output remained as strict as ever and even reached scandalous proportions towards the end of PASOK's rule (especially in the period 1988-1989)<sup>158</sup>. PASOK did not dare to lay off the unnecessary staff with which successive governments had loaded the two networks, apparently fearing the political implications of causing massive redundancies in a period of rising social discontent. Finally, the government failed to provide the new Corporation with the substantial subsidy that was necessary for the modernization of technical infrastructure, especially that of ET-2. Irrational organization and lack of modernization of production meant that ERT-AE continued

to suffer major financial losses and to provide an output of low quality. The implications of such policies were particularly serious for the Corporation in view of the competition from private television stations which appeared at the end of 1989 and which have absorbed a large part of the audience and advertising revenue from public broadcasting<sup>159</sup>.

At the same time, ERA faced strong competition from the new local authority-run stations, which became highly popular partly because of their novelty and partly because of their lively music programmes and informal style of presentation. This was particularly true for the Athens station '9.84' which, with the new ethos it introduced into the political coverage and its popular music programme, not only attracted the largest part of the radio audience, but also absorbed vital advertising revenue from the state-owned radio channels<sup>160</sup>. Soon, new stations were mushrooming all over the country, as local authorities - or, rather, mayors, political parties, individual politicians, press publishers and other entrepreneurs - sought to gain a foothold in the broadcasting field.

However, the initial euphoria soon evaporated as due to increasing competition for a relatively small audience and advertising base and the lack of realistic and effective financial planning, the vast majority of stations - including '9.84' - suffered heavy financial losses<sup>161</sup>. Another serious problem was the lack of effective controls over the implementation of the rules governing the operation of independent stations. Hence, the context within which 'free radio' has been operating is one of anarchy and violation of the law<sup>162</sup>. The committees of deontology have been in practice abolished in all stations, so there is no control of the implementation of the principles set by the law<sup>163</sup>. The situation has become even more chaotic with the proliferation of independent television stations since 1989. Phenomena such as the operation of television stations without official

authorization, the concentration of different media - radio, television, press - in fewer hands, the deteriorating quality of broadcast material, the emphasis on crime and sensationalism, have been notable characteristics of the deregulation (in practice, if not institutionally) of radio and television<sup>164</sup>.

These dramatic new developments in the field of broadcasting are also gradually changing the political agenda regarding the operation of the mass media in Greece. The question of the redistribution of political control over broadcasting does not constitute a crucial political issue any more, although it remains open in the case of the state-controlled media. The multiplicity of radio and television outlets has somehow eliminated the necessity for the safeguarding of the balanced coverage of politics within a single organization. The situation now in broadcasting is more similar to the situation of the press, in that through the largely partisan reporting of each station audiences are provided with the whole range of political opinions - at least those representing the party political spectrum - that exist in the country today. It could be argued that this arrangement is closer to Greek political culture, characterized by a passionate approach to politics and a preference for monologue rather than dialogue.

If state manipulation of broadcasting is becoming an issue of the past, the new question on the political agenda is how to make the large number of broadcasters now operating within the country accountable. The Codes of Deontology which were published recently in the press<sup>165</sup> constitute an effort to tackle this problem. This will entail, however, a redefinition or, rather a proper clear definition of the mission of radio and television in the changing Greek society.

## 8.7 Conclusion

PASOK's policy on radio and television revealed that the party lacked entirely a concrete plan for democratic reform of broadcasting institutions. Notwithstanding its condemnation of ND's authoritarian practices vis-a-vis broadcasting, while in government PASOK pursued a policy on the broadcast media similar to its predecessor. As in the case of the Conservative government, PASOK sought to use radio and television to gain legitimacy for its policies. A helpful law and a compliant management was all that PASOK was interested in regarding the two broadcasting organizations.

It is true that under the Socialists the broadcast media offered more access to the opposition or other major social organizations to air their views and criticisms of the government. Yet, the balance was always in favour of PASOK's policies. Moreover, PASOK sought to promote those ideas which would best serve its own political interests.

Eventually, the party's overall attitude towards broadcasting deepened the crisis of legitimacy of Greek broadcasting institutions, especially as it was proved that partisan political control on radio and television was not an exclusive characteristic of right-wing policies. Like New Democracy, PASOK never pursued the development of a public service ethos in broadcasting. Thus, the final decision to do away with the state monopoly did not involve any consideration as to whether or how this ethos should be preserved in the emergent broadcasting system. As a result, the deregulation has led to a chaotic situation in radio and television.



## NOTES

1. See "Contract with the People", p. 17.
2. See the parliamentary debates noted in Chapter 6. See for instance, the proposal of the KKE-es, Gazette of Parliamentary Debates, Sitting 25, 7.2.1978, p. 887.
3. It should be noted here, that the "Declaration of the 3rd September" did not contain any reference at all to the printed press or broadcasting, although it dealt with other cultural institutions such as education and the church. Instead, the party declared as a general commitment, to safeguard the freedom of opinion and expression. See p. 16 of the declaration.
4. See the "Constitution for a Democratic Greece", in The Constitution of Greece, a publication of the weekly paper Pontiki, Athens 1987, p. 260-261.
5. Amendment of 25. 4. 1975 as it is quoted by N. ALIVIZATOS: State and Broadcasting (in Greek), Sakkoulas, Athens 1986, p. 23.
6. Definition given by PASOK deputy A. Kaklamanis; quoted by Alivizatos, *ibid*.
7. As we saw, EIRT was a public institute operating within the sphere of public administration, while its successor ERT was a state owned company operating under private law.
8. See the Speech of PASOK deputy A. Kaklamanis, in the Gazette of Parliamentary Debates, Period 2, Session 2, Sittings 1-33, Sitting 33 of 27.11.1975, p. 1117.
9. See the Gazette of Parliamentary Debates, Vol 1, Sittings 1-48, Sitting 20 of 17.1.1975, p. 349.
10. *Ibid*, p. 343.
11. Speech of 5 April 1977 at the ESIEA headquarters, see Problems of Press and Journalism (in Greek), ESIEA, Athens 1977, p. 127.
12. See the national press, 26.1.1978.
13. Extensive extracts of the reports of "Exormissi" were also carried by the pro-PASOK daily press. See for instance, TA NEA

5.1.1978.

14. See the speech of deputy Prime Minister K. Papakonstantinou in the Gazette of Parliamentary Debates, Period B', Session A', Sittings 1-31, Sitting 25 of 7.2.1978, p. 875.

15. Ibid, p. 874.

16. See for instance, TA NEA and ELEFTHEROTYPIA of 6, 7, 8 and 9 February 1978.

17. See Papandreou's speeches, Gazette of Parliament. Debates, op. cit., Sitting 27 of 7.2.1978, p. 881 and Sitting 26 of 8.2. 1978, p. 916.

18. Ibid, p. 918.

19. Ibid, p. 917.

20. Ibid, p. 919.

21. Ibid, p. 916.

22. Ibid, p. 919.

23. Ibid.

24. "Contract with the People", p. 43.

25. Ibid, p. 44

26. See the Introductory Report to the Greek Parliament of 27. 7.1982 which accompanied the Bill, p. 1.

27. The new commander of YENED was Brigadier V.Tsangris. See the national press, 24.10.1981.

28. The three new appointees were: journalist Y.Voutsinas, actor L.Komninos and film critic N. Fenek Mikelidis.

29. See Gazette of Parliamentary Debates, Period 3, Session A, Sittings 1-23, Sitting 19 of 12.8.1982, p. 626.

30. Remarks made during the trial of the junta protagonists, Summer 1975. M. SPOURDALAKIS: PASOK: Structure, Internal Crises and Concentration of Power (in Greek), Exandas, Athens 1988, p. 223 note 20 and p. 278 note 40.

31. Ibid, p. 278 note 40.

32. See Gazette of Parliamentary Debates, Sitting of 27-11-1975, on the new legal framework for EIRT.

33. Introductory Report to Parliament, op.cit.

34. Ibid. Also the speech of the representative of PASOK. Gazette of Parliamentary Debates, Session A, Sitting 19, 12-8-

1982, p. 621.

35. See the speech of KKE deputy E. Ipsilandi, Gazette of Parliamentary Debates, Sitting 19 of 12.8.1982, p. 628.

36. Article 15, par. 2 of Law 1288/1982.

37. Article 16, par. 4 of Law 1288/1982.

38. Article 16, par. 5 of Law 1288/1982.

39. Article 16, par. 6 of Law 1288/1982.

40. Article 18, of Law 1288/1982. Also, interview of ERT-2's Chairman S. Apostolopoulos with the author, 4-1-1989.

41. P. DAGTOGLOU: Broadcasting And Constitution (in Greek), 4th Edition, Sakkoulas, Athens 1989, p. 64. For a similar critique of the new legislation, see Alivizatos: State and Broadcasting, op.cit., p. 40.

42. Introductory Report to Parliament, op. cit., p. 1.

43. See speech of A.Pavlidis, Gazette of Parliamentary Debates, op. cit., Sitting 19 of 12.8.1982, p. 624.

44. Intervention of the Minister to the Prime Minister M. Koutsogiorgas in the debate; ibid, p. 622.

45. As Spourdalakis points out, PASOK tried to give to Greek political life a technocratic character, by projecting itself as a pool of expertise on every issue be it social, economic or other; Spourdalakis, op. cit., pp. 240-244 and 308-309.

46. For instance, in the 1981 general election PASOK's lists of candidates included eight university professors, four journalists and four artists; there were also two representatives of the first group and three of the third in the party's Central Committee; C. LYRINTZIS: "The Rise of PASOK and the emergence of a new political personnel". In, Z. TZANNATOS (ed) Socialism in Greece: the first four years, Gower, London 1986, p. 118.

47. The author encountered this stance of silence at the various interviews with most of PASOK appointed officials of the two channels.

48. Interview in TA NEA, 4.11.1981.

49. See TA NEA, 19.3.1982.

50. Speech in "Television Today" at the Greek Open University,

the national press, 22.1.1982.

51. According to an estimation, ERT-1 was obliged to pay 4,985,000 drachmas each week up to 1983 in order to pay off the programmes' producers; TA NEA, 20.9.1981.

52. See for instance the series "Lavreotika" and "Strike" (Aperghia), shown in the period 1982-83, which dealt with the uprising of the miners of Lavrion during the turn of the century.

53. See speech of A.Pavlidis, Gazette of Parliamentary Debates, op. cit., pp. 623 and 626; also D. KATSOUDAS: "Greece: A Politically Controlled State Monopoly Broadcasting System". In, R. KUHN (ed) Broadcasting and Politics in Western Europe, West European Politics, Vol. 8, no 2, p. 150.

54. Press Conference, the national press, 19.3.1982.

55. Interview of N. Sotiriadis with the author, 22.9.1988. See also, interviews of former ERT-1 Director General D. Katsimis and former head of ERT-1 news G. Douatzis in TA NEA, 3.9.1985.

56. PASOK had continued the ND-established practice, whereby control over ERT-1 was transferred by the Minister to the Prime Minister to the Undersecretary for Press and Information.

57. The national press, 20.1.1984.

58. See ANTI, No 265, 6.7.1984 and report in MESIMVRINI, 16.9.1985.

59. See his lengthy interview in ANTI, ibid, p. 21-25, where he speaks about his decision to establish a Programming Committee at the ERT-2 and his choice of some political documentaries to be produced by ERT-1.

60. Interview with his successor to the post D.Katsimis in TA NEA, 3.9.1985 and MESIMVRINI, report, op. cit.

61. The draft was published by the weekly paper TO PONTIKI on 15.1.1984.

62. See the proposed reforms in the national press, 31.1.1984.

63. Annual Report of the Board of Governors to the General Assembly of ERT-1 for the year 1983, 15.6.1984., p. 1.

64. See Peponis's complaints about the attacks from the Press and the left-wing parties in his interview in ANTI, op. cit.

Peponis's proposal for the reform of broadcasting had been met with a lot of opposition by the Federation of the unions of the employees in the two networks, POSPERT, which pressured for the merger of ERT-2 into ERT-1 since 1983; interview of the member of POSPERT Administrative Council, G. Maganias with the author, 21.1.1988.

65. MESIMVRINI, op.cit.

66. "I wanted to work and the Chairman would not allow me to", Katsimis would say in an interview a year later. TA NEA, 3.9.1985.

67. See the resolution of 1.1.1985 issued by the Board of ERT-1 in TO VIMA, 9.1.1985.

68. See Vassilikos' interview in TA NEA, 5.9.1985.

69. Mathiopoulos, interview with the author, 18.1.1989. See, also Katsimis, op. cit.; Vassilikos, op. cit.;

70. Katsimis, *ibid*.

71. Interview of N. Sotiriadis with the author, op.cit.

72. *Ibid*. See also Sotiriadis' interview in TA NEA, 8.12.1986.

73. Interview of N.Sotiriadis with the author, *ibid*.

74. *Ibid*. It was alleged by political columnists that Chalatsis had fallen from Papandreou's grace for having discontinued a series on the two sexes that was produced and presented by Papandreou's protege and, later, his third wife Dimitra Liani; see the article of S. Kouloglou in ANTI, no 340, 27.2.1987, p. 22-23.

75. S. Apostolopoulos, interview with the author, 4.1.1989.

76. *Ibid*.

77. *Ibid*.

78. Hundreds of indignant and offended viewers phoned to the ERT-2 headquarters demanding the interruption of the transmission. Before Apostolopoulos was able to reach his office at ERT-2, a panicked technician switched off the power from the general transmitter of the network for more than two hours; *ibid*. See also the national press, 2 and 3 May 1984.

79. Apostolopoulos, *ibid*.

80. See the letter of Kapsis to Papadopoulos in the national

press, 26.2.1987.

81. Ibid.

82. Apostolopoulos, interview with the author, op.cit.

83. Ibid. See also Stratis' interview in TO VIMA, 29.3.1987.

84. Stratis' interview in TO VIMA, ibid.

85. The sacked were Sp. Charamis, Director of Television; K. Livadeas, Director of Radio;; A. Lignadis; G. Tsoutsias; I. Pefkianakis; and Triantafyllou. See the national press, 14.1.1982.

86. The number of personnel under contract rose from 940 in 1977 to 1235 in 1983 and to 1523 in 1984; Operational Regulations (Ipiressiakos Organismos) of ERT-AE, 4th edition, April 1986.

87. Sotiriadis, interview with the author, op.cit.

88. Katsimis's interview in TA NEA, op.cit.

89. Apostolopoulos, interview with the author, op.cit.

90. Mathiopoulos, interview with the author, op.cit.

91. According to the information given by a Conservative deputy, which was never contradicted so far as we know, within the first two years of the Socialist government the loans to pro-government papers were increased by 104 per cent, while those to the opposition press only by 26 per cent. Also, a few days prior to the 1985 election, the state-owned Agricultural Bank bought from the Lambrakis Group a plot of land for nearly 1 billion drachmas; KYRIAZIDES: "Press Economics", ANTI, no 320, p. 31-36.

92. We imply here the attempts of a regional publisher, Popotas, to set up two national papers with loans from the state-owned Commercial Bank. Also, see the involvement of leading PASOK cadres in the setting up of the pro-PASOK "Eleftheros Logos" (Free Speech); ibid. Finally, the close ties between the banker and publisher G.Koskotas and the government led to the prosecution of former ministers and Papandreou himself for involvement in a scandal of money embezzlement; the trial is currently held.

93. M. DIMITRIOU: "The crisis of the Greek Press and how to

overcome it", ANTI, op. cit., p. 37-41.

94. See the interview of former ERT-1 News Director A.Bouloukos in TA NEA, 29.2.1982. Also, for the names of well-known journalists who were suspended, see: "The Condition of ERT today", ENA, no 33, 15.8.1990.

95. See the complaints of ND's leader C.Mitsotakis at a protest rally outside ERT-2, VRADINI ON SUNDAY, 2.12.1984.

96. Interview of ERT-2 Editor-in-Chief A.Chrysochoou with the author, 8.1.1987.

97. Interview of A.Chrysochoou with the author, 16.1.1989. See also interview of an anonymous journalist in TA NEA, 27.2.1984.

98. We imply here the case of News Director D.Katsimis, who was pressured to resign after he had allowed the transmission of an acidic statement by the ND leader E.Averoff without providing a government reply; Katsimis, interview, op.cit.

99. See the national press, 4.11.1981.

100. See interview of an anonymous journalist of ERT-1 in TA NEA, 27.2.1984.

101. Ibid.

102. Particular emphasis was placed on Papandreou's trips abroad and his meetings with foreign leaders, as well as on the "Movement of the Six" for Peace and Disarmament of which Papandreou was a member.

103. Interview of Editor-in-Chief of ERT-1 K.Hountas with the author, 12.1.1988. Also, interviews with Chrysochoou, op.cit.

104. Interview of anonymous ERT-1 journalist, op. cit. Also, interview of former ERT-1 News Director G.Douatzis in TA NEA, 3.9.1985.

105. Interview of A.Chrysochoou with the author (1987), op.cit. Also, interview of N.Sotiriadis with the author, op.cit.

106. Interview of S.Apostolopoulos with the author, op.cit. Douatzis, op.cit. Interview of Hountas with the author, op.cit.

107. See interview of former ERT-2 News Director Chr.Kontaxis in TA NEA, 29.2.1984. Also, interview of anonymous ERT-1 journalist op.cit. and interview of A.Chrysochoou with the author (1989), op. cit.

108. Interview with Chrysochoou, *ibid.*
109. Interview of N.Sotiriadis with the author, *op.cit.*
110. See the critique of M. Spourdalakis, *op. cit.*, p. 309.
111. The author had had personal experience from a visit to ERT-2 on 8.1.1987. Also, interview with Chrysochoou (1989), *op. cit.*
112. Interviews of Hountas and Chrysochoou (1989) with the author, *op.cit.*
113. Interviews of Sotiriadis and Chrysochoou (1987) with the author, *op.cit.* Also, interview of ERT-1 journalist S.Stanotas in TA NEA, 28.2.1984.
114. See Kontaxis's interview, *op.cit.*; Stanotas, *ibid.*
115. Interview of former ERT-2 Chairman S.Apostolopoulos with the author, *op.cit.*; also, see interview of an anonymous reporter of ERT-2 and member of PASOK in TA NEA, 28.2.1984.
116. See interviews of Stanotas and anonymous ERT-2 reporter, *ibid.*
117. On ERT-1 alone, the number of current affairs programmes was 30-35 monthly. Some examples are the "Here and Today" (Edo kai Simera), "Faces and Issues" (Prosopa kai Themata), "Open Cards" (Anoichta Hartia) and economic and consumers' programmes; interview of the former Head of Current Affairs department at ERT-1 Makis Yiombazolias with the author, 21.9.1990.
118. For these reasons, a former ERT-2 Chairman characterized the programme as "Klista Hartia" (Hidden Cards); Argyropoulos, *op. cit.*
119. See TA NEA, 6.11.1984.
120. See the national press, 8.11.1984.
121. See KATHIMERINI, 3.5.1985.
122. See EXORMISSI, 3.5.1985; KATHIMERINI, *ibid.*
123. See KATHIMERINI, 17.5.1985.
124. See the national press, 1.6.1985.
125. Interviews of N.Sotiriadis and A.Chrysochoou (1989) with the author, *op.cit.*
126. Interview of C. Argyropoulos with the author, 8.9.1988
127. *Ibid.*



128. At a cabinet meeting following Laliotis resignation, Papandreou stated that the former Undersecretary for the Press had his full backing in the policy he was pursuing in broadcasting; see "The backstage of the resignation" in TO VIMA, 24.11.1985.
129. See their letter of resignation; *ibid.*
130. Interview of Argyropoulos with the author, *op. cit.*
131. TO VIMA, 24.11.1985.
132. *Ibid.* See also, TA NEA, 8.9.1985.
133. See TO VIMA, 24.11.1985. Also interview of Argyropoulos with the author, *op.cit.*
134. See their letter of resignation in TO VIMA, 24.11.1985. For the controversy caused by the intervention of the Minister of Labour, see ELEFTHERTYPIA, 16.11.1985.
135. See his speech to the cabinet, in TO VIMA, *ibid.*
136. *Ibid.*
137. See the national press, 22.11.1984 and 2.12.1984.
138. See the speech of KKE MP Em. Ypsilandi in the Gazette of Parliamentary Debates, Sitting 19, 12.8.1982, *op.cit.*, p. 628-629
139. See, for instance, the KKE's reaction against the anti-Right rhetoric of PASOK during the 1985 election campaign, in Clogg, *Parties...op.cit.*, p. 108.
140. See, for instance: The First Pan-hellenic Conference on Radio and Television, Athens, 6-10 June 1983; two Conferences organized by the Initiative Group for Science and Society (OPEK), Athens, 27-29 September 1985 and 11-13 April 1986; the Open Discussion organized by KKE, Athens, 20-21 March 1986; the Conference of political review ANTI, Athens, 14-15 December 1985.
141. In 1983 a group of artists, academics and liberal professionals set up the Committee for the Protection of TV Viewers; see the national press, 31.5.1983.
142. See ANTI, 23.12.1983 and KATHIMERINI, 23.5.1983.
143. See the series of interviews in the literary journal TO DENTRO (The Tree), no 12, January-February 1985, and no 13,

March-April 1985. Also, Mathiopoulos's interview with the author, op.cit., and the plans of the Mayors of Athens and, especially, Thessaloniki to relay European programmes beamed by satellite. For a general review of these developments, see S.PAPATHANASSOPOULOS: "Greece: Nothing is More Permanent than the Provisional", Intermedia, vol. 17, no 2, 1989, p. 29-35.

144. From 250,000 in 1986 to around 600,000 in 1988; see G. M. LUYKEN: "The VCR Explosion and its Impact on Television Broadcasting in Europe", Columbia Journal of World Business, Fall 1987, p. 65-70. See also KYRIAKATIKI ELEFTHEROTYPIA, 18/19.4.1987, where it was reported that in the period between November and December 1986, 300,000 VCR were sold in Athens only.

145. See ND's proposal for the broadcasting law, February 1986, in P. DAGTOGLOU: Broadcasting and Constitution (in Greek), Sakkoulas, Athens 1986, p. 287-302.

146. Interview of the Deputy Mayor of Athens Th.Katrivanos with the author, 13.1.1988.

147. The most ardent advocate of free radio within PASOK, was Papandreou's own son, George, who at the time was Undersecretary for Youth; see his views in TO VIMA, 14.12.1986. Also, see the views of PASOK's youth organization in TA NEA, 19.6.1987.

148. See interview of the member of the committee representing EDA S.Linardatos with the author, 28.12.1986. The author has in her archive the minutes of the committee's meetings and proposals made by political parties and unions of journalists and artists.

149. Five out of seven members of the new organization's Board of Directors were to be appointed by the Minister to the Prime Minister; article 6 of Law 1730/1987. Also, articles 7 par 2 and 8.

150. Articles 4 and 5.

151. Article 9.

152. Article 10.

153. Articles 17 and 11 respectively.

154. Article 3. Among other, radio and television programmes should conform to the principles of objectivity, pluralism, have good quality, safeguard the quality of Greek language and respect the personality and private life of the individual. There were also regulations regarding the terms of the coverage of parliamentary procedures and electoral campaigns. Finally, the advertising time could not exceed the 8 per cent of the daily broadcast programme.

155. Article 2 par. 4-13. See also, Presidential Decree No 25 of 15-1-1988, especially Articles 3-7.

156. The Committee consists of three 'ex-officio' members, namely, the chairmen of the State Council and the Supreme Court, the chairman of the Union of Journalists of the Athens Press, and two specialists in the field of mass communications. Article 16 of Presidential Decree, *ibid.*

157. Article 15, *ibid.*

158. See, for instance, the controversy caused because of the coverage of Papandreou's arrival to Athens' airport after he had undergone a serious heart operation in London; TA NEA, 26.10.1988; the national press 26 and 31.10.1988.

159. For the financial and other problems of ERT-AE see the article "A Channel For Sale" in MESIMVRINI, 6.6.1990.

160. Indicatively, between January and February 1988, the "9.84" absorbed 52 per cent of advertising expenditure in radio, whereas the share of the national radio service was down to 39.5 per cent; CHRONOS (Time) magazine, 14.3.1988, p. 25.

161. See "The Winter of Radio" in TO VIMA, 10.6.1990; see also the special file in TO VIMA, 6.8.1989.

162. For instance, local stations have increased de facto their transmission range, or have been turned into networks; TO VIMA, 6.8.1989.

163. *Ibid.*

164. See A. Loverdos: "Codes of Information", in TA NEA, 17.7.1991. See also, "The Jungle of Channels", in TO VIMA, 11.2.1990.

165. See A. Loverdos, *op.cit.*

## CONCLUSION

The object of this thesis was to describe, analyse and explain the organization of Greek broadcasting and its relationship to the political process from the establishment of the first public broadcasting service in 1936 to the abolition of the state monopoly with the introduction of independent radio stations in 1987. Using a historical and political approach, the present study has critically examined the evolution of Greek broadcasting institutions and set this against the background of major developments in the social, economic and, above all, political spheres over a period of more than fifty years. Thus, we have analysed the political background of successive institutional reforms of the state broadcasting services and evaluated the implications of these reforms for the operation of broadcasting and for its relationship to the government.

The main conclusion to emerge from our research is that all governments of the period under examination, whether civilian or military, dictatorial or democratically elected, imposed strict controls over the political output of state broadcasting. What seems more remarkable is that with the exception of dictatorial regimes - during which the broadcasting services were incorporated into the government machine and subjected to preventive censorship - the form of these controls remained largely the same throughout the first fifty years of Greek broadcasting. Direct ministerial interventions and partisan appointments to key managerial and editorial posts in the broadcasting organizations were the common features of the policy of all Greek governments on radio and television.

As the findings of our research suggest, the 'fourth estate model' as a description of the role of broadcasting in liberal democracies is not applicable to the government-broadcasting relationship at any stage in the history of Greek broadcasting until 1987. The independence of broadcasters to report impartially political reality, enquire into the actions of politicians and expose them to public scrutiny, as the 'fourth estate' model would entail, was never pursued as an objective by the Greek political class. Instead, successive governments seized upon the great opportunities offered by radio and television to further their own political ends; that is, to secure the consent and - at least - the tolerance of the people to their policies. All that was needed for this purpose was a helpful law and a compliant management, and politicians - from I. Metaxas to A. Papandreou - sought to have both at their disposal.

As became apparent from our detailed study of the various reforms of broadcasting legislation introduced since 1936, effective power rested with the minister responsible for the control of radio and television, namely the Minister to the Prime Minister or the Undersecretary for Press and Information. Apart from making appointments to the key posts of the broadcasting organizations, the Minister or the Undersecretary was empowered in the 1950s and 1960s to decide upon the general programming policy of EIR and even to exercise preventive censorship on the content of programmes. After 1974 his role was to communicate the political and ideological line of the government to both ERT/ERT-1 and ERT-2.

The Minister or the Undersecretary, however, is neither the only nor the main source of policy-making on broadcasting within the executive. As our analysis of government practices for the period after 1974 has shown, the ultimate source of major policy decisions regarding the running of the broadcasting companies has been the Prime Minister. Karamanlis,

Rallis and Papandreou all manifested an equally strong interest in the performance of ERT/ERT-1 and ERT-2 by selecting personal friends and proteges for the chief executive posts of the two organizations. Moreover, the choice of the person to become Undersecretary for Press reflected to a high degree the kind of policy on broadcasting that each Premier wished to see implemented. Thus, both Lambrias during the first term of ND rule as well as Laliotis in the first few months of PASOK's second term in office were selected to liberalize the operation of radio and television. In contrast, the appointment of Tsaldaris to the post in the wake of the 1977 election reflected the increasing insecurity of the ND government and its shift towards more conservative positions. Individual ministers have also played a significant role in shaping the content of news and other programmes as well as the general employment patterns of Greek broadcasting organizations.

The other actors involved in the production of political messages have been subject to a significant number of constraints, so that they have become in practice incapable of determining the programme content to any significant extent. The Boards of Governors, dominated as they were by government supporters, have exercised very little power over the running of the organizations for the most part of Greek broadcasting history. Certainly, their role has been far from that of a supreme regulatory authority. The broadcasting management - namely, the Director General, the head of news and heads of other programming departments - has always consisted of supporters or members of the governing party, a fact which has led to the convergence or, indeed, identification of their political interests with those of the government. Besides, they could always be dismissed if, for any reason, they failed to satisfy their political masters. Apart from this, the recurrent conflicts over the distribution of power between the Director General of ERT and the Chairman of the Board under Law 230/1975

further undermined the power and authority of the organization's chief executive.

In addition, journalists, employees and external collaborators rarely expressed any political or ideological opposition to the heavy-handed policies of the government or of the directors of the broadcasting organizations. The repression of political opponents, especially those of the Left, from the first years of radio until 1974, the purges of those with 'unhealthy' views and the offering of employment in the state machine as a reward for the 'nationally minded' generated widespread insecurity among the staff of the broadcasting organizations. They also led to the creation of a submissive attitude towards the government and the management.

Apart from repression, however, there have been more covert controls imposed by politicians upon employees. Journalists have been selected in most cases from those ideologically close to the government and usually employed on a part-time basis in the news departments of radio and television. Working in the broadcasting networks has provided a second and far from negligible source of income to members of a profession which is characterized by great job insecurity. This has largely led to the development of a patron-client relationship between journalists and government politicians in which editorial and professional independence are exchanged for economic benefits and major career prospects. The same applies to many employees under temporary contracts and to outside collaborators, who were more often than not supporters or members of the party in power. The preoccupation with improving the financial situation of their members is perhaps the key to understanding the lack of any opposition to government control of programme content from journalists' unions as well as from unions of employees which have usually been very active when it comes to economic demands.

The dependence of broadcasters upon the political will of the government and the need to secure one's position have discouraged the development of any creative initiative within the broadcasting organizations. Instead, as Sir Hugh Greene observed, what has emerged among employees is a civil service mentality permeating all levels of the organizations' hierarchy according to which compliance with the government's wishes has been considered almost an obligation. Under these circumstances Greek radio and television were not allowed to adopt a critical stance towards those in power. Greek broadcasters have been required to deal with the affairs of the state only in the way that politicians in government have wished them to do so. In the classic model of communication,

A (politicians) → C (channels of communication) → B (voters)

the element C, if identified as Greek broadcasting, has never been actively involved in the process of political communication. Instead, it has served as a mere transmitter of messages from A to B or, as an opposition politician put it, as "the humble servant of the government".

Our conclusion - that those in political power have continuously exercised strict control over broadcasting institutions - leads us to the second question included in the objectives of the present thesis: in whose interests has this control been exercised? According to the classic Marxist approach to the media, broadcasting in liberal democracies serves as the instrument of domination of the ruling class or classes, reproducing the values and norms which best serve those classes' interests. On the basis of evidence presented in this study it could be arguably suggested that Greek broadcasting has indeed served as a legitimating mechanism of the established order. Such evidence includes, for example, the promotion of anti-communism as the official state ideology by both the EIR and the armed forces radio; and the practice of



negative references to, or even the complete silence on, industrial action and generally to social protests which has characterized radio and television coverage, not only under right-wing governments but also under PASOK. In contrast, other evidence - such as the systematic promotion and even exaltation of left-wing ideas, struggles and values during the years of Socialist rule - suggest that the role of Greek broadcasting institutions is not as clear-cut as that described by the dominance paradigm.

To suggest that Greek broadcasting has been the instrument of the dominant classes is to argue that the state is also an instrument of bourgeois domination. Yet, as we were able to demonstrate at various stages of this analysis, the Greek state has enjoyed a considerable degree of independence from direct control. The very establishment of the colonels' dictatorship, despite the hostility or mistrust towards the junta manifested by a large part of the Greek bourgeoisie, reflects most clearly the inability of this class to influence directly developments which take place in the political sphere. Due to the delayed and limited industrial development of the country, the state has acquired a central position not only in the economy but also in social and political life. After World War II in particular, the state played a dominant role in the socio-economic development of Greece by allocating resources and providing a favourable institutional framework for the reproduction of capital. In addition, as an employer and redistributor of incomes to different social groups, the state became the guardian of vital interests of a large part of the population.

On the other hand, owing to the underdeveloped character of the Greek economy, the capitalist classes have been relatively weak and largely dependent on state support for their survival and growth. Similarly, the working class has remained small in size and poorly organized, whereas the middle ground has been

occupied by a large peasant population connected with political power through extensive clientelistic networks and by smaller social groups with different, even conflicting, interests.

Economic and social underdevelopment have largely affected the evolution of political parties. Social incoherence and the consequent lack of a class-based discourse, together with the poverty of the Greek political culture and the persistence of patronage as the prevailing means for mobilizing mass support, have prevented Greek political parties, other than the KKE, from becoming autonomous forces with a clear identity and mass organization. The main features of bourgeois parties both before and after World War II were their organizational weakness, clientelistic structure and dependence upon the personality of the leader as a means for securing unity and increasing their electoral appeal. Unable to become well-organized forces with a concrete social base, political parties relied heavily on the mechanisms of the state in order to expand their clientelistic networks and even to persecute their political opponents. The fragile character of political parties and their inability to cope effectively with the emergence of new demands and increased mobilization generated by the process of economic and social development have been largely responsible for recurrent political crises which have often led to the breakdown of parliamentary institutions.

Even after the collapse of the military regime in 1974 and despite the extensive renovation of political personnel, the persistence of the same social structures and political practices imposed limitations on the establishment of mass parties. Thus, ND continued to rely on clientelism failing to develop a clear identity and mass organization. As for PASOK, in the absence of a mass social movement, it became increasingly dominated by its leader, whereas its elaborate organization was reduced to the role of an electoral machine.

As a result, New Democracy and PASOK remained attached to the state mechanisms to secure and expand their electoral bases. Patronage continued to determine the dominant political ethos.

The vagueness of the social structure has greatly influenced the policies and discourse of Greek political forces. In order to expand their appeal, the parties have been led to the articulation of discourses which are intended to mask the contradictions inherent in Greek society and establish a unity among groups with different interests. Thus, the mobilization of political support has been largely based on the exploitation of historic cleavages, symbols and slogans, or on the appeal of charismatic leaders able to express the aspirations of the largest possible part of the population. In this respect, the anti-communism of the 1950s and 1960s played a decisive role, not only in the legitimation of the post-war bourgeois regime but - long after the communist peril had disappeared - in the reproduction of the power of the Right. With the establishment of a fully competitive party system after the collapse of the junta, political parties have appeared to be increasingly pre-occupied with the articulation of a discourse able to attract support from all groups present in Greek society. Thus, throughout the 1970s ND projected itself and its leader as the only safeguard against regression to authoritarianism and the only guarantee of economic, social and political modernization. On the other hand, PASOK sought to unite under its green banner the fragmented middle strata by exploiting the Right-Left cleavage and Papandreou's indisputable charisma.

Anxious to preserve the social alliances which brought them to power, Greek politicians have always manifested a profound mistrust of the independent operation of institutions - such as trade unions or broadcasting - which could serve as channels for the articulation of social interests and/or for the expression of opposition to the policies of the government. The organizational weakness of Greek political parties and,

consequently, their insecurity caused by the fluidity of their electoral base are a key to understanding why democratically elected governments insist upon exercising tight control over broadcasting institutions in ways not very dissimilar to those applied at times of authoritarian rule. Broadcasting has been continuously subjected to conscious and deliberate manipulation by successive governments - both authoritarian and democratic - in order to serve as a legitimating mechanism, not so much of the established social order, as of those governments' specific policies and practices. Even at the time of transition to democracy, when freedom of the press was considered an essential precondition for the establishment of a competitive political system, the operation of broadcasting organizations was closely controlled by Conservative and Socialist governments alike. In fact, both PASOK and ND have used this rare state-owned resource to counter-balance what they always considered to be negative or even hostile coverage of their policies by the entire national press.

The insistence of Greek politicians upon exercising close control over broadcast political output in the period of democratic transition stemmed from their almost naive perception of radio and particularly television as powerful weapons, whose effect upon audience were as direct and dramatic as those of a tranquillizing injection. Both ND and PASOK appeared to think that the exaltation of their ideas, policies and leaders by television would directly influence public opinion in favour of the government and would reproduce the consensus which had brought these parties to power. Greek politicians also seemed to be unaware of the negative effects of their over-exposure on television and of the possibility that the silence of the broadcast news on major controversial issues at a time when these issues were being extensively reported by the daily press would only underline the authoritarian and paternalistic practices of the party in power.

To summarize, the political history of Greek broadcasting, as discussed in the present study, casts grave doubts on the applicability of either the 'fourth estate' or the 'dominance' paradigm of broadcasting in an economically and politically developing country, where the democratic rules of the political game became fully and universally accepted less than two decades ago. Indeed, the study of government-broadcasting relations in the first fifteen years of transition to democracy gives support to the observation of G. Pridham that Greece - along with the other new Mediterranean democracies, Spain and Portugal - has successfully established its political-institutional structures, but still has some way to go before it develops the major characteristics of a system-supportive political culture: popular participation, articulation of pluralism and modern political parties with mass organizations, elements which are crucial for the stabilization of the new democracy. Whereas after the dictatorship the institutionalization of a fully competitive system was recognized by all political forces as a necessary precondition for the effective resolution of conflict, Greek politicians have done little since 1974 to promote the development of a democratic political culture within Greek society. Both the formal organization of powers - i.e. the establishment of a powerful executive and a relatively weak Parliament - as well as the policies and practices of successive governments vis-a-vis civil society have revealed a paternalistic view of politics and society which transcends all forces in the political spectrum. Through the control of the trade unions and the broadcasting media and through the articulation of discourses which can appeal to all social groups alike, the major political forces of the transition have tried to establish a 'unity of the polity at the top' rather than to educate the citizens in new forms of political participation.

This behaviour has reinforced the a-political characteristics of Greek politics, that is, the absence of any link

between political practices and programmes with real events taking place in the social sphere, and the transfer of all social demands to the state for immediate satisfaction. As the experience of both PASOK and ND governments has shown, this strategy has been counter-productive in terms of both these parties' electoral interests and the general effort of economic and social modernization. The deterioration of the economy and the inability of governments to deliver their promises generated disappointment and increased the pressure by social groups for the satisfaction of their demands. Also, the tendency of parties in government to avoid the introduction of reforms which might meet a lot of opposition and thus harm their short-term electoral interests has prevented the rationalization and modernization of social and economic structures and has led to the perpetuation of chronic problems. The failure of PASOK's economic policy, the near-bankruptcy of the state, the scandals and the general disillusionment with Socialist policies in the late 1980s and, currently, the inability of the ND government to forge ahead with a programme of reforms which, though necessary, might entail significant political cost, are all products of this mentality<sup>1</sup>.

Yet, insofar as 'democracy' is a "joint learning experience"<sup>2</sup> the mistakes and impasses of the past can lead to re-adjustments in political behaviour of the political elites and the citizenry at large. The coalition government of ND and the forces of the Left - the KKE and the Greek Left (EAR) - in summer 1989 and the all-party government in November of the same year were crucial steps towards not only the historical reconciliation between Right and Left but also the establishment of a new consensus among the political forces regarding the resolution of Greece's acute economic crisis. Additionally, the gradual disentanglement of the social forces from the Left-Right cleavage has given rise to new social struggles such as the ecology movement which even succeeded in electing a parliamentary representative in two consecutive

elections (November 1989 and April 1990). Apart from the above, the environment of the European Community has also influenced the process of democratic transition. Beyond economic interdependence and the implementation of guidelines and institutional changes common to all member-states, the democratic traditions and participant cultures of European nations are a form of political socialization for the large number of Greek visitors and especially for students in other EEC countries.

The dismantling of the broadcasting monopoly in 1987, although primarily motivated by party political interests, reflected to a large extent the influences of the European context as well as the resentment of authoritarian policies and the increasing need within Greek society for more information and discussion about crucial issues. Although at the moment Greece is experiencing the slow and painful death of an old era without the new one yet being in sight, it is already clear that the formation of new social and political contracts based on the thorough and sincere discussion of real problems and the balancing of different social interests is the only realistic option for national development.

In such a case, a redefinition of the terms of the political game would be necessary. Specifically, this would mean the establishment of an autonomous trade union movement, the emergence of well-organized parties whose base will participate fully in the formulation of party policies and, more generally, the active participation of civil society in public life. Broadcasting could perform a crucial role in realizing these objectives. In particular, radio and television could become the fora for the discussion of problems facing Greek society by offering access to all main arguments and proposed solutions. They could also set the agenda for new issues by allowing scope for new social and political movements to express their ideas and inform and influence public opinion. In this way,

broadcasting could both become the expression of a more pluralistic society and at the same time contribute to its development. However, this redefinition of the role of Greek broadcasting is easier said than done, especially now that the public broadcaster (ERT-AE) which could most effectively perform this task is facing fierce competition from private channels and the challenge of cross-frontier transmissions.

If pursued, this new role for broadcasting would entail the review of the present institutional framework and of the terms under which both independent and state-run broadcasting operate. In other words, this would mean the re-organization and rationalization of public broadcasting, as well as the establishment of restrictions on the operation of commercial television. It could also involve the establishment of a network of regional stations which could provide access to different social groups and organizations both at the local and national level. New media technologies, such as FM radio and cable television, could also provide new channels of communication for different social groups.

Undoubtedly, the relationship between broadcasting and politicians in Greece has a long way to go before it stabilizes. The fluidity of the present situation, both regarding political forces as well as broadcasting institutions, makes any prediction as to what the characteristics of this future relationship are going to be difficult. However, judging from the importance that politicians have attached to the function of broadcasting institutions so far, it is not an exaggeration to suggest that future policy on radio and television will reflect the real intentions of the Greek political elites regarding the development of democracy.



## **Future research**

This thesis has concentrated on the historical development of Greek broadcasting institutions and their relationship to the political process. Although we have tried to be as comprehensive as possible, the length of the period under examination has imposed some limitations on the scope of this analysis and on the number of aspects of the operation of broadcasting discussed. Therefore, we have thought it useful to suggest possible future lines of inquiry which would to a considerable extent complement our own. Three in particular seem highly relevant.

The first area of research would concentrate on the internal organization of different broadcasting companies. In particular, the emergence of independent radio and television stations provides material for a comparative study of role allocation and patterns of behaviour within both the state-run and independent broadcasting organizations. Especially, a lengthy study inside the news departments of different companies would enrich our knowledge about the principles, priorities and ethos of public and independent broadcasters. The tradition of inquiry on the sociology of broadcasting institutions which has developed in Britain could be usefully employed as the basis for research into the Greek broadcasting organizations<sup>3</sup>.

A content analysis of programming and particularly of news programmes would be another line of research which could complement our own. A methodical analysis of radio and television news content over a specific time period during different phases of the history of Greek broadcasting organizations could be used to exemplify, or even to falsify, some of the necessarily impressionistic conclusions about news content contained in this thesis. Unfortunately, the absence of adequate archive data renders this a very difficult, if not impossible task. However, current news output could provide the

basis for research on news values and more generally on the ideological role of broadcasting in Greek society. Once again, in Britain there is a significant tradition of inquiry into the content of news programmes which could provide the framework for such a study<sup>4</sup>.

Finally, a third line of inquiry could involve a comparative analysis of the historical evolution of broadcasting and its role in the political communications process in Greece and in other countries which have had a similar tradition of partisan political control over broadcast output. In particular, the countries of Southern Europe, and especially Spain and Portugal, seem to invite such a comparison for a variety of reasons which include: their simultaneous transition to democracy, consequently the comparable stages of democratic development, and the similarities in their socio-economic development. Of course, one should not underestimate the difficulties which could be caused by the possible lack of adequate data regarding the historical evolution of broadcasting in these countries. If realized, however, such a study could broaden our knowledge on the political systems and cultures of developing democracies and help us understand whether similar patterns of socio-economic development lead to similar attitudes vis-a-vis broadcasting, or whether other factors also influence these countries' broadcasting policies<sup>5</sup>.

These constitute three areas which in the light of our work require further research. The three proposals are intended only as examples of the kind of work that a media student can engage him/herself in and in no way exhaust all the possibilities. The area of political communications, and more generally of mass communications, in Greece is a goldmine for those who wish to learn and understand more about Greek society, its institutions, its values and its living patterns. It is hoped that this thesis has been a modest contribution to furthering

the understanding of the institutional evolution and role of broadcasting in the political development of Greece.

#### NOTES

1. For political developments in Greece after the electoral defeat of PASOK in June 1989, see: Ch. LYRINTZIS and I. NIKOLAKOPOULOS (eds): Elections and Parties in the 1980s: developments and prospects of the political system (in Greek), Themelio, Athens 1990.
2. D. RUSTOW: Transitions to Democracy: towards a dynamic model, in Comparative Politics, April 1970, p. 358.
3. See T. BURNS: The BBC: Public Institution and Private World, Macmillan, London 1977; P. SCHLESINGER: Putting 'Reality' Together, first published in 1978 and reissued by Methuen, London and New York 1987; M. TRACEY: The Production of Political Television, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1978.
4. See GLASGOW UNIVERSITY MEDIA GROUP: Bad News, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1976 and More Bad News, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1980. Also, H. DAVIS and P. WALTON (eds): Language, Image, Media, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1983.
5. For the validity of such a comparison, see the arguments of G. PRIDHAM: Comparative Perspectives on the New Mediterranean Democracies: A Model of Regime Transition? in G. Pridham (ed): The New Mediterranean Democracies: Regime Transition in Spain, Greece and Portugal, Frank Cas, U.S.A. 1984. On Spanish Broadcasting, see E. LOPEZ-ESCOBAR and A. FAUS - BELAU: Broadcasting in Spain: A History of Heavy-Handed State Control, in West European Politics, vol 8, no. 2, April 1985, special issue on Broadcasting and Politics in Western Europe, edited by R. Kuhn, p. 122-136. Also, for the spanish media in general see R. GRAHAM: Spain: Change of a Nation, Michael Joseph, London 1984, p. 228-248.

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Eleftherotypia  
Exormissi  
Kathimerini  
Machi  
Messimvrini  
Ta Nea  
To Vima  
Vradyni

**MAGAZINES**

Aion  
Anti  
Chronos  
Eleftherotypia  
ENA  
Optocoakoustiki  
Radiotileorassi  
Scholiastis  
To Dentro  
World Broadcasting

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**LIST OF INTERVIEWEES**

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- Argyropoulos Christoforos:** former ERT-1 Chairman, interviewed 8.9.1988
- Chrysochoou Achileas:** YENED/ERT-2 Editor-in-Chief, interviewed 8.1.1987 and 16.1.1989.
- Delipetros Nikos:** former Director General of ERT-1, interviewed 14.1.1988.
- Hakkas Nikos:** former EIR/EIRT radio announcer, interviewed 16.12.1986.
- Houndas Kostas:** Editor-in-Chief of ERT-1 news, interviewed 12.1.1988.
- Karzis Theodoros:** former ERT head of news, interviewed 13.1.1988
- Katrivanos Theodoros:** former deputy Mayor of Athens, interviewed 13.1.1988.
- Linardatos Spyros:** EDA representative in the 1986 inter-party committee for television, interviewed 28.12.1986.
- Maganias George:** member of POSPERT, interviewed 21.1.1988.
- Mathiopoulos Vassos:** former ERT-1 Director General, interviewed 18.1.1989
- Papageorgiou Efthymios:** former EIRT television newsreader, interviewed 16.1.1989 and 8.1.1990.
- Protheroe Alan:** former BBC head of news, interviewed 5.9.1989.
- Sotiriadis Nikos:** former ERT-1 Deputy Director for programming, interviewed 22.9.1988.
- Spicer Joanna:** Specialist on BBC administration, interviewed 14.8.1989.
- Synadinos Dimitris:** former ERT Deputy Director for Administration, interviewed 12.1.1988.
- Vallindras Marios:** former Deputy Director General of ERT interviewed 20.1.1988.



**Yiombazolias Makis:** former head of ERT-1 Current Affairs Dept,  
interviewed 21.9.1990.

**ESIEA-Administrative Council:** reply to questionnaire submitted  
by the author, 12.9.1988.

## **APPENDICES**

NAME	DURATION OF OFFICE
I. Petmezas	July 1945-January 1946
K. Dimaras	January 1946-April 1946
P. Sifnaeos	April 1946-December 1946
I. Bettos	December 1946-December 1947
D. Svolopoulos	December 1947-March 1950
C. Tsigantes-Svoronos	March 1950-March 1953
I. Alexiades	March 1953-May 1954
G. Kokkolas	May 1954-July 1955
I. Bettos	July 1955-December 1955
E. Apokoritis	December 1955-April 1957
V. Aslanides	April 1957-January 1958
V. Schmidt	January 1958-February 1959
A. Margaritis	February 1959-April 1959
S. Spyromilios	April 1959-March 1961
I. Bettos	March 1961-April 1961
K. Bastias	April 1961-November 1963
E. Stasinopoulos	November 1963-April 1964
A. Peponis	April 1964-August 1965
V. Aslanides	August 1965-October 1965
G. Dafnis	October 1965-May 1967
I. Anastasopoulos	May 1967-December 1970
K. Ploumbis	December 1970-September 1971
K. Mitrellis	September 1971-December 1973
I. Karaiosifoglou	December 1973-August 1974
D. Horn	August 1974-November 1974
A. Vlachos	November 1974-December 1975
I. Lampsas	December 1975-February 1978
K. Hondros	February 1978-August 1981
N. Delipetros	August 1981-October 1981
G. Romeos	October 1981-February 1984
D. Katsimis	February 1984-July 1984
V. Mathiopoulos	July 1984-September 1985
G. Kontogiorgis	September 1985-November 1985
T. Halatsis	November 1985-January 1987
N. Sifounakis	January 1987-July 1988

**Appendix 1: Directors General of EIR, EIRT, ERT and ERT-1, 1945-1988**

**Appendix 2: Biographical Notes of Directors General and Chairmen of EIR, EIRT, ERT-1 and ERT-2.**

**APOKORITIS EVANGELOS.** Born in 1897 in Amphilochoia. Major-General, professor at the Military Academy (1925-1937), military advisor in the Balkan Committee of the U.N. (1945-1951). Director General of EIR, 1955-1957.

**APOSTOLOPOULOS SOULIS.** He studied Engineering and Economics. He worked as manager in several companies and was appointed as advisor in the Ministry of Finance by PASOK. He was then appointed as Chairman of ERT-2 (1982-1984). After his resignation he was transferred to the state-owned company ITCO which dealt with imports and exports. After a scandal regarding the import from Yugoslavia of corn that was later exported in the EEC as Greek, he resigned in December 1986. He kept on holding, however, similar positions in other state-owned companies. In 1990 he was put on trial for the "corn scandal" and found guilty. He is currently serving a prison sentence.

**ARGYROPOULOS CHRISTOS.** Born in 1937 in Lamia. He is an Athens lawyer. During the 1967-1974 dictatorship he defended in martial courts several members of the anti-junta resistance. He is a member of Law societies and other scientific groups and also, Chairman of the Independent Peace Movement. Chairman of the Board of ERT-1, 19-9-1985 to 29-11-1985.

**BASTIAS KOSTIS.** Born in 1901 in Ermoupolis. He worked as an author and journalist in several newspapers since 1923. During 1947-1949 he was cultural attache in the Greek Embassy in Washington. He was Director General of EIR (1961-1964).

**BEIS KOSTAS.** Born in 1933 in Athens. He holds a Law doctorate and is a professor at the University of Athens. He has written

several legal monographs and he runs a monthly procedural law review. He was Chairman of the Board of ERT (1981-1983).

**BETTOS IOANNIS.** Born in 1898 in Ioannina. He was Director of the Foreign Ministry's Press Office (1948). A journalist, he was appointed several times as Director General, Chairman and Vice-Chairman of EIR (1946-1947, 1955-1957, 1961).

**CHONDROS CONSTANTINE.** He was a veteran pilot in both military and civil aviation, with a distinguished record. He held the post of Director in Olympic Airways for 16 years. He was appointed Assistant Director General at ERT in 1977 and Director General in 1978. He held this position until 1981.

**DAFNIS GRIGORIOS.** Born in 1909 in Corfu. He was a journalist and political editor in Athens newspapers. He was also a lawyer and Director of the Athens Press Agency in 1963. He was Director General of EIR (1965-1967).

**DELIPETROS NIKOS.** He is a lawyer. During the German occupation he published several magazines for the resistance. He worked between 1948 and 1951 as a political editor in the radio. During the EK government he was appointed Director of the Department of Social Security. He was sacked by the dictators in 1967 and fled to Paris, where he published an anti-junta magazine. After the dictatorship he became a member of ND and was appointed General Secretary of Press and Information (1978). He held the post of Director General of ERT from August to October 1981.

**DIMARAS CONSTANTINE.** Born in 1904. He studied literature and became an author. He worked as a journalist and a literary critic. He held the post of Director of Programming at EIR (1945-1946) and was Director General in 1946.

**DIMITRAKAKIS CONSTANTINE.** Born in 1883 in Trichonis. Chairman of the Legal Council of the State (1949-1954) and Minister of Justice in 1958. He was Chairman of the Board at EIR in 1949.

**FOKAS DIMITRIOS** (1886-1966). He was an officer in the Greek Navy during the Balkan Wars and the First World War. He left the Navy in 1935 as a Vice-Admiral. He was a member of the Athens Academy and Chairman of the Board at EIR (1945-1946).

**GEORGANTOPOULOS E.** He was an officer of the Port Police and professor at the Higher School of Industry. During 1984 he was Chairman of the Board at the ERT-1.

**GOUNARAKIS CONSTANTINE** (1895-1953). He was professor of electronics and electronic communication at the Athens Technical University. Between 1948 and 1949 he was Chairman of the Board at EIR.

**HORN DIMITRIS.** Born in 1921 in Athens. He was an actor, one of the best talents in Greek theatre. He is a conservative and a friend of ex-King Constantine. He held the post of Director General of EIRT from August to November 1974.

**KATSIMIS DIMITRIS.** He is a journalist and worked as Press Officer at the Greek Embassy in Lisbon. He was the first Director of the ERT's News Department under PASOK. From February to July 1984 he was Director General of ERT-1. In Summer 1988 he was appointed advisor to the Undersecretary of Press.

**KONTOGIORGIS GIORGOS.** Born in Levkada in 1947. He is a lawyer, with studies in Political Science, Sociology and History (doctorate from Paris University). He is a professor of Political Sciences at Pantios University in Athens. He held the post of Director General of ERT-1 from September to November 1985.

**MATHIOPOULOS VASSOS.** He is a journalist with experience in broadcasting since the time he had been working in West Germany. He was Director General of ERT-1 during the period 1984-1985. After leaving ERT-1 he became Press Officer at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and resigned from this post in early 1988.

**PANAGIOTOPOULOS IOANNIS.** Born in Aetolikon in 1901. He worked as a literature teacher in the secondary education and was a well-known author. He was Chairman of the National Theatre for ten years. He held the post of Chairman of the Board at EIRT (1974-1975).

**PAPACHATZIS GEORGIOS.** Born in 1905 in Chalkida. He was a lawyer and professor of Administrative Law at the Pantios University. He was Chairman of the Board at EIR (1966-1967).

**PEPONIS ANASTASIOS.** Born in 1924. Manager and producer at EIR during 1945 and 1950-1951. When EK was in government (1964) he was appointed Director General of EIR. He established the Demotic language in the radio news and started the Experimental Television station. During the period 1967-1974 he was imprisoned and sent in exile. In January 1984 he became Minister without portfolio responsible for broadcasting, a post he held until July of the same year.

**PESMAZOGLOU STEFANOS.** Born in 1901 in Athens. He was a journalist and publisher of the newspaper PROIA. He held the post of Chairman of the Board at EIR during the period 1946-1947.

**ROMEOS GIORGOS.** Born in 1934 in Corfu. While studying at the School of Economics and Commerce he worked as a journalist. In 1959 he joined the Athenian daily TO VIMA. In 1971 he was held in a military prison for a year because of his activities against the junta. From 1976-1978 he held the post of Vice-

President at the Union of Journalists of the Athenian dailies. He was Director General of ERT-1 (1981-1984). He is currently a Euro-MP for PASOK and deputy Speaker of the European Parliament.

**SOFRONOPOULOS GEORGIOS.** Born in 1894 in Patras. He worked in the financial sector of the civil service and became Minister of Finance in 1963. He held the post of Chairman of the Board at EIR from 1957 to 1964.

**SPYROPOULOS GEORGIOS.** Born in 1896 in Piraeus. He was a judge, and vice Chairman of the Council of the State. He held the post of Chairman of the Board at the National Broadcasting Organization. He was Chairman of the Board at EIR (1964-1966).

**STASINOPOULOS EPAMINONDAS.** Born in 1900. He was an army officer and an author. He was Director General of EIR (1963-1964).

**STASINOPOULOS MICHAIL.** Born in 1903 in Kalamata. He was a distinguished lawyer and professor of Administrative Law in the Pantios University. In the caretaker governments of 1952 and 1958 he held ministerial posts. He was Chairman of the Board at EIR during 1951-1954 and 1966. He became the first President of the Republic after the change of the regime in 1974.

**STAVROPOULOS MICHAIL.** Born in 1901 in Larissa. He was a lawyer, and Chairman of the Legal Council of the State. He held the post of Chairman of the Board at EIR (1967-1970).

**SVOLOPOULOS DIMITRIOS.** Born in 1899 in Kalamata. He was a journalist and historian. He was Director General of EIR (1939-1941 and 1947-1950).

**TSIGANTES-SVORONOS CHRISTODOULOS.** Born in 1897 in Romania. He was an army officer and fought in the Middle East during the Second World War. He had a brilliant career and left the army



as Major-General. He worked as a military editor in several newspapers and held the post of Director General of EIR from 1950-1953.

**VASSILIKOS VASSILIS.** Born in Kavala in 1933. He studied law and television before turning to writing. He published works in all literary forms: novels, short stories, essays, articles, poetry and plays. He became internationally famous with his book "Z" and his work has been translated in 20 languages. After his return to Greece in 1974 he worked as a regular member of the editorial staff of Athenian dailies. He was appointed to the post of Assistant Director General at ERT-1 in 1981 by the PASOK government. Vassilikos has made a record by Greek broadcasting standards: he was the only appointee who was not sacked or forced to resign. He left ERT-1 after the end of his contract in 1984.

**VLACHOS, ANGELOS.** A retired career diplomat, whose appointment as Director General of EIRT caused a fierce reaction from the opposition which accused the government of appointing to the Broadcasting Institute a junta collaborator. Vlachos had served as temporary Undersecretary at the Ministry to the Prime Minister in 1967 and as General Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during Ioannides office, after November 1973.



GREEK RADIO PROGRAMME.  
A.I.S. BROADCASTING.

ATHENS

Weekly Radio Programme.

MONTH.


Date	From.
	To.

[illegible]

NOTE for alterations :-

Appendix 3: Open schedule plan of the Greek Radio Programmes, 1945. In the announcers' jargon it is also called 'Sentoni' (Bed sheet) because the original was rather huge. Apart from the Greek, there were programmes for the British and French troops stationed in Greece, as the different flags signify (from the archive of N. Hakkas).



23.50 24.10 *Ελληνική*  
 1460P, 1047P, 1460P, 1047P, 1915P, 1543P, 1545P.  
 8-5-45.  
 6-45. *Δουρα*  
 7. *ΑΝΑΚΟΧΗ*  
*ΠΑΝΕΛΛΗΝΙΟΣ ΕΟΡΤΑΣΜΟΣ*  
*ΑΝΑΚΟΧΗΣ*  
  
 PAX  
 8-5-45.  
 16.50 16.45 *Σιδίον, ΚΡΣΑ.*  
 16.45 17.20 *Σερβική*  
 147B, 6431A, 162A, 194A  
 194B, 216A, 212A, 216B, 220B  
 227A, 3654B, 2139, 31A  
 2140.  
 17.20 17.30 *Γαλλική*  
 17.50 17.45 *Α.Ι.Σ.* 15'  
 17.45 *Σχολική*

Appendix 5: Letter sent to the head of EIR's news service D. Chronopoulos by the British Commander of the A4 Army Broadcasting Unit (from the archive of N. Hakkas).

SUBJECT: STUDIO DISCIPLINE.

A4 ARMY BROADCASTING UNIT,  
ATHENS, CMF.

REF A4/MISC/8.

21 JUL 45.

DEAR

*D. Chronopoulos*

1. I FEEL IT MY DUTY TO BRING THE FOLLOWING FACTS TO YOUR NOTICE.

2. EVER SINCE WE BEGAN USING STUDIO 6 FOR OUR EVENING TRANSMISSIONS, THE RADIO ATHENS 7 TO 7.15 PROGRAMME HAS ALWAYS BEEN BROADCAST FROM THAT STUDIO—THUS SAVING TIME AND LABOUR, AND ALSO KEEPING UP THE CONTINUITY OF THE PROGRAMMES.

LAST EVENING, HOWEVER, SOMEONE, FOR NO APPARENT REASON, DECIDED THAT THIS 15 MIN. PROGRAMME SHOULD BE BROADCAST FROM STUDIO 1, OMITTING AT THE SAME TIME TO INFORM US, WITH THE FOLLOWING RESULTS.

3. AT 7 O'CLOCK PRECISELY, BY THE CLOCK IN THE STUDIO, MY CORPORAL, WHO WAS PRESENTING OUR 6.30 TO 7 O'CLOCK PROGRAMME, CLOSED DOWN OUR PROGRAMME, ~~AND~~ SINCE THERE WERE NO MEMBERS OF RADIO ATHENS PRESENT WITH THE NEXT PROGRAMME CONCLUDED, VERY RIGHTLY I THINK, THAT THERE HAD BEEN A SLIGHT HITCH, AND ANNOUNCED THAT THE NEXT PROGRAMME WOULD BE A FEW MINUTES LATE BUT THAT IN THE MEANTIME HE WOULD PLAY RECORDS. THIS HE DID, UNTIL THE ARRIVAL OF ONE OF YOUR STUDIO ENGINEERS, WHO INQUIRED AS TO THE WHEREABOUTS OF THE GREEK ANNOUNCER AND ENGINEER. MY CORPORAL REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW, WHEREON THE ENGINEER WENT AWAY, RETURNING SHORTLY AFTERWARDS WITH THE INFORMATION THAT THE PROGRAMME WAS BEING BROADCAST FROM STUDIO 1.

4. THE AFFECT ON THE AIR, AS YOU WILL NO DOUBT HAVE BEEN TOLD BY THE PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR MONITORING YOUR PROGRAMMES, WAS TO SAY THE LEAST OF IT A LITTLE 'RAGGED'.

5. I WAS MONITORING THE PROGRAMME IN MY OFFICE, AND HEARD MY CORPORAL CLOSE DOWN THE PROGRAMME, APOLOGISE FOR A SLIGHT DELAY, BUT THAT IN THE MEANTIME HE WOULD PLAY A CERTAIN RECORD. THIS HE DID, AND IN THE MIDDLE OF THE RECORD THERE WAS A SHARP 'CLICK'—COMPLETE SILENCE FOR AT LEAST A MINUTE, AND THEN THE GREEK ANNOUNCER CAME ON AND OPENED THE NEXT PROGRAMME.

6. I FEEL SURE THAT YOU WILL AGREE WITH ME THAT THIS UNFORTUNATE INCIDENT COULD HAVE BEEN QUITE EASILY AVOIDED, IF ONLY SOMEONE HAD ADVISED US OF THE CHANGE OF STUDIOS.

7. THERE ARE TWO FURTHER POINTS THAT I WOULD LIKE TO MENTION ON THE SUBJECT OF STUDIO DISCIPLINE. THE FIRST IS THE SUBJECT OF LIGHT SIGNALS. AT THE MOMENT ONE IS LIKELY TO GET ANY OF THREE TYPES OF SIGNAL. THE FIRST, THE CORRECT ONE, IS THE RED LIGHT FLICKERED FOR THIRTY SECONDS, FOLLOWED BY A STEADY RED LIGHT. THE SECOND, THE INCORRECT ONE, IS A WARNING WHITE LIGHT FOLLOWED BY A STEADY RED, AND THE THIRD, WHICH IS ALSO INCORRECT, AND MOST UPSETTING, IS A STEADY RED LIGHT WITHOUT ANY PRIOR WARNING. COULD STEPS PLEASE BE TAKEN TO SEE THAT ALL THE ENGINEERS KNOW AT LEAST ONE OF THE ABOVE METHODS, AND THAT THEY ALL USE THE SAME METHOD. THE FIRST IS THE CORRECT METHOD, AND I RESPECTFULLY SUGGEST THAT THAT BE THE METHOD USED. FINALLY, COULD STEPS BE TAKEN TO SEE THAT ALL THE CLOCKS IN THE STATION ARE CORRECT, AND FURTHER THAT THEY AGREE WITH ONE ANOTHER. I AM WILLING TO ASSIST IF YOU SO DESIRE IT, IN ANY WAY POSSIBLE, SINCE IT IS IN OUR OWN INTERESTS AS WELL AS YOURS.

8. MAY I ASSURE YOU ONCE AGAIN OF OUR WILLINGNESS TO CO-OPERATE IN ANY WAY POSSIBLE, OUR MAIN AIM IS TO HELP TO RAISE THE STANDARD OF PROGRAMMES BROADCAST FROM THIS STATION, AND IT IS WITH THIS IDEA UPPERMOST IN MY MIND THAT I HAVE BROUGHT THESE FACTS TO YOUR NOTICE.

I REMAIN,

YOURS (SINCERELY,

*James G. Sneyd*

O.C. A4 ARMY BROADCASTING UNIT,  
ATHENS.

8 KENSINGTON COURT PLACE  
LONDON W 8  
937 7646

25th April 1975

Mr. P. Lambrias  
Ministry of Press and Information  
Zalacosta Street  
ATHENS  
Greece

I write to send my most sincere thanks to you for the opportunity which you gave me to study EIRT and to consider its future programme development. I am most grateful for the time that you gave to me to discuss my work: and to everyone in your Ministry and in EIRT who received me so kindly and gave me so much information. My visit was an experience which has left me deeply interested in the future of television in Greece.

As you know, I left with your Office on 14 April a report in which I attempted to offer to you some observations and suggestions. I found that these could not go as far or offer as much positive information as I would have wished. In the immediate situation, before a new constitutional basis is created, for television in Greece, I believe that a number of steps can be taken towards a new character for EIRT, if EIRT Management has a united purpose and will to do so. I also believe that when a new constitution has been created, this united purpose and will continues to be the essential requirement for the development of a National Broadcasting service. These beliefs are I hope expressed in my report. What I can mention only to yourself is my anxiety that this essential consensus of purpose does not at the moment exist in the Directorate of EIRT. It is normal in broadcasting organisations that strong differences of opinion should exist among senior officials on policy, programme and organisation subjects = but it is ~~axiomatic~~ <sup>axiomatic</sup> that discussions take place to air the differences and arrive at a consensus, so that action follows which has a firm basis of mutual confidence and support. It is my fear that this process is not occurring in EIRT = and its absence means ~~a weakness~~ <sup>a weakness</sup> in central policy. In this situation it is not easy to make proposals for the future.

I was fortunate to have a long meeting with Mr. Vlachos on the last evening of my stay - after my report was written - when I was able to raise a number of policy subjects. I learned of the creation of a Programme Committee, composed of two members of the Board with the Director General